ISIS Versus Al Qaeda. Who Will Control Global Jihad?

While the terrorist foot soldiers are fighting on the ground in Syria, another battle is being fought behind the scenes, one to gain influence over the global jihadi movement. This competition could raise the terror threat against Europe and the United States to a new level, as both groups aim to provide their capabilities.

ISIS started as a more extreme offshoot of Al Qaeda (AQ) but its central command officially announced on March 2014, that ISIS has no relationship with their leadership. Two groups also began fighting around that time with conflicts taking place both on the ground and ideologically. 

In their fight for legitimacy over the jihadi movement, the groups will continue to fight each other, fight for control over Iraq, Syria and experts warn that these rival extremists could soon turn their attention to launching attacks on the West, in attempts to display their capabilities. 

Two leaders behind this fight are ISIS chief and declared caliph Baghdadi and AQ chief and Islamic figure Zawahiri. In regards with the groups' leadership mind set; ISIS is putting more energy on an aggressive show, while AQ is structuring an influence network. 

It won't be wrong to argue that AQ is extremely active in rural areas and among the poor, within the conflict regions. The group was able to reach out the minds of economically suffering territories through out the Middle East and South Asia creating deeply religious elements.

    Al Qaeda's Syrian Offshoot Nusrah Front,fighting ISIS elements around western Syria's Yarmouk region.[AP, April 2016]

ISIS perception is much different however. They are being seen as a flash in the pan. People see its leader as a remnant of Saddam's Republican Guard, and when compared to Zawahiri, they see Baghdadi as having no Islamic Intellectual standing and no moral authority. 

This view is part of the reason why ISIS is having trouble spreading beyond the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. Outside of that, it has only managed to find some influence in destabilized environments in Libya and Afghanistan where it was able to lure some former members of the Taliban with "money". 

Elsewhere, the situation is much different. Whether its the jihadi networks in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE or Sudan, ISIS has had little luck shaking the foundations laid by Al Qaeda. 

ISIS was able to make gains quickly but the noise it made drew to much attention and it is loosing momentum for a few months. For example, while Russians recently revealed that last year ISIS made up to 200 million USD from stolen antiquities from Palmyra alone, their financial channels in oil and looted antiquities have been hit hard by US, Russian and European efforts. 

Al Qaeda on the other hand, brings in less cash but its black market income is a stable, steady some 25 to 30 million USD annually. With Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) alone, the extremists had 35 million USD at their disposal which they had gained mainly through kidnappings of Europeans in North Africa. 

Recruitment has followed a similar pattern. ISIS was drawing large number of fighters early on, through often brutal propaganda and the promise of well-paying work. This has slowed however through hits to its finances and efforts to stop its online propaganda. 

With Al Qaeda on the other hand, its links and networks to move fighters have been around since the war between mujahideen and Soviet Union (1979-1989). However both ISIS and AQ are often able to recruit young men because both are viewed as being against the dictatorships that are unfortunately common throughout the Muslim societies and both are able to offer work to people (not just as fighters but also as side duties for the shadow  activities)  in countries where opportunities are hard to find.

Most analysts agree that even if ISIS were defeated and the war in Syria ended, it would likely only drive ISIS to form a base of operations elsewhere, most likely in North Africa, and give Al-Qaeda even more notoriety. Al-Qaeda may actually have the long game "figured" out in Syria. Bashar Assad will likely stay in power. And in that environment, with ISIS gone,  Al-Nusrah Front will likely be regarded as the most influential group that opposes the regime. 

Al-Qaeda also has a much different approach than ISIS. While ISIS uses harsh violence and brutality for social control and dominance, -something that has damaged its influence among many local population and disturbed the fabric of religious identity- the approach Al-Qaeda uses is more about working by, with and through local populations. 

Still, the balance of power could easily change. What ISIS has done is, to make good on some of Bin Laden's longer range plans. Laden's strategic theory rested on what he had called "the stronger horse" that if you could defy the super power and still be standing up, and actually the Muslim world would rally to you as the stronger horse. This theory was part of Bin Laden's plans with the September 11 attacks. But Laden made a miscalculation, and thought the US would fire a few cruise missiles back at him and he'd still be standing to some possible Special Forces or CIA operations. But instead; the US invaded not just Afghanistan but also Iraq, launched a large scale war on terror and eventually killed him in his hide-out in northern Pakistan.

ISIS on the other hand, has managed to launch terrorist attacks against the West and to seize territory for its caliphate, while still managing to remain standing, being the current "stronger horse". The goals of the global jihadi movement are to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant, and to attack the "enemies of Islam" in Europe, US and elsewhere. 

With this in mind, we can say that what ISIS has done is to accomplish some of the things at an earlier stage in that organization's development, than Al-Qaeda was able to do. While Al-Qaeda still has support from many of the jihadi elites, the actions of ISIS are winning in the ideological battle between the two. Despite the headlines about ISIS losing ground in Syria and Iraq, experts agree that the war is far from over. No matter how things unfold in Syria and Iraq, both ISIS and AQ could prove significant threats in the region and beyond. If Assad falls and free elections are held in Syria, Al-Nusrah Front will likely be elevated to the political and possibly ruling class of Syria. They will not be seen as bad boys in the broad society, instead will be patriots and freedom achievers. 

