Turkey-ISIS...Friends or Foes...Questions and Answers

Alleged Turkey-ISIS Relations

Erdogan government and Turkey’s involvement with Syria surfaced in the first quarter of 2012, but records indicate that the relations between Turkish Intelligence (MIT) and Sunni Groups had a longer history. Of course back then Syrian Sunni groups were amorphous, FSA was not on the theatre and Salafis were the only ones who were able to counter Assad Forces. By 2012, we observed dispersion of these groups (due to religious-ethnic-organizational reasons) and the group names like Nusra Front, Ahrar Al Sham, Ansar Al Sham, Tawhid Brigade, Idlib Martyrs Brigade, Suqour Al Sham Brigade, Abbas Battalion and Ahfad Al Rasul Brigade became visible and prominent for the Western Media and Analysts.

By 2012, we observed Turkish Intelligence efforts; to unite the Syrian resistance groups via influential Sunni States (Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and to some extend Saudis) and promoting Free Syrian Army (FSA) as a secular Sunni Group which should be supported both by West and Sunni States to topple Assad Regime. According to AKP government; a unified political body SNC;  – made up of Sunni intellectuals, clerics and other Syrian Ethnic Minority bodies-, should have had a fighting army and FSA was the best option for such an establishment.

On October 31; The US indicated that it was undertaking its most aggressive attempt yet to reshape the Syrian opposition, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissing the “Turkey supported Sunni leadership” as a bunch of affectless exiles who should be replaced with a group more representative of the fighting groups on the ground. According to the media sources and policy analysts; over the last several months the State Department has worked to broaden its contacts in Syria, meeting with military commanders and local governance representatives, in a bid to bypass the fractious SNC (Syrian National Council).

A serious number of Syrian Opposition figures took part in a unity conference started on November 5, in the Qatari capital Doha. For the US, this represented an opportunity to overhaul Syria’s fragmented opposition leadership. At the Doha conference, the SNC was expected to decide whether to accept a plan proposed by a prominent dissident, Riad Seif, to set up a new leadership group of about 60 members. The SNC would get about 22 seats, meaning its influence would be diluted, while military commanders and local leaders in rebel-held areas would win wider representation. [U.S. officials and opposition leaders called the initiative the "Seif-Ford Initiative” named after the US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford and the former Syrian parliamentarian and dissident who were imprisoned after he signed the Damascus Declaration on respect for Syrians' human rights in 2005. He was released in 2011, and allowed to leave Syria in June 2012.]

After this brief history of developing events; I come to the conclusion that, Turkey’s concerns regarding losing the headway over re-structuring Syria, pushed AKP government to deepen its relations with Salafist Sunni blocks like Ahrar al Sham-Nusra Front etc. and they had to keep some level of relations with these groups, by using FSA and non-significant Turkmen groups (e.g. Bayirbucak Turkmen Tribe) as an umbrella. It’s been published lots of times that by 2014, FSA started losing ground and lots of its fighters [especially the ones from prominent Sunni tribes] joined to the ranks of Salafist groups. ISIS was indeed one of those groups, which at the beginning, had been acknowledged by Turkey as an Iraqi Sunni effort to expand Sunni Jihad into Syria. AKP was not at good terms with Baghdad’s Shia dominated Maliki government, yet was not so influential on Iraqi Sunni groups due to Al-Qaida involvement in the region. Also, there was a peace process with Kurdish PKK and Erdogan was maintaining good relations as well as construction and energy related contracts with Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government and Barzani.

Turkish Interests vs. Kurdish Interests

Most of the military analysts in Turkey agree that; until the capture of Mosul and taking hostage of Turkish Consulate personnel in June 2014; Turkey considered ISIS as a part of Sunni resistance- Al Qaida in Iraq’s Syria expansion- and overlooked its activities, since they were prone to fight Assad forces as well as PKK establishments on the Turkish-Syrian border. 

It won’t be wrong to argue that Turkish interests on the region can be summarized under two head-lines.

      1-  Preventing any PKK involved military/political headway which will cause a future autonomy for Syrian Kurds. (PYD’s canton establishments can be regarded as a confrontation for Turkish concerns)

      2-   Leading political efforts to topple Assad, for paving the way for a Sunni-era in Syria.

To some extent, these two interests collide with each other. Because a strong Sunni dominance of the region will definitely rely on border relations with Turkey, of which is occupied mostly by Kurds. Turkey’s ultimatum to PYD for “not to extend its operations to the West” (Latakia), drawing the West of Euphrates as a Red Line for Kurds, basically stems from this concern. Ankara wants an ISIS free and Kurdish Free territory in Syria, which can be flourished with Ankara’s hands-on assistance. Latakia is prone to be an economic territory for even a de-facto Sunni State, of which, if can be protected against Assad and other threats, might give Sunnis an upper hand to keep going against Assad.

Turkey is aware that PYD (which used to be a branch of PKK for decades, -Salih Muslim acting as deputy under Ocalan since 1980s-) success leaning towards an autonomous (or semi-autonomous) governance in northern Syria, will be a strong influence for its Kurds. Ankara’s efforts to strengthen Barzani and Iraq KRG’s influence over Syrian Kurds were not fruitful, indicating that a de-facto Syrian Kurdish political entity right under its nose will not be a friendly one. 

