Syrian Resistance Groups-4 (Idlib Tawhid Brigade)

 

Idlib Tawhid Brigade

The International Crisis Group released a great report last week detailing the evolving role of Salafists in the Syrian civil war. The report identified rebel groups with Salafist leanings whose future activity require monitoring. One group not mentioned in the report but worth watching is the Tawhid Brigade in Idlib Province (a different group than the Aleppo-based Tawhid Brigade).

As the report points out, establishing the exact ideology of a Syrian rebel group is difficult. Most do not explicitly outline their worldview and some have adopted positions simply to gain favor with donors. Although the Idlib Tawhid Brigade has not publicly defined their ideology, there is evidence indicating that they are toward the Jihadist-Salafist end of the Islamist spectrum.

The Idlib Tawhid Brigade formed in mid-May by uniting several rebel cells near Idlib city. In a statement dated July 7, the Tawhid Brigade defined themselves as an independent group, separate from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and defined their mission as supporting religion. They also posted an al-Arabiya interview with Sheikh Aid al-Qarni, a Saudi cleric who preached in support of attacks against American troops in Iraq. On October 1, the Tawhid Brigade claimed to carry out a joint operation with fighters from the jihadist group Jabhat Nusrah, attacking two regime positions near Salqin. It should be noted, however, that the connection between the Idlib Jabhat Nusrah and the Jabhat Nusrah units carrying out large-scale bombings in Damascus and Aleppo is unclear. The following day, the brigade posted a video of a joint operation with the Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham in which, what appears to be a suicide bomber detonates a motorbike at a regime checkpoint near Idlib city.

In addition to working with Salafist groups, the Tawhid Brigade regularly carries out operations with FSA units, particularly the Shuhada Idlib Brigade, which is considered the armed wing of the Idlib City Revolutionary Council. Currently, the Tawhid Brigade is laying siege to an air defense station near Salqin in conjunction with units from Jabhat Nusrah, Ahrar al-Sham, and Deraa al-Thawra. The Idlib Tawhid Brigade also has links to the Muslim Brotherhood which is a major funder of the brigade.

While defining where exactly the Tawhid Brigade sits on the Islamist spectrum is difficult, the fact that they carry out suicide attacks, have links to Salafist groups, explicitly reject affiliation with the FSA, and emphasize their religious roots more than your average FSA group, all point toward the brigade being a rebel group worth monitoring.

Syrian Resistance Groups-3 (Shuhada Suriyah)

In late July, Jamal Maaruf, leader of the Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah Battalion formed the Shuhada Suriyah Battalions, presaging a growth in capabilities and aggressiveness. Before mid-July, Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah’s area of operations was restricted to Jebel al-Zawiyah and the M5 highway seven kilometers to the east, it has since expanded 29 kilometers further east to the border of Aleppo province and north to Saraqeb.

The expansion began late July when the group moved south of Jebel al-Zawiyah to capture regime positions in Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabl in quick succession. Shuhada Suriyah then participated in the battle for Ariha in late August. A few days later, they traveled 45 kilometers from their base in Deir Sunbil to carry out a raid on the Abu Dhuhur air base. There were many impressive aspects of this operation, including the seizure of a section of the air base as well as the downing two MiGs, but their ability to sustain the fight for two weeks far from their base of operations was unprecedented.

After pulling back from Abu Dhuhur, Shuhada Suriyah did not simply rest and regroup. Instead, it attacked regime positions in the town of Saraqeb, strategically located where the M4 and M5 highways meet, and maintained the fight for three days.

Over the past two months, Shuhada Suriyah’s pace of operations, extended area of operations, and strategic choice of targets has been impressive, making it a key player in northern Syria. The funding that Shuhada Suriyah is reportedly receiving from Gulf states probably accounts for part of this rapid expansion in capabilities.

Written by Berman, Asher at Syria Survey blogspot.com 

Syrian Resistance Groups-2 (Networks and Relations)

Syrian Rebel Groups Expand into National Networks

A new phenomenon is emerging in Syria in which powerful rebel groups that were formally associated with a single city are developing national networks. Rebel networks including the Ahrar al-Sham Battalions and the Free Syrian Army have existed on a national level since the early stages of the Syrian civil war, but the expansion of networks that once revolved around a distinct region into nationwide organizations reflects the increasing complexity of Syrian rebel groups, the growing influence of several charismatic leaders, and the power of money.

The Ariha based Suqour al-Sham Brigade was one of the first to expand out of their province when they incorporated the Shuhada Halab L’Muham al-Khasa Battalion in Aleppo city during the spring. Abdul Razzaq Tlass’ Farouq Battalion, a dominant player in Homs, now claims the Farouq al-Shamal Battalion based around the Bab Hawa border crossing, as well as a group in Damascus that played a role in the bombing of a Syrian army general staff building on September 2. The Damascus-based Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade, which also took part in the September 2 bombing, recently announced the formation of a battalion in Idlib province named Suqour Jebel al-Zawiyah, giving the brigade a presence in the north.

Given their distinct areas of operation, it is unlikely that there is an operational relationship between the leaders of the brigades and their new far-flung battalions, but the satellite groups probably receive financial benefits from their well-endowed patrons. A recent video by the videographer Mani depicted Farouq Battalion commanders receiving a shipment of $100,000 in cash, while Ahmed Abu Issa, the leader of Suqour al-Sham, candidly told reporters in August that “people want to join us because we have enough weapons.”

Suqour al-Sham and the Farouq Battalions are both high-profile groups with charismatic leaders, allowing them to pull fighters, funders, and journalists into their orbits. It is also likely that Abu Issa and Tlass have political ambitions for the post-Assad era. The expansion of their networks beyond their immediate region gives them control of geographically widespread networks of supporters, allowing them to be national political leaders after the war.

 By Berman Asher Syria Survey

Syria-Turkey-Kurds: Scenarios and Debates.

Win-Lose-Debates for Assad Regime, Syrian Opposition, Turkey and PKK

Syrian uprising has given Kurdish groups new opportunities to advance their nationalist agendas while serving as proxies for neighboring states. In Turkey, the Kurdish- nationalist terror organization PKK has taken advantage of the rift between the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and the Turkish government by turning to the former, offering its para-military services.

