Putin Aims For Global Recognition with His Eurasia Plan

In a recent conversation about the Ukraine crisis German Chancellor Merkel reportedly told President Obama that "Putin is living in another world"..seeking to explain Putin's seemingly reckless actions. Other commentators have found him irrational. Yet for the past few weeks, Putin has been the master of the game, unleashing surprises, creating facts on the ground, defying Westerns sanctions, astounding all with the audacity of his nationalistic agenda and ambitions. Contrary to the Merkel's remark, we must operate in this world. So we should make an effort to understand and analyse Putin and his mind-set.

Western leaders inhabited it until a few decades ago; Asian leaders still play by its rules. It's the world of geopolitics, of great power competition, tailored to Russia's peculiar circumstances. Moreover; to students of Russian History, Putin is a familiar figure, heir to century long tradition of Russian strategic thinking, what Russians called "the great power school" of international relations.It's grounded around four key ideas.

(1) Sovereign states are the central actors in world affairs, as they have been since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Private companies, NGOs and other non state entities are not autonomous actors pursuing their own parochial interests, but rather instruments of state power.

(2) Conflicts are inevitable because sovereign states, by their very nature, seek to enhance their power and prestige, in competition with another.

(3) Hard power is the coin of the realm, in a world of disharmony and conflict.

(4) Only great powers can truly pursue independent foreign policies. They are by definition, the few countries that determine the structure, substance and direction of global affairs.

In line with this thinking; Putin has devoted himself, since he rose to power 14 years ago, to restoring Russia as a great power, after the humiliation of 1990s. "For the first time in the past 300 years" -he wrote as he assumed power-, "Russia is facing a real threat of sliding to the second even third echelon of world states. We are running out of time to counter this threat. We must strain all intellectual, physical and moral forces..."

The path to restore the greatness, in his agenda, was grounded in the Russian idea of a mix of patriotism, power, statehood and social solidarity. In his first two terms as president, Putin rebuilt a centralized state and engineered an economic recovery. For the past several years, he has focused on regenerating Russia's hard power by;

• steadily increasing defense spending
• modernizing military
• establishing Division level rapid reaction forces and
• forming a new Special Spetsnaz army.

With the annexation of Crimea; he has boldly declared an end to 35 years of geopolitical retreat, which began with Brejnev's ill fated invasion of Afghanistan and shaken with his effort in 2008,to deter Georgia's Abkhazia policies. There was nothing irrational in this approach and no effort to hide his goals. No one should have been surprised, as Putin moved step by step in fulfilling his desire on Ukraine, even if his success has been greater than anyone would have predicted in 2000.

For the West, the question is how far Putin intends to press Russia's geopolitical advance. Are there any geographical limits to his plans...Here too, Russian tradition offer some clues.

Russia lies on the nearly Eurasian plain, a vast expanse stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific. Strategic depth is essential to its security. Consequently Russian leaders have sought to push borders as far away as possible, from the Russia's heartland centered on Moscow. Russia's expansion has ended not so much when it ran into defensible physical barriers as when it came up against countervailing powers like Germany-Austria-Poland in the west; China in the east; and Anglo-Saxon powers of Britain, United States in the south. Those powers defined Russia's strategic space.

Today the former Soviet space, with the exceptions of the Baltics and Russia itself, is a region of fragile states, corrupt elites and pervasive poverty that offers little resistance to a dynamic Russia. It was not like this so long ago. In the years after Soviet collapse, Moscow watched with growing concern as outside powers, first of all US, and non-state forces, especially radical Islamic groups penetrated into the region, eroding Russia's presence and threatening its security. Until Putin began to rebuild the state however, Russia did not have the will and wherewithal to resist or counter this pressure.

Two events in 2004, -Chechen attack against a school in Beslan in north Caucasus; and the orange revolution in Ukraine- linked the various threats together in Putin's mind and drove home the dimensions of the challenge. The Beslan School attack persuaded him that the United States was using counterterrorism as a smoke screen for geopolitical advance, because it was not above using what he saw as Chechen terrorists "to bite off a juicy pie" of Russia, as he put it in an interview. The Orange Revolution made the link in his mind between America's democracy promotion and its geopolitical advance into Russia's strategic space. Indeed; he thought that event was a dress rehearsal for Washington's plans over Russia itself. In response, Putin began to elaborate a coherent policy, combining military-economic and soft-power instruments to counter American policies and reassert Russia's primacy across the former Soviet space. There followed sharper albeit largely covert competition in Central Asia; gas wars against Ukraine and Georgia; the seizure of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from -a regional US ally- Tbilisi in 2008; and annexation of Crimea. 

In 2011, Putin announced his long-term ambition, to draw all the former Soviet states into a Eurasian Union, which Russia would dominate due to its economic and military superiority. Ukraine is now the central and the most essential battlefield for this vision, for without Ukraine the union makes neither economic, nor strategic sense, given the Ukraine's great potential and strategic location between Europe and Russia.

The way to stymie Russian expansion is not by denying visas and freezing assets of Russian officials, business associates. The US and West's current approach tells to public that they've caught off-guarded and did not have any preventive or deterrent strategy against Moscow. National security always trumps economic well-being, in Putin's world. Rather; history indicates that the way to stop Russia is to organize regions along its periphery. The West has already done that in Eastern Europe and Baltics, now safely anchored in EU and NATO ranks, although the states there, will require reassurance and continued support for deepening integration into European institutions.

But Ukraine, like Moldova and Caucasian States, teeters on the edge of becoming a failed state. Consolidating it as a modern state is an enormous task, requiring wholesale replacement of a predatory elite that has sabotaged economic development. (According to IMF, Ukraine's economy as grown by about a quarter since 1992, while Russia's has more than doubled.) Putin is betting that the West lacks the resources, the vision and the patience to consolidate Ukraine. He believes that history is on his side since he's been asserting and politically preparing Ukrainians for some time. This is his most important advantage.

-----By Thomas Graham----------------------------------------------------------------

Expected Developments

NATO-Ukraine relations were built up on a "Distinctive Partnership" level since 1997.  NUC (NATO Ukraine commission) helped to reinforce a practical cooperation, NATO supported some initiatives in Ukraine and Ukraine -symbolically- supported NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan as well as Somalia, as the only Eastern Europe country contributing to all ongoing NATO led operations. 