Does Putin's allegations regarding an oil deal reflect the truth?

Not just ISIS but also other Syrian Resistance elements have been parts of oil smuggling efforts through Turkey. Some Turkish experts believe that ISIS is the dominating force behind all these smuggling efforts, because they are the ones who "sell oil" to any smuggling groups, thanks to the Mosul Oil which has been controlled by ISIS since June 2014.

Besides, crude oil is just a significant part of overall smuggling efforts, because some groups have been caught with containers of diesel and gasoline, probably processed and distributed through Mosul Refinery, which again, puts ISIS in the center of the spotlight as the “main supplier” if not a smuggler.

From 2012s to the mid-2015, (especially in the aftermath of ISIS Kobane attacks, Turkey’s neutral stance against its attacks on Kurds, but then opening of Incirlik Air Base, which caused ISIS attacking on Kurdish demonstrations in Diyarbakir-Suruc and Ankara) Turkey was an accomplice if not an abettor, by loosening the border control (especially through Hatay-Kilis region) and turning its back against smugglers. For some politicians, this blind eye was necessary for Sunni Fighting groups as well as Turkmen resistance groups to revive the suffering economy. In return for cheap oil sold into Turkish markets, they were claimed to be getting medical equipment-medicine-clothing- etc. (!) In this case the FINAL BUYER/DISTRIBUTOR in Turkey can only be a government controlled buyer/distributor, otherwise it will not be easy to create a market for this illegal product and off the market oil sale cannot be a long term job for Turkish oil wholesalers, because the market is known as one of the most expensive in the world. So; even though the government denies its connection/approval/covert support for oil smuggling; we have to accept at least some level of Ankara involvement, in terms of smuggled-oil’s controlled distribution into Turkish Markets.

There is also another fact, that since the oil smuggling have been an easy way to profit, a lot of different groups and individuals started to pursue this trade, with our without the approval of ISIS or other groups who are controlling the territory. [In May 2015, ISIS executed 4 people who were trying to start their own oil network between Syrian Qara Baba and Turkish Reyhanli region]There are multiple records, mentioning about families (who have relatives on Turkish side of the border) got caught digging 500 to 1000m long holes and inserting plastic pipe-lines, to be able to “pump” oil from Syria into Turkey..

Turkey, in most cases, used such events and arrests to save the face, as if they were doing their part, to contain ISIS profiting from oil; but on the other hand, there are countless numbers of allegations, claiming Ahrar Al Sham, Nusra Front oil smuggling activities, of which are known and approved by Turkish Intelligence. [Since 2013, Turkish MIT has the overall authority for Syrian Border security units and military troops.]

     Gasoline Smuggling Route, Hatay Syria Border (April 2014)

     Hatay Altinozu,  a smuggling pipe line close to Ozeker village (March 2014)

Does Turkish Intelligence have some level of control/dialogue with ISIS?

This can never be fully exposed due to the nature of the “job”. I believe Turkish MIT is able to keep “some” level of communication with ISIS, by using proxies or other Sunni elements’ liaison abilities. Again, I believe that during 2014 MIT and ISIS was able to maintain a dialogue channel through a small level of communication chain handled by Islamic Leaders and members of Islamic sects who has followers in southeast Turkey and Syria, which is corrupted and disturbed by 2015.

Is Border Security being neglected by Turkey?

I have to accept the fact that, it is not easy to cover and control, especially Hatay region and its western parts alongside the border, due to the geographical constraints and inadequacy of the border troops. But, the War is approaching (we might expect to witness more airstrikes, combined with ground army troops' movements from Turkey, as well as more Kurdish operations on ISIS with the support of US/Western Special Operation Forces) all for a big push to conduct the Safe Zones inside Syria. 

    Hatay Reyhanli, Kusakli village (April 2014)

Turkey thinks (and trying to convince US/West) that safe zones established inside, might play a crucial role to stopping routine border crossings. But this is something to be discussed for the future steps. Should Turkey and Allies plan to contain ISIS, weaken its free travel in the northern sector and then get to the further steps of the operation for safe zones, this will be a slow moving process. Being able to control the majority of Turkey-Syria border is important for two main reasons:

(1) Such a control, will lessen foreign fighters' influx in and out of the ISIS territories,

(2) This will also make things easier for a future "Safe Zone" creating strategy. 

In a military point of view; current US/Western strategy relies on following steps:

•        Weaken ISIS with constant air strikes, for which the target intelligence is gathered through Kurdish elements working with US Special Forces and Intelligence Units.
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•       Force ISIS to shift troops from Iraq into Syria, (which presents a better open terrain to monitor insurgency movements) and scatter ISIS military ranks forcing them to disperse, and push them for Urban Defense preparations especially in and around Deir Az Zour, Dabiq and Raqqa.[the towns where ISIS officially rules, governs and trains the recruits]
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•        Isolate passage points from Syria to Iraq (e.g. Al Yarubiyah-Sinjar-Al Baadi-Khwayibyra- Qaim)
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•       Clear ISIS from MOSUL and gain control of the oil fields and refineries in the region.