In Iraq after some delay, Kurdish elites who are connected to Barzani  have entered Syrian opposition politics --with a little push, and unwillingly since Syrian Kurds are closer to PKK and have a  lot of respect but less ties with Barzani--, highlighting the ironies and internal tensions of their own position.  And in Syria itself, Kurds have created the Kurdish National Council in parallel to the main opposition body, the Syrian National Council (SNC) -- a reaction to the possibility-- that the SNC will morph into a successor regime led by Muslim Brothers under Turkish influence.

The Kurdish National Council; a bloc of Kurdish parties, walked out of a "Syria's Friends" meeting in Istanbul last month. They did so because the Islamist-dominated Syrian opposition group refused to include wording about the rights of Kurds, by basically refusing to promote autonomy for Kurds and stating that any issue about partitioning is unacceptable.

A delegation from the Syrian Kurdish National Council departed for the US on May 5, 2012 at the request of the US State Department. Head of foreign relations for the council Abdul Hakim Bashar, who is heading the delegation, said: "It's a four-person delegation, which also includes three members of the council, Sadi Malaye, Kamaran Haji and Walid Shawqi. The delegation met with the state department, congress and US officials. During the visit they asked the US government to put pressure on Syrian opposition parties to look at the Kurdish nation in Syria and to recognize its rights.

Whether or not the Assad regime falls, these cross-border power plays reinforce the increasing rationalization of the Kurdish problem and its destabilizing potential.

 

Three possible scenarios in terms of "win/lose approach" can be observed in Syria/Turkey and PKK perspective;

Scenario I

a. Regime falls and remnants of the Syrian Baathists leave the country under the heat of wide range uprisings and pressure from the international community. In this case; SNC will naturally try to establish a provisional government and the new Syrian constitution's oppose for partitioning will be discussed for a long time, even after the general elections.

b. Kurds unsurprisingly  will put every effort for a maximum benefit, asking for more than an ethnic-recognition. Initially they most probably will try to impose an autonomous recognition. [This demand has been brought forward by Syria's Kurds, as the one and only condition for participating Syrian opposition and SNC. President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government Masud Barzani and PKK patrons acknowledged the demand, as Kurds' sole purpose to exist.]

c. Turkey will probably support the new Syrian regime's efforts for stabilization, primarily helping refugees sheltered in Turkey turn back safely. Should the Free Syrian Army gets busy with fighting regime supporters and remnants of Baathist groups, Turkey might feel obliged to intervene PKK activities which are expected to be intensified on the north-west mountainous region, fighting PKK elements in Idlib-Jabal Kurd and Afrin sector. If the tensions in the Kurdish dominated north-east Syria rise, Turkey again won't hesitate to support Free Syrian Army policing and counter PKK operations in Manjib, Jarabulus, Ayn Al Arab, Telabyad, Ras Al Ayn, Qamishli-Al Malikiyah sector.

d. Despite a painful process, it's not out of logic to consider that allied Syrian Arabs and Turkey will  convince Syria's Kurds for negotiations without a PKK card. Given Turkey serious damage to PKK in Syria, Kurdish National Council will want to hold "autonomy demands" and try cooperating with the new regime who will be eager to comfort Kurds with some reforms and improvements. At this point, US and other international bodies should convince Massoud Barzani not mulling on Syrian Kurdish Council's negotiation efforts, since Iraq Kurdish groups are eager to involve in Syria's Kurd problem in a destructive manner.

e. PKK fighting against Syria's newly established "Sunni" government, and against Turkey who's trying to promote Sunni Arabs, will also face a great deal of opposition and antipathy from the neighbouring Arab countries. Notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council members will not like any Kurdish efforts occluding the road map for Syria's Sunni Opposition.

f. Assad and his associates gone, Syrian Army divided, PKK -with most probably 2000 fighters inside Syria- will not be successful to stop Turkey's military operations. Considering the 600 mile distance from Qandil compounds into Syrian territory, re-deployments are far less possible. Recruiting local Kurds for a low intensity conflict will be the detriment of PKK cause.

[Assad and PKK Lose, Opposition and Turkey Win. New government's approach to Israel and Iran might open new disputes. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and US may out flank new era Syrian politics, leaving Turkey out of the box.]

Scenario II

a. Assad rejects to leave, his army fights fiercely against opposition, causing thousands fleeing north, and a Kurdish initiative with Assad's direction opens path for a Kurdish Autonomy under the PKK umbrella, giving Turkey a solid reason to enter Syria and establish buffer zones in Syrian part of the border.

b. This will also ignite an asymmetric counter guerrilla warfare with PKK compounds deployed in the extending line of Kassab-Salkin-Idlib-Afrin and Jarabulus. Lacking urban warfare, Turkish Army will avoid military operations in the towns, and standing on the outskirts of northern Kurdish populated areas its soldiers will be negligible to PKK attacks. But on the other hand, Turkey's existence in Syrian territory is a deterrent factor for PKK, which will weaken Kurdish hand for pressuring Assad to honor his commitments for  autonomy. Assad might ask PKK for an absolute military progress against Turkey to negotiate Kurdish autonomy, having PKK excitedly using its full capacity to accomplish the task. 

 

Possible Turkish Concentrations for buffer-zones inside Syria will be Kurdish populated towns. This action might ease tensions between Arabs and Kurds, protect fleeing Arabs from provocative actions and help Turkey to minimize PKK influence in the northern sector.

c. According to this scenario Turkey most probably won't make a wide scale war with Syria. It's more sound that Turkey will want to fight only against PKK and only on the border region, which also is the main passage route for refugees and war devastated civilians causing them get caught between a cross-fire. If PKK or Syrian Army attempt to harass civilians, Turkey will gain a noble advantage by its protective attitude.

d. Syrian Army may launch artillery attacks on Turkish positions but they will probably choose to concentrate in urban compounds, instead of attacking Turkey in the open. Assad wouldn't want to shift his premier army units defending the southern border against Israel, since most of these troops will be occupied either with Golan disputes or homeland insurgency. So a Syria-Turkey war will most likely be a static one, more like a mutual show of force. Stabilizing Syrian war efforts on the air and sea with its superior air and naval power, Turkey will be advantageous to locate and destroy "a trapped" PKK in north Idlib, Jabal Kurd and Afrin region which are the most mountainous places, suitable for PKK deployment.


e. If Syria chooses to stall the war against Turkey; avoiding to relocate its premier units on the Israel Border to the north, and dealing with Turkey in an  eccentric level; US and international community will acknowledge this as a weakness and will probably give more serious signals for a military intervention, meaning if Assad chooses not to leave, continues to possess a threat to Israel, and Syrian opposition makes itself visible to world by demonstrating eagerness to get rid of the last Baathist government at the region, a US involvement is more likely. 


f. In case of a US or NATO involvement in Syria, Turkey will have its preferred battleground against PKK and will not need to concentrate on Syrian army. In the long run, PKK might be expected to leave Syrian mountains and focus on political developments for Kurds. Assad's break down will not effect democratic commitments in terms of Kurdish demands, which might create a negative attitude between Turkey and US. It's obvious that Turkey will never accept a solid autonomy for Syrian Kurds. Such a step might bring a turmoil between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, hence Turkey has been promoting a serious scale of economic cooperation with the regional government, and also might damage Turkish-US relations.

