Advancing U.S. Interests in Iraq Will Require More Than Airstrikes. [Michael Sing]

In ordering limited airstrikes in Iraq, President Barack Obama has reluctantly become involved in a crisis he wished to avoid. Given that Iraq’s leaders seem too diverted by thepolitical turmoil in Baghdad to address the grave threats to their country, one can perhaps understand his hesitation. Nevertheless, his narrow goals for the U.S. airstrikes–providing humanitarian relief and protecting U.S. personnel and facilities in Erbil and Baghdad from the extremists known as the Islamic State–carry their own risks.

U.S. personnel in Iraq must be protected–rather than evacuated, as their counterparts in Libya recently were–because they are there in service of strategic American interests, which President Obama has not enumerated but rightly hesitates to forsake. But advancing these interests will take more than stop-gap measures.

For one thing, while airstrikes appear to have allowed Iraqi forces to regroup, they may ultimately prove insufficient to roll back the Islamic State’s advances. The U.S. approach also leaves the initiative to the extremists; U.S. forces would go idle if the group pauses its advance, shifts its focus to consolidating its hold over the territory it has seized, or ratchets up terror attacks and sabotage in areas it does not control.

The president’s approach also fails to treat the Islamic State as a threat to the entire region. It has advanced in Syria, attacked Lebanon, and poses risks to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. These forces brutally oppress the populations under their control, including Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis who do not share the group’s extreme ideology.

So why define the U.S. mission so narrowly?  The announced policy appears to be a compromise between two options debated by analysts and officials since the Islamic State took control of Mosul in June. The first approach was to withhold military support until a new, more inclusive Iraqi government was formed; this would, the thinking went, avoid removing incentive for Iraq’s Shiites to take a more conciliatory approach toward Sunnis and Kurds (and thus would avoid the U.S. appearing to take sides in Iraq’s sectarian dispute).

The alternative was to use military force to set back the Islamic State sooner rather than later in order to halt Iraq’s descent into sectarian conflict–which would make political compromise more elusive–and to persuade Iraqi Sunnis that politics, not the Islamic State, was the right vehicle for redressing their grievances.

The Islamic State’s rapid advance led the Obama administration to split the difference: order airstrikes, but on very narrow terms, in hopes of halting the extremists and buying more time for Iraqis to form a new government, while withholding broader military support in order to keep the pressure on Iraqi Shiites to compromise. This is a familiar pattern for President Obama: When presented with policy options A and B, he tends first to delay and ultimately to choose parts of each.

But a compromise between two policy options is not necessarily a viable course of action. And advancing U.S. interests will require a more robust, proactive strategy, steps such as aid for Syrian rebels and the Kurdish peshmerga and a broader effort to cripple the Islamic State behind which the U.S. can rally regional and international support.

Michael Singh is managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 2005 to 2008, he worked on Middle East issues at the National Security Council.

Kidnapping Europeans: The main income source for al-Qaeda

In its early years, al-Qaeda received most of its financing from affluent donors from the Middle East, but counterterrorism officials now believe the group finances a significant portion of its recruitment, training, and arms purchasing from ransoms paid to free Europeans.

“Kidnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant source of terrorist financing,” said David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in a 2012 speech. “Each transaction encourages another transaction.”

In 2003, al-Qaeda’s kidnapping operations brought in roughly $200,000 per hostage; today,terrorists can fetch up to $10 million per hostage, of which a large portion goes to al-Qaeda’s central command in Pakistan. “Kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil,” wrote Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, “which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.”

According to HomeLand Security News Wire Al-Qaeda’s three main affiliates — al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in northern Africa; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen; and al-Shabab, in Somalia — are driving most of the kidnapping business, of which they practice common kidnapping protocols.

Trained kidnappers working for, or as, al-Qaeda affiliates tend to target Westerners visiting or working in northern and eastern Africa. The New York Times reports that upon kidnapping the victims, the terrorists make contact with their home countries via media outlets or directly through an embassy, confirming the kidnapping and later requesting a ransom for the release of their victims.

A review of the history of kidnappings by al-Qaeda during the past decade shows that European countries are more likely to answer ransom demands, leading many U.S. counterterrorism officials to blame the thriving terrorism business on the willingness of European countries to pay ransoms.

Boko Haram (1)

Troops moved swiftly at the weekend to regain Borno State town Damboa from Boko Haram insurgents. In the process, troops killed 50 insurgents and lost two soldiers.

The troops survived five ambushes to reclaim the town which had been held by the insurgents for about one month.
The Special Forces and more troops have been deployed in Gwoza where more than 150 people had been killed by the insurgents, it was gathered.

National Security Adviser (NSA) Col. Sambo Dasuki has said that the government had blocked all the source of fund for Boko Baram, thereby making it difficult for the sect to get funding for its nefarious activities.

The Defence Headquarters has also said neither soldiers nor their wives could reject deployment to Gwoza and the Sambisa Forest.

The protest in Maiduguri on Saturday by wives of some soldiers was being regarded as “indiscipline.”
According to a top military source, who gave insights into how Damboa was reclaimed, said: “The troops survived five deadly ambushes by the insurgents to recapture Damboa, Delwa, Mustafari, Manga, Wanga and secure all routes leading to these places.

“We have completed the mop up operation in Damboa and environs. So far, the troops succeeded in killing 50 insurgents and lost two of their colleagues.
“Many arms and ammunition were also recovered from the insurgents including vehicles and  anti – aircraft RPG.
“We are doing our best to restore normal life and business activities to these areas. The target is to clear the areas completely of insurgents and ward off further threats.”

On Gwoza where over 150 had been killed, the highly-placed source added: “Special Forces have been sent to the  Emirate, including surrounding hill tops.
“We will dislodge the insurgents from the town within the next one week. “The reality is that the insurgents had been taking advantage of the terrain in Gwoza to abduct, maim and kill innocent ones. The battle of Gwoza is expected to cover a lot of air strikes.”