Regardless of how things develop, the jihadists who have pledged to fight for AQ or ISIS will likely find other conflicts to join, especially those who came from Europe. They will not have a path back to their country and a lot of those jihadists will be going from one conflict to another to assume the holly cause. 

As the fighting dies down in Syria, or if either group is forced to flee, it's likely that some of them will take the road to Europe. This can lead to a situation similar to the Madrid Bombings, where one jihadi mastermind was able to convince moderate Muslims to launch a terrorist attack. 



The war in Syria is not just a civil uprising. For ISIS and Al-Nusrah, the fight is rooted in the goals of jihadi movement, and the instability in Syria merely presented them with an opportunity to further these goals. Their goals are to influence the international system, starting with the Muslim world, then spreading out from there, as ISIS has started doing with its claimed caliphate. 

The longer ISIS is allowed to hold its bases of power, the more credibility and respect the group will gain in the jihadi movement and the more danger it will present to the West. In the rural areas of many Muslims countries, AQ and ISIS have influence because they are viewed as being opposed to the dictatorships they live under. 

By taking the sidelines, the US and Europe allowed jihadi groups to take the lead roles in the Arab spring revolutions, which only helped raise the notoriety of the radical Islamist movements. It is hard to sponsor any moderate group or national ally in the region, as there are many underhanded systems at play.

In Libya, jihadists who were part of the rebellion, now become stakeholders; Iran sponsors Hezbollah and Hamas, and uses Assad as a proxy; Turkey has passively supported jihadi movements by allowing fighters to join the Syrian war unabated. 

There actually are two parts of radical Islamist movements. One part is the action arm. The terrorists and the fighters. The other part is the political arm, the ones who try to influence political systems and spread propaganda. 

One of the best ways to combat ISIS-AQ like groups is to focus on combating their political arms, since this would degrade their notoriety. This will allow them to form bases of power and radicalize people to support their cause. 

Al Qaeda functions as more of a somewhat loose network of jihadi groups that pledge their allegiance to it. The group started as a violent off shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks to achieve the goals of jihad through open systems within societies. Much of AQ's direct political work is conducted through its political spoke-persons  and influential imams.

With ISIS, much of its propaganda revolves around professionally made videos, its use of social media and its videoed horrible violence. As long as ISIS narrative goes unchallenged, they will continue to gain notoriety in the jihadi community and will likely be able to continue to hold their caliphate. Especially their attempts to retrieve chemical weapons should not be underestimated, since they have the desire, knowledge and required professional network to develop and pull off such an attack in any designated location. 

ISIS and Its Possible Novel Attacking Tactics in the Future

The organized ISIS attacks in Paris on November 13, followed by a spree of lone-wolf attack of a married Muslim Couple in California San Bernardino, on December 3, were targeting life’s innocent pleasures. The terrorists shot anyone who strayed into their gun-sights, showing no mercy.

The deadly grasp of ISIS now reaches far from its base in Syria and Iraq. A day before Paris attacks, suicide bombers killed 43 people in Lebanon. On November, 224 died when a bomb destroyed a Russian aircraft over Egypt. ISIS has spread death across Middle East and North Africa, threatening to kill crusaders in Washington and beyond. 

Knowing ISIS as an enemy

IS bases its terrorism on a vicious calculation. It believes that successful attacks will inspire the would-be Muslim radicals that it is trying to recruit. But it also wants to provoke a backlash in order to convince those same radicals that the world despises them and their religion. In February IS propaganda described a “grey zone” in which some Muslims’ loyalty is divided between radical Islam and a country where they do not feel that they completely belong. IS wants terrorism to drive Muslims out of this grey zone and into the black-robed embrace of the Caliphate.

Remember that the West has two things to defend: the lives of its citizens, and the liberal values of tolerance and the rule of law that underpin its society. Where these are in conflict, it should choose policies that minimize the damage to values in order to make large gains in protection. Sadly, in the scramble for security, that principle often seems to be the first thing to go.

The starting-point for a safer world is at home, with the right legal powers. Jihadists are often radicalized online, in small groups. They communicate electronically. When they travel, they leave a trail. The intelligence services need controlled access to these data. Terrorists thrive on secrecy, yet the security services may abuse their powers. The solution is a legal framework subject to political and judicial scrutiny.

The law can be flexible—but only up to a point. After Mr Hollande declared a state of emergency, which he will seek to extend to three months using a vote in parliament, the police were able to stage raids across France without the need for a warrant. Some raids led to arrests and one, on November 18th in the suburbs of Paris, to shootings and to another plot being thwarted. Short-lived emergency powers are justified, because of the heightened risk of such follow-up attacks. But the French parliament needs to be careful. If warrantless searches later become routine, abuses will surely follow.

Resources count, too. This week Britain announced a 15% increase in the size of its security services, and a doubling of spending on cyber-defense. Mr Hollande has promised to recruit more police officers and judges. Yet some other states seem out of their depth. Several of the jihadists who attacked Paris came from Molenbeek, a suburb of Brussels with a large Muslim population that it struggles to integrate. Proportionately, more people have gone to join IS in Syria from Belgium than from any other country in Europe. The Belgian security services are a weak link.