 We have to keep in mind that; weakened, dispersed ISIS may want to get an exit strategy by trying new partnerships with other Sunni groups (like Nusra Front-Ahrar Sham-etc.) and they also will try to announce an Islamic Mobilization, inviting its followers to join the Final Jihad and secure the passage for Heavens by becoming Martyrs. So, before reaching this level, both US and also Turkey will want to get a better control of the border. Especially Turkey, as a forerunner for Safe Zone operations (not to combat with ISIS but to weaken Assad) will have to take care of its (intentional or not) weakness at the border line, to be able to establish relatively safer army movements and transportation to establish and maintain the proposed Safe Zones.

ISIS Eschatology, The Final Battle

Many Muslims anticipate that the end of days is here, or will be here soon. In a 2012 Pew Poll, in most of the countries surveyed in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, half or more Muslims believe that they will personally witness the appearance of Mahdi. [In Islamic eschatology the messianic figure known as Mahdi (the guided one) will appear before the Day of Judgement.] This expectation is most common in Afghanistan (83%), followed by Iraq (72%), Tunisia (67%) and Malaysia (62%).

Historically, narratives of the apocalypse have occupied a relatively marginal role in Sunni Islam, as distinct from Shi’ism. For Sunnis, the Mahdi is not here yet. But for most Shi’ites, He has already been born, but is now hidden and when he reveals himself, justice will prevail. The 1979 Iran Revolution is considered by some Shi’ites to be an early sign of Mahdi appearance. For some Sunni sects and almost all Shi’ites, the Mahdi role in part is, to end the disunity of the Muslim community and to prepare for the second coming of Jesus Christ, who is understood to be a prophet of Islam.

Jean Pierre Filiu, an expert on Islamic eschatology, observes that popular pamphlets and tracts, colored with superstition have always circulated but until recently, their impact on political and theological thinking was nil among Sunnis. A conscious effort to connect these narratives to current events can be traced to at least 1980s, when Abdullah Azzam, an architect of modern jihad, argued that Muslims should join the jihad in Afghanistan, which he considered to be a sign that the “end times” were imminent.

For years, Al Qaeda invoked apocalyptic predictions in both its internal and external messaging, by using the name ‘Khorasan’; a region that includes parts of Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan, from which it is prophesied the Mahdi will emerge alongside an army, bearing “black flags”. Internal Al Qaeda documents and communiques from Bin Laden, often listed his location as Khorasan, and more recently an Al Qaeda cell in Syria adopted this name.

ISIS has begun to evoke the apocalyptic tradition much more explicitly, through actions as well as words. Thus, ISIS has captured Dabiq, a town understood in some versions of the Islamic narrative, to be a possible location for the final apocalyptic battle, and declared its intent to conquer Istanbul (Constantinople) in keeping with the prophecy.

For ISIS and Al Qaeda before it, an important feature of the narrative is the expectation of sectarian war. The early Islamic apocalyptic prophecies are intrinsically sectarian because they arose from similar sectarian conflicts in early Islam, waged in Iraq and Levant. As such, they resonate powerfully in today’s sectarian civil wars.

Hassan Abbas, an expert on jihadi movements, observes that ISIS is trying to deliberately instigate a war between Sunnis and Shi’a, in the belief that a sectarian war would be a sign that the final times have arrived. In the eschatological literature, there is reference to crisis in Syria and massacre of Kurds. This is why Kobane and Jarabulus is important. ISIS is exploiting these apocalyptic expectations to the fullest. 

While Muslim Apocalyptic thought is diverse and complex, most narratives contain some elements that would be easily recognized by Christians and Jews. “At an undetermined time in the future, the world will end; a messianic figure will return to earth; God will pass judgement on all people justly relegating some to heaven and some to hell.”

Considerable diversity exists however, in writings about what will precede this final judgement. Because the Qur’an is not an apocalyptic book, writers have been forced to turn to supplementary materials, including the words (hadiths) attributed to Prophet Muhammad. The events in this period are described as “Lesser Signs of the Hour” and “Greater Signs of the Hour”. The lesser signs are moral, cultural, political, religious and natural events designed to warn humanity that the end is near, and to bring people into a state of repentance. These signs tend to be quite general that it is possible to find indicators of them in any modern society. (e.g. crimes, natural disasters, etc.)

The Greater Signs by contrast, offer a more detailed account of the final days and while there is considerable variation among those stories, a few elements are consistent.

Constantinople will be conquered by Muslims,

·       The Antichrist will appear and travel to Jerusalem,

·       A messianic figure (in some instances he is Jesus, and in some others he is Mahdi) will come to earth, kill Antichrist and convert masses into Islam.

·       The world’s non-Muslim territories will be conquered.

Many contemporary writers concerned with the apocalypse, resent the suggestion that they are somehow affiliated with or participating in terrorist violence. It would be naïve to deny the increasing role that this literature has played in contemporary jihad. ISIS is using apocalyptic expectation as a key part of its appeal. A Sunni Muslim told Reuters on April 2015; “If you think all these Mujahideen came across the world to fight Assad, you are mistaken. They are all here as promised by the Prophet. This is the war He promised. It is the Grand Battle.”