There were indications yesterday that the Defence Headquarters has said that soldiers or their wives cannot reject posting to either Gwoza or Sambisa Forest.
Another military source said: “The soldiers or their wives cannot turn down deployment to Gwoza or Sambisa Forest or anywhere there is a security challenge.

“We are going to engage in massive deployment of troops to these places and other flashpoints in the country. Contrary to insinuations, our troops are well-kitted because we know that curtailing insurgency requires being sufficiently armed.

“What the wives of some of the soldiers did in Maiduguri at the weekend was strange to military ethics and orientation. Right from the time of enlistment, it is made clear that no soldier can reject posting.
“The so-called protest amounted to indiscipline in the Armed Forces., we will not condone such.

“Maybe some of the wives of these soldiers need more orientation and enlightenment. We will not hesitate to guide them accordingly.
The source added: “There is no Army General that has not paid his or her dues by serving in frontline zones or managing security challenges. All our Generals are tested.”

The National Security Adviser(NSA) said the nation’s educational system will be overhauled in the light of the security challenges facing the country.
He said the recent abduction of Chibok girls had compelled the government  to place the protection of schools high on national security agenda.

Dasuki made the submissions in a paper at the Nigeria Security Summit at Harvard University, Cambridge, in the United States.
He said: “When we started to deal with the Boko Haram threat, our laws were not so clear on a number of fundamentals. Through the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013, significant progress has been made.
“It has allowed us to not only define terrorism, but block avenues of financing for their activities while putting in place structures to deal with our current threats. This has included the establishment of a Counter terrorism Centre and, working with key stakeholders, we have developed a National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST).

Dasuki said the nation’s educational system will be overhauled to serve our current security and economic interests.
He said: “Further to this, the threat that we face has drawn our attention to the need to overhaul our educational system. We are struggling with an educational system that does not currently serve our security, political and economic interests and as we revisit our national security policy, education has remained a top priority.

While we grapple with education reform to ensure the right kind of education is available for all, the recent abduction of girls from their school in Chibok has compelled us to place the protection of schools high on our national security agenda.
“Working with traditional institutions, community based organizations and the police, local governments must be proactive in building community resilience and good governance.

“It is time we leverage on our democratic processes to increase access to decision making for a majority of our citizens. Inclusive, non-discriminatory and participatory governance is more likely to detect discontent before it erupts.
“The goal of politics must be to lift our people out of poverty and provide them with the enabling environment to compete favorably.
“This may not eliminate the possibility of misguided individuals or groups rising up against the nation, but will address some of the underlying factors leading to recruitment into groups prone to violent extremism.
“We must also address environmental pressure from climate change that results in increased competition for limited natural resources, leading to increased herdsmen, farmer conflicts, inter-ethnic and communal clashes.
“The youth bulge is both a challenge and an opportunity which the federal government has recognized and initiated programs to increase job opportunities.

“Insurgents seek to force fundamental changes on society, operating with impunity; they violate all decent human values in an effort to draw a commensurate response from authorities. Terrorists win when states respond to their attacks in ways that are incompatible with their values.
The NSA assured that Nigeria will abide by international practices in curtailing the prevalent insurgency.
He said the Armed Forces had been undergoing a series of training on human rights.

A NEW PKK THROUGH REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

For the last two decades, PKK’s Area of Operations in Turkish Territory was divided into 12 regions. They also held some large territories with winter bases and multiple strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan which provided them sort term shelter and logistic deployment before launching guerilla operations inside Turkish territory.

Since the beginning of bilateral peace process between Turkey and PKK; media sources and PKK experts claim that Black Sea-Amanos-and Mardin groups, as well as some 100-200 fighters from Hakkari groups are withdrawn until the midst July, which suggests a group of 250 to 300 strong. Also, according to Turkish security and military officials, total number of militants who left Turkey is about 150 to 200. Since the Turkish Ministry of Interior records indicate the approximate number of PKK in Turkey is somewhere around 2000 to 3000, it will not be wrong to argue that PKK did not leave Turkey and has shown no indication that they’re willing to do so.

Different PKK leaders at different interviews spoke out that PKK will not lay arms permanently but Imrali’s call for cease-fire and withdrawal will be honored despite their distrust to AKP Government; stating PKK will continue to act as a regional actor and strengthen its troops, to be able to “help Kurds in trouble areas wherever their assistance is needed”. Recent clashes on September and November 2013, between PKK’s Syria affiliation PYD and Anti-Assad resistance groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusrah (JN) in Syria’s northern towns of Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal Abyad, Al Azaz, Hasakah and Jarabulus confirm this comment. According to FSA web sites and Kurdish media in Iraq; PKK’s Amanos, Mardin and Black-Sea Groups of approximately 150-250 strong, who were withdrawn from Turkey on August 2013 and positioned in the northern Kurdish towns of Syria, were responsible for these attacks.

MAP-1     PKK in Turkey and Iraqi-Turkish Border before Peace Process

Recent Changes in PKK’s Restructuring and Its Possible Effects on the Region

The news about a major change within PKK management in July 2013 was a surprise for Turkish public. One of the co-founders of PKK, Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal), an experienced fighter and unconventional warfare expert, who has been heading the PKK’s General and Executive Council   (KCK-Koma Ciwaken Kurdistan- Union of Kurdish Communities) for 3 years was assigned as the new Commander in Chief of HPG (PKK’s Armed Wing) and left his post to another PKK co-founder Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma) and Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat). PKK announced Cemil Bayik and Hulya Oran as co-chairs of the Executive Council and adopted a two-chaired management for the first time in its 39 year-old history. The illegal armed group took the decision with a 162-delegate congress on Qandil Mountain on July 9.

Some PKK Analysts argue that, it was Ocalan who personally planned the whole power change by writing letters, advising and consulting the names with the organization. It is known that there has been continuous exchange of correspondence between Ocalan and the PKK leadership. Ocalan wrote letters and guidelines separately to PKK’s women sub-committees, to European posts and to KCK leaders in Qandil. In his last letter to the Executive Council, he shared his views and proposals for a necessary leadership change in some critical levels of the organization and pressured for Bayik and Hulya Oran’s assignment as co-chairs, as well as Karayilan’s take over the military wing.