That matters because the Schengen agreement abolished border controls between 26 European countries. Schengen has symbolic and economic value, but it also drags intelligence down towards the level of the weakest. Once a semi-automatic weapon crosses into a Schengen country from the Balkans, there is little to stop it reaching the hands of jihadists in France. A terrorist can put together a suicide-vest undetected in Brussels and travel unimpeded to Paris to detonate it.  

The Schengen countries need to adapt to a more dangerous world. First, they need a stronger outer frontier. The French want to create an enhanced European border force, financed and staffed by all of Schengen’s members. This is a good idea, but an overdue one.

Second, within the borderless zone, Schengen’s members need to take down the barriers to policing. The EU’s database for migrants does not sync with the one at Europol, the law-enforcement agency. The European Parliament, worried about privacy, has been blocking a plan to give police access to passengers’ names on flights. Countries can do spot checks at the border, but not systematic ones. In Europe more broadly, requests for other countries’ records on, say, ballistics and criminals’ DNA, can be clumsy and time-consuming. To change such things would enhance security, but entails no infringement of fundamental rights. Do it.

Return of Foreign Fighters

By contrast, the use of a strong external border to shut out refugees would gravely undermine liberal values without making Europeans any safer. Yet excluding refugees is what politicians in Europe and America have proposed, after one of the Paris attackers entered Europe through Greece, possibly on a false Syrian passport.


The coalition partners of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, argue that, after Paris, the flow of refugees must be controlled. Poland’s Europe minister has written that it would be dangerous to take them in. Although America has a rigorous system for checking the backgrounds of refugees, over two dozen state governors now say a modest scheme to accept 10,000 Syrians should be halted. So does Marco Rubio, a Republican presidential candidate. Jeb Bush, another candidate, is broader-minded—he would allow in Syrian Christians (and IS propaganda chiefs would back him all the way).

The logic of turning away refugees is deeply flawed, practically and morally. Clearly, there is a risk of infiltration, and Europe should monitor new arrivals. But at least five of the Paris terrorists were European citizens, not refugees. Someone determined to blow himself up in a terrorist attack could always pay a people-smuggling network to get him in. Some of the refugees arriving on Greek islands were themselves the victims of jihadist violence, occasionally at the hands of Europeans who went to Syria to join IS. For Europe to put up a wall to Muslims would suggest that, as IS says, Europeans despise them all. That could be a pathway to terrorism, too.

The fight with ISIS

As well as securing its borders and making terrorists easier to detect within them, the world needs to fight IS in its territory in Iraq and Syria. As a last resort, that should include the deployment of Western ground troops.


Some, particularly on the left, argue that military engagement will defend neither Western values nor Western security. Unless it is clear how military action would end, killing people is hard to justify. Moreover, jihadist violence will only rise from the ashes and expose the world to greater danger. That, they say, is what the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tell you.

Crucially, IS holds territory, as al-Qaeda once did in Afghanistan. Dislodging it would be worthwhile, because IS uses this territory to raise money and attract, train and co-ordinate many thousands of potential terrorists. For as long as it controls its would-be capital, Raqqa, and the Iraqi city of Mosul, IS remains a symbolic “homeland” for radical Muslims. The fact of having withstood the world’s great powers—because Allah wills it—serves as potent inspiration.

An alternative strategy to warfare might be to wait for IS to wither by itself. But that is a forlorn hope. IS continues to exist because the Middle East is consumed by a titanic struggle between Sunni and Shia Islam. This is overlaid by the clash between regional powers and the rivalry of America and Russia. Whatever the opponents of military action say, the West is not what sustains this fight. Were Western countries to withdraw and focus on diplomacy alone, the violence would still go on, possibly for decades.

The case for military action, then, is that the alternative is worse. And yet, partly because it has been a low priority, progress in America’s campaign to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS has been agonisingly slow.

After Paris, however, the mission has taken on some urgency. Mr Hollande, vowing to be “merciless”, has ordered intense French bombing on Raqqa. America has been gradually increasing its efforts, including recently by saying it will deploy 50 special-forces troops against IS. Britain’s government is likely to seek parliamentary backing for bombing raids in Syria—about time it supported its allies.

All this is welcome, but it is unlikely to be enough. To destroy IS means taking Raqqa and Mosul. That requires an army. So far, the plan has been to train Iraqi forces to use in Iraq, and to look to Kurds and sympathetic fighters in Syria. That plan is not going well. The Kurds have other worries. Despite the training (and money), neither the Iraqis nor the Syrians are ready for a big fight.

The first step now must be to try harder to make the existing plan work, using more trainers and many more special forces fighting alongside Iraqi units. But if that fails, troops will have to come from elsewhere. Nicolas Sarkozy, the former French president, spoke for many this week when he suggested making common cause with Russia, and putting up with Mr Assad in order to use their fighters against IS. That approach has a superficial appeal, but would lead to a bloodbath—because both Mr Assad and his Iranian backers are sworn enemies of the Sunnis whose home is in IS’s territory. Better to assemble a UN-mandated force using Turkish, Saudi and Gulf Arab troops. That will not be easy, but all these countries have an interest in stabilizing a Sunni region that threatens them—directly in the case of Turkey, which has itself been the victim of IS terrorism.


