On October 31 The US indicated that it was
undertaking its most aggressive attempt yet to reshape the Syrian opposition,
with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton dismissing the current
leadership as a bunch of affectless exiles who should be replaced with a group
more representative of the fighting groups on the ground. According to the
media sources and policy analysts; over the last several months the State
Department has worked to broaden its contacts in Syria, meeting with military
commanders and local governance representatives, in a bid to bypass the
fractious SNC (Syrian National Council).
A serious number of Syrian Opposition figures took
part in a unity conference started on November 5, in the Qatari capital Doha.
For the US, this represented an opportunity to overhaul Syria’s fragmented
opposition leadership. At the Doha conference, the SNC was expected to
decide whether to accept a plan proposed by a prominent dissident, Riad Seif,
to set up a new leadership group of about 60 members. The SNC would get about 22
seats, meaning its influence would be diluted, while military commanders and
local leaders in rebel-held areas would win wider representation.
U.S. officials and opposition leaders called
the initiative the "Seif-Ford
Initiative” named after the US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford and the
former Syrian parliamentarian and dissident who were imprisoned after he signed
the Damascus Declaration on respect for Syrians' human rights in 2005. He was
released in 2011, and allowed to leave Syria in June 2012.
The Doha meeting concluded with the
establishment of a new body for the Syrian Resistance. The carefully balanced
new group “National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces” will be headed by Mouaz Al Khatib, a
cleric imam who fled Syria for Cairo in July 2012. Al-Khatib is known as a moderate who has called for
political pluralism and strongly opposes sectarian divisions among Syrians.
Naming him as a president of the coalition is expected to be a move to counter or
control Muslim extremists who are gaining power among rebel groups.
Riad Seif and Suheir
Atassi were elected vice presidents. Mr. Riad Seif, 66, was a member of the
so-called "Damascus Declaration" group – a coalition of pro-democracy
activists that came into existence after Assad came to power in 2000. Seif is
one of the country's most prominent opposition figures. He was released from
prison in July 2010 after years in jail for anti-government activities. Mrs.
Suheir Atassi, a long time opposition activist and a lawyer, comes from an
influential socialist family from the central city of Homs. She has been an
outspoken critic of Assad for years and was arrested days after the uprising
began while taking part in an anti-government protest in central Damascus.
As a result of the Doha
meetings; SNC secured 22 out of 60 seats in the new establishment and also
appointed a new leadership cadre, announcing a Syrian Christian and Communist
George Sabra as its new president. Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohammed
Farooq Taifoor was elected as Sabra's deputy. The Brotherhood, a political
Islamist group with strong affiliates in Egypt and around the Arab world, is
known to be the dominant force within the SNC. So, by appointing Sabra as the
new head, SNC is acknowledged to be trying to promote a more democratic profile
to the US and the West, which can be interpreted as the new body of the Syrian
Resistance will be more cooperative at least until they’ve got weapons and
sources. The new group so far has been welcomed by Britain, France, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and six member states of the Arab League.
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Syrian
Militia
Since the uprising against Assad Regime
started in Syria as of 2011, world had witnessed that the main stream
opposition was out sourced from Syrian Military units; which adopted the name
"Free Syrian Army" (FSA).
FSA, -not well organized and equipped, and
unable to launch a massive and decisive attack against Syrian Army-, was
desperate against Assad at the beginning. Turkey's efforts to provide shelter
and some military equipment for Syrian militia and providing refuge for fleeing
civilians, along with some core members of the resistance was fruitless to
ignite the resistance for fight. At this point, international observes along
with media, witnessed new militia groups emerging one after another. As of
February 2012, there were at least 10 different groups protecting their
territories and fighting against Baathist groups.
To date; it's hard to give a definite number
of resistance groups, but at the main stage of the ongoing battle, there are at
least 15 to 20 local or nationwide groups with approximately 30,000 fighters,
some with foreign roots; mostly organized in battalion level and larger
formations, fighting with guerilla tactics against Assad Forces.