The General Council which will function under imprisoned Ocalan is announced to be managed by 6 members; Cemil Bayik-Hulya Oran-Murat Karayilan-Mustafa Karasu-Nuriye Kesbir and Elif Pazarcik, and for the first time in PKK history, 3 women were assigned to the council.

As for other changes taken at the six-day "general meeting" on northern Iraq's Qandil Mountain; hawkish military figures Peyman Huseyin (aka Bahoz Erdal) and Nurettin Halef Al Mohammed (aka Nurettin Sofi) were assigned commanding positions under Murat Karayilan while two prominent figures and PKK co-founders Ali Haydar Kaytan (aka Fuat) and Duran Kalkan (aka Abbas) were assigned to more passive coordination posts due to their age and claimed health conditions.

All these mentioned changes are regarded as an important step to support the ongoing peace process by containing or pacifying the well-known hard-liners within the organization but with Karayilan as the Commander in Chief of the PKK military; with Peyman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd and classmate of Bashar Assad, who has been acting as deputy commander in chief of HPG and running PKK’s Special Operations branch Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) and Nurettin Sofi, another Syrian Kurd who was Amed and Botan Regional Commander with some 2000 militants and HPG Executive Committee member; the new military structure of PKK does not fit in a picture for a permanent peace process, but just the opposite. It can be evaluated that by assigning strong military figures in critical command positions, PKK is positioning itself both for establishing permanent gains in Syria and Iraq and for the aftermath of the ongoing peace process with Turkey, whether it meets their expectations or not. Should the proceedings fail, Turkey might face a stronger, fresh, more crowded and a more dynamic PKK.

Insight of PKK’s new Leadership assignments

1. The new chairman of the PKK’s executive council (KCK) Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma) is known for his close ties with Iranian Intelligence and Iran’s border paramilitary Pasdaran command. Despite being one of the five co-founders of PKK and commanding PKK units in some small scale fights in 1980s, Bayik was not a dedicated fighter like Karayilan was, but he proved himself being an accomplished planner and a diplomat that he was able to build a bridge with Iranian intelligence agency VEVAK in 1990s. Intelligence experts believe that his ties with VEVAK also provided some level of communication with Iraq’s Shite leadership, too. Analysts believe that his status as the co-chair might help PKK and PJAK to ease tensions with Iran and promote an alliance with Assad Forces against Syrian opposition.

2. Co-Chair Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat) is a Turkish Alawite Kurd from Tunceli’s Hozat province, who joined the PKK ranks in 1994 right after her graduation from Kayseri High School and participated in numerous fights against Turkish security forces. She acted as Women’s Battalion Commander and Deputy Chief of Qandil Training Center. Her past experience in PKK’s women division YJA Star and Women committees makes her an iconic figure to promote PKK sympathy especially among Kurdish women and Alawites in Turkey and Syria. According to Turkey’s Alawite Organizations and Alawite Cultural Foundations’ comments, Hulya Oran’s new position within PKK is expected to focus on Alawite populations’ cultural and basic human right problems through PKK’s regional frame-works and philosophy. Also Turkey’s PKK experts explicate her function as controlling the PKK Units in Dersim Region, which is a vital base for organization’s recruitments and military operations.

                                                                                                                                             

3. General Council’s new female member Nuriye Kesbir (aka Sozdar Avesta) is an ethnic Kurd from Mardin province who was born in to a family with Yezidi faith. She was an activist who worked for PKK’s European offices and Kurdish Young Women’s Movement (Komalen Ciwan) from 1990s to 2001. According to Turkish Security officials she can speak fluent German, English, intermediate Dutch, and she was also working for PKK’s Europe Chief Zubeyir Aydar, assisting PKK’s Germany and Netherlands offices’ political activities/demonstrations until her arrest by Holland Police in The Hague in 2001. Following her release, she joined the PKK ranks in Qandil in 2006 and acted as political advisor to executive board and also women’s committee member, which makes her an important figure for organization’s Europe strategy and policies.

4. Other female member Elif Pazarcik/Ronahi (pseudonym) is also a Turkish Alawite Kurd from Maras/Pazarcik province who joined PKK in 1980 at an early age of 16 as an activist, arrested and released by Turkish Security in 1981, 1988 and 1990 until her attendance to PKK camps in northern Iraq in 1991. She actively served as service personnel, unit fighter, and troop commander and managed Women’s High Committee (Koma Jinen Bilind) from 2008 to 2013. Her election to General Council with Oran and Kesbir indicates a new era for PKK management with women in decision making process. PKK experts and analysts evaluate this change not radical but a belated effort because this new woman dominated showcase will likely to change the bad image of their texture.

5. Mustafa Karasu (aka Huseyin Ali or Avaresh) is a Turkish Alawite from Sivas/Gurun province who is also one of the co-founders of PKK. He is well respected among PKK’s ethnic fighters with Alawite roots and also known as a grim politician and doctrinaire rather than a fighter. Before Ocalan’s arrest and imprisonment he served in Central Committee in Bekaa Valley and carried out envoy duties with Iranian intelligence from 1993 to 1999. He is known with his close ties with Turkish Marginal Leftist organizations such as DHKP-C and Dev Yol in 1990s and believed to be capable of influencing currently active leftist armed groups for mutual benefits. DHKP-C connections in Syria might bring some level of Assad government’s support to PKK/PYD and Karasu is believed to be playing a major role in such a relation.

6. Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal) is a Turkish citizen from Sanliurfa/Birecik province. He is one of the founders and the most prominent figure of PKK. Founding PKK in 1978 with Abdullah Ocalan in Ankara, he planned and commanded organization’s first military operations, coordinated recruitment and training efforts, inspiring from Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung wrote a dozen guerilla manuals and pioneered the adoption of new military techniques and tactics through-out the PKK ranks during 1990s. When it was vital for PKK to abandon Syria, just a few months before Ocalan’s fleeing to Russia, it was Karayilan who organized and established Qandil region as a permanent base by coordinating with Talabani’s PUK and Barzani’s PDK.  He performed lead positions within PKK’s constantly changing structure. Being an experienced fighter with big influence in PKK substructure, his last assignment as Head of People’s Defense Committee (HPG) which is PKK’s Military Structure, may be evaluated as a sign to coordinate, tidy up and unite PKK troops for an oncoming war and determination to prevent any undesired military operations that can be launched by remote groups, dispersed from Turkey, Iran, Iraq to Syria.