[Assad and PKK Lose, Turkey and Opposition Win. But Opposition inherits a long term Kurdish problem in its northern border.]


Scenario III


a. Assad takes serious democratic steps, comes to terms with the opposition and even accepting an exile option, paves way to elections which also brings an end to Baathist regime in Syria.


b. Assad might try to negotiate his existence in the post era. Opposition will not want him to stay. So it can be thought that if opposition becomes stronger and fight against Syrian army, Assad might step down and leave. If Assad fears a US incursion and tries to find common grounds with opposition before US involvement, it's not out of logic that he may first of all prevent a foreign invasion but also may persuade his people and may be able to stay behind the curtains in future Syrian politics. 


c. It's obvious that Assad's voluntarily step a side will bring a different atmosphere  for Middle East. First of all; it will be the first democratic step down, for a long-term tyrannic regime in the region which none of the others (e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Zine-el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarek of Egypt, Qaddafi of Libya and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen) had shown the courage of act. 


d. Secondly, an optimistic political wind, apart from turmoils and blood will make things easier and the new regime will be able to consolidate its efforts for reorganization and construction of the new parliament. 


e. Assad, either choosing to step down or not, will most probably try to take advantage of his continued power and will be more effective in future policy making efforts, than current Opposition cadres. If Assad and Opposition decide to work together for an effort of normalization, this cooperation will not be optimistic for Kurdish expectations. This is why, PKK chief Ocalan commented from his cell in an isolated island Imrali, that PKK should be close both Assad and Opposition and should be willing to support any party who's eager to commit what Kurds deserve.

PKK Check Point on Syria's Turkish border town of Afrin.

Kurds demonstrates in Afrin promoting Barzani and Ocalan as National Figures, together. 

www.strategyonblog.blogger.com
By Coskun Unal

Syrian Resistance Groups-1 (Ahrar Al Sham)

BAB AL HOWA, Syria -- When members of the Farouq Battalions first began to wear distinctive green T-shirts with their fighting unit’s logo in the spring, you could see them only around Homs, more than 100 miles south of the crossing point of Bab al Howa along the border with Turkey.
Now, however, they can be seen not only in Bab al Howa, one of two crossing points the Syrian rebels control, but all over northern Syria, a sign that as the war goes on, some of the rebel groups that began as local rebellions now stretch throughout the country, with a chain of command that’s national in scope; in Farouq’s case, stretching all the way to Damascus.
Farouq’s T-shirts identify their wearers as part of the Free Syrian Army, but Farouq itself has no operational links to the former army officers who defected, now reside in Turkey and nominally claim leadership of the Free Syrian Army. Neither do a number of other battalions and brigades, big and small, that have emerged across the country. By one count, there are more than 600 battalions, though fewer than 10 stand out as having significant organizational capability across large swaths of territory.
Indeed, the news media convention of referring to all these groups as the Free Syrian Army is accurate only in that they all oppose the government of President Bashar Assad. In reality, they’re independent actors, sharing little in ideologies or resources.
In northern Syria, the largest of these groups is Ahrar al Sham, a unit whose fighters generally belong to the conservative Salafi strain of Islam and have proudly hoisted their banner from Aleppo to the outskirts of Hama. There are even reports of them fighting as far south as Syria’s border with Jordan.

“If you want to join Ahrar al Sham, you have to pray,” said one Ahrar fighter near the city of Hama, who asked not to be identified out of security concerns.
In Aleppo, the country’s largest city, the Tawhid Brigade controls the largest number of fighters, many of whom also espouse a fundamentalist Islamist creed.
In Damascus, much of the fight is led by the Islam Brigade, which one Syrian analyst, who also asked not to be named for security reasons, described as a grouping of battalions that also are primarily Salafists.

The idea that army defectors make up much of the rebel forces has long been a myth, one that in past months rebel media spokesmen have done less to promote. Farouq’s fighters are largely volunteers, as are those of Ahrar al Sham.
“We are making a lot of progress. In the past, we were unorganized; now we are much more systematic and organized,” said Khalid Amin, a member of Ahrar al Sham in Qalat al Mudiq, a city of about 30,000 in the western part of Syria where rebels move with relative ease and use the space they’ve carved out to train and to construct weapons.
Though the rebels largely solved problems with acquiring light weapons and ammunition earlier this year, Amin said both remained expensive. That’s a major impediment, the rebels say.
“As long as bullets are 100 lira (about $1.50 each) or more, it will take more than a year to topple the regime,” Amin said.
Rebels in Turkey and Syria confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing financial support for different rebel groups. They said the Qatari government was directly involved in supporting groups associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a longtime opponent of the Assad dynasty, and that Saudi Arabia was channeling money to Salafi groups such as Ahrar al Sham.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/24/3014440/syrias-rebel-groups-united-only.html#storylink=cpy

Syria Shoots Down Turkish Jet: A Crisis with Russia Ahead

When Syria shot down a Turkish military aircraft on Friday, it was yet another sign that the regional dimension of the uprising against the Assad regime is evolving from a struggle by proxy to open hostilities. The challenge for Washington is how best to respond to the crisis at a time when strong support for Turkey may endanger closer diplomatic cooperation with Russia.


Although details of the incident remain unclear, the heart of the matter is that a Turkish fighter briefly flew into Syrian airspace, was subsequently fired on, and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. It was the latest in a string of incidents over the past few months between Syria and Turkey. As Turkish support for the opposition has increased, Assad's forces have committed a number of shootings across the Turkish frontier and actively backed the Kurdish PYD -- the Syrian branch of Ankara's old enemy, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).