Some of the most significant opposition groups
on the Syrian battlefield are; Free
Syrian Army Command (Nationalist, Moderate) Idlib Tawhid Brigade (Jihadist),
Aleppo Tawhid Brigade, Jabhat Al Nusrah (jihadist), Ahrar Al Sham, Shuhada
Idlib Brigade, Dera’a Al Thawra Battalion, Shuqur Al Sham Brigade, Aleppo Al
Khassa Battalion, Farouq Battalion aka Tlass Battalion (FSA), Ahfad Al Rasul
Brigade, Umma Brigade, Hamza Battalion (FSA), Shuhada Suriyah Battalion
(Jihadist), Othman Dhu Nurain Battalion (FSA), Al Sahaba Brigade (Jihadist), Al
Qaka Brigade, Fajrul Islam (Jihadist), Tawafiq Group, Al Saiqa Brigade and
Turkmen Brigade (FSA).
It’s imperative to emphasize that Brigade
level groups are believed to be holding 300-800 armed militias, and at
battalion level this number might change from 50 to 100. The most notable and
well-known figure of the Syrian revolt, Free Syrian Army (FSA) is believed to
have over 10,000 militia, mostly deserters from the Syrian Army. Given the fact
that there are at least 4 generals and 9 to 10 Colonels who are able to establish
functioning command & control structures within FSA, and their commitment
to unite the dispersed militia groups under an umbrella, make FSA the only
accountable resistance group.
On 24
March 2012, the Free Syrian Army united with the Higher Military Council of SNC.
The groups agreed to put their differences behind them, and in a statement declared
that they decided to unite all the military councils and battalions inside the
country under the unified leadership of the Free Syrian Army.
As of
today, it’s obvious that FSA is far from controlling the overall militia. The
latest tragic event on September 3, execution of 13 captured Syrian Army
soldiers by Al Qaida linked “Jabhat Al Nusrah” fraction, created a disturbance with
no condemn among FSA and SNC ranks. The execution was quiet similar to Iraqi Al
Qaida’s brutal raid to Haditha Police Barracks on March 2012. During the infamous raid, Iraqi Al Qaeda
members killed 27 handcuffed Iraqi policemen and 2 police chiefs with
suppressed pistol shots to the head. And Jabhat Al Nusrah fighters performed a
very similar brutality by shooting surrendered and handcuffed Syrian soldiers
in the head one by one. It is likely that they do not want to endanger their
reputation as a Syrian resistance group by being linked to Al Qaeda. But in
terms of their methods, approach and structure, there are indications that Al-Nusrah
and Al Qaeda are linked.
Despite
FSA’s military efforts to organize a unified resistance with the ability of
launching coordinated defensive and offensive urban warfare against Syrian
Army; jihadist/extremist groups like Al Nusrah, Fajrul Islam and Al Sahaba brigades
seem to prefer more decentralized operations, focusing on weak military targets,
hitting them with terrorist tactics, executing the captured soldiers publicly
and “punishing” anybody suspected to have ties with regime. These mentioned
groups proved themselves effective to create safe areas in Idlib, Aleppo,
Zawiyah and Hama; which are currently facing heavy counter attacks by regime
forces. Even though Germany Intelligence Agency (BND) reports and some European
media articles claim these radical Islamist groups as minority, they still pose
a threat for Syria’s stability during the post -Assad era, as well as Israel’s current
and future struggle with Hamas and Hezbollah.
In the military perspective, militia’s operations support several major
objectives. First, they inflict increasing losses on regime personnel and
equipment, including combat vehicles, and aircraft. According to the daily
casualty reports of Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on Facebook, regime
forces averaged nearly 50 personnel killed per day in October, up from 35 in
September. And in the first ten days of November, the average rose to 54. Wounded
and captured personnel as well as defectors must be added to this toll. Meanwhile,
reported clashes between rebel and regime units averaged some 25 per day last
month, up from 18 in September; the total October tally of 764 was the highest
monthly number since the war began.
Second, militia forces are
interdicting key lines of communication, especially in Aleppo and Idlib
provinces. This activity hinders the regime's ability to move forces to
threatened areas and ties them up in protection of lines of communication (LOC).