Barack Obama, America’s president, and other Western leaders have an incentive to shepherd such an alliance, because, if that scheme fails, a military campaign would depend on troops from NATO. Such a deployment still lacks political support. Speaking this week, Mr Obama seemed keener to dismiss suggestions of ground troops than he did to pursue IS. Yet, with each attack that IS unleashes on the West, the imperative to use Western troops against it will grow. In the terrible event of a large strike on American soil, the matter would be settled.

An Assesment on Russia-Turkey Crisis

Downing of the Russian SUKHOI 24 Shouldn’t Wreck the Campaign Against ISIS

Turkey’s strike on a Russian warplane on November 24^th may have been avoidable, but it was hardly an accident. Turkey claims that in the five minutes before downing, two SUKHOI Jets flew briefly across a finger of territory that pokes into Syria, it issued ten warnings. And despite Russia’s denials and a suggestion that its plane has been hit inside Syrian airspace, the run of the evidence is in Turkey’s favour. Russia was provocative, Turkey was hot-headed. But the real task here should be to ensure that the winner is not ISIS.

That’s now a danger because the loss of airplane threatens to poison relations between two countries intimately involved in the Syrian civil war, on opposite sides. Russia backs Assad regime, Turkey backs some Sunni groups. Putin, calling Turkey’s actions ‘stabbing in the back’, vows for serious counter-measures and consequences. Even now, Russia is bombing Syrian Turkmen tribes who have an affinity with Turks and also trying to extend its relations with Syrian Kurdish groups, who are currently working with US Special Forces on the ground.

A grave responsibility falls on the shoulders of the French President Hollande, who has been shuttling from capital to capital to galvanize efforts against ISIS. As of December 2015, Britain, France, Spain and Germany have come to a consensus to support US air operations and started tasking their Air Forces on to ISIS targets.

Russia on the other hand, extended its dialogues with Iran and its proxies to create a Moscow Dominated anti-ISIS blog. It has also positioned some (allegedly 4 to 6) S-400 batteries to strengthen the naval and ground deployments around Damascus and Latakia. On the ground of the current conflict, Russian campaign is not going to well. As well as a jet, it lost a helicopter which was sent to rescue the downed pilots. After years of fighting, the official Syrian Army is in poor condition. With Russia’s logistics and air support, it is now holding steady but has failed to retake back much territory. Due to the Western pressure and the bloodshed caused by its government, Mr. Assad is a liability for Putin. With him in power, reaching out to a permanent peace is almost impossible.

We also have to acknowledge the facts that Russia has its own reasons to stay in the game. Russian civilians have been killed in the bombing of an airliner over Egypt, some radical Chechen groups inside ISIS are of Russian origins who had been attacking Russian security forces for decades, and also Russia is under the scrutiny of Islamic home-grown jihadists inside its borders.

A Russia-Europe and US alliance against ISIS seems vital, yet this may be beyond Mr. Hollande’s reach at the moment. But he, as well as the leaders of influential states might yet shift their priorities, at least to get Moscow and Ankara thinking about a settlement. Yet, both Mr. Putin and Mr. Erdogan are known for letting national pride drive their decisions, backing down or changing attitudes for both are quite unlikely.

The Danger of Russian and Turkish Competition in Syria

The downing of a Russian jet by Turkish fighters has brought the dangers posed by Moscow’s intervention in Syria into sharp relief. While the Russian and Turkish Presidents trade insults and display their competitive machismo, the world faces the prospect of a military crisis between Russia and NATO. Although we do not yet know what Russia’s response will be, we can safely assume that it will not increase the prospects of peace and stability in Syria.

Cooler heads should put a stop to this escalatory spiral now. The United States should take immediate efforts not only to stop further conflict between Ankara and Moscow, but also to forge significantly greater cooperation between Russia and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. In so doing, Washington can both prevent incidents such as this one from recurring, and more effectively address the Syrian civil war and the fight against extremists there.

The proxy war that dare not speak its name

Notwithstanding the joint diplomatic efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, this incident actually fits into a pattern: The United States and its allies on the one hand, and Russia and its allies on the other have for months been engaged in a tit-for-tat proxy war in Syria. Despite the handshakes in Vienna, on the battlefield the United States and its allies, including Turkey, seem to consider Russia an adversary, with several steps taken to counter Russia’s intervention directly, including a major increase in the provision of anti-tank missiles to rebel groups. One such missile reportedly hit a Russian helicopter involved in the mission to rescue the downed pilots on Tuesday and killed a Russian marine.

Moscow has clearly been eager—almost to the point of desperation—for more cooperation with Washington and its coalition partners. Ever since the Russian bombing began, the Kremlin has been twisting itself in knots to engage the United States on Syria: Everything from a proposal to send a Prime Minister Medvedev-led inter-agency delegation to Washington for talks; a bid for enhanced military negotiations; and various ideas for deeper intelligence sharing. President Vladimir Putin, not someone known for a supplicant’s pose, has repeated his openness to enhanced cooperation with the United States over Syria like a mantra for almost two months—and he continues to do so, despite being consistently spurned by the Obama administration.