Even before the jet was downed, Ankara had been asking Washington for greater support in dealing with the threats from Syria. The U.S. response has been to insist that Turkey ask for a consultation under Article 4 of the NATO charter, which concerns threats to a member state's "territorial integrity, political independence, or security." That fateful meeting will finally happen tomorrow as a result of Friday's incident.


Washington's dilemma is simple: over the past week, it has invested considerable time and effort talking with Russian representatives in Geneva, where officials are assessing the purpose and modalities of a "Contact Group" of countries to find a political solution to the Syria crisis. On one hand, if Washington does not back Turkey sufficiently, it will signal to Bashar al-Assad that downing NATO aircraft will not cost him militarily. On the other hand, if the United States expresses unqualified public support for Turkey, and if NATO announces or even hints that it is preparing various contingencies for Syria (a 180-degree shift from its latest summit in Chicago), then Russian support for the proposed Contact Group could be in jeopardy.


Of course, Turkey itself may have multiple interests at stake in the NATO consultation. Ankara likely views the meeting as a test of its relationship with Washington and key NATO partners as much as a call for allied support against Damascus. Ankara does not appear to be chomping at the bit for confrontation with Syria, but Turkish leaders would surely like to know whether the alliance is ready to back it should such conflict ensue. Based on today's comments by EU leaders, NATO support is qualified at best.


Solving this dilemma requires that Washington get its priorities straight. U.S. policy clearly states that the solution to the crisis is in line with that of the vast majority of Syrians -- Assad has to go. Although avoiding full-blown civil war should be a consideration in how Washington pursues his departure, it is not a goal in of itself. Forcing his ouster via diplomacy alone is a long shot at best, even with Moscow's help. To increase the chances of diplomatic success while preparing for the steady worsening of the conflict (a well-established trend since the uprising began), Washington should openly state its options for "Plan B" during the NATO meeting, and its willingness to exercise them.


By Andrew J. Tabler


Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics

U.S. has wrong idea of Syrian opposition

Fractured, splintered, disorganized. This is how U.S. officials and the international community have branded Syria's opposition, and many say that is why the West opposes military intervention.

At a conference on Syria recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, "The opposition has work to do."

Activists and analysts say the U.S. administration is not giving an accurate picture of the opponents to Syrian dictator Bashar Assad.

"Of course you will not get 23 million Syrians in one organization — this is impossible," said Radwan Ziadeh, a spokesman for the Syrian National Council (SNC), a committee of Syrian exiles. "This hasn't been possible in other cases or countries (either)."

Sunday, the council met in Istanbul to pledge unity and elect a new leader to convince the world that it is a trustworthy alternative to Assad. Council officials selected Abdulbaset Sieda, a Kurdish activist, to head the opposition.

That they picked a member of a minority group rather than from the majority Sunni Muslim community shows the opposition is serious about being inclusive and avoiding civil war in a post-Assad Syria, they say.

"We are now in the process of repairing the relationship between the SNC and the forces working inside Syria so that we may reach common grounds between us," Sieda said.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, where revolutionaries were organizing for years, dissidents in Syria had little chance to unite because of repression from the regime.

Syria has numerous differences in ethnicity, religious beliefs and social strata.

The SNC must accommodate members of the Muslim Brotherhood, liberal activists, minorities and the Free Syrian Army. Similar divisions existed in Egypt's revolution last year, but there was no insistence then from the West that Egypt's opposition movement agree on a political platform.

Before the council selected a Kurdish leader, Syria's Kurdish dissidents accused it of dismissing their interests. Some minorities — Assyrians, Alawites, Maronite Christians, Greek Catholics — have largely not joined the opposition.

Assad is well aware of the mistrust among Syria's enclaves and takes advantage of it, some analysts say.

"I think the regime has played the sectarian card brutally well," said David Lesch, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Trinity University in San Antonio. "Alawites and the Christians for the most part, even if many may not be enamored with the regime or with Assad, they see him and the regime as the least worst alternative."

Members of the Free Syrian Army, a coalition of anti-regime militias, have kept a distance from the council. Wassim Sabbagh, a refugee who left his job in New York to join the resistance, runs arms and equipment to the rebel fighters.

"We don't trust the SNC," he says. "They are fake."

The emergence of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change as an alternative has further complicated matters. The committee supports reforming the regime and does not demand the toppling of Assad as does the SNC.

"We call them the opposition made by the regime," Ziadeh said. "It is not important for us to have dialogue with them. That will desecrate our credibility among the Syrians."

Other council members disagree. "I know some of them personally," said Mulham al Jundi of the Syrian National Council. "Some of them are (the) real Syrian opposition, and they are asking for freedom."

There is some common ground among the opposition. Leaders say all groups share the goals of democratic progress, equal rights and — more immediately — a safe zone and no-fly zone within Syria to stop Assad's military from killing civilians.

And the entire movement seems to agree on one thing: the international community's lack of assistance, especially that of President Obama.

"It's obvious to everyone that no one wants to help the Syrian people," said Noureddin al-Abdo, an activist in Idlib. "Obama could make Assad leave with a move of his finger. But we now know that the whole world doesn't want Assad to leave."

Hozan Ibrahim, a member of the council, says Western powers continue to denigrate the opposition to justify their own reluctance to intervene.

"We don't have U.S. leadership pushing in any meaningful way" for a resolution, says Kadir Ustun, research director for the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, a Washington think-tank focused on Turkish-American relations.

Ustun says it is not Syria but the Western nations that must unify behind a common objective to avoid "endless violence" in a post-Assad Syria.

"If we don't agree on an end goal, we don't know what comes next," Ustun says. "We'd have armed groups roaming the country."

Syria Hits A Turkish F-4. There Will Be Consequences

NATO will hold an emergency meeting on Tuesday to discuss the downing of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces, a spokeswoman for the Atlantic Alliance said.

"Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4" of NATO's founding treaty, under which member countries can request a meeting if their security is threatened, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said, adding that the meeting would take place on Tuesday.


Turkey called for the meeting today after accusing Syria of shooting down one of its warplanes in international airspace.


Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said on national television an investigation by Ankara into the incident concluded that its plane was "shot down in international airspace, 13 nautical miles from Syria".


Davutoglu said the plane was shot down shortly after it "momentarily violated Syrian airspace" but added that the unarmed plane, on a mission to test Turkey's radar defences, had posed no threat to Syria at any time.