 Another purported sign is the pro-Assad Hezbollah’s movement into Syria, with their ‘yellow flags’. Rohullah Hosseinian, an Iranian cleric and Member of Parliament explained; “As Imam Sadiq has stated, when the forces with yellow flags fight anti-Shi’ites in Damascus and Iranian forces join them, this is a prelude and a sign of the Coming of His Holiness.”

The New York Times interviewed dozens of Tunisian youth who are disproportionately represented among foreign fighters with ISIS, and found that the messianic expectation was part of the appeal. Almost none of the interviewers believed that ISIS was involved in mass killings or beheadings, claiming that the videos were manufactured by the West. All of the youth viewed the existing Arab governments as autocratic and corrupt. They complained that there were no pure scholars of Islam whose views were untainted by politics or allegiance to some form of earthly power; but at the same time noted that, the absence of uncorrupt Islam Scholars could be yet another sign of the incoming apocalypse. All of the interviewed youth praised Baghdadi for declaring him as Caliph of The Muslims, a title longed and awaited by them.

An important figure for Jihad, Abu Musab Al Suri’s book “A Call to a Global Islamic Resistance” is not only a template for Muslims’ individual Jihad, but also contains many pages of apocalyptic predictions. For prominent analysts; this book (translated and published in English with the title of “Your Path to Jihad”) was meant to attract a very wide readership of ordinary Muslims, not just committed Salafis. Al Suri proposes a distributed network model of decentralized resistance that reflects and responds to the aspirations of ordinary Muslims.

In the summer of 2014, ISIS fought to capture Dabiq, a Syrian town close to Turkish border, and released the first issue of its English-language magazine, called Dabiq in July. Its editors explained that they anticipate Dabiq will play a historical role in the period leading to the Final Day, but first it was necessary to ‘purify’ the town and to raise the ‘proposed black flags’ of the Caliphate there. Now that allied forces have entered the battle, the jihadists anticipate that the final battle in Dabiq is drawing near, and both Shi’a and Sunni groups hope to achieve the privilege of destroying the infidels.

But why is ISIS’s obsession with the end of the world so important for us to understand?

For one thing, violent apocalyptic groups tend to see themselves as participants of a cosmic war between good and evil, in which ordinary moral rules do not apply. Most terrorist groups worry about offending their human audience with acts of violence that are too extreme. [This was true even for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Central, who withdrew their support for the Algerian terror group GIA and admonished Zarqawi’s AQI for their violence against Muslims.] But violent apocalyptic groups are not inhibited with the possibility of offending their followers because they see themselves as participants of the ‘ultimate battle’. Their actions also, are significantly harder to predict, then any other politically motivated terror groups. The logic of ISIS is heavily influenced by its understanding of prophecy and military strategic value of Dabiq has little to do with ISIS’s desire for a confrontation advantage there. 

While most new religious movements of apocalyptic prophecy are not violent, the deliberate inculcation of apocalyptic fears often precedes violence. Two types of violence can occur: violence against the membership (such as mass suicide) and violence against the outside world.

The American apocalyptic group Heaven’s Gate is an example of a suicidal cult. In 1997, 39 members committed mass suicide in an effort to join a group of aliens on their spacecraft, which cult-members believed, was following the tail of the Hale-Bopp comet. In 1993, more than 80 followers of David Koresh, the leader of the Davidian cult, died in a fire they set themselves, after a 51 day stand-off with federal agents. Koresh had predicted, based on his reading of the book of Revelation, that his followers would achieve salvation as a result of a violence on his compound. The breakaway Catholic organization known as “The Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God” anticipated the end of the world in the year 2000. Soon after adherents arrived at church on the anticipated date, the church burned down.

The group responsible for the 1979 Mecca Rebellion, a small sect led by Al Utaybi is an example of a Muslim apocalyptic cult. Its leader Juhayman Al Utaybi was a member of the Bedouin tribe that had participated in the Ikhwan Revolt in the 1920s, the aim of which was to return Saudi Arabia to its purest Wahhabi roots. In November 1979, Juhayman’s followers laid siege to the Grand Mosque compounds in Mecca, a sacred site in Islam, which they held for two full weeks. The cult was inspired by the teachings of Nasir-al-Din Al Albani, a Salafi who advocated a return to the pure Islam of the Quran and the Hadith. Albani eschewed politics and violence and the cult began with the same quietist tendencies until the they had been took over by Mohammed Al Qahtani in 1978. Qahtani was killed by Saudi police during the 1979 siege but this did not stop the group which Al Utaybi took charge, claiming that Qahtani was the Mahdi and he was still alive.

In a study that is widely seen as among the most important contributions to social psychology, a team of observers joined a prophetic, apocalyptic cult to determine what would happen to the group, if the predicted events failed to materialize. Marian Keech (a pseudonym for Dorothy Martin) the leader of the cult, predicted the destruction of United States in a great flood, scheduled for December 21, 1955. She told her followers that they would be rescued from the floodwaters by a team of outer-space men, in flying saucers with whom she was able to communicate, she said through telepathy. When the apocalyptic flood did not materialize, instead of walking away from the cult and its leader, most members continued as loyal followers and commenced efforts to recruit new followers, praising that their lives along with the human life, were saved thanks to their leader’s efforts. 