Political Intentions

Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Ocalan announced from Imrali, that PKK and Syrian Kurds should support whoever claims to be ready to give Kurds’ demands. In different media interviews, both Murat Karayilan from Qandil, and Head of PYD Saleh Muslim mentioned the importance of a political recognition, highlighting that Kurds were ready to govern themselves and would take necessary measures to protect their territory.

Saleh Muslim commented on PYD intentions to declare a limited autonomy on July 2013, and on November 11, 2013 PYD management announced the establishment of a regional government in Rojava (referring Kurdish populated northern Syria region). Creating a lot of turbulence and anger both from Turkey and Barzani’s Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, PYD’s plans are still intact and in progress.

With Cemil Bayik’s assignment as co-leader, there had been some important developments within PKK intra- ranks as well as diplomatic connections. Bayik started with major changes in the PKK media organizations, removing some high level officials closer to Murat Karayilan on December 5, 2013. Those officials removed by Bayik-Hozat include Ahmad Deniz (Head of PKK External Relations Committee), Roj Willad (PKK’s website Firat News editor in chief), Deyari Qamishlo (PKK Media Supervisor and Head of the Syrian Relations Committee), Havel Damhat (Qandil Chief Coordinator) and Haqi Hawal (Head of Iran and PJAK Media Unit.)

Following the PKK’s 2013 convention and high level management change, Karayılan’s wing is claimed to be in decline, and has been excluded from some decision-making posts within the PKK. “These changes are internal and not related to any conflicts within the PKK, they’re related to the party structure,” said Zagros Hiwa, the member of PKK foreign relations committee and predecessor of Ahmad Deniz for Head of External Relations Committee.

These changes shouldn’t only be acknowledged as “pacification” of Karayilan supporters, but also as significant indicators for PKK intensions to promote strong diplomatic and organizational cadres in Syria, Iraq and Iran; which Kurdish media sources claim that, Ahmad Deniz and Deyari Qamishlo (pseudonyms) have been assigned as liaisons and coordinators to Syria’s PYD and they are claimed to be assisting/directing PYD’s Saleh Muslim to take necessary measures to format the future Syrian Kurdistan’s manifesto and management principles according to the design and decisions given by the Qandil management.

According to media news of Iraqi Kurdistan, Havel Damhat and Haqi Hawal (pseudonyms) are also acting as negotiators to establish some level of diplomatic connections between PKK, Bagdad and Iran, to further possible assistance to PYD, in their local scale fights against Syria’s radical resistance groups like Al Nusrah and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, as well as supporting Assad’s military operations as a force multiplier.

Peyman Hussein and Nurettin Sofi are two other actors, who should be regarded highly important for PYD/PKK’s cooperation with the Assad Regime; because of the fact that they’re both Syrian Kurds with close ties to Syrian’s Baathist officials as well as intelligence agency “Al Muhaberat” since the early 1990s.

According to Kurdish media reports, both figures left Qandil sometime on November and stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan’s western border close to Simalka-Al Qahtaniya region to be able to contact and consult with PYD and Assad liaisons, at least for a few months. Considering PKK leadership has left Syria in 1999 closing its permanent facilities and training camps in Bekaa Valley on Syria-Israel border, this alleged “come-back” indicates serious intentions for building new bridges with Syrian regime.

Given the facts that Peyman Hussein and Bashar Al Assad were classmates for one year at Damascus Medical School in 1987 and used to have some level of dialogue, also both Peyman and Nurettin Sofi are known to be PKK’s effective tools for communicating with Syrian Baath Party officials to develop strategies against their mutual enemy “Turkey” back in 1990s; this new PKK positioning may be evaluated as a serious effort to establish beneficial relations with Syrian government and a long-term efficient organization within Syria’s Kurdish Rojava region.

Challenges and Controversies

1. Turkey

Since the first month of the bilateral peace process, Turkish authorities have been complaining about PKK’s unwillingness for a major withdrawal and their activities for strengthening military bases in Qandil region, referring a significant increase in joining PKK ranks as of May 2013. PKK confirms the increase in new recruitments, by publishing new Guerilla Graduation Ceremonies through their web sites.

Visa versa, PKK has been opposing Turkish efforts for building new water dams, along with transforming old military and gendarme posts and stations to much sophisticated strongholds, by building new military installations (KALEKOL) on the Iranian and Iraqi border, as well as on the areas that control PKK routes in southeast of Turkey.

Turkish Ministry of Defense announced that KALEKOL project, which was initiated in September 2010, is designed to host 50 to 100 military personnel, with high level protection as well as superior fire power. Main Contractor Company TOKI delivered 114 KALEKOLS to Army and Gendarme units throughout Turkey’s eastern and southern border since 2012, and is expected to deliver another 166 KALEKOLs at Iraq and Syrian border region no later than May 2014.

Following the declaration of the bilateral peace process, between September and December 2013; PKK units attacked three KALEKOL construction sites in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces, destroying the machinery and kidnapping contractors. In addition to these incidents, PKK’s militant youth organization Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDGH) demonstrated road blocks and check-point police operations in Sirnak, Cizre and Hakkari provinces of Turkey which created a lot of public anger and criticism among the government ranks as well as Turkish intellectuals who have been supporting the peace dialogues since the beginning.

Turkish government confirms that PKK, using the peace process for its benefit, has reached out a serious threat level in terms of military readiness, recruitment and re organization of the fighter troops and political establishments not only in Turkey, but also in Syria and Iraq.  