That spurning is certainly morally and politically justified. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea are brazenly illegal acts. Its intervention in support of a Syrian regime that is slaughtering its own people on a nearly daily basis lacks any conceivable moral justification. But in Syria, there is perhaps a higher moral and strategic calling—stopping further ISIS attacks, ending the war and the killing, reducing the flow of refugees, and avoiding a dangerous escalation toward a great power war. Those goals will require cooperation with Russia.

Current U.S. policy—escalating a proxy war by countering Russia’s moves on the ground, and conditioning cooperation on counter-ISIS strategy with progress in Vienna—rests on an assumption that Russia will eventually abandon its long-held positions on Syria and adopt U.S. ones, either due to setbacks on the battlefield or out of its desire to join up with the Western anti-ISIS alliance.

Similar efforts to change Russia’s calculus have been ongoing for over three years now. There has been precious little to show for them. Far from responding to pressure on the battlefield by compromising, Russia has doubled down in its support and escalated the struggle at every juncture.

A new approach to Syria

A new approach is necessary. This approach would have two simultaneous elements.

First, the United States and Russia would agree to set aside the issue of Assad in their bilateral relations and at the Vienna talks, declaring themselves neutral on the issue of his role in the political transition. Such a step would actually represent a return to the letter of the June 2012 Geneva Communiqué; since then, both countries’ positions have in fact departed from that compromise. Returning to it would mean that the future leadership of the country will be determined by a process of negotiation among the various Syrian parties, with outside powers playing only a mediating role. U.S. and Russian neutrality on this issue in the Vienna talks might not immediately produce an agreement—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the various Syrian groups would continue to struggle over this and other contentious issues—but without it an agreement would be impossible.

Second, putting this issue aside in the Vienna talks should allow Moscow and Washington to focus on what they do agree on in Syria, namely the anti-ISIS struggle. The United States and Russia are not in a position to join each other’s anti-ISIS coalition, particularly since Russia’s contains the Assad regime. But they could serve as inter-coalition liaisons, attempting to find common ground between the coalitions on issues of targeting, military strategy, de-confliction and broader counter-ISIS and counter-extremism efforts in Syria and beyond. At best, such an effort might allow for a much more effective anti-ISIS effort; at worst, it would offer a more counter-terrorism-focused channel for the United States to make the case to the Russian military to modify its approach to the conflict and for all relevant militaries to maintain the kind of regular communication that can prevent incidents like Tuesday’s clash.

Deepening engagement, however distasteful, with Russia on Syria must be seen as a necessary—even if not sufficient—step in bringing the nightmare there to an end; in preventing further terrorist attacks like those in Paris, Sinai, and Beirut; and in avoiding inadvertent escalation. It will not eliminate differences with Moscow, particularly on issues like Ukraine. But the other options available to the United States—countering Russia on the battlefield or doing nothing while hoping that President Erdoğan and President Putin can remain calm—will almost certainly make the situation in Syria worse, and could well lead to a much bigger calamity. 

---Brookings Institute, December 2015---

Turkey’s Kurdish Village Guards

History

Inspired from different State Applications; (Peru’s Rondas Campesinas; Columbia’s United Self Defense Forces; Chechnya’s Kadyrovsty Militia) Turkish Parliament’s 1985 amendment to the State Law 442 For Villages (Article-74) paved the way to establish, arm, organize Village Guards- all from the Kurdish dominated regions-, for their fight against PKK.

Regardless of the inspiration, Turkey as a state was familiar with recruiting locals to deal with regional insurgencies, an experience derived in 1890s. During the last decades of Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdul Hamid II understood the fragility of the Ottoman military, and the Empire’s weaknesses of its domestic control, so he decided to contain the Armenian uprising, as well as a possible Russian invasion in the East by establishing para-military forces that were named after the Sultan, “Hamidiye Regiments” (troops of Hamid).  Some 25-30 influential Kurdish Tribes (mostly from Erzurum-Erzincan-Van-Mus-Agri-Bitlis-Siirt-Elazig-Urfa-Adiyaman and Mardin) as well as few Turkmen Tribes (Karapapaks-Karakecilis-Haydarans) located on the Ottoman-Russian border provided personnel for Hamidiye Regiments. 

Two decades later, the newly borne Turkish Republic faced similar problems in its Eastern region. Despite the fact that they were the victors of an independence war, they felt threats both from Russia who just founded a new Communist State and had strong intentions to widen its area of influence; and Kurds, who sided with British and French military to be able to found their own state, during the War of Independence. The Kurdish tribes sided with British and French forces from 1918 to 1923 were fugitives, with lots of arms and ammunition. The 1 year-old Turkish republic were centralized and were not capable of directing enough troops to secure its eastern and southern borders, so Ankara Government revived an old strategy and approved State Law for Villages in 1924, giving the local military commanders authority to build militia and conduct operations against Kurdish armed groups of fugitives. Village Law 422, Article 74 enabled Gendarme Commanders to recruit Village Guards, arm and train them and use them against local uprising, hijacking, smuggling attempts conducted by the above mentioned “fugitive” Kurdish tribes. The Law stayed active till 1939 and had been revoked following the Major Kurdish uprising (Dersim Uprisings) started in 1931 and suppressed by Turkish Army in 1939. One of the reasons for revoking the Law was that most of the Kurdish Village guards turned their weapons against Turkish Military in the midst of the uprising, because they didn’t want to turn against their own people, and also Turkey couldn’t be able to mobilize sufficient power causing  serious Rebel progress at the beginning.