Out of this observation, researchers developed the theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that when individuals are confronted with empirical evidence that would seem to prove their beliefs wrong; instead of rejecting those beliefs, they will often hew to them more strongly still, rationalizing away the disconfirming evidence. All of us have experiences with cognitive dissonance in our ordinary lives: When we hear or see something we don’t want to believe because it threatens our view of ourselves or our world, rather than changing our views, we may be tempted to persuade ourselves that there has been a mistake, that the discomforting evidence is wrong, we may be in need of new glasses or we just misheard it. When this happens in cults, members may try harder to recruit others to join them in their views. Since then, a number of similar cults have been studied, many but not all of which followed this pattern. The vast majority survived the failed prophecy, but some employed other stratagems/tactics to cope with cognitive dissonance, such as ‘spiritualizing’ the prophecy by claiming that the life did not end, but changed significantly on the day the world was predicted to end.

Among Protestant Apocalyptic cults, there is an important distinction between pre-tribulation and post-tribulation fundamentalists. Pre-Tribulation believers expect that Jesus will save them from experiencing the apocalypse through a divine rapture, the simultaneous ascension to heaven of all good Christians. Post-Tribulation believers on the other hand, expect to be present during the apocalypse. Christian militants who subscribe to post-tribulation beliefs, consider it their duty to attack the forces of the Antichrist, who will become leader of the world during the end times.

William McCants explains that there is no analogous post-tribulation eschatology in Islam. “The Islamic Day of Judgement is preceded by a series of signs, some of which occurred in Muhammad’s own life time. The signs are mentioned in words attributed to Muhammad and usually have the formula such as ‘…The Hour won’t come until…..’ As you get closer to the Day, the signs become more intense. ISIS can’t hasten the Day with violence but it can claim to fulfill some of the major signs heralding its approach, which might be tantamount to the same thing.”

Many new religious movements employ a set of practices for enhancing commitment. These include sharing property- signing it over to the group admission-limiting interactions with the outside world-employing special terms for the outside world- ignoring outside news sources-speaking a special jargon-unusual sexual practices-polygamy or celibacy-communal ownership of property-uncompensated labor and communal work-daily meetings-mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance and denunciation, institutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through the attribution of magical powers, legitimization of group demands through appeals to ultimate values (such as religion) and the use of special forms of address. Most terrorist groups employ at least some of these mechanisms. Violent cults develop a story about imminent danger to an ‘in-group’, foster group identity, dehumanize the group’s purported enemies and encourage the creation of a ‘killer-self’ capable of murdering large numbers of innocent people. As we have seen ISIS members engage in a number of these practices. Many Western recruits burn their passports as a rite of passage. ISIS flaunts its sexual enslavement of polytheist as a sign of its strict conformance with Sharia and of the coming end times. The strict dress code is enforced in part by public shaming of women who don’t comply.

Like other apocalyptic groups in history, ISIS’s stated goal is to purify the world and create a new era, in which a more perfect version of Islam is accepted worldwide. This is a typical millenarian project, which always involves transforming the world into something more pure, either politically or religiously.

As we have seen, ISIS emerged out of an especially barbaric strain of Al Qaeda, which was initiated by Abu Musab al Zarqawi rather than Bin Laden himself. One of the reasons for both Zarqawi’s and ISIS’s anti-Shi’ite savagery is their apparent belief in end-times prophecies. It is impossible to know whether Baghdadi and other ISIS leaders truly believe that the end times are near or are using these prophecies instrumentally and cynically to attract a broader array of recruits. Either way, appealing to apocalyptic expectation is an important part of ISIS Modus-Operandi. And goading the West into a final battle in Syria is a critical component of the scenario.

Threat Analysis of Islamic State (IS) Terrorism for Turkey

Threat Analysis of Islamic State (IS) Terrorism for Turkey

1. Presence of Potential Threat              

Islamic Cults and Orders are widely present in Istanbul, dispersed through Gebze, Adapazari, and central Anatolia. (widely in Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, Sanliurfa, Kahramanmaras and Adiyaman). Even though most of these Orders are peaceful and busy with daily life; some, especially the ones organized as small communities in western and eastern Anatolian cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Konya, Adapazari, Samsun, Trabzon, Rize, Ankara, Hatay, Mersin, Malatya, Sanliurfa, Bingol (e.g. Aczimendis, Menzil and Kaplancilar orders) are known with their anti-secular, radical salafist doctrines and they hold a large youth population as sympathizers within their ranks.

IS’s recruitment through Turkey is a process with multiple steps. Social media is the primary source for introduction and gatherings. Also, volunteers or curious youngsters with Islamic backgrounds and religious intentions usually follow Salafi/Wahhabi media publications like;

·          Nusret Front publications (www.haksozhaber.com.tr) (Istanbul-Bursa-Kocaeli-Konya)

·          Takva News Agency (www.takvahaber.net) (Offices in Istanbul-Adapazari-Ankara-Konya-Malatya)

·          ilim-der foundation (www.ilimder.com.tr) (Offices in Istanbul-Kocaeli-Ankara-Konya-Bursa-Gaziantep)

·          Yolcu Publishing (Malatya-Sanliurfa-Adiyaman)

·          Ilke Haber Ajansi (www.ilkehaberajansi.com.tr)

·          Furkan Education and Service Foundation(www.furkanhaber.com) (Istanbul- Ankara-Konya-Kayseri-Hatay-Sanliurfa-Antep)

·          Anatolian Youth Organization’s publications (Istanbul-Kocaeli-Ankara-Bursa-Antalya-Mersin-Adana-Gaziantep-Malatya-Adiyaman-Sanliurfa), which give these followers deeper Islamic ideology and encourage them to join the Jihad, within the ranks of Mujahids.