As a result, this contributes to the isolation of regime positions in disputed
areas, including artillery fire bases and airfields. While the rebels still
have difficulty overrunning major regime positions, they are able to invest and
harass them.
Third,
the militia forces are reducing the regime's influence and presence in rural
areas, by seizing positions or forcing the government to abandon them under
pressure. This might be helpful for establishing safe zones in a close future.
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How to
Support the Syrian Opposition
1. The first step to organize a strong and
functioning resistance is having a unified political structure, military
command, and of course a national strategy for their war against the regime. If
the newly elected body of “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces” becomes successful to gain internal and international trust,
the states like Turkey, Britain, France and even US might be more confident for
providing arms, basic weapon systems and other necessary equipment to a
reliable interlocutor.
2. Establishment of a no-fly zone over
Northern Syria is vitally important to give an upper hand to opposition. The boundaries
of this area will possibly be shaped by militia’s efforts in the rural areas of
Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo and Al Thawra, which are all within the 36th parallel.
These places are currently undertaking air and artillery attacks by regime
forces.
3. The uncoordinated militia is attacking weak
regime positions and facilities to acquire weapons and ammunition. Every
position they take provides some of each, sometimes in large quantities. Favorite
targets are checkpoints and air defense facilities. Although these types of
attacks create considerable pressure on the regime, the necessity to acquire a
few AK-47s or RPG-7s along with some ammunition, is also a burden for the
resistance leadership. Establishing a secure and safe supply route to provide
small arms and ammunition is important to support the command structure to
focus on more critical objectives.
4. The newly formed revolutionary council
should work hard to convince Russia and China that they’re dedicated to
overthrow Assad regime but mutual relations during post-Assad era will remain
close. Should the uprising turns into a nation-wide organized resistance, it
will be easier to entice Russia and China take Assad out of the equation.
5. An overt US military involvement might
strengthen Al Qaeda in Syria, having jihadist groups separate themselves from
the Syrian Opposition. According to some area experts, this separation is
inevitable in the future due to rationalism and a number of other factors. But also an American military intervention might
end up inflaming the region's sectarian divisions. For now, the United States
should continue quietly working with key countries in the region like Turkey, a
NATO ally with the strongest potential to provide assistance and safe harbor to
Syrians looking to leave the conflict zone. Another important country is Iraq,
which has strong economic links to Syria—the United States should try to use
its leverage with the Iraqi government to get its support in isolating the
Assad regime in Syria.
6. Washington should be
aware that jihadist sectarian groups are getting stronger in Iraq, Lebanon and
Jordan as a result of the complexities, and this might raise the threat level
Israel might face, if the flame spreads over Syria. Al Qaeda in Iraq and its
sub groups in Syria should be monitored carefully. Israel currently dealing
with terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran and executed by Hezbollah and Hamas of
Lebanon will be completely surrounded by “war-ready” hostiles, if Syrian
opposition fragments. Washington should convince Israel for controlled counter
attacks and pressure Netanyahu to avoid civilian casualties considering that
the deaths of innocent will strengthen radicalism and anti-Americanism, not
only in Syria but also in the Middle East.
7. On the other hand if the war against Assad
escalates to an uncontrollable bloodshed, if the Syrian opposition clearly asks
for American help, if the rest of the Arab States support such a military
intervention, and if America's European allies prove ready to join in such an
effort, the United States should contribute those military assets which only it
can provide. It was the French and British governments that took the political
lead in putting together the Libyan military intervention. In the case of
Syria, that sort of leadership should fall to Turkey—a NATO ally, a Middle
Eastern state bordering Syria, and a Muslim society with a moderate Islamist
government.
8. Other than Russia, China, Iran and North
Korea; there are currently 36 open embassies in Damascus.
(Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,
Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark (Beirut Office), Eritrea, European Union
Delegation, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, North
Korea, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen. )
Denmark, Hungary Bulgaria and Czech Republic
are the NATO member states which have not closed their embassies in Damascus.