Temporary Village Guards (TVG) (1985-1999)

Turkey faced with another Kurdish problem, emerged in 1970s with the inspiration of Communism and Left Wing ideologies but this time it would go on for decades. A group,- well organized, trained and properly equipped for guerilla warfare-,named themselves “Apocular” after their enthusiastic ideologue Abdullah Ocalan, established Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and started wide scale guerilla attacks; first against Gendarme Outposts, then police, and finally State agencies and facilities. Attacks were so organized that the local Gendarme, police, or army troops were not able to stop PKK, due to their conventional training, lack of mountain operations, as well as their unfamiliarity with the mountainous terrain.  This operational lack brought the old Village Law 422 in to agenda and Turkish Parliament approved a new Law (no. 3175) to employ Temporary Village Guards on March 1985.

According to Law 3175; the initial responsible units for guards’ employment were provincial gendarme regiments. They were responsible for hand picking the candidates and sending their names to Ankara Gendarme General Command HQ, for a detailed back-ground check. The process for determining the names was a simple one working through the hierarchical layers of the Gendarme organization. The village/town gendarme companies would talk to the tribal elders and ask for candidates’ names, the tribal leaders and their communities were required to be the ones that did not cooperate or support PKK in the past. The age interval for the nominees would be 24 to 46 and they were all required to complete their mandatory military service with a positive record. The village/town companies would send their nominee lists to their Regiments’ HQ and Regimental Intelligence Branch would complete the initial security research for the applicants, before they send the names to Ankara for the approval from General Command and finally from the Secretary of Interior. The Minister of Interior would approve the Temporary Village Guards’ Lists on a monthly basis, as soon as these lists were sent from Gendarme General Command HQ.

As a sub unit of a battalion; each Gendarme Company (either located in the towns/villages or in a mountain post) had a TVG quota of 100-120 and this quota was not subject to increase. Battalion or Regiment commanders had the authority to adjust the company designated TVGs, by shifting some of them to other operational areas, temporarily.

The first 22 provinces (primarily Diyarbakir, Urfa, Elazig, Erzurum, Erzincan, Van, Mus, Bitlis, Siirt, Agri, and Mardin) employing Law 3175 was able to gather a force of 50,000 Temporary Village Guards as of 1993. This number increased up to 80,000s, due to the fact that Turkey started to conduct cross-border operations against PKK from 1993 to 2000. An amendment to the Law 3175 provided Temporary Village Guards a civil-servant/government employee status (with retirement and health benefits). 

With the amendment-1; Central Government was giving Provincial Governors the authority to assign/re-assign village guards in case of a necessity. With this, governors –coordinating with army’s garrison commanders-were also being able to send village guards to different regions or cross-border operations under the operation control of the operating brigades or Corps.

Following the Ocalan’s capture in 1999 in Kenya, Turkey decided to dismantle some guards (since the position was literally “temporary”) and the number decreased to 57,000 as of 2000.

In 2000 Turkish Parliament cancelled the TVG recruitment Law but in 2005 legally gave the TVGs a government employee status with health and retirement benefits. In 2007, the law was reinstated with additional benefits such as family health coverage and a certain retirement age (55) for village guards who served within the force for 15 years or more.

Voluntary Village Guards (VVG) (2000-2011)

In 2000, after Ocalan’s capture, PKK was still fighting and the new leadership sheltered in Qandil Mountains turned the organization to a multi-level well-functioning group, quartered 300 km far from Turkey, yet still able to conduct fierce military operations against Turkish Army. Turkey once again needed Village Guards but their numbers were decreased and there were oppositions within the Parliament due to some criminal activities conducted by some of these village guards, the public opinion against this entity was negative, so government decided to employ guards on a voluntary basis, and they enabled this with a second amendment to Law 3175. According to Law 3175-2; anybody who were under the threat of a PKK attack would be able to apply for a “Voluntary Village Guard” position and his individual application would be followed and decided by town governors-Kaymakams- 

The central government gave the overall responsibility for Voluntary Guards’ employment to provincial officials and gendarme commanders. According to the Voluntary Guard regulations;

They were not given the same rights as the Temporary Village Guards,

They would not get any retirement benefits, nor would be paid by the government.

They would be given a rifle, 4 magazines and 300 ammunition, and should they use it during a fight or a PKK attack, they were supposed to get the approval or confirmation of the local gendarme (later army) commander they were working for. (*)

Again, the volunteers were required to have a clean security history and they (and their families) were required to be distant to any PKK activities.

Their primary duty would be protecting their villages/territories against PKK and other threats or unlawful activities (e.g. smuggling). In case they were needed for a wide scale military operation, they would be paid and provided extra ammunition.