Domestic drivers for volunteer recruitment mostly stem from Islamic teachings and doctrinal advices of senior religious figures within the Orders, as well as individuals’ social environment. Last intelligence reports indicate that the Turkish participants through IS ranks vary through different layers of public; some married with kids, with military service experience and permanent jobs; others, teenagers with Islamic mind-set, high school or university students from poor portion of the population, who’re looking for adventure and wishing to join a sacred cause. There are fighters with Chechen or Bosnian origin who fought in Russia-Chechen wars and Bosnia-Serbia low intensity conflicts. There are also a significant amount of Turks with psychological problems, drug addiction, etc. who are believed to be attracted by IS’s way of life as well as the regular monthly salary paid to the fighters.

Some security analysis mention that the drive for joining the radical groups (not just IS but also others like Nusrah Front, Ahrar Sham Brigade, etc) fighting in Syria/Iraq is not limited to Islamic doctrines. This is also about sending a message to Western oriented secular system. The reason for IS spearheading the popularity among Turks, may be explained with points like; its black banner holding the Prophet’s seal which turned into a trade mark, its propaganda mechanism through web, its ability to substantiate and accommodate the fighters, all of which are the matters serving as a supportive element for people’s desire to join the Jihad against infidels in the region.

Turkey had to combat against similar religion oriented radical terror groups in the past. Groups like IBDA-C (Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front), Turkish Hezbollah (a Sunni Kurdish terror group), Hizbut-Tahrir, and others conducted brutal terror actions against government institutions, public places, and security forces in1978-2000. If IS can keep its operational tempo and become successful to annihilate the opponents, it may enjoy an increasing popularity  throughout the region’s hard-core Islamists, and former followers of the above mentioned groups are potential candidates for establishing cells and supporting the long awaited Islamic cause (Da’wa) led by the IS, by conducting terrorist activities on soft and hard targets.

If we compare Turkey’s past Islamic terror groups and today’s IS; we will notice that there are a lot of similarities in their techniques, mindsets and ideologies. Another common issue is their stance against Kurdish groups and parties in the region. IS is determined to fight with PYD/PKK in Syria’s Rojava region, and in the past both IBDA-C and Hezbollah were PKK’s arch enemies. So it will not be wrong to argue/analyze that;

·          IS will be able to find enough numbers of supporters inside Turkey, some of those will be the former members of the past radical Islamic terror groups,

·          With the leadership of the experienced command cadres who have been fighting in Iraq and Syria; recruiting, training and arming the new IS cells inside Turkey is possible,

·          Among the potential targets of IS in Turkey; the primary and easiest ones might be Kurdish cities and Kurdish political figures/organizations, as well as religious minorities.

·          Considering Turkey-KRG strategic rapprochement and the last oil deal between two parties; Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, especially its stations in Iraqi Kurdistan and TPO’s (Turkish Petroleum Agency) 6 pumping stations (BOTAS) in Silopi, Idil, Sirtkoy, Maden,  Gaziantep, Adana , with 890 km. of pipeline passing parallel to the Syria border may be a potential target for IS cells.

2. Intent and Possible Target Sets

Turkish government officials announced that there are approximately 500-600 Turkish citizens (some sources claim the number reaching up to 1,200s) fighting alongside IS in Syria and Iraq. A few of these Turks are believed to be acting as leading figures (either as inner circle leaders, deputies under Baghdadi or as troop commanders) within the organization.

Considering the past Islamic terror groups’ capabilities; IBDA-C was successful at using remote detonation attacks, assassinations and suicide attacks on soft targets; Hezbollah was also good at attacking soft targets in Turkey’s Kurdish dominated regions. So newly established, potential IS groups/cells will be able to use the same methodology, but also they will be able to use more sophisticated attacking techniques on hard-targets.

Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay and Iskenderun are the most possible and ‘easy to reach targets’ for IS terror attacks, due to these mentioned provinces’ diverse populated nature, complexity and their economic potential, as well as the mountainous south-western border region which might provide infiltration/exfiltration routes for IS action cells. Other potential targets may be Diyarbakir, Mardin and Sanliurfa, since these Kurdish towns are lightly guarded due to the ongoing peace process with Turkey and PKK, and they are also significantly/politically important for PKK, who has been fighting against IS in Syria’s Rojava region.

In addition; IS may not need to infiltrate its militia into Turkey to hit the critical provinces or awaken its cells of returnee jihadists, but they may choose to use intermediaries or supporter groups within Turkish Islamic hard-liners who swore allegiance (ba’yah) for Baghdadi’s Caliphate. In this case; IS returnees united with the recruited elements of former Islamic hard-liners, might be able to conduct terror attacks and create havoc especially by attacking western brand institutions in big metropols like Istanbul, Kocaeli or Ankara. (McDonald’s restaurants, Starbucks, shopping malls, foreign Bank offices like HSBC, embassies/diplomats, as well as Turkish Army/Police guest houses and personnel service buses in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir were targeted by IBDA-C and Hizbut-Tahrir in the past.)