Their existence in Syria, maintaining diplomatic relations with Assad Regime
might jeopardize a NATO military intervention. NATO and Washington should find
a way to politically isolate Assad and provide unity among their member states.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hot Regions
and Militia’s Area of Operations (Map 1)
Since the beginning of November, the fighting
in Afrin, Idlib, Aleppo and Al Zawiyah is accelerating. Assad's forces have
lost some positions in Idlib. The militia also just invested the key regime
airfield at Taftanaz. Aleppo is under growing threat of isolation from the
west, south, and east, and key regime strongholds near Afrin, Atareb and Managh
in Aleppo province are surrounded by militia. Along with FSA; Jabhat Al Nusrah,
Shuqur Al Sham, Al Tawhid and Shuhada Idlib Brigades are known to be operating
in these cities and surroundings.
According to military analysts and Middle East
reports, clashes have also increased to some extend in the countryside around
Damascus. Serious fighting has erupted there as the regime tries to maintain
control over the outskirts while suppressing the rebel presence inside the city
-- in other words, Assad's forces are now battling for the very center of the
regime. The intensified fighting there also means that the regime is less able
to reinforce other important theaters. Mostly FSA is operating in Damascus and
its neighboring regions to the north. Also jihadist Jabhat Al Nusrah and Shuqur
Al Sham brigades are believed to be controlling southern towns of Darayya, Al
Moadamyeh, Artooz, Qatana, Al Kiswah and Zakyah.
The rebellion is growing in the central-eastern
cities of Al Thawra, Raqqa, Tal Abyad, Hasakah and Deir al-Zour as well. In
Raqqa province, armed opposition elements are on the rise, seizing territory
near the Turkish border through Tal Abyad, Suluk and interdicting the main
highways to Hasakah and Deir al-Zour provinces at several points. Formerly one
of the peaceful provinces in Syria, Hasakah has seen a dramatic increase in
fighting this month, including the seizure of the Ras Al-Ain border crossing
with Turkey and clashes in several other locations in the north. The regime
rushed reinforcements to Ras al-Ain and has employed combat helicopters in the
area, but has been unable to suppress the unrest. Intelligence reports mention some
FSA involvement with small scale demonstrations and operations, especially with
Al Abbas Battalion Forces. But the dominant groups in the central Al Thawra,
Raqqa and Deir Al Zour are told to be jihadist/salafist Ahfad Al Rasul Brigade,
Fajir Al Islam and Tawafiq Battalion militias.
Media reports mention about PKK deployments
under its umbrella organization PYD, throughout Syria’s northern border with
Turkey, through Aleppo’s Ashrafiyeh and Seikh Makshoud towns, Afrin, Ayn Al
Arab, Qamishli and Malikiyah towns and surroundings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turkey’s
Military Positioning and Capabilities (Map
2)
Turkey’s 2’nd Army Command responsible for
the eastern and southern regions is currently deployed on Syrian border with seven
brigades. Syrian border falls under the 2’nd Army’s 6th Corps’ area
of responsibility. Four of those seven brigades (39th Mechanized Infantry
Brigade, 5th Armored Brigade, 20th Armored Brigade and 70th
Armored Brigade) are actually 6th Corps’ troops and their border
positioning against Syria did not be acknowledged as a serious situation but a
cautious measure, until the Turkish Parliament authorized military operations
and ordered Chief of Staff to apply new rules of engagement if necessary
against Syria on October 4.
In a few weeks, new troops and weapon systems
are transported to the region. In addition to the 6th Corps’ four
brigades; 1st Commando Brigade (Airborne), 16th
Mechanized Brigade, 172nd Infantry Brigade, a Special Forces Brigade
along with Stinger systems, modern T-155 howitzers and MLRS units are brought
to the border and attached to the 6th Corps’ battle plan. 25 F-16
fighter jets are attached to 8th Airbase Command in Diyarbakir and
the number of F-16s in this base rose up to around 130.