As of 2011, the approximate number of Temporary and Volunteer Village Guards are announced as 71,646. (69,000+ in the Kurdish region, some 2,500 are in the west, north and southern regions) In 2013, AKP Government announced that they’re working on a new law regarding Temporary/Voluntary Guards and added that despite the peace process and PKK opposition against this system, majority of the Kurds who used to work within the force, do not want government to dismantle them.

Tribal Factors

For 1980s and 1990s, the effect of Tribe Leaders and elders were significant on Kurdish societies. Especially Sunni Kurdish Tribes were not supporting PKK and Ocalan was targeting tribe leaders, and threatening their authority, so especially prominent Kurdish Tribes with large populations, chose to side with the Government and became the initial/main source for the first TVG troops.

Buldan Tribe (Sanliurfa), Babatlar (Sirnak), Meman Tribe (Mardin), Tatar Tribe (Cizre), Ezdinan Tribe (Van), Jirki tribe (Sirnak-Hakkari-Semdinli), Pinyanish Tribe (Mus), Ertushi Tribe (Bitlis) were the hard line Ankara supporters and main Village Guard sources, yet all the leaders of these tribes were connected to the system through  politics, business or other financial channels.

Sons and immediate relatives of some of these tribal leaders were protected by the Turkish government, some were located in police academies, military high schools, and some promising ones were funded for college education (Medicine, Education, and War Colleges) in Ankara or other big cities. In 1998, Head of Buldans and Babats were chosen as MPs and served in a coalition government. (Buldan, Tatar and Ertushi from Ciller’s True Path Party-Dogru Yol Partisi-; Babat from Nationalist Movement-MHP-)

1995 and afterwards were also significant due to the unofficial “cheap oil/diesel” trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey managed this unofficial traffic secretly, tolerating Village Guard tribes to bring thousands of liters of diesel from Zakho, Duhok, and Irbil through Turkish border gates of Habur. The trucks would leave Turkey with some insignificant amount of food, cans, flour, onions or butter, filing import documents destined to Kurdish cities and would come back no less than 500 liters of diesel loaded into special tanks located in their back or chassis.

This trade became so popular in 1997s that every VG family who had 3-4 people within the force, would assign rest of their sons or elderly as truck drivers. These VG related drivers would easily get trade permission from Gendarme and provincial government and start bringing and selling diesel. They would sell the cheap diesel to any gas station below the market rate, and the gas station would sell it on the market rate, which back then, was a win-win situation. The profit margin was so big, that Turkish government had to limit the trade with a quota of 100 liters per passage. In 2000, Turkey banned the sale of the cheap oil to individual buyers. Lots of state oil collection stations were opened in Silopi-Cizre-Mardin-Diyarbakir and the cheap oil were purchased by the State for fixed price. (The State sold this collected oil to big buyers with official bids and tenders.)

Use of TVG/VVGs

Initially, the purpose for recruiting TVGs or VVGs was establishing security in the remote areas that the military troops were distant. Guards were required to protect their territories/villages until a military assistance arrived. They were also responsible to be the eyes and ears of the closest gendarme post, and required to support them when needed and inform them about the ongoing PKK activities, close to their regions.

But the Army noticed the warrior potential of the guards. They were almost a match for the PKK fighters, pretty good with the mountain operations and were mostly natural pathfinders. So Army decided to use this potential and started assigning Guards for military operations.

At the beginning; they were participating small scale Gendarme Company operations as path finders and security elements, with the order of the town/village company commander. They were providing translation and security, opening fire against attackers only in an emergency. But their potential was an opportunity for Turkish Army, who back then, had only 3 Commando Brigades, 3 Gendarme Commando Regiments and Special Forces ODAs for an effective combat against PKK. The rest of the Gendarme and border Infantry troops were ineffective and TVGs would literally be a Force Multiplier. So Army and Gendarme decided to support their medium and wide scale military operations with TVG/VVG units, which later turned into a regular battle drill.

Every Army brigade positioned in the South-East of Turkey, started to develop their operation plans with TVG troop assignments, some even established battalion size TVG troops. These troops played a crucial role in Army’s cross-border operations into Northern Iraq in 2001, 2002 and 2007. For some specific tribes like; Babats of Sirnak/Senoba, Jirkis of Sirnak and Hakkari, Tatars of Cizre, company level (60-100) or battalion level (200 or more) TVG operations against PKK, -without participation of military- were conducted within Turkish borders and the results were more than satisfactory.

Change of the Political Atmosphere and Disengagements from TVG/VVG Ranks

AKP government faced a lot of opposition for TVG/VVG existence, both from Kurdish groups in the parliament and political opposition groups. But until 2012, right before the peace-talks process, village guards-despite some disputes, misbehavior, corruption and anti-disciplinary actions- were preserving their importance for the fight against PKK.