I will not go to the details regarding Ukraine's strategical importance for Russia, or Crimea's geopolitical/strategic importance for Putin government. But, considering the political imbalance in Ukraine and the public/political turbulence Kiev government has been facing for almost a decade, I believe Putin's last move should not be regarded as a "surprise". So I believe NATO must have a contingency plan to handle this "awaited crisis" and still evaluating the best method to give a deterrent message.

Speaking of this contingency plan; Turkey, Poland, Germany, Romania will be main actors in this plan. But I significantly point out Turkey, because Turkey;

a. has a large and operational military structure, 

b. has a long and positive history with successive Ukraine governments,

c. is able to control Black Sea routes to Crimea and Ukraine,

d. is controlling the Dardanelles and Bosporus, the main sea-passage to the large Black Sea basin.

e. has a significantly large public, who will object the Russian occupation of Crimea, due to the historical reasons.

Turkey on the other hand, is dependent to Russian oil and gas, especially after Iran's refusal to increase the volume of Turkey's natural-gas acquisition 3 weeks ago. Considering the fact that Turkish government is quiet busy with upcoming local elections, as well as scandals that's been shaking the public since December 2013, it will not be wrong to say that Ukraine and Crimea is not in Erdogan's agenda as a priority. But, should NATO and US speed up a deterrent response and be ready to initiate, Turkey will most probably support it.

In situations like this (e.g North Korea in 2013, Libya 2012) NATO always waits for a UN resolution followed by an international denouncement. So,following a couple of serious UN meetings and a couple of air force maneuvers, NATO's primary reaction will most probably be a peace keeping exercise, inclusively in Poland, Romania and Turkey. This exercise will most probably include a sea-phase and NATO vessels' existence over the Black Sea region might well be used as a negotiation issue with Russia. As of March 11, NATO started  air war games in Poland and US jets are dispatched in the exercises. I believe we will witness similar deterrent exercises during April and May.

  

A NEW PKK THROUGH REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

For the last two decades, PKK’s Area of Operations in Turkish Territory was divided into 12 regions. They also held some large territories with winter bases and multiple strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan which provided them sort term shelter and logistic deployment before launching guerilla operations inside Turkish territory.

Since the beginning of bilateral peace process between Turkey and PKK; media sources and PKK experts claim that Black Sea-Amanos-and Mardin groups, as well as some 100-200 fighters from Hakkari groups are withdrawn until the midst July, which suggests a group of 250 to 300 strong. Also, according to Turkish security and military officials, total number of militants who left Turkey is about 150 to 200. Since the Turkish Ministry of Interior records indicate the approximate number of PKK in Turkey is somewhere around 2000 to 3000, it will not be wrong to argue that PKK did not leave Turkey and has shown no indication that they’re willing to do so.

Different PKK leaders at different interviews spoke out that PKK will not lay arms permanently but Imrali’s call for cease-fire and withdrawal will be honored despite their distrust to AKP Government; stating PKK will continue to act as a regional actor and strengthen its troops, to be able to “help Kurds in trouble areas wherever their assistance is needed”. Recent clashes on September and November 2013, between PKK’s Syria affiliation PYD and Anti-Assad resistance groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusrah (JN) in Syria’s northern towns of Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal Abyad, Al Azaz, Hasakah and Jarabulus confirm this comment. According to FSA web sites and Kurdish media in Iraq; PKK’s Amanos, Mardin and Black-Sea Groups of approximately 150-250 strong, who were withdrawn from Turkey on August 2013 and positioned in the northern Kurdish towns of Syria, were responsible for these attacks.

Recent Changes in PKK’s Restructuring and Its Possible Effects on the Region

The news about a major change within PKK management in July 2013 was a surprise for Turkish public. One of the co-founders of PKK, Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal), an experienced fighter and unconventional warfare expert, who has been heading the PKK’s General and Executive Council   (KCK-Koma Ciwaken Kurdistan- Union of Kurdish Communities) for 3 years was assigned as the new Commander in Chief of HPG (PKK’s Armed Wing) and left his post to another PKK co-founder Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma) and Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat). PKK announced Cemil Bayik and Hulya Oran as co-chairs of the Executive Council and adopted a two-chaired management for the first time in its 39 year-old history. The illegal armed group took the decision with a 162-delegate congress on Qandil Mountain on July 9.

Some PKK Analysts argue that, it was Ocalan who personally planned the whole power change by writing letters, advising and consulting the names with the organization. It is known that there has been continuous exchange of correspondence between Ocalan and the PKK leadership. Ocalan wrote letters and guidelines separately to PKK’s women sub-committees, to European posts and to KCK leaders in Qandil. In his last letter to the Executive Council, he shared his views and proposals for a necessary leadership change in some critical levels of the organization and pressured for Bayik and Hulya Oran’s assignment as co-chairs, as well as Karayilan’s take over the military wing.

The General Council which will function under imprisoned Ocalan is announced to be managed by 6 members; Cemil Bayik-Hulya Oran-Murat Karayilan-Mustafa Karasu-Nuriye Kesbir and Elif Pazarcik, and for the first time in PKK history, 3 women were assigned to the council.

As for other changes taken at the six-day "general meeting" on northern Iraq's Qandil Mountain; hawkish military figures Peyman Huseyin (aka Bahoz Erdal) and Nurettin Halef Al Mohammed (aka Nurettin Sofi) were assigned commanding positions under Murat Karayilan while two prominent figures and PKK co-founders Ali Haydar Kaytan (aka Fuat) and Duran Kalkan (aka Abbas) were assigned to more passive coordination posts due to their age and claimed health conditions.

All these mentioned changes are regarded as an important step to support the ongoing peace process by containing or pacifying the well-known hard-liners within the organization but with Karayilan as the Commander in Chief of the PKK military; with Peyman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd and classmate of Bashar Assad, who has been acting as deputy commander in chief of HPG and running PKK’s Special Operations branch Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) and Nurettin Sofi, another Syrian Kurd who was Amed and Botan Regional Commander with some 2000 militants and HPG Executive Committee member; the new military structure of PKK does not fit in a picture for a permanent peace process, but just the opposite. It can be evaluated that by assigning strong military figures in critical command positions, PKK is positioning itself both for establishing permanent gains in Syria and Iraq and for the aftermath of the ongoing peace process with Turkey, whether it meets their expectations or not. Should the proceedings fail, Turkey might face a stronger, fresh, more crowded and a more dynamic PKK.