Lungescu said, "Under Article 4, any ally can request consultations whenever, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. The North Atlantic Council will meet on Tuesday at Turkey's request. We expect Turkey to make a presentation on the recent incident."


Iran urged Ankara and Damascus to show "restraint" over Syria's shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet, Iranian state media reported today.


Tehran "asks both sides to show calm and restraint and hopes that with tact and tolerance and dialogue, this issue will be evaluated and through a peaceful resolution, tranquility and stability will be preserved in the region," Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi was quoted as saying.


Iran is the staunchest ally of Syria, which is embroiled in a 15-month conflict UN officials fear has become a civil war.


Turkey, a NATO member, sits on the other side as a critic of Syrian President Bashar al Assad's crackdown on the unrest.


A Syrian anti-aircraft battery near the Turkish border on Friday shot down a Turkish Phantom warplane that Damascus said violated its airspace by flying in low and fast from the Mediterranean.


"According to our conclusions, our plane was shot down in international airspace," Turkey's foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu said. "The plane did not show any sign of hostility toward Syria and was shot down about 15 minutes after having momentarily violated Syrian airspace."


The minister said that there was no warning from Syria before it shot down the plane, which did not have arms and was flying on a training mission and undertaking a radar system test.


"The Syrians knew full well that it was a Turkish military plane and the nature of its mission," he said.


Syria has said it took out the F-4 phantom jet on Friday after it violated its airspace, and on Saturday (local time) Turkey acknowledged that the plane may have done so in comments seen as a bid to cool tensions between the former allies.


In a statement issued after Syria confirmed it downed the plane, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey would take all necessary steps once it established the facts.


NATO member Turkey has become a major critic of Syrian President Bashar al Assad over his brutal crackdown on opposition protests and rebel groups.


Turkey has taken in more than 30,000 civilians who fled the violence in Syria, housing them in camps near the border, according to foreign ministry figures.
Earlier this month, it hosted a key meeting of Syrian opposition activists.


Syria and Turkey said their navies were coordinating a search for the Phantom's two pilots.

Proxies

Proxies and Patronage Networks

Just as Kurdish groups have been used as proxies by regional states, they also have used those governments to help fight their own battles. The PKK is particularly adept at exporting its radical nationalist, leftist ideology and its war with the Turkish state across borders. For nearly two decades, the group maintained training camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, then under Syrian control, despite ongoing pressure from Ankara and threats of expulsion from then-Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. The PKK’s Syrian support base eventually collapsed: In October 1998, Asad and the Turkish government signed the Adana accords, whereby Syria banned PKK activities and forced PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan out of his Syrian refuge, leading to his eventual capture by Turkey in Nairobi. But the group soon found another makeshift haven in the porous border districts of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Since then, the PKK has had two regional headquarters from which to take direction -- one in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, under the leadership of hardliner Murat Karayılan, and one in Öcalan’s prison cell on Imralı island in the Sea of Marmara. It also has established networks deep inside Iraqi Kurdistan at the Makhmour camp, which since 1998 has functioned as a self-contained town for nearly 12,000 Kurdish refugees from Turkey, the majority of whom are women and youth. These refugees were first moved into Iraq in 1992, to the Atrush camp in Dohuk governorate. In 1998 the UN High Commission for Refugees gave them refugee status and resettled them to Makhmour, which lies about 60 miles from the KRG’s capital of Erbil in a “disputed territory,” that is, an area claimed by both the KRG and the central government in Baghdad. The camp holds municipal elections and maintains educational facilities that teach in the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish, as well as Turkish and English. The second-generation youth in Makhmour -- some 30 percent of the population -- are overtly sympathetic to Öcalan.

The Syria crisis has encouraged the PKK to extend its cross-border reach by turning, once again, to the Asad regime for aid. The intermediary is the PKK’s affiliate in Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). “It is a historical chance for us,” affirmed Salih Muslim Muhammad, leader of the PYD. “We have a right and we are making use of it.”  Part of the opportunity that the Kurdish groups see comes from the deterioration of Turkish-Syrian relations as the Asad regime cracks down on the Syrian uprising, a development that has reawakened the mutual interest of Damascus and the PKK in using each other against Ankara. The PKK/PYD in particular, but other Syrian Kurds as well, is increasingly concerned about Turkey’s growing clout in the region and in Syrian opposition politics. This anxiety stems from the belief that the SNC, the presumed heir to power in Damascus if the Asad regime falls, is dominated by Muslim Brothers ideologically friendly to Turkey’s Islamist ruling party, the AKP. Syrian Kurds are equally worried about the accession to power of an Arab nationalist opposition, which, they say, would emphasize Sunni Arab nationalism and not Kurdish national interests.

Syrian Kurdish demands also reflect the demonstration effect of regional pro-democracy movements and, in particular, the achievement of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. The bitter legacy of Arab nationalism for Kurds explains why two of their key demands are to “de-ethnicize” the name of the Syrian state, changing it from the Arab Republic of Syria to the Syrian Republic, and to win guarantees of Kurdish self-rule. These demands have persisted past Bashar al-Asad’s offer in April 2011 to grant “Syrian Arab” citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Kurds rendered stateless by an earlier regime decree in the 1960s. Some Syrian Kurds even look to the federalism of post-Saddam Iraq as a model for a post-Asad government, despite the very different geographic distributions of the two Kurdish populations. (Iraqi Kurds are about 20 percent of the total population and most of them live in one part of the country, the north. By contrast, the 2 million Syrian Kurds are about 8 percent of the population and many are dispersed among majority-Arab regions.) Still others who worry Kurdish interests would be subordinated to Arab nationalism or who have assimilated to the Syrian state are unsupportive of regime change.

Syrian Kurdish opposition politics also is part of the big picture of cross-border linkages, intra-Kurdish rivalries and competition over control of Kurdish nationalism. There are significant cultural, linguistic and historical ties between Kurds in Syria and Turkey; the nature of the ties differs, however, across groups and regions. Some affiliations are rooted in the refugee flows between Syria and Turkey after World Wars I and II, as well as mutual annexations of territory, which led to considerable resettlement. Ideological affinities exist as well, consolidating groups across borders on political grounds. Over one third of the PKK, for instance, is comprised of Syrian Kurds. These ties further solidified with the lengthy PKK presence in Syria under the elder Asad, which allowed organizational networks to emerge through Syrian Kurdish parties, even after Öcalan’s departure.