The above statement does not indicate that there were no disengagements among Guards’ ranks until 2012. Especially from 2000 to 2006; PKK showed a lot progress of influence in Van and Hakkari regions, which resolved in having 5 major Kurdish Tribes dissolving from the Village Guard system. In Hakkari region; some villages of Shidan, Jirki tribes, in Sirnak region villages of Goyan Tribe and in Batman and Sason regions, villages of Keko and Temok tribes decided to leave the system due to the changing military balance and pressure from PKK. Turkey’s response, according to some political media news and bloggers, was harsh which resulted in forcing the occupants of these villages leave the region. Most of them immigrated into Iraqi Kurdistan and found refuge in UN Camps like Makhmur. Some moved into big Kurdish cities like Diyarbakir and Van and became PKK supporters, both politically and militarily engaging within PKK ranks.

Numbers and Tribes for Village Guard Organization (2000-2004)

Province	Number of T.V.G	Number of V.V.G	Population	Supporting Tribes*
Hakkari	7,643	5	236,581	Jirki, Shidan, Geylan
Sirnak	6,935	2,433	353,197	Babat, Goyan, Tatar, Tayan, Jirki
Siirt	4,680	460	236,676	Kherzan, Amar, Khalilan, Mamedi, Aziyan
Bitlis	3,896	3,366	388,678	Bekiran, Bedikan, Buban, Shego
Bingol	2,655	74	235,279	Bayiki, Beritan, Canbek, Gazili
Mus	2,147	2,375	453,654	Pinyanish, Beritan, Batikan
Batman	2,943	1,019	456,734	Batikan, Reshkotan
Van	7,365	220	877,524	Burukan, Bekiran
Mardin	3,860	1,226	705,098	Omeri, Kehraman
Tunceli	386	89	93,584	Elhanli, Beritan
Diyarbakir	5,814	2,141	1,362,708	Deger, Ensari, Ertushi
Elazig	2,124	-	569,616	Dirijan, Izol,Eliki
Agri	1,881	-	528,744	Sepki, Zilanli
Adiyaman	1,563	-	623,811	Rishvan, Shemski
Kahramanmaras	2,267	-	1,002,384	Agacheri, Eliki
Igdir	377	-	168,634	Bekiran, Redkan
Kars	578	-	325,016	Beskan, Badili
Malatya	1,632	-	853,658	Dirijan, Rishvan
Ardahan	96	-	133,756	Beziki,
Sanliurfa	966	-	1,433,422	Bucak, Izol, Sheyhanli
Gaziantep	565	-	1,285,249	Sheyhanli, Rishvan
Kilis	34	-	114,734	Sheyhanli
TOTAL	60,407	13,408		73,815

Table-1 Number of Village Guards in provinces governed with State of Emergency Laws in 2004 (Records of Turkish Ministry of Interior)

*Tribes’ guard support information is general, indicating the dominant tribe for the specific province.

Village Guards’ Possible Future as a political and military entity within Turkey’s Kurdish Problem

Following the AKP government’s new regulation on Village Guards’ Status in 2009, a large  position for 60,000 opened for new applicants, which was a sign that Turkey had no intentions to shut down the program. But a group of village guards’ attack to a rival tribe and killings of 44 civilians (6 of them Village Guards of Mardin’s Bilge Village) in on May 2009 forced government to set up and investigate the malpractice and lawlessness of the system.

Turkish Ministry of Interior and Gendarme General Command’s plan was to employ some 90,000 village guards in total (both temporary and volunteer) till the end of 2011 but the Parliamentary Commission’s report on the organization was negative and it was suggesting further and detailed investigations, and the recruitment program halted. With the beginning of peace talks between Turkey and PKK leadership in 2012, the fate of the Guards became infertile.

In 2012; 4 major tribes, Jirki, Beritan, Izol and Pinyanish -all, main personnel sources of the program- stepped back and refused to support the system. (In 2011 the total number of the Guards were announced as 71,646) These tribes were followed by some sub-branches of other major tribes (Ensari, Burukan, Geylan, Babat, Batikan) causing some significant dissolve within the organization. Some political media groups suggest that the number of Guards in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Bingol, Mus, Van and Batman are shrinking, yet neither Ministry of Interior nor General Command are keen to provide numbers.

In 2013, AKP Government announced that they’re working on a new law regarding Temporary/Voluntary Guards and added that despite the peace process and PKK opposition against this system, majority of the Kurds who used to work within the force, do not want government to dismantle them. This can also be verified through the 2014 local elections and presidential elections. Kurdish candidate Selahattin Demirtas was able to secure %9.7 of the general votes, but the victor of the elections with %51.6, Prime Minister Erdogan was also successful of getting Kurdish votes. He got the majority of Kurdish votes in Antep, Urfa, Bingol, Adiyaman, Erzurum, Kars, and Bitlis. In other Kurdish cities he was able to get significant amount of Kurdish votes: (Van %42, Mardin %38, Diyarbakir %35, Sirnak %14, Mus %36, Batman %38, Siirt %42, Hakkari %16, Agri %36, Igdir %38, Tunceli %14)

According to the Turkey’s Higher Election Agency 2014 August records, the number of the Kurdish presidential votes for Erdogan is:

Agri 72,356
Igdir 18,964
Tunceli 5,979
Diyarbakir 214,115
Mardin 119,362
Bingol 79,538
Mus 61,250
Siirt 51,379
Sirnak 28,243
Van 174,369 
Bitlis 72,139.

These numbers well indicate that Erdogan Government is still able to employ and maintain a significant number of Village Guard troops.