Insight of PKK’s new Leadership assignments

1. The new chairman of the PKK’s executive council (KCK) Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma) is known for his close ties with Iranian Intelligence and Iran’s border paramilitary Pasdaran command. Despite being one of the five co-founders of PKK and commanding PKK units in some small scale fights in 1980s, Bayik was not a dedicated fighter like Karayilan was, but he proved himself being an accomplished planner and a diplomat that he was able to build a bridge with Iranian intelligence agency VEVAK in 1990s. Intelligence experts believe that his ties with VEVAK also provided some level of communication with Iraq’s Shite leadership, too. Analysts believe that his status as the co-chair might help PKK and PJAK to ease tensions with Iran and promote an alliance with Assad Forces against Syrian opposition.

2. Co-Chair Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat) is a Turkish Alawite Kurd from Tunceli’s Hozat province, who joined the PKK ranks in 1994 right after her graduation from Kayseri High School and participated in numerous fights against Turkish security forces. She acted as Women’s Battalion Commander and Deputy Chief of Qandil Training Center. Her past experience in PKK’s women division YJA Star and Women committees makes her an iconic figure to promote PKK sympathy especially among Kurdish women and Alawites in Turkey and Syria. According to Turkey’s Alawite Organizations and Alawite Cultural Foundations’ comments, Hulya Oran’s new position within PKK is expected to focus on Alawite populations’ cultural and basic human right problems through PKK’s regional frame-works and philosophy. Also Turkey’s PKK experts explicate her function as controlling the PKK Units in Dersim Region, which is a vital base for organization’s recruitments and military operations.

                                                                                                                                             

3. General Council’s new female member Nuriye Kesbir (aka Sozdar Avesta) is an ethnic Kurd from Mardin province who was born in to a family with Yezidi faith. She was an activist who worked for PKK’s European offices and Kurdish Young Women’s Movement (Komalen Ciwan) from 1990s to 2001. According to Turkish Security officials she can speak fluent German, English, intermediate Dutch, and she was also working for PKK’s Europe Chief Zubeyir Aydar, assisting PKK’s Germany and Netherlands offices’ political activities/demonstrations until her arrest by Holland Police in The Hague in 2001. Following her release, she joined the PKK ranks in Qandil in 2006 and acted as political advisor to executive board and also women’s committee member, which makes her an important figure for organization’s Europe strategy and policies.

4. Other female member Elif Pazarcik/Ronahi (pseudonym) is also a Turkish Alawite Kurd from Maras/Pazarcik province who joined PKK in 1980 at an early age of 16 as an activist, arrested and released by Turkish Security in 1981, 1988 and 1990 until her attendance to PKK camps in northern Iraq in 1991. She actively served as service personnel, unit fighter, and troop commander and managed Women’s High Committee (Koma Jinen Bilind) from 2008 to 2013. Her election to General Council with Oran and Kesbir indicates a new era for PKK management with women in decision making process. PKK experts and analysts evaluate this change not radical but a belated effort because this new woman dominated showcase will likely to change the bad image of their texture.

5. Mustafa Karasu (aka Huseyin Ali or Avaresh) is a Turkish Alawite from Sivas/Gurun province who is also one of the co-founders of PKK. He is well respected among PKK’s ethnic fighters with Alawite roots and also known as a grim politician and doctrinaire rather than a fighter. Before Ocalan’s arrest and imprisonment he served in Central Committee in Bekaa Valley and carried out envoy duties with Iranian intelligence from 1993 to 1999. He is known with his close ties with Turkish Marginal Leftist organizations such as DHKP-C and Dev Yol in 1990s and believed to be capable of influencing currently active leftist armed groups for mutual benefits. DHKP-C connections in Syria might bring some level of Assad government’s support to PKK/PYD and Karasu is believed to be playing a major role in such a relation.

6. Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal) is a Turkish citizen from Sanliurfa/Birecik province. He is one of the founders and the most prominent figure of PKK. Founding PKK in 1978 with Abdullah Ocalan in Ankara, he planned and commanded organization’s first military operations, coordinated recruitment and training efforts, inspiring from Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung wrote a dozen guerilla manuals and pioneered the adoption of new military techniques and tactics through-out the PKK ranks during 1990s. When it was vital for PKK to abandon Syria, just a few months before Ocalan’s fleeing to Russia, it was Karayilan who organized and established Qandil region as a permanent base by coordinating with Talabani’s PUK and Barzani’s PDK.  He performed lead positions within PKK’s constantly changing structure. Being an experienced fighter with big influence in PKK substructure, his last assignment as Head of People’s Defense Committee (HPG) which is PKK’s Military Structure, may be evaluated as a sign to coordinate, tidy up and unite PKK troops for an oncoming war and determination to prevent any undesired military operations that can be launched by remote groups, dispersed from Turkey, Iran, Iraq to Syria.

Political Intentions

Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Ocalan announced from Imrali, that PKK and Syrian Kurds should support whoever claims to be ready to give Kurds’ demands. In different media interviews, both Murat Karayilan from Qandil, and Head of PYD Saleh Muslim mentioned the importance of a political recognition, highlighting that Kurds were ready to govern themselves and would take necessary measures to protect their territory.

Saleh Muslim commented on PYD intentions to declare a limited autonomy on July 2013, and on November 11, 2013 PYD management announced the establishment of a regional government in Rojava (referring Kurdish populated northern Syria region). Creating a lot of turbulence and anger both from Turkey and Barzani’s Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, PYD’s plans are still intact and in progress.

With Cemil Bayik’s assignment as co-leader, there had been some important developments within PKK intra- ranks as well as diplomatic connections. Bayik started with major changes in the PKK media organizations, removing some high level officials closer to Murat Karayilan on December 5, 2013. Those officials removed by Bayik-Hozat include Ahmad Deniz (Head of PKK External Relations Committee), Roj Willad (PKK’s website Firat News editor in chief), Deyari Qamishlo (PKK Media Supervisor and Head of the Syrian Relations Committee), Havel Damhat (Qandil Chief Coordinator) and Haqi Hawal (Head of Iran and PJAK Media Unit.)

Following the PKK’s 2013 convention and high level management change, Karayılan’s wing is claimed to be in decline, and has been excluded from some decision-making posts within the PKK. “These changes are internal and not related to any conflicts within the PKK, they’re related to the party structure,” said Zagros Hiwa, the member of PKK foreign relations committee and predecessor of Ahmad Deniz for Head of External Relations Committee.