Competing for influence in Syrian Kurdistan are Iraqi Kurdish parties, whose cross-border patronage networks also run deep. Both Masoud Barzani’s Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), founded in Damascus in 1975, have maintained individual representations in Damascus and the Kurdish border town of Qamishli for over three decades. The KDP and PUK also help to bankroll their Syrian Kurdish party affiliates, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria and the Progressive Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Syria, respectively. These political ties overlap with tribal and geographic affiliations, particularly among KDP cadres in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Badinan region, the Syrian Kurdish Jazira area and the Hakkari district in Turkey, all largely under Barzani family influence.

Iraqi Kurdish party-cum-family patronage networks have grown stronger since 2005, when the KRG’s budget and associated revenue accruing to the KDP and PUK expanded exponentially as part of the rollout of the federal Iraqi state. From 2005-2009 the KDP and PUK each received about $35 million per month as part of their party budgets from the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament. Cross-border revenue flows have fattened the salaries of party cadres in Syria, with the monthly pay of some reaching approximately $7,000,  and paid for operational needs, all without objection from the Asad government and its security apparatus. This tacit understanding between the KRG and Damascus kept the Iraqi Kurdish parties from getting involved in the Syrian opposition movement -- initially.

Kurdish Nationalism or Kurdish Interests?

The KRG’s position on the Syrian crisis changed, however, with the sharpening world criticism of the Asad regime’s repression and emergent challenges to its own political and economic interests. Although Iraqi Kurdish elites had the backing of their party cadres in Syria in their non-interventionist stance, they soon realized that the overall Syrian Kurdish opposition was largely comprised of youth and independents who were critical of the establishment parties. To shape the course of Syrian Kurdish nationalism, therefore, it was necessary for KRG leaders to win over the younger generation and non-partisan communities. Supporting regime change and Kurdish nationalist rights in Syria was one way to do so.

Moreover, as the PKK became active in Syria and Syrian Kurds refused to engage with the SNC, Barzani intervened to quell the concerns of Turkey and bolster the KRG-Ankara alliance. Turkey had reason to worry. The PKK had stepped up its militant campaign and Kurds had become more vocal in their demands for democratic autonomy. There was an active PKK sister organization in Iran (PJAK), and of course the PKK retained its presence in the Qandil Mountains, inside an autonomous Kurdistan region. Ankara hardly needed a third uncontrollable Kurdish nationalist movement mobilizing on its southern border. Similarly, the KRG could not afford to jeopardize its lucrative commercial and political relationship with Turkey and the international recognition linked to it for the sake of cross-border Kurdish nationalism. 


Despite its post-Saddam “autonomy,” Iraqi Kurdistan remains a highly dependent region. The KRG receives nearly all of its revenue (nearly $11 billion in 2012) from Baghdad and produces virtually nothing, making it highly solicitous of Turkish and other foreign goods and investors. Approximately 80 percent of Iraqi Kurdistan’s food and clothing imports, valued at $6-9 billion in 2010, are from Turkey. More than 60 percent of the firms in the Kurdish north, commanding assets worth more than $620 million, are Turkish. These realities prompted Barzani to seem to please Ankara On the contrary in February 2012, he convened a conference in Erbil, bringing all the political forces among the Syrian Kurds together, keeping PKK/PYD low profile, to establish a unified front that would discuss and bargain whether or not to support the SNC. And his visit to USA on April 2012 strengthened these efforts by secret talks held with US State Department officials.

KRG efforts have proven effective in moderating some Syrian Kurdish nationalist groups -- largely those under Barzani’s influence -- and may have temporarily pacified the SNC and its Turkish benefactor. SNC leaders have promised to incorporate protections of Kurdish prerogatives into their agenda and the Kurdish National Council has moved closer to the SNC. Still, the alliance is fragile, at best. Most Kurds remain skeptical of the post-Asad governments they envision, fearing that a step to independence by granting an autonomy might be jeopardized. 

Nor does an interim pact resolve the growing challenges and potential consequences of competing cross-border Kurdish nationalisms. These concerns are salient for the KRG. On the one hand, Barzani must avow to his Kurdish brethren across borders that he supports their rights while remaining committed to the KRG policy of not engaging in warfare against the PKK. Yet, as the PKK becomes increasingly assertive in Syria and Iran, the KRG will find itself in the uncomfortable position of having to quell PKK influence not only in its own domain, but also in neighboring states where Kurdish nationalist interests and those of Turkey are juxtaposed. The pursuit of regional stability is imperative for investment and public relations purposes as the KRG promotes its region as the “other Iraq” and aims to expand its budding energy sector.

The Syrian crisis poses another possible risk for the KRG. Even if Iraqi Kurdish elites can bring the Kurdish National Council into the SNC and check PKK influence in Syria, they are not enthusiastic about the prospect of regime change in Damascus. Like their Syrian Kurdish brethren, many Iraqi Kurds are leery of a Syrian government swayed by the Muslim Brothers and anxious about the spillover of political Islam into their region. These concerns are predominant among independent secular groups and establishment party activists, especially KDP cadres. (Goran, the new party that mobilizes secular discontent with the KDP and PUK, tends to welcome any regime change in the Middle East as a boost for opposition politics.) Barzani and the KDP maintain relatively positive relations with several moderate Islamist party leaders in both Iraqi Kurdistan and Ankara, but they are facing a rising challenge from Islamists at the grassroots.

Over the winter months, there have been serious tensions between the KDP and the Kurdistan Islamic Union in Dohuk governorate, one of the three northern provinces that make up the KRG’s territory. On December 2, 2011, locals in the town of Zakho near the Turkish border burned down several hotels and liquor stores, as well as a massage parlor, all of which were owned by Christians or members of the Yezidi religious minority. KDP cadres responded by massing in the streets and attacking Union offices in four towns, including Erbil. The KDP asserts that Union mullahs incited the mobs in Zakho, while the Union and others retort that one mullah accused of preaching against the establishments, Ismail Osman Sindi, is a KDP loyalist. The incident follows the torching of Union offices in Dohuk by the KDP in 2005, which led to several Islamist deaths. Then, the Union accepted KRG apologies. Today, it refuses to join the KRG government of Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and remains in opposition, alongside Goran.