2.  Syria

According to the Turkish and Kurdish media news, approximately 300 PKK fighters are transferred to Syria’s northern towns, , mainly Kobani (Ayn Al Arab), Derik (Al Malikiyah) and Afrin regions, both from Turkey and Iraq. In addition, it’s also claimed that another 200 to 250 fighters are moved from Qandil to temporary bases in Northern Iraq’s mountainous region, to be able to reinforce and support PKK units positioned in Syria. 

Military analysts and media reports mention that Syria’s Kurdish dominated northern towns of Ayn Al Arab (Kobani), Afrin, Al Malikiyah (Derik), Tal Abyad, Azaz and Jarabulus are substantially controlled by Kurdish groups, especially PKK/PYD.

Intelligence reports and some media news mention that PKK established some level of reconnaissance units equipped with off-road dirt bikes, 50 cal. long range sniper rifles and machine gun mounted Toyota Pickups. The same sources mention about PKK efforts to maintain telecommunication systems through-out Syria, which is expected to provide two-way and more secure communication with Damascus, Qandil leadership and fighter units in the region, since US and Turkish counter intelligence efforts are highly capable of intercepting PKK’s current telecommunication. These developments indicate the existence of serious efforts for strengthening PKK armed groups in Syria and establishing more capable combat-ready troops derived through local population, supported with experienced PKK units, through-out the Syria’s northern sector, for a wide scale urban warfare.

Major clashes on September and November 2013, between Kurds and Anti-Assad resistance groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusrah (JN) and ISIS in Syria’s northern towns of Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal Abyad, Al Azaz, Hasakah and Jarabulus can be accepted as serious indicators for the upcoming term, yet ISIS and PYD are still trying to control Qamishli and Ras Al Ayn, two border towns with high volume of trade and business opportunities.

So far, Qandil’s threats have not been actualized yet no clashes are reported between PKK/PJAK and Iranian Security forces since September 2013. PJAK’s Head of Foreign Relations, Shamal Beshir talked to European media sources on December 2013, stating that Syria is prone to be the next battle ground for Al Qaida; PJAK is willing and ready to support Syria’s Kurds with every tool within their capabilities. His explanations are interpreted by military and policy analysts, as cooperation offer to Iranian government to support Assad regime by isolating and pacifying extremist Sunni groups within Syria.

MAP-2        PKK’s Military Concentrations on Syrian-Turkish Border

3. Iran

Iran and PKK relations have been dire for almost a decade and the main reason behind this conflict was PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan), an offshoot of PKK, based in Iran’s eastern territories. PJAK announced its establishment in 2004 and since then it’s been fighting against Iranian military units, mostly deployed on the Iran-Iraq border’s rural areas.

Intensified Iran pressures on PJAK’s military activities are at its lowest levels since June 2013. But, although both sides have agreed upon a cease-fire on August 2011, Iran and PJAK had attacked each other on small scales, until both sides found a common ground in Syria, for supporting Assad regime.

On May 2013, following his arrest and release by German Police, Abdurrahman Haji Ahmedi (PJAK Political Leader, a German citizen living in Hamburg) commented about two high level PJAK members’ arrest by Iranian security forces; stating that the rise of transnational jihadists in Syria is a threat for the region and warned Iran stop attacking Kurds, highlighting that Jihadists were mutual enemy for both Kurds and Iranian Government.

Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani, who took office on August 2013 initiated a new and promising era in terms of human rights, freedom and tolerance. But despite his positive start, he did not hesitate to approve the hangings of two PJAK members; Habibollah Golparipour and Reza Mamadi, who were captured and sentenced to death in 2009. Both men were hanged on October 2013 and PJAK officials in Qandil immediately declared that the executions will not go unanswered, threatening Iran with major retaliation.

4. Iraq

For the past few years, Turkey has been trying to grant Iraqi Kurdistan and Barzani a pivotal role as a Kurdish symbol of political progress in the region. The Erbil Agreement and the Kurdish National Congress were both red lines for Turkey, but Ankara welcomed them because they happened under Barzani’s patronage.

On the other hand PKK; by engaging in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s complicated politics and supporting the Iraqi Kurdistan’s opposition party GORRAN(Change Movement) is attempting to suppress Barzani, while stirring local criticism of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These PKK interventions are unlikely to alter the status quo in the Iraqi Kurdistan region however they are fueling political fragmentation and creating additional challenges to regional stability.

GORRAN became popular as a Kurdish nationalist party that seeks to remove Barzani from office while pressing for a parliamentary and not presidential system for the region. Following the regional elections held on September 2013, which resulted with 2 year-old party’s unexpected victory in Suleymania region; GORRAN leader Nawshirwan Mustapha announced his support for the PKK and affirmed the PYD as the representative of the Kurds in Syria, posing another direct challenge to Barzani and the KDP. The PKK-GORRAN alliance also is based on shared concerns about Turkey’s regional power and the need to isolate Erdogan’s influence efforts over Iraqi Kurds and in Syria.

In response to the PYD’s unilateral steps to leading Syrian Kurds, Massoud Barzani, the KDP leader and president of Iraqi Kurdistan, called on all other Syrian Kurdish political parties to gather in Erbil. The result of the gathering was unifying all the pro-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) parties under one umbrella called the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is a member of the Syrian National Coalition, which opposes President Bashar al-Assad. It has accused the Democratic Union Party (PYD) for supporting and siding with Assad regime. To avert any possible armed conflict between the KNC and the PYD, a meeting was held in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil under the auspices of Barzani. The two sides agreed to cooperate on the ground, establishing the High Cooperation Council.

According to the agreement, the two parties share all responsibilities in the Syrian Kurdish territories, but the agreement has so far failed to achieve its goals. In meetings with US and European officials, KNC leaders have labeled the PYD as a “gang that belongs to the PKK,” which they listed as a terrorist organization.

On December 2013, KRG agreed to supply Turkey with oil through a pipeline in a landmark deal that Baghdad considers illegal and refused to approve. Maliki Government stressed that the quantities of Iraqi oil exported to Turkey must be known to the central government, oil must be sold at international market prices, and revenues from oil sales must be channeled to the account of the Iraq Development Fund in New York, in line with previous U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Furthermore, oil is not the sole apple of discord between KRG and the Central Government. Kurdish territorial claims on Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninawa regions, which are also prominent oil-rich grounds-, seem to cause further tensions between two groups. 