These changes shouldn’t only be acknowledged as “pacification” of Karayilan supporters, but also as significant indicators for PKK intensions to promote strong diplomatic and organizational cadres in Syria, Iraq and Iran; which Kurdish media sources claim that, Ahmad Deniz and Deyari Qamishlo (pseudonyms) have been assigned as liaisons and coordinators to Syria’s PYD and they are claimed to be assisting/directing PYD’s Saleh Muslim to take necessary measures to format the future Syrian Kurdistan’s manifesto and management principles according to the design and decisions given by the Qandil management.

According to media news of Iraqi Kurdistan, Havel Damhat and Haqi Hawal (pseudonyms) are also acting as negotiators to establish some level of diplomatic connections between PKK, Bagdad and Iran, to further possible assistance to PYD, in their local scale fights against Syria’s radical resistance groups like Al Nusrah and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, as well as supporting Assad’s military operations as a force multiplier.

Peyman Hussein and Nurettin Sofi are two other actors, who should be regarded highly important for PYD/PKK’s cooperation with the Assad Regime; because of the fact that they’re both Syrian Kurds with close ties to Syrian’s Baathist officials as well as intelligence agency “Al Muhaberat” since the early 1990s.

According to Kurdish media reports, both figures left Qandil sometime on November and stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan’s western border close to Simalka-Al Qahtaniya region to be able to contact and consult with PYD and Assad liaisons, at least for a few months. Considering PKK leadership has left Syria in 1999 closing its permanent facilities and training camps in Bekaa Valley on Syria-Israel border, this alleged “come-back” indicates serious intentions for building new bridges with Syrian regime.

Given the facts that Peyman Hussein and Bashar Al Assad were classmates for one year at Damascus Medical School in 1987 and used to have some level of dialogue, also both Peyman and Nurettin Sofi are known to be PKK’s effective tools for communicating with Syrian Baath Party officials to develop strategies against their mutual enemy “Turkey” back in 1990s; this new PKK positioning may be evaluated as a serious effort to establish beneficial relations with Syrian government and a long-term efficient organization within Syria’s Kurdish Rojava region.

Challenges and Controversies

1. Turkey

Since the first month of the bilateral peace process, Turkish authorities have been complaining about PKK’s unwillingness for a major withdrawal and their activities for strengthening military bases in Qandil region, referring a significant increase in joining PKK ranks as of May 2013. PKK confirms the increase in new recruitments, by publishing new Guerilla Graduation Ceremonies through their web sites.

Visa versa, PKK has been opposing Turkish efforts for building new water dams, along with transforming old military and gendarme posts and stations to much sophisticated strongholds, by building new military installations (KALEKOL) on the Iranian and Iraqi border, as well as on the areas that control PKK routes in southeast of Turkey.

Turkish Ministry of Defense announced that KALEKOL project, which was initiated in September 2010, is designed to host 50 to 100 military personnel, with high level protection as well as superior fire power. Main Contractor Company TOKI delivered 114 KALEKOLS to Army and Gendarme units throughout Turkey’s eastern and southern border since 2012, and is expected to deliver another 166 KALEKOLs at Iraq and Syrian border region no later than May 2014.

Following the declaration of the bilateral peace process, between September and December 2013; PKK units attacked three KALEKOL construction sites in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces, destroying the machinery and kidnapping contractors. In addition to these incidents, PKK’s militant youth organization Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDGH) demonstrated road blocks and check-point police operations in Sirnak, Cizre and Hakkari provinces of Turkey which created a lot of public anger and criticism among the government ranks as well as Turkish intellectuals who have been supporting the peace dialogues since the beginning.

Turkish government confirms that PKK, using the peace process for its benefit, has reached out a serious threat level in terms of military readiness, recruitment and re organization of the fighter troops and political establishments not only in Turkey, but also in Syria and Iraq.  

2.  Syria

According to the Turkish and Kurdish media news, approximately 300 PKK fighters are transferred to Syria’s northern towns, , mainly Kobani (Ayn Al Arab), Derik (Al Malikiyah) and Afrin regions, both from Turkey and Iraq. In addition, it’s also claimed that another 200 to 250 fighters are moved from Qandil to temporary bases in Northern Iraq’s mountainous region, to be able to reinforce and support PKK units positioned in Syria. 

Military analysts and media reports mention that Syria’s Kurdish dominated northern towns of Ayn Al Arab (Kobani), Afrin, Al Malikiyah (Derik), Tal Abyad, Azaz and Jarabulus are substantially controlled by Kurdish groups, especially PKK/PYD.

Intelligence reports and some media news mention that PKK established some level of reconnaissance units equipped with off-road dirt bikes, 50 cal. long range sniper rifles and machine gun mounted Toyota Pickups. The same sources mention about PKK efforts to maintain telecommunication systems through-out Syria, which is expected to provide two-way and more secure communication with Damascus, Qandil leadership and fighter units in the region, since US and Turkish counter intelligence efforts are highly capable of intercepting PKK’s current telecommunication. These developments indicate the existence of serious efforts for strengthening PKK armed groups in Syria and establishing more capable combat-ready troops derived through local population, supported with experienced PKK units, through-out the Syria’s northern sector, for a wide scale urban warfare.

Major clashes on September and November 2013, between Kurds and Anti-Assad resistance groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusrah (JN) and ISIS in Syria’s northern towns of Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal Abyad, Al Azaz, Hasakah and Jarabulus can be accepted as serious indicators for the upcoming term, yet ISIS and PYD are still trying to control Qamishli and Ras Al Ayn, two border towns with high volume of trade and business opportunities.

3. Iran

Iran and PKK relations have been dire for almost a decade and the main reason behind this conflict was PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan), an offshoot of PKK, based in Iran’s eastern territories. PJAK announced its establishment in 2004 and since then it’s been fighting against Iranian military units, mostly deployed on the Iran-Iraq border’s rural areas.

Intensified Iran pressures on PJAK’s military activities are at its lowest levels since June 2013. But, although both sides have agreed upon a cease-fire on August 2011, Iran and PJAK had attacked each other on small scales, until both sides found a common ground in Syria, for supporting Assad regime.

On May 2013, following his arrest and release by German Police, Abdurrahman Haji Ahmedi (PJAK Political Leader, a German citizen living in Hamburg) commented about two high level PJAK members’ arrest by Iranian security forces; stating that the rise of transnational jihadists in Syria is a threat for the region and warned Iran stop attacking Kurds, highlighting that Jihadists were mutual enemy for both Kurds and Iranian Government.

Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani, who took office on August 2013 initiated a new and promising era in terms of human rights, freedom and tolerance. But despite his positive start, he did not hesitate to approve the hangings of two PJAK members; Habibollah Golparipour and Reza Mamadi, who were captured and sentenced to death in 2009. Both men were hanged on October 2013 and PJAK officials in Qandil immediately declared that the executions will not go unanswered, threatening Iran with major retaliation.

So far, Qandil’s threats have not been actualized yet no clashes are reported between PKK/PJAK and Iranian Security forces since September 2013. PJAK’s Head of Foreign Relations, Shamal Beshir talked to European media sources on December 2013, stating that Syria is prone to be the next battle ground for Al Qaida; PJAK is willing and ready to support Syria’s Kurds with every tool within their capabilities. His explanations are interpreted by military and policy analysts, as cooperation offer to Iranian government to support Assad regime by isolating and pacifying extremist Sunni groups within Syria.

4. Iraq

For the past few years, Turkey has been trying to grant Iraqi Kurdistan and Barzani a pivotal role as a Kurdish symbol of political progress in the region. The Erbil Agreement and the Kurdish National Congress were both red lines for Turkey, but Ankara welcomed them because they happened under Barzani’s patronage.

On the other hand PKK; by engaging in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s complicated politics and supporting the Iraqi Kurdistan’s opposition party GORRAN(Change Movement) is attempting to suppress Barzani, while stirring local criticism of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These PKK interventions are unlikely to alter the status quo in the Iraqi Kurdistan region however they are fueling political fragmentation and creating additional challenges to regional stability.

GORRAN became popular as a Kurdish nationalist party that seeks to remove Barzani from office while pressing for a parliamentary and not presidential system for the region. Following the regional elections held on September 2013, which resulted with 2 year-old party’s unexpected victory in Suleymania region; GORRAN leader Nawshirwan Mustapha announced his support for the PKK and affirmed the PYD as the representative of the Kurds in Syria, posing another direct challenge to Barzani and the KDP. The PKK-GORRAN alliance also is based on shared concerns about Turkey’s regional power and the need to isolate Erdogan’s influence efforts over Iraqi Kurds and in Syria.

In response to the PYD’s unilateral steps to leading Syrian Kurds, Massoud Barzani, the KDP leader and president of Iraqi Kurdistan, called on all other Syrian Kurdish political parties to gather in Erbil. The result of the gathering was unifying all the pro-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) parties under one umbrella called the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is a member of the Syrian National Coalition, which opposes President Bashar al-Assad. It has accused the Democratic Union Party (PYD) for supporting and siding with Assad regime. To avert any possible armed conflict between the KNC and the PYD, a meeting was held in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil under the auspices of Barzani. The two sides agreed to cooperate on the ground, establishing the High Cooperation Council.

According to the agreement, the two parties share all responsibilities in the Syrian Kurdish territories, but the agreement has so far failed to achieve its goals. In meetings with US and European officials, KNC leaders have labeled the PYD as a “gang that belongs to the PKK,” which they listed as a terrorist organization.

On December 2013, KRG agreed to supply Turkey with oil through a pipeline in a landmark deal that Baghdad considers illegal and refused to approve. Maliki Government stressed that the quantities of Iraqi oil exported to Turkey must be known to the central government, oil must be sold at international market prices, and revenues from oil sales must be channeled to the account of the Iraq Development Fund in New York, in line with previous U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Furthermore, oil is not the sole apple of discord between KRG and the Central Government. Kurdish territorial claims on Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninawa regions, which are also prominent oil-rich grounds-, seem to cause further tensions between two groups. 

Assessments for 2014

Syria is a new and promising front for PKK to initiate its military and political goals.  While Assad is turning the face of the war to Al Qaeda elements and radical groups, Syrian resistance and its weak political structure SNC (Syrian National Coalition) is losing both credibility and popularity, which give PKK a chance to implement its political agenda for Rojava Region.  If they can isolate and secure the northern Kurdish regions, they are capable of cultivating and administering necessary measures to promote a new Kurdish government, with or without Assad’s approval.

Syrian resistance groups are dispersed and a unified command structure is almost impossible. Free Syrian Army (FSA), sponsored by Turkey, is losing influence giving away a serious number of its troops to Islamist and radical groups. Turkey is also very concerned about the emerging power of both the jihadists and Kurdish militia forces in Syria. By maintaining a direct connection to compliant Syrian rebel groups, Ankara can try to play different rebel factions against each other in an attempt to minimize the jihadist and Kurdish separatist threat. As operations intensify across the Turkish-Syrian border, the risks of clashes between Turkey and the Syrian regime, transnational jihadists or the advancing YPG Kurdish militia remain very real. Sharing a vast border with a destabilized Syria, Ankara cannot hope to completely isolate itself from Syria and can only take measures to diminish the risk. A Turkish operation against PKK /PYD units is said to be on the table, but Erdogan Government will probably want to see the results of the ongoing peace process before deciding for action.

2014 Geneva meeting’s success to unite Syrian opposition is important but doesn’t seem to be promising. Kurds agreed to send delegation to Geneva as KNC representatives and PYD is expected to join the talks. PYD’s active support for Syrian resistance may turn Assad against Kurds in the north which will result in losing the gains for PKK and PYD.

Iran will support PJAK and PKK for fighting against Al Qaida affiliated Sunni groups.  Also Tehran government might give a green light for establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdish region within Syria in the future, if Assad fails to advance in his fight against insurgency. But this will not mean a major policy change against PJAK activities in Iran. 

Chinese Scientists Steal Corn Seeds Throughout USA and other Fertile Grounds.

Yet, this blog had never been a news blog and avoided dealing with conspiracies; recent events concerning a wide scale Chinese technology theft efforts, forced me to focus on the topic which might have a further influence on United States' China policies.

Following a long time media and State focus on China's internet hacking attempts, recent events indicate another area for Chinese interests.Thefts from Midwestern US cornfields may be part and parcel of China's acquisition strategy in agriculture.

On March 2013, a manager for DuPont Agriculture, one of the biggest in mid USA, saw a Chinese man on knee, digging up one of the company's research fields in Iowa, while a second Chinese man stood nearby. One of them, Mo Hailong, claimed that they were attending to a conference and then both two ran off the scene in hurry, making the DuPont manager suspicious enough to report the incident to local authorities.