The KDP is loath to see the Union acquire strategic depth, particularly as all parties prepare for provincial council elections in September. A post-Asad government run by Muslim Brothers or Arab nationalists also could undermine Iraqi Kurdish interests by lending succor to Sunni Arab groups in Iraq, particularly in the disputed territories of the Ninawa governorate (anchored by the city of Mosul), where key Kurdish oil concessions and mixed populations are located.

In fact, though over 95 percent of Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslim, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq remains a largely secular ideology. While coopting moderate Islamists into their government, Iraqi Kurdish elites have made a concerted effort, particularly since September 11, 2001, to redefine the roots of Kurdish identity as Zoroastrian and even Yezidi as a means of differentiating themselves from Sunni Arabs in Iraq. The KRG has also pressed forward with its program to Latinize (“modernize,” in KRG parlance) the Kurdish language. These efforts have had mixed results. While youth have become accustomed to the changes, they continue to be educated in Arabic script. Many Muslims also remain devoted to Arabic script for its utility in reading the Qur’an.

PKK says Syria should negotiate with Kurds

PKK Demands, Pressure Assad Regime.


An infamous authoritarian leader-figure of the terrorist Kurdistan Worker Party or PKK, Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal), called Syrian government to negotiate with Kurds, on a press conference held on March 2012, in Qandil enclave, the heartland of PKK.

For the last 3 weeks Syria is facing most violent protests since 1980s, mainly by Sunni Arab community. Meanwhile Kurdish region in northwest is relatively calm since PKK is acting as a shadow police force to keep Kurdish protests at a minimum, proving it has a strong authority on Kurds of Syria.

Karayilan said it's highly possible that the protest will spread across Syria and Kurdish region will be effected. He incomprehensibly called Syrian government to immediately declare reforms which will guarantee rights for people of Syria.

Karayilan insisted that Kurdish question in Syria is one of the most important obstacle in the road for democracy and called Syrian government to negotiate with Kurds at the highest level. He warned of future protests in Kurdish region and said “if Kurds revolt, it would have much more effect than the revolt of Arabs community. Kurdish people demand a democratic Syria and freedom. Syria must recognize Kurdish identity and respond to political, cultural and social demands of Kurdistan people”.

This statement has been regarded as a threat to Syrian regime and also international community, which in fact points out a desire for Kurds, that this "opportunity" will be regarded at any cost, and PKK is ready to make things difficult for a Western incursion over Syria, unless they are provided a serious sets of demands. Despite some political conflictions between PKK and KDP, it seems like PKK and Barzani are in tune for a Kurdish reorganization in Syria.

Karayilan said that Kurdish Question in Syria is one of the most important obstacle in the road for democracy

Karayilan proposed an "initial solution" based on creating an autonomous region for Kurds in Syria. He also called Kurds to build dialogue with Syrian government and opposition and then decide about whether or not to join the protests. This can be interpreted as "the Kurds of PKK is willing to act as hired-guns for anyone who's willing to accept their demands. This is also creating a dilemma that, with Assad approaching PKK, distancing Syrian opposition, means that things will be quiet complicated in case of especially a multinational military incursion.

“Kurds must act together. It's an important process. We think that a change is close but costly and Kurds will pay that cost and be free” Karayilan said.

The PKK has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984, to establish a Kurdish state in the south east of the country. As a change of strategy for the last decade, its aim is the creation of an autonomous region before an independent Kurdish State.  This is something almost impossible to achieve without a total-war.   

Over 2 million Kurds live in Syria, mainly in the north bordering Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan region. They comprise seven to eight percent of the population; and despite the fact that PKK had been sheltered within Syria, and its leadership and cadres found safe heaven in Damascus from 1980s till 1998 (the date Ocalan forcibly left Syria), Syrian Kurds never surfaced as a minority standing up for their democratic rights until 2011. There was a time that they had a strong alliance with Hafez Al Assad particularly against Turkey, but PKK never attempted to support or organize its own people in northern Syria.

So called "suppression" of ethnic identity of Kurds in Syria include: various bans on the use of the Kurdish language; refusal to register children with Kurdish names; replacement of Kurdish place names with new names in Arabic; prohibition of businesses that do not have Arabic names; not permitting Kurdish private schools; and the prohibition of books and other materials written in Kurdish.These are all  trumpeted claims of Kurds to promote international concerns. Assad's regime was never tolerant to any kind of entity within Syrian territory. As a matter of fact,Turkey seems to be the only country developing measures for meeting Kurdish demands in terms of preserving culture and language.

PKK threatens Turkey against Syria action

PKK militants threatened on Thursday to turn all Kurdish populated areas into a "war zone" if Turkish troops entered Syria, a sign the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which has allies in Syria may be taking sides in the conflict there.

A renewed alliance between Damascus and the PKK would anger Turkey and could prompt it to take an even stronger line against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over his brutal repression of anti-government protesters.

PKK chief Murat Karayilan said Turkey was preparing the ground for an intervention in Syria. "The Turkish state is planning an intervention against our people," the Firat news agency, close to the militants, quoted him as saying. "Let me state clearly, if the Turkish state intervenes against our people in western Kurdistan, all of Kurdistan will turn into a war zone," he said. An ordinary menace, which PKK used to comprehend before every major event, at the region.

Western Kurdistan is the term PKK use to describe Kurdish areas of northeast Syria, while by Kurdistan they mean the Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said last week that setting up a "safe zone" or a "buffer zone" along the border with Syria to protect civilians from Assad's forces was among the options being considered should the stream of refugees turn into a flood.

Setting up such a zone would involve troops entering Syria to secure territory. Turkey has turned sharply against its former friend Assad and has taken a lead in trying to forge international agreement on the need for stronger action on Syria. Turkish 2'nd Army Corps' which is responsible guarding Syria-Iraq-Iran border has 4 mechanized and armored brigades covering Syrian border. These troops, supported by commando brigades and armored brigades shifted from premier 1'st Army Corps' might be effective in the outbreak of a war.

While Syrian government forces are clashing daily with insurgents demanding the downfall of Assad, Syrian Kurdish areas have remained relatively calm, despite many Kurds' long-standing opposition to the government.

Some Syrian Kurdish groups opposed to Assad have formed their own umbrella group after complaining of being sidelined by the main opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), which they say is dominated by Arab nationalists. On the other side, SNC Leadership condemned Kurdish parties pushing for independence and playing a double game to gain upper-hand.