Assessments for 2014

Syria is a new and promising front for PKK to initiate its military and political goals.  While Assad is turning the face of the war to Al Qaeda elements and radical groups, Syrian resistance and its weak political structure SNC (Syrian National Coalition) is losing both credibility and popularity, which give PKK a chance to implement its political agenda for Rojava Region.  If they can isolate and secure the northern Kurdish regions, they are capable of cultivating and administering necessary measures to promote a new Kurdish government, with or without Assad’s approval.

Syrian resistance groups are dispersed and a unified command structure is almost impossible. Free Syrian Army (FSA), sponsored by Turkey, is losing influence giving away a serious number of its troops to Islamist and radical groups. Turkey is also very concerned about the emerging power of both the jihadists and Kurdish militia forces in Syria. By maintaining a direct connection to compliant Syrian rebel groups, Ankara can try to play different rebel factions against each other in an attempt to minimize the jihadist and Kurdish separatist threat. As operations intensify across the Turkish-Syrian border, the risks of clashes between Turkey and the Syrian regime, transnational jihadists or the advancing YPG Kurdish militia remain very real. Sharing a vast border with a destabilized Syria, Ankara cannot hope to completely isolate itself from Syria and can only take measures to diminish the risk. A Turkish operation against PKK /PYD units is said to be on the table, but Erdogan Government will probably want to see the results of the ongoing peace process before deciding for action.

2014 Geneva meeting’s success to unite Syrian opposition is important but doesn’t seem to be promising. Kurds agreed to send delegation to Geneva as KNC representatives and PYD is expected to join the talks. PYD’s active support for Syrian resistance may turn Assad against Kurds in the north which will result in losing the gains for PKK and PYD.

Iran will support PJAK and PKK for fighting against Al Qaida affiliated Sunni groups.  Also Tehran government might give a green light for establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdish region within Syria in the future, if Assad fails to advance in his fight against insurgency. But this will not mean a major policy change against PJAK activities in Iran.

This Article has been published by IHS Jane's on May 2014.

The Emergence of Political vs Radical Islam in Syria and Ba'ath Party's Effect on the Radicalization (PART-1)

The official emergence of a political Islam in Syria is almost dated with the birth of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in 1945. Some historians date the Syrian Ikhwan's foundation to the emergence of the politically active Islamic societies (Jamaats and Jamiats) in 1920s, the term following the break-up from the Ottoman Empire.

It is not wrong to argue that Syrian Ikhwan's foundations are found in late Ottoman Syria when from 1860 to 1914, tha Salafiyya movement reached Damascus and became so influential in local public and Islamic circles, that it would later shape the Ikhwan's reformist and moderate agenda between 1946 and 1969.

Historically; Salafiyya movement sought to reform Islam from within, in order to give Arab world the resources deemed necessary to confront the challenges of Western domination and containment. The Salafism, which would emerge out of this trend was, primarily intellectual and political in its aims, and peaceful in its means.

History of Islamic Sects and Societies in Syria (1838-1945):

Most of the historians and Middle East experts agree that Syria’s religious awakening starts with their pan-Islamic, nationalist efforts to get rid of French occupation in 1914s, a term followed by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence and its inspirational influence throughout the Levant region. While 1945 marks the official birth of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan), its intellectual roots can be traced back to decades earlier, in which during the Ottoman era of 1860 to 1914, the Salafiyya movement reached its heights in Damascus and became so influential in local Islamic circles, that it would later shape the Ikhwan’s religious reformation agenda between 1946 to 1969.

The initial prominent figure for the birth of Syria’s religious clergy was an Egyptian, Jamaladdin al-Afghani (1838-1897), who called for the unification of the “entire” Umma” –the world wide Muslim Community- advocating a pan-Islamic nationalism which rests in the Prophet’s teachings. What Afghani eventually sought was, to reform Islam by promoting a return to the practices of “Salaf”(the great Ancestors or Caliphs) who succeeded Prophet Mohammed at a time when Islam was rising. The path that leaded to Caliphs’ way of ruling was called or known as Salafiyya/Salafism and Syria was one of the best places in the Middle East to offer accommodation to the teachings of Salafiyya Movement.

Ibn Taymiyya of Damascus, a prolific scholar (Ulama) in Islamic history was able to unite the followers of two different Islamic views; Sufism (a mystical and relatively moderate branch that seeks the divine unification and oneness with Allah the God) and Salafism ( which proposes to follow Prophet’s and Caliphs’ way of living; ”Sunnah”), by inviting them to unite under the flag of “jihad” or holly struggle against the unbelievers, infidels as well as the invaders throughout the Islamic regions, from Algeria to Syria.

Sufism had a wide variety of branches since the Ottoman era, and these differential sects were distinguishing themselves with their rituals (zikhir) and other means of extra worshipping methods and customs, from daily Islamic rituals, which caused Sufism regarded as heretic by the mainstream Islamic institutions and society.

                                      

The proposed Salafi-Sufi unity agreed on a consensus that Islam was work and action (amal), not controversy or argument (jedal); Islam teaches reliance to God as the primary rule of action (tawakkul), not passive resignation (ta’waqul); and above all; Muslims’ purpose is God, constitution is Quran, and their sole leader is Prophet, final path is jihad, eternal wish is martyrdom. None of these matters were arguable for quiet moderate Sufi scholars, since they were pointing out the very basic essence of Islam. Sufism specifically in Levant region; which used to expound the jihad “as one’s inner and spiritual war against the evil that shelters within him”, wandered off its ancient philosophy and came to terms with Salafiyya’s more radical definitions for Islamic principles.

Keeping the jihad as an important part of the Islamic unification; Damascus kept sheltering influential Islamic societies; such as Jamiat al Gharra (1924), Jamiat al Hidaya al Islamiyya (1937), Jamiat al Ulama (1938),and Ikhwan Al Muslimin (1945). And during this period, Syria was sheltering two main Sufi Nakshibandi sects’ Haznevi and Qadiri branches.