Mo and 5 alleged accomplices were arrested by FBI in 2013. The incident raised a few eye brows and it became a case of espionage of a massive industry , starved and green-eyed over foreign competition, and a lot of plot tied to power and manipulation.

Mo is proved to be acting on behalf of International Business of the Beijing Dabei Nong Technology Group (DBN Group). Mo's accomplice Wang Lei who was caught digging up seeds is also the vice chairman of Beijing Kings Nower Seed S&T Company. US intelligence confirmed that both companies were cover organizations connected to Chinese Red Army's Technology Department.

When former Chinese Communist Party Leader Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms in 1978, he identified science and technology as the key areas for China's modernization and domination in the global markets. He later put forth Project 863 (State High Technology Development Plan) for catching up and surpassing Western powers, which also paved the way for China's widespread and organized know-how and technology theft efforts. 

China has a clear desire for the seed technology. As a whole, China is facing an agricultural crisis both for its enormous population and for its live stock feeding. This presented an acute dilemma to Beijing, hence while its losing clean water and arable land, there is growing demand to wheat and meat on the streets. To deter the increasing problem; China is believed to be organized in US, as well as Argentina, Brazil, Eastern Europe, Israel and Turkey through its international trade companies, to be able to determine the seeding technologies and also to conduct field experiments within these mentioned countries.

According to FBI reports, imprisoned Mo and Lei had purchased their own agriculture plots in Iowa and Illinois between 2011-2013, where they were growing and experimenting the stolen seeds with their inbred seeds.Now, inbred seeds are self-pollinating and need to be crossed with other inbred seeds to create the hybrid seeds, which will easily be adjusted to desired climatic conditions. According to FBI, it takes 5-7 years to develop inbred seeds, and the cost of such a project will be around $30-$40 million.

China has a clear interest in hybrid seeds, as they are designed to be resistant to drought and pests. In particular they are resistant to soil salinity-which is a major problem for China's agriculture. Israel and Turkey have been working on their home-made national seed programs for over two decades and especially Israel proved itself to be a prominent world leader, with wide marketing opportunities.

Chine; with its military procurement projects and missile joint production agreement on the table, is prone to be interested in Turkish Seeds and it will not be a surprise if Beijing asks Turkey agricultural off-set opportunities.

Turkey to continue strengthening military power

Turkey has made significant progress in many areas, especially in the economic sphere during 2012.

As a result of reforms in the country, significant progress was achieved in the defense industry. The launch of Altay tank production, mobile outposts that have worked well in the fight against the PKK terrorist organization, the local production of pistols, "ANKA" drones and other military equipment can be listed as examples of a breakthrough in this field.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted that Turkey has become one of the leading exporters of defense products.

Along with that Turkish officials stressed that the military equipment produced in the country is of great interest for neighboring countries.

In November 2012 it was announced that Cairo will purchase 10 unmanned military airplanes from Ankara based on an agreement between Turkey and Egypt.In the past, Egypt purchased 5 F-16 Fighting Falcons from Turkey exchanging some 600 Grand Cherokee SUVs manufactured in Egypt, with the US State Department's permission

According to statistics, exports of Turkish defense products increased by 35.7 percent in 2012 compared with the previous year, reaching $ 1.2 billion.
Furthermore, the information states that the UAE ($ 101 million) and Saudi Arabia ($ 99 million) are among the countries importing Turkish military equipment.

Iraq which is considered as the main support base of the PKK terrorist organization and which does not have good relations with Turkey is also among the importing countries.

In general, reforms have been carried out in the Turkish defense industry for several years now, their implementation began in 2009, and Turkey plans to become a leader in the production of military equipment by 2016.

Thus, there is every reason to say that Ankara will strengthen the work in military industrialization. Construction of military ships, vessels for protection of coastal zones as well as construction of new military ports will be one of the many directions in this area.

Major changes are also expected in air defense field of Turkey in 2013. The Turkish Defense Ministry has set a goal to renew the entire military equipment this year, especially military aircraft and helicopters. The ministry plans to do this on the account of locally produced equipment. In addition, the ministry intends to sell upgraded military equipment to other countries.
Thus, Turkey which is a NATO member and has the real potential to become an influential country in the region, will continue to pursue the development of its defense industry.

On the Blink of a Marginalizing Turkish Socialism, Extremist Turkish Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) is Signaling for More Actions in 2013.

DHKP-C (The Front) Started to hit sensational targets, after a decade long silence.

Turkey's extreme-left Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) has claimed the responsibility of the suicide attack on the US embassy in Ankara on February 1, 2013. Right after the US Embassy attack, Front’s most popular website www.halkinsesitv.com announced that “the attack was an act of self-sacrifice and the sole intent was to target US and its collaborator AKP Government.” Through their website they also claimed that they have the potential, dedication and willingness to punish traitors who are siding / cooperating with Imperial powers like US, Israel and especially Turkish Security Forces, accusing the police as being a merciless tool for AKP Government and serving Gulen Congregation/Hizmet Movement, an Islamic Turkish influential group whose leader is living in the US. (These comments can be reached at www.halkinsesitv.com., www.sosyalistforum.net, www.devrimcigenclik.info, www.ozgurce.org in German and Turkish)

In the US Embassy Attack; DHKP-C militant Ecevit Şanlı (A.K.A Alisan) blasted a 6 kg TNT embedded to a vest, killing a security officer and wounding a journalist. Ministry of Interior reports indicated that he was in disguise as a cargo-man which enabled him to enter the main gate. He was also carrying a pistol and hand grenades as a backup; indicating that his primary objective was to clear the entrance with his pistol guarded by three to four security guards, try his chances to find a passage through a second security door with grenades and finally blow himself inside the visa offices compound.

According to police records, Şanli was a well-known figure for DHKP-C, who was recruited in Istanbul, trained in Greece and attended several attacks from 1995 to 1997 against police posts and governmental buildings. He was arrested after his deliberate attack to Istanbul Harbiye Officers’ Club building with LAW rockets in 1997 and sentenced to 25 years. He served time for some 4 years and released in 2001 with a presidential amnesty due to the Wernicke Korsakoff syndrome, a disease caused by a long- term hunger strike he performed, during his time in jail.