But the comparative calm in Syria's Kurdish northeast may also be related to what some Kurdish analysts say is the growing influence of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian Kurdish group allied to the PKK which has kept away from the opposition. Colonel Riyad Al Asaad, head of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) claims that PYD's leaving the Syrian opposition is ordered by PKK HQ, due to the commitments given by Assad regime.

Armed PKK people intercepting Kurdish protesters in northern town of Afrin Feb 2012.

Turkey warns Syria on PKK


The PKK, set up in 1984, is commanded from bases in the remote mountains of northern Iraq, but was once backed by Syria.

Though Turkey has the second biggest army in NATO; unlike the success of Sri-Lanka against Tamil Tigers, it has failed to quash the PKK in 27 years of bitter fighting. More than 30,000 have been killed in the conflict. Turkey, the United States and the European Union all list the PKK as a terrorist organisation.

Turkish officials say they are watching closely for signs Syria may renew its support for the PKK, which it dropped in late 1998 after Turkish Army's massive deployment on the Syrian border. Damascus was forced to deport PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan who was later seized by Turkish intelligence services in Kenya.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has repeatedly said Syria "would not dare" make such a mistake again.

Middle East experts say that if there will be a war between Syria and Turkey, PKK existance in northern Syria will give Turkey enough reason for incursion.


Coskun Unal, May 01, 2012.

Summary of Syria's Kurds' Political Maneuvers

A demonstrator holds aloft a Kurdish flag (right) at an anti-regime protest near Damascus on February 1.


There are about 2.5 million Kurds in Syria -or around 8 percent of the population — the Damascus regime never formally counts them for fear of acknowledging the size of their community. By some estimates, Kurds may be larger even than the ruling Alawite sect.


A new report by the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based foreign policy think tank, describes them as “the decisive minority” in the Syrian revolution. Their participation in a unified opposition that would be “in the interests of the U.S. for a stable and inclusive Syria and would boost the rapid overthrow of the Assad regime,” the report says. Of course this rethoric is familiar, since the world media transfered such articulations before Iraq War, carrying Barzani and Talabani demands for assisting U.S operations.


The importance of the Kurdish position has been marginalized in the mainstream opposition narrative of the Syrian revolt, despite the fact that some of the earliest demonstrations took place in the northeast where Kurds inhabit a strategic area bordering Turkey and Iraq. Even if it looks like the Syrian Leadership might have been given some promises for Kurdish rights,  Syrian Kurds -without a coordinated leadership- are trying to guarantee an upper-hand.


The Kurds are a combative people. As a nation of more than 20 million with their own language and culture, they have defended their presence with fighting guerilla tactics  for decades, in what is today the troubled borderland of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.


The Kurds have reasons enough to bide their time. When they rose against the Assad regime in widespread rioting in 2004, their short-lived revolt was met with disdain and even hostility from potential allies in the Arab opposition. This attempt, notably with a purpose of drawing media attention, was  ill-fated and looked like an organized scene, to get the public opinion other than igniting a flame.


They now find themselves on the margins of an opposition movement dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab nationalists, two tendencies implacably opposed to recognizing Kurdish minority rights.


Worse still, from the Kurdish perspective, the Syrian opposition is being shepherded towards unity by Turkey, a country with a long history of  fighting against a Kurdish origin terror organization (PKK). “The U.S. outsourced the task to Turkey,” tells Michael Weiss, a Syria expert and communications director at the Henry Jackson Society . “If the unity conference were hosted by the U.S., the Kurds would have been much happier.” On the other hand; Kurdish efforts trying to put U.S on the stage, might well have a negative effect on Turkish public opinion against its NATO partner and strategic ally in the region.


The main Kurdish opposition alliance — the Syrian Kurdish National Council or KNC — has been pressing for the past year for its Arab allies to recognize the Kurdish people and their national identity in a post-Assad constitution. If the Assad government fell, the Kurds would likely press for reparations for past forced “Arabization” of Kurdish land.


But the current talks on unity have hardly been felicitous. As recently as Monday night, Kurdish delegates in Istanbul obtained a copy of a “national pact,” penned by the Arab-dominated Syrian National Council (SNC), which contained “no single word” on the Kurds in Syria, according to a Kurdish activist familiar with the document.


Recent efforts by the U.S. and others to cajole the SNC into embracing the Kurds may have come too late, as President Assad seeks to re-impose his control.


The Kurds have at least one loyal ally — the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan, the most peaceful and prosperous region of post-Saddam Iraq. Masoud Barzani, president of the region, has acted as the godfather of the KNC in Syria.


In his last US visit on April 2012, during a talk in Washington Institute, Mr. Barzani underlined the fact that, " Kurdish effort for Syria's stability and over-throw of the regime will have a price." saying that "if there will be war, and Kurdish blood is needed, West and US should be ready to pay what Kurds have been asking for, freedom and democratic rights..."


It is a partnership with a downside: the prospect of an alliance between an influential Iraqi Kurdistan and a possible autonomous Kurdish zone in Syria only serves to heighten Turkish fear about the unsettling effect it might have on its own Kurdish population.
As Syria’s Kurds debate their next move, they face divisions within their own ranks.


The Assad regime appears to have renewed its links with the cultish Kurdish Workers’ Party, the PKK, and is accused of employing a local offshoot of the PKK to crack down on other Kurds. Latest media reports indicate PKK moving about 2000 fighters from Qandil enclaves to northern Syria. Although it proclaims itself to be a pan-Kurdish movement, the PKK is essentially a Turkish-oriented movement that Damascus has in the past used as a cat’s paw in its relations with Ankara.


A number of moderate Kurdish leaders have been assassinated since the PKK affiliate attacked Kurds demonstrating against the Damascus regime.


There is no mystery in why the regime seeks to divide the Kurds, according to Heyam Aqil, London representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria that is prominent in the KNC. “Assad knows the Kurds are well-organized,” “If the SNC allied with the Kurds, other minorities would join.”

Syrian Kurds during a pro-democracy demonstration calling for political changes in Syria in Qamishli The term AZADI, written on the flag means Freedom.

The Kurds and their supporters claim it would be a tragedy if they were cut out of the Syrian equation. They also blink an eye to West's islamo phobia and play the good-old card  that the Syrian Kurds are predominantly secular, western-oriented and embrace a pluralistic vision for a “new” Syria, in contrast to some other opponents of the Assad regime.