Religion and Policy in Syria through 1950s

1920s were a time of intense change in Syrians’ daily lives. France dominated Syrian political life during the mandate period (1920-1946) and the challenge to this foreign rule aroused strong anti-colonial resistance against Western influence on Islamic values as well as Arab culture. Many Syrian Sunnis were startled by enforced secular norms which in their eyes threatened the Islamic traditions. In addition, there were shortages and economic difficulties mostly compounded by soaring inflation, disrupting the traditional social fabric of main trade cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia and Deir Al Zour. Because of these effects, the emergence of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in 1946 was pretty much the outcome of country’s economic condition, as well as its sociological, religious and political landscape.

Owing its name to its Egyptian sister organization; Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood (Jamiat Al Ikhwan Al Muslimin) was born out of the personal ties and religion based concerns developed by Syrian Islamic scholars with Brotherhood’s Egyptian founder Hassan Al-Banna during their religious studies at Cairo’s Al Ahzar University. Upon finishing their education and return to Syria; Mustapha Al-Sibai and Mohammed Hamid played an important role to establish religious organizations (Jamiat) with political agendas, until Sibai announced the foundation of Syria Ikhwan in 1946.

Mustapha Al Sibai

At the time of Ikhwan’s creation, Syria had just gained independence from French Mandate and parliamentary had been restored by President Shukru Al Kuvvatli of the Syrian National Bloc, which had led the struggle against French. The National Bloc was dominated by urban businessmen and landlords, wishing to carry out a liberal reformist agenda, to be able to provide a less painless transformation process.

Kuvvatli’s inability to effectively deal with the creation of the state Israel in May 1948, Syria’s defeat in the subsequent Arab-Israeli war provided fertile ground for the emergence of the new parties, and leftist, nationalist as well as religious trends rapidly found body in Syria’s political structure.

Shukru Al Kuvvatli, Syrian President from August 1943 to April 1948

Akram Al Hawrani, mobilized peasantry in his home town of Hama, where his Arab Socialist Party rapidly became influential actor at local and national level. Michael Aflaq and Salahaddin Al Bittar, founded the Ba'ath (Resistance) Party which originally centered around the idea of Arab unity before giving it a populist and socialist spin by allying Hawrani's socialist forces in 1953.

Akram al-Hawrani, was a Syrian politician who played a prominent role in the formation of a widespread populist, nationalist movement in Syria's Arab Socialist Party and in the rise of the Ba'ath Party.

Repeated student strikes and the defeat against Israel in 1948 war quickly led to a serious deterioration of political atmosphere, creating an anti-American and anti-Semitic Arab world view, which resulted in allying with Soviet Block, along with continuous coups', starting with Colonel Husni Al Zaim's disbanding all political parties in March 1949 military coup.

Created in 1940s as a reaction to the French Mandate in Syria, Ba'ath was a purely intellectual movement emphasizing Syrian national struggle for independence in pan-Arab terms.Led by a Christian, Michael Aflaq and a Sunni, Salahaddin Al Bittar, it assumed a political nature only after the independence when they started to publish Al-Ba'ath Daily in 1946. Initially the main ideological force behind Ba'ath Party's emergence in Syrian politics, was its insistence on the existence of an Arab Nation whose historic legacy would give the Arab World strength, if united, to face the challenges of Western Imperialism. Uniting against Imperialism, naturally brought a warm welcome to socialism, which culminated in the emergence of an Arab Socialism inside the manifesto of an Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in 1953.

In reality; throughout the 1940s to 1950s the radical parties that emerged on Syria's political scene, all strove to emphasize their commitment to a fairer social structure, which would benefit the "lower middle classes" frustrated by a growing distinction between Syrian rich elites-privileged class. While Syrian Communist Party -whose sole purpose of foundation was an attempt to cherish Soviet Republic- naturally emphasized its communist ideology, the Ba'ath insisted on its own brand of Arab Socialism, and the Syrian National Socialist Party put forward a national-socialist ideology. Muslim Brotherhood had also tainted its dis-ideology with a degree of left wing rhetoric, putting up candidates for election under the platform of "Islamic Socialist Front".

The doctrine of Islamic Socialism- put forward by Mustapha Al Sibai (Red Sheikh) in his Ishtirakiyyat al Islam (People's participation of Islam)- represented the Syrian Brotherhood's first attempt at articulating an Islamic Way different from western or eastern values, which also is adopted by Ba'ath founders.In the early context of the Cold War, the Muslim Brotherhood 's Islamic Socialism and its attempt to strike a middle ground between capitalism and communism meant that it had to walk a fine line between rejecting West while not completely embracing the USSR, which favored UN Partition Plan for Palestine in November 1947 and enjoyed a distinctive popularity among the Arab Nations. The Syrian Brotherhood considered that enemy of the West Imperialism was a friend of the Muslims and therefore the USSR and its policies should be supported.


Ba'ath Party's Emergence as a Lead

Created in 1940s as a reaction to the continued French presence in Syria, the Ba'ath Party was at first a purely intellectual movement emphasizing Syria's nationalist Arab struggle. Led Michel Aflaq and Salahaddin Al Bitar, Ba'ath assumed a political nature, only after they start publishing Daily Ba'ath newspaper, following the granting of independence in 1946. With the popularity of the paper, they assumed first national congress in 1947 and became a political movement. Progressively, elements of socialism were integrated into its revolutionary pan-Arab rhetoric and this culminated the birth of the Arab-Socialism , in which its exemplified by Ba'ath's 1953 merge with Akram Al Hawrani's Arab Socialist Party.

Ideologically Baathist wanted to draw a line between the Russia inspired communism and Tito inspired Arab Socialism. Politically and tactically the alliance with Al Hawrani's peasant movement reinforced Ba'ath's appeal across Syrian societies especially in rural areas.