A Brief History of the DHKP-C

The DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) is a Marxist-Leninist, anti-western splinter group of the Turkish terrorist group Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left). Dev Sol was originated as a splinter group of Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path) which itself was a splinter group of THKP-C (Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front). The THKP-C was an offshoot of the broader Revolutionary Youth movement (Dev Genc) within Turkey. In the early 1990s, infighting within Dev-Sol resulted in the emergence of two factions. Dursun Karatas (a.k.a Dayı/Uncle), who

founded Dev-Sol by combining splintered factions of Turkish radical leftist groups in 1978, changed the group's name to DHKP/C in 1994 in Damascus. Bedri Yagan, also a founding member of Dev-Sol, broke from the Karatas faction and created a new faction, THKP/C (not to be confused with the original THKP/C). Karatas faction dismissed its political branch in 2000 adopting the name DHKC (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front). They shortly call themselves as “Cephe” (The Front).

The organization has committed many acts since then and formed a strong system within the prisons which helped to strengthen its grassroots. Aftermath of 1994 remodeling, the organization continued their activities. One of the groundbreaking attacks of DHKP-C was assassination of a prominent businessman of Sabancı Group, Özdemir Sabancı and his two associates in 1996. This sensational action is followed by some other assassination attacks to retired army generals and police officers, and then a chain of “hunger strike” protests in Turkish prisons from 1999 to 2003, which caused at least 13 out of 126 DHKP-C prisoners’ death in strike.

In 2000; DHKP-C leadership – most of them were in Belgium, Netherlands, Greece and Germany- initiated a new agenda for the organization, for the purpose to reach out the acceleration they enjoyed during 1990s, announcing that their “Revolutionary Wave Program” would be initiated by every member whether in jail, in exile or on the field/front. The program was primarily put in action by the jailed members of the Front with a series of hunger strikes and prison uprisings. Turkish Government took some harsh methods to counter, launched military operations to some major prisons in Istanbul on December 19, 2000. As a result, a total of 54 prisoners were killed and more than 150 were wounded. Turkish Government named these prison interventions as “Back to Life Operations” and re-punished 154 prisoners –majority of which were DHKP-C members- with additional sentences. In the following term, DHKP-C tried to assassinate some government officials and ex-Secretary of Justice Hikmet Sami Turk who they thought were masterminds of “Back to Life” operations.

Turkey’s terror experts mostly agree that; following the death of DHKP-C founder and leader Dursun Karatas in Belgium in 2008, the Front –under the new leadership of Musa Asoglu, Zerrin Sari and Huseyin Fevzi Tekin- stayed low and avoid confrontations. Except one failed attempt to kill ex Secretary of Justice H.Sami Turk with a suicide bomber attack in 2009, the Front did not show any profile other than participating “May 1 Workers’ Day” celebrations with Front banners and flags. Analysts agree that between the years 2008-2012; the Front, trying to fill the gap of Dursun Karatas, most probably focused on assigning new leadership cadres and cells in Europe, Turkey and Middle East. They also must have been established new areas of operation as well as new assault plans and targets.

Countries Sheltering DHKP-C

According to Turkish Ministry of Interior and intelligence reports; The Front is believed to be functional in Syria and six European countries; Greece, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Spain.

(1)  Greece: Huseyin Fevzi Tekin is reported to be heading the Front’s activities in Greece. He’s also believed to be directing the cells in Turkey and organizing the safe passages of the militants from/to Turkey and Middle East, through Greek Islands, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Another prominent figure Zerrin Sari is believed to be managing the training camps in Greece’s Lavrion, Kinesa and Oropo-Dileysi regions. According to media reports, the group is sharing Lavrion camp’s guerilla training facilities with another terrorist group, PKK.

(2)  Germany: DHKC’s politburo is believed to be located in Berlin. Germany has a significant importance for the group, in terms of providing short-term safe housing, money raising and publications’ printing and distribution. The group is believed to be managing at least 3 printing houses, 10 to 15 local markets, coffee houses, restaurants and some small scale doctrine training camps in Germany.

(3)  Belgium is also important for the group, since the country black-listed Turkey for human-rights abuses in 2001. So the Front members can find refuge in this country without much difficulty. Musa Asoglu, who was a close friend of Dursun Karatas and accepted as the heir of him, is living in Brussels. Intelligence reports mention that Belgium is Front’s primary address for organizing its major decision making meetings and political demonstrations.

(4)  In Netherlands, The Front is believed to be dealing with drug trafficking and sales, making enough profit to support weapons procurement.

(5)  In Italy, the group is developing ties with Italian Communist Refoundation Party and organizing political activities to corner Turkish government with accused human rights abuses.

(6)  In Spain, the group is believed to be organizing joint political platforms with Bask and ETA figures, as well as Socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) members. Also there are reports suggesting that the Front has a couple of safe houses in Madrid’s suburban areas.

(7)  Syria: The group leaders as well as militants have great sympathy against Syria and Assad regime, since Damascus provided shelter for Karatas and his friends from 1994 to date. Bekaa Valley, a no man’s land on Syria-Lebanon border had been used by lots of extremist left organizations for almost 50 years. Interrogation reports of some captured militants indicate that DHKP-C leadership was planning to establish a safe haven along with efficient training camps in Syria’s Bekaa Valley but the project is cancelled in 2011, after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising.

The Reasons Behind US Embassy Attack

After a four year re-organization phase, DHKP-C has become more active in Turkey by 2012 once again. The organization have killed 3 police officers and committed some illegal activities like attacking to police stations by suicide bombers in the last six months, before the attack of US Embassy in Ankara.

Following their activities closely, Turkish Police and National Intelligence Agency (MIT) shared a report last year and indicated that there are 15 suspects who were abroad and trained to deploy terrorist attacks to some high value targets. Police stated that 8 of them were trained in Greece, 4 in Germany, one in Syria and two in Belgium. Based on this report Ecevit Şanlı was among four people who were trained in Germany.

According to the organization’s press announcements and web site comments, DHKP-C supported Assad Regime and his war against Syrian resistance. The group also condemned Turkey’s war readiness efforts against Syria and took sides with PKK, strongly opposing PATRIOT deployments in the region, as well as NATO/US military involvement against Syria.