Turkey’s recent artillery retaliation attacks
on October 4 and 5, against Syrian army positions proved that the border is hot
and a military incursion is close. But Turkey’s war readiness efforts signal
the opposite for several reasons:
(1) Turkish military
lacks in urban warfare, which is a “must to know” if the purpose is to support
militia on the ground and fight against Assad troops to throw them back from
critical regions like Aleppo, Idlib or Afrin for creating a “promised” safe
zone. According to the media reports, deployed armored and infantry troops are
busy with digging trenches and strengthening defensive counter-measures against
Syrian artillery and rocket attacks. Commandos are busy with search and destroy
operations against PKK units positioned in Turkish territories of Yayladag,
Samandag and Altinozu. If the intention were a scaled incursion in or around Syrian
cities, troops should have been exercising combined maneuvers and movement
formations.
(2) Turkish troops are
weak in terms of CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear) warfare.
Although the 1st Army Command has a CBRN training center and school
in Istanbul; neither sustainable CBRN inventory nor personal and troop level
trainings are sufficient. Assad having a large number of chemical weapons in
his arsenal and intention to use them even as a last resort, possess a great threat
for this vulnerability yet Turkish troops on the border, currently confine with
defensive CBRN counter measures. Even though
some Syrian and Russian political figures guarantee that chemical weapons won't
be used against civilians and be taken from the groups which have potential to
pose threat to other states, there’s no guarantee to avoiding them in a
military warfare.
(3) Syrian
Kurds are a major problem for Syrian opposition since the beginning of the
uprising. According to the intelligence reports and media news, Syrian Kurdish
Democratic Union Party (PYD) took control of some northern towns (Azaz, Ayn Al
Arab [Kobani], Tel Abyad, Derbassiye, Tall Tamr, Ras Al Ayn, Amude, and Al
Malikiyah[Derik]) near the Turkish border as pro-government forces pulled out
without a fight. PYD claims that the Assad’s forces handed over the territory
deliberately, strengthens the idea of Syrian-Kurdish cooperation against a
possible Turkish incursion. Turkey is following every PKK movement in the
region and the primary reason to deploy Commandos and Special Forces might aim
to pursuit PKK troops positioned on the north west of Syrian border. A Turkish
military intervention to establish a safe zone in the north might fuel wide
scale Kurdish uprisings both in Turkey and Syria and this is something Turkey
wouldn’t want to deal, especially when it’s busy with fighting PKK across Iraq
and Iranian border.
Despite these
weaknesses, Turkey is militarily capable to establish a safe zone inside Syria,
in a depth not to exceeding 30 to 50 km. of its border. Deployment graphic of
the Turkish brigades indicates 4 possible sectors of responsibility, on the
east and west side of the Euphrates River.
The most
suitable region for such a zone seems to be the west of Euphrates River,
northern sector of Aleppo-Al Bab-Manbij sector, circling a zone close to
Afrin-Idlib-Aleppo regions in which consequent heavy fights have been given
against regime forces.
Having
sector 1 as primary objective, avoiding the East of Euphrates but controlling it
with troops in sector 2; Turkey might be able to support resistance, prevent
decisive air and artillery strikes of regime forces and also fight against PKK
deployed in the mountainous Jabal Al Kurd region. Having the support of Masud
Barzani who has authority and respect amongst Syrian Kurds who’re not PKK
followers, Turkey might ease the Kurdish tensions and give a message to Syrian
and Iraqi Kurds that it’s determined to fight PKK and also respectful to Kurds
if they are not sided with terrorists.
Once army
boots are on Syrian soil, there is strong possibility that Turkish cities like
Adana, Hatay and Gaziantep might be targets of Syrian rockets or as the worst
of all chemical weapons. Turkish State Departments’ application to NATO and
Washington for PATRIOT Systems confirm Turkish fears. So, without obtaining
NATO or US support, Turkey will not want to move forward under any
circumstances.
NATO
recently decided to base PATRIOTS in Turkey, which also represents a possible
future NATO involvement with the Syrian crisis. By the time PATRIOTS are
located on the region, Turkey will be one step closer to an incursion.