3. Capability Demonstrated by Previous Attacks in Turkey

On March 21, 2014, three foreigners traveling from Syria to Istanbul (Benjamin Xu-Germany, Chendrim Ramadani-Sweden, and Mohammed Zahiri- Kosovo) attacked Turkish police who were conducting routine security controls on a checkpoint, in Nigde. Attackers were claimed to be ISIS fighters going to Istanbul probably for terror attacks right before the Local Elections. They were carrying pistols, silencers, hand grenades and falsified ID cards. Turkish security officials announced that the three were believed to be assisted for their trip, and the weapons, IDs were provided by their Turkish associates, somewhere between Kilis-Gaziantep and Adana.

Other than the March 21 incident mentioned above, there are no significant and deliberate IS attacks in Turkey, yet. Turkish Chief of Staff’s “daily incident reports” provide information about countless numbers of border crossing and smuggling attempts around Hatay’s Yayladagi, Altinozu, Narlica, Reyhanli border posts; Kilis’s Oncupinar, Yuksektepe Border posts; Gaziantep’s Calkaya and Otluca border posts.

From February to September 2014, IS demonstrated deliberate car bomb attacks, mortar / artillery barrage fires and motorized raids on the Kurdish towns of the Syrian border. Some of its mortar/artillery attacks targeted Turkish positions in Reyhanli, Kilis and most recently Nusaybin on September 13.These attacks are also indicators for IS’s capability to disturbing entrenched military troops with the light artillery and mortars in their arsenal.

Analysis of demonstrated IS attacks indicate that the group has the potential to disturb fixed Turkish troops, with artillery/mortar barrages, can conduct small unit operations on the Turkish Border posts, can conduct suicide attacks in towns and metropols, and small scale ambushes, hit-run attacks on mobile Turkish border units.

4. Assessment of IS Threat for Turkey and Its Possible Results

Turkish Army border troops and brigades are well trained and equipped for conventional operations, have better command &control structure comparing to ISF and Peshmerga forces. IS’s capability to attack and take down Turkish army installments or units larger than a platoon, is unlikely. On the other hand, border platoons (35-40 strong) can be considered vulnerable to IS cells’ ambush type attacks but the Army has been taking precautions to minimize the results of such confrontations, by improving its thermal monitoring systems, positioning tanks as supportive elements, and assigning experienced officers for the command posts. Considering the Turkish Army deployments, its combatant adequacy, Southern-Turkey’s road structure and the geographical terrain; it is almost impossible for IS, to move and advance with mounted militia and motorized troops, capture villages/towns/cities, raise their infamous black flag, etc. as they used to do in Syria and Iraq. This is why, IS threats should be assessed within the perspective of unconventional warfare techniques and tactics.

Forefront IS threat for Turkey is the existing entities within the reach of the group inside Syria and Iraq. In my opinion, the best potential target for an imminent IS attack will be the 35 soldiers guarding the Suleiman Shah Shrines in Syria’s Karakozak village of Kobani province. Shrine and its soldiers have been hanging like the sword of Damocles over AKP government’s head for some time.

Secondary threat factor against Turkey can be assessed as the organized terror attacks of returnees and recruits. Despite the recent exaggerated and controversial Turkish Intelligence success over the release of 46 Turkish diplomats and families who were kept captive by IS for 102 days,-which also might be interpreted for some level of Turkish influence over IS ranks-; Turkey is not immune from IS terror cells’ recruitment and operations, especially inside big metropols due to their problematic structure for security forces’ control and monitoring terror activities. Discussing the possibility of some level cooperation, -perhaps the possibility of a block against PKK/PYD existence on the Syrian border- between Turkey and IS is not out of logic, but none of the above guarantees security or immunity from IS terror, due to the complicated variables of the region. IS’s last declaration of newly founded “Firat Province”, extending from Abu-Kemal of northeast Syria, to Al-Kaim of western Iraq indicates its intention to control and dominate the Turkish border and Aleppo sea-port, and this alone should be evaluated as a potential future threat for Turkey.

When using terror as a tool, most likely targets for IS are high value state institutions and infrastructure as well as foreign institutions and brands which have symbolic values for the public. Places like Starbucks, McDonalds etc are widely preferred by Turkey’s secular public, yet they’re often criticized and disliked by the others. Depending on the results of Western supported anti-IS military campaign which is expected to start any time sooner; defeated or survived IS will most probably be capable of;

·          Attacking Turkey’s high value infrastructure close to Syrian border (e.g. oil pipe-lines, eastern sector railroad tracks, dams)

·          Conducting bombings, arson on western-originated facilities with symbolic values

·         Attacking any visible artistic elements and structures, representing Turkey’s secular values (e.g. Ataturk statues, museums, art centers)

·          Assassination attempts to Turkish and Kurdish politic figures

·          Attacking crowds in populated areas

·      Kidnapping and killing prominent figures of Turkey’s secular life (businessmen, stars, singers, etc) or opposition figures from Islamic orders, groups and organizations.