The recent attack shows that the concerns of security forces in Turkey were not baseless. DHKP-C assumed the responsibility of the attack to the embassy next day and publishing a declaration in its website stated that the bomb blasted because of the US and Turkey’s policies in Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

DHKP-C dynamics are based on opposing imperialism and fighting against every value which represents American ideology. In this perspective, it will not be wrong to say that every American entity “in Turkey” is bound to be targeted by the Front. Also, intelligence experts believe that the organization is looking for options to reach out a permanent training base which will enable the group to recruit more and more candidates both in Turkey and abroad, smuggle them to a safe haven to train, equip and prepare for a revolutionary war, just as PKK has been doing for more than four decades. And by targeting high profile American figures and/or buildings, it will be easier and prestigious for the Front, to gain access to such places in Syria or another place in the Middle East.

Regional Reasons for DHKP-C’s Rising Profile

The DHKP-C as stated above is a Marxist-Leninist organization and this is not the first time that the organization attacks to a foreign target, especially to American targets. But again, the US Embassy attack shouldn’t be regarded as a confrontation against US; as in one of his speech a leader figure of the organization Huseyin Fevzi Tekin stated that “the most vital objective of the Front is not US but its collaborators”. He added that America’s imperialist policies wouldn’t gain such success without the support given by other nations so the revolutionists should do their best to bring havoc on this cooperation by creating a chaos and instead of attacking “the strong” they should choose to punish “relatively weak” collaborators.

It can be argued that developing events after Arab Spring fueled anti-Western/anti-American ideologies both for right and left wing ideologies. “E.g. in Middle East’s Islamic culture, which prohibits the suicide, the Arab Spring is initiated with a suicide in which Mohammed Bouazizi – a Tunisian street vendor- dowsed himself with fuel and set his body on fire in a protest in 2010. What happened next was unexpected as it was explosive. Riots broke out, spread to Tunisian cities and amidst massive demonstrations President Zayn-Al Abidine and his cabinet were eased out by army and forced to flee into exile.

Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, against heavy handed governments with close ties to West have inspired one another and created a domino effect in the region. DHKP-C Leadership should have noticed the importance of a strong organization with dedicated militants whose sacrificial acts are keen to inspire crowds. The group started to “awaken” its cells in Europe and in Turkey due to the following possible reasons;

·         The time was right, and with the advantage of anti-American and anti-West atmosphere, they would be able to gain some international support and sympathy in the Middle East, a front they have been neglected for more than a decade. (E.g. even a slight improvement to establish a post in North Africa (Tunisia or Libya) may give Front an advantage to transport its militants in and out of Europe.)

·         Syrian regime did not dissolve as fast as it was expected and they turned out to be an immediate enemy of the Turkish State. The Front probably felt the urgent need to support its enemy’s enemy, probably hoping to get a permanent support either from Baathists or their current sponsors like Russia, or even Iran.

·         It became obvious that, the instability throughout the Middle East would be permanent, causing long term vacuums which might be filled with strong organizations with military capabilities. (If the Front succeeds to gain access to the isolated regions, the longer their cause, existence and ability to fight may survive.)

·         New governments in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Tunisia have Islamic roots and a significant religious agenda. If Assad regime dissolves, the picture in Syria will not be so different. Despite their differences, most of these countries will pursue a fundamentalist policy, and all together they will be able to oppose Israel, as well as America and continue to support Palestinian regime, Hamas and Hezbollah, who’re also filling some vacuum in the region. In the long run, even though they are distant to any religious ideology, DHKP-C’s military capabilities and its strong connections in Europe might be needed by the new regional actors/groups, to suppress any initiative in favor of Israel and the West.

·         Turkey’s ruling party AKP and Turkish Security Forces are also in the central target of the Front, since AKP crushed Turkish Left parties –including the main opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) - in the last two elections and filled out most of the state agencies, governorates and municipalities with its cadres. In addition to the negative atmosphere of “The Ergenekon Case” about an alleged illegal neo-nationalist organization accused of planning to oust the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government through a military coup, university students and some left wing socio political humanitarian foundations are not happy with AKP policies and Turkish Leftist groups have no efficiency in Turkish political arena. This weakness creates some amount of sympathy to marginal left wing groups, and DHKP-C might easily enjoy popularity among Turkish Left by putting some weight on social life, with sensational activities. (E.g. In Istanbul Okmeydani square on February 15, 2013 a public bus of metropolitan municipality have been stopped and burned to fire with Molotov Cocktails. Traffic has stopped for hours and Istanbul Police couldn’t reach the area on time. In the following hours more than three revolutionary leftist groups claimed responsibility and each of them praising US Embassy attack, threatened government for following angry mob demonstrations.)

DHKP-C’s Possible Actions in the Future

DHKP-C is significantly famous with its assassinations and suicidal attacks, so it will probably be the first priority for the Front to attack “soft and hard targets” whenever and wherever the ground is suitable. Soft targets by their nature and existence do not have much security and they are much easier to attack than hard targets, which deter attacks by maintaining a comparatively strong security presence, as was the case in US Embassy Attack. Possible “hard targets” on the cross-hairs of the Front might be US or Israeli personnel and their associates, AKP figures and party employees, police and police stations, Turkish media buildings and journalists who are known to be supporting AKP policies, Turkey’s Islamic foundations and support groups who have Western ties. (e.g. like Gulen Movement’s supporters). A wide variety of soft targets may be included to this list; such as tourists and touristic places, restaurants and cafes with US franchising trademarks like Starbucks, Burger King or Mac Donald, public transportation, water, electric distribution facilities, etc.

Turkish media and police records in the vicinity of recent events indicate that the Front is expected to increase their safe house restructuring activities in Turkish metropols -like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Kocaeli, Antalya and some other cities in Turkey’s Southeast, like Mersin, Hatay, Gaziantep, Maras -with improvements like multiple steel-door emplacements in their safe houses, building complicated explosive mechanisms and booby traps, with the intention to make any police operations hard and costly. Since the safe houses are used to provide short/long term refuge and safety for militants before and after their activities, it is also logical to presume that each safe house location might as well indicate a location for the group’s assault attempt. And this brings Turkish intelligence to the assumption that the cities stated above, might witness DHKP-C assaults in a close future.

The Front may also be expected to show more profile in political opposition arena, cooperating with other marginal leftist groups in Europe. They also may seek for a common ground to develop a mutual agreement with PKK, putting aside their long term political disagreements, but cooperate, at least in opposing and condemning the AKP Government. Such cooperation may include intelligence gathering and sharing about critical targets and organizing social protests against AKP policies, to be demonstrated by large crowds.

By Coskun Unal

Published by TRAC on February 2013