By 1954 The Brotherhood had decided to give up most of its political activities in a historical decision, which would affect the movement's organization capacity to stand for an election. The Syrian Ikhwan had suffered repression early on, when Husni Al Zaim declared, after his December 1949 that, he would first destroy the Communist Party, before turning to Muslim Brotherhood.Under Al Zaim's short rule, the brotherhood was outlawed and steps were taken to limit it influence. 

Husni Al Zaim (Syria's President from April to August 1949)

While Ikhwan members turned back into politics after Al Zaim's overthrown, their participation into Syrian politics only lasted a few years, till Colonel Adib Shishakli's November 1951 coup.

Colonel Adip Shishakli

Shishakli taken over most of the institutions, and his dictatorship lasted on February 1954,with the effects of Egypt's General Abdel Nasser's popularity. Growing popularity of Nasser in Egypt and across the Arab world, coincided with an increase over Muslim Brotherhood repression. This repression coming from the Arab world's most popular leader, put the Syrian Ikhwan in a delicate situation. While condemning the pressure over Brotherhood, they were not able to criticize the General Nasser, to avoid the risk they may face.

In 1952, Al Sibai was arrested and Shishakli's authoritarian rule for  3 years accounted for Ikhwan's decision to shrink from politics and turn into neutral areas like education and social work. Ikhwan's decision to temporarily retreat from politics was also most prominently affected by the situation in Egypt. The growing popularity of Gamal Abdel Nasser across the Arab World coincided with a dramatic increase in Muslim Brotherhood's government repression, which caused the dissolution of the organization in 1954 and imprisonment of its leader Hassan al-Hudaybi, who had succeeded Hassan Al Banna upon his death.

The repression faced by the Brotherhood at the hands of Arabs' rising star Nasser, put the Syrian Ikhwan in a delicate situation. While they could only condemn Nasser's harsh measures against Brotherhood, they had to tone down critiques of the Nasser regime due to the risk of loosing Arab support for the cause in progress.

Egyptian Hassan Al Hudaybi, during his imprisonment by Nasser, 1958

In this perspective; staying out of politics was a way for Syrian Ikhwan to avoid taking an opposition stance against popular Nasserism. For Mustapha Al Sibai, this however did not mean that members of Syrian Ikhwan were supposed to be distant from the upcoming elections, as long as this was accomplished on an individual basis, not involving the "movement". Thus; while Syrian Brotherhood did not directly participate in the 1954 general elections, Ikhwan sympathizers like Muhammed Al Mubarek and Maruf Al Dawalibi ran as independents and were elected for the Parliament. Similarly; Al Sibai also ran independently as Damascus candidate in 1957 by-elections but lost to Baathist Riyadh al Maliki.

In 1958, Syrian government asked Nasser to accept a merger between Syria and Egypt for establishment of a United Arab Republic (UAR). Syrian Ikhwan accepted a union which ideologically it was a way to commit pan Islamism and pan-Arabism. Syrian Brotherhood was also one of the few important groups that did not participate in the break up of Syria-Egyptian Union, when a dynamic civilian-military coalition orchestrated Syria's recession from UAR in September 1961. And on March 8 1963, a group of Baathist and Nasserist officers carried out a coup d'etat defeating Nasser. This was a historical turn which would profoundly affect Syria's political and social instructions for the next 45 years.

Baathist Revolution and the reaction of the Islamic Groups

The political, ideological and influential struggle between Syrian Ikhwan and Syrian Baath which came to dominate Syria between 1963-1982 was often portrayed by the regime, as a struggle between modernity and religious fanaticism.Although the Islamic opposition carried out a naturally ideological dimension, the roots of the clash were much more complicated. The ideology of re-shaping Syria had not only been unsuccessful in mobilizing the masses, but had in fact, failed to unite the people on a unified cause.

While the sectarian problems emerged with Salah Jahid's ascent to power in 1966 or the advent of Hafiz Al Assad's rule over Syria in November 1970; the roots of Islamist opposition against Baath can be traced back to 1950s.

By identifying Islam with Arab nationalism, the Baathist ideologue hoped to convince Arabs that embracing secularism did not mean rejecting religion, which was also a visible well-structured case in Turkey and Turkish politics, who had been trying to settle and implement of Kemal Ataturk's envision for a Turkey unified with Western values.

To religious Sunni community the Baathist ideology was a harsh betrayal of the very essence of Islamic doctrine. The same controversy however, had been the source of a big dispute among Islamic sects and groups, since the diversion of Ali's caliphate in 700 ac, pawing the way to the emergence of Kharijites (Hariciler) , which could be a main topic of a different study.

The troubles causing public unrest started in April 1964, with a campaign of agitation by Friday prayer leaders who delivered inflammatory speeches against seculars and Baathist regime. While street riots spread through most Syrian cities, they focused heavily on Hama, a stronghold of religious conservatism, where they took a violent dimension, shaping city's hatred for the regime for decades, till today.

According to Abdel Halim Khaddam, Governor of Hama, who would rise to the vice presidency later, the troubles began where 3 local  teachers were transferred to  Deir ez Zoor due to their anti secular political views. The demonstrations gradually raised to a brutal dimension when a Baathist militia man was killed by the angry crowd, triggering fierce government retaliation.

After the mediation of Sheikh Muhammed Al Hamid, a respected well known religious scholar, a negotiated solution had been found to end the 29 day long crisis.

At the time, Baath party line was still influenced by its historical founders such as Michael Aflaq and Salaheddine Al Bitar, who would temporarily assume the premiership after Hafez Al Assad in the future. Although they were secular, most of them were not Sunnis and therefore had respect for other religious traditions. However; as the balance of the power among religious communities inside the Syrian Army progressively changed in favor of minorities like Alawites, so did the orientation of the Syrian government. The regime soon became dominated by military originated men, whose minority and rural background gave them a more radical stance. Their ascent to power culminated in General Salih Jadid's coup in February 1966, after which the regime started be referred as neo-Baath, - a term defining the radically left-wing socio-economic policies adopted by Syria from 1966 to 1970.

General Salah Jadid

PART-2 will continue with The Radicalization of Syrian Islamic Groups