5. Assessment of violent unrest/protests associated with the threat (either pro or anti-Muslim), likely triggers and places

As the existence of radical Islamist groups supporting IS in Turkey cannot be denied, there are also significant number of anti-IS groups led by; secular groups (mostly Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Leftist ideology supporters), nationalist political groups functioning under Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Kurdish groups leaded by Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Other than the Kurds, none of these groups can be assessed as a serious potential for organizing destructive unrest activities.

Given the increasing confrontations between IS and PYD/PKK in Syria’s Kurdish northern Rojava region; Kurds are on the blink of organizing nation-wide, continuous protests, which may not only damage the ongoing peace process with the AKP government, but also may turn into violent unrests among the Kurdish dominated provinces like Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Mardin, as well as western metropols holding significant Kurdish population like Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya. It is also another fact that any Kurdish protests demonstrated in the western provinces (e.g. Istanbul, Izmir) have the potential of triggering anti-Kurdish protests, which may cause extensive confrontations/clashes among the rival groups of both sides. Recent defeat of PYD/PKK against IS invasion in Kobani and Sinjar forced BDP, call for Kurdish mobilization and Turkey’s Kurds summed on the Syrian border towns of Ceylanpinar, Suruc and Cizre. The army forcefully scattered the groups but the potential of wider unrests still exists.

IS related civil unrests will also be depending on the forthcoming US led military operations against the group. Military defeat or weakening of IS may force the leadership to focus on more suicide type revenge attacks, and Turkey will be a suitable/target-rich battle zone for the group’s political activities. IS also has the potential to influence some religious groups, taking advantage of important Islamic gatherings like Friday prayers, Eid Al Adha, etc, turning them into nationwide demonstrations.

6. Turkish Intelligence and Security Force Capabilities

a. Police & Army

Turkey has two main anti-terror forces within its counter terrorism system. While division-level Special Forces command (made of 2 SF Brigades with 6 Regiments, a training center and a Special Aviation Regiment) is tasked with internal and international operations in the rural and highlands of Turkey and surroundings, Police Special Operation Groups are responsible from internal threats and urban operations on the problematic regions and locations. Among the two, the former is more operational and capable of working with multinational task forces in international environments. Turkey’s new Prime Minister Davutoglu announced on September 22, 2014 that according to the latest security restructuring, the embassies and diplomats in problematic regions (Iraq-Somali-Lebanon-Libya-Sudan-Algeria-Egypt) will be protected by Special Forces ODAs. Both groups can be considered effective tools for combatting IS like threats. It is true that they may not be functioning as agile and organized as their western counterparts but they proved their mission worthiness on most occasions, yet their methods of execution have always been controversial. Turkish Police for example, conducted 5 major operations-with around 15,000 police- against illegal radical groups and mafia organizations, in Istanbul and Kocaeli, in the past three months, and arrested more than 600 with terror and supporting terror charges. Also the modernized border security action plan, prepared by Turkish Gendarme General Command, Office of Police Director General, and announced by the Turkish government on September 15 consists of;

·       Stationery Border Control Points will be established on critical hard terrains,

·       Integrated Consulate Stations will be formed on mobile checkpoints, for mobile passport controls and confirmation,

·       Army border troops will be supported with additional 50,000 police officers designated as Special Border Police Force,

·     Borders will be supported with extra heavy weapon systems and thermal infra-red monitoring cameras,

·     Border and customs IT Software will be improved and supported by new biometric analysis systems,

·          A new data base for immigration and refugee process will be formed and this data base will be connected to intelligence and police networks,

·   Remote controlled TALOS (Transportable Autonomous Patrol System for Land Border Surveillance) vehicles –an EU project headed by Poland and participated by 14 countries, supported by Turkey’s TUBITAK and ASELSAN, currently under production phase- will be widely used on Syrian border.

b. Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT)

Turkish Intelligence’s involvement with Syrian resistance groups is not a secret. President Erdogan assigned MIT Chief Mr. Fidan to organize and assist Syrian resistance groups, almost 2 years ago, when there were no IS, on the ground. Yet MIT was not successful enough to foresee the radicalization of Islamic groups and establishing ISIS with the help of Al Qaeda and Iraqi Sunni elements.

It will not be wrong to argue that Turkish Intelligence Agency showed significant progress, especially in 2014. They successfully assisted France, Spain and Morocco for their operations in Syria. More recently MIT managed the release of 46 Consulate personnel and families from a distant IS safe-house in Mosul, carrying negotiations to move them from Iraq into Syria’s IS dominated border town Tal Abyad and taking over the hostages from IS guides, bringing them to safety require a lot of channels and MIT in general, proved itself credible to carrying out a negotiation based operation such as this particular one conducted on September 20.

Despite a lot of criticism on the Agency; concerning particularly its inexperienced Chief’s strong political and personal relations with the President, MIT is able to conduct effective IMINT, SIGINT but especially HUMINT (with the assistance of few informants inside FSA, Nusrah and to some level IS) inside Syria and this may be a force multiplier for US and Western Agencies for their Syria strategy.

Published by IHS for Carpenter Report 2014