Summary of Syria's Kurds' Political Maneuvers

A demonstrator holds aloft a Kurdish flag (right) at an anti-regime protest near Damascus on February 1.


There are about 2.5 million Kurds in Syria -or around 8 percent of the population — the Damascus regime never formally counts them for fear of acknowledging the size of their community. By some estimates, Kurds may be larger even than the ruling Alawite sect.


A new report by the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based foreign policy think tank, describes them as “the decisive minority” in the Syrian revolution. Their participation in a unified opposition that would be “in the interests of the U.S. for a stable and inclusive Syria and would boost the rapid overthrow of the Assad regime,” the report says. Of course this rethoric is familiar, since the world media transfered such articulations before Iraq War, carrying Barzani and Talabani demands for assisting U.S operations.


The importance of the Kurdish position has been marginalized in the mainstream opposition narrative of the Syrian revolt, despite the fact that some of the earliest demonstrations took place in the northeast where Kurds inhabit a strategic area bordering Turkey and Iraq. Even if it looks like the Syrian Leadership might have been given some promises for Kurdish rights,  Syrian Kurds -without a coordinated leadership- are trying to guarantee an upper-hand.


The Kurds are a combative people. As a nation of more than 20 million with their own language and culture, they have defended their presence with fighting guerilla tactics  for decades, in what is today the troubled borderland of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.


The Kurds have reasons enough to bide their time. When they rose against the Assad regime in widespread rioting in 2004, their short-lived revolt was met with disdain and even hostility from potential allies in the Arab opposition. This attempt, notably with a purpose of drawing media attention, was  ill-fated and looked like an organized scene, to get the public opinion other than igniting a flame.


They now find themselves on the margins of an opposition movement dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab nationalists, two tendencies implacably opposed to recognizing Kurdish minority rights.


Worse still, from the Kurdish perspective, the Syrian opposition is being shepherded towards unity by Turkey, a country with a long history of  fighting against a Kurdish origin terror organization (PKK). “The U.S. outsourced the task to Turkey,” tells Michael Weiss, a Syria expert and communications director at the Henry Jackson Society . “If the unity conference were hosted by the U.S., the Kurds would have been much happier.” On the other hand; Kurdish efforts trying to put U.S on the stage, might well have a negative effect on Turkish public opinion against its NATO partner and strategic ally in the region.


The main Kurdish opposition alliance — the Syrian Kurdish National Council or KNC — has been pressing for the past year for its Arab allies to recognize the Kurdish people and their national identity in a post-Assad constitution. If the Assad government fell, the Kurds would likely press for reparations for past forced “Arabization” of Kurdish land.


But the current talks on unity have hardly been felicitous. As recently as Monday night, Kurdish delegates in Istanbul obtained a copy of a “national pact,” penned by the Arab-dominated Syrian National Council (SNC), which contained “no single word” on the Kurds in Syria, according to a Kurdish activist familiar with the document.


Recent efforts by the U.S. and others to cajole the SNC into embracing the Kurds may have come too late, as President Assad seeks to re-impose his control.


The Kurds have at least one loyal ally — the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan, the most peaceful and prosperous region of post-Saddam Iraq. Masoud Barzani, president of the region, has acted as the godfather of the KNC in Syria.


In his last US visit on April 2012, during a talk in Washington Institute, Mr. Barzani underlined the fact that, " Kurdish effort for Syria's stability and over-throw of the regime will have a price." saying that "if there will be war, and Kurdish blood is needed, West and US should be ready to pay what Kurds have been asking for, freedom and democratic rights..."


It is a partnership with a downside: the prospect of an alliance between an influential Iraqi Kurdistan and a possible autonomous Kurdish zone in Syria only serves to heighten Turkish fear about the unsettling effect it might have on its own Kurdish population.
As Syria’s Kurds debate their next move, they face divisions within their own ranks.


The Assad regime appears to have renewed its links with the cultish Kurdish Workers’ Party, the PKK, and is accused of employing a local offshoot of the PKK to crack down on other Kurds. Latest media reports indicate PKK moving about 2000 fighters from Qandil enclaves to northern Syria. Although it proclaims itself to be a pan-Kurdish movement, the PKK is essentially a Turkish-oriented movement that Damascus has in the past used as a cat’s paw in its relations with Ankara.


A number of moderate Kurdish leaders have been assassinated since the PKK affiliate attacked Kurds demonstrating against the Damascus regime.


There is no mystery in why the regime seeks to divide the Kurds, according to Heyam Aqil, London representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria that is prominent in the KNC. “Assad knows the Kurds are well-organized,” “If the SNC allied with the Kurds, other minorities would join.”

Syrian Kurds during a pro-democracy demonstration calling for political changes in Syria in Qamishli The term AZADI, written on the flag means Freedom.

The Kurds and their supporters claim it would be a tragedy if they were cut out of the Syrian equation. They also blink an eye to West's islamo phobia and play the good-old card  that the Syrian Kurds are predominantly secular, western-oriented and embrace a pluralistic vision for a “new” Syria, in contrast to some other opponents of the Assad regime.

Syria's Kurds, Wild Card

Syria’s long-oppressed Kurdish minority is emerging as a key wild card with the potential to boost the momentum of a scattered and beleaguered opposition movement as a year-old revolt appears poised to become more violent.

So far, the Kurds have not been enthusiastic supporters of the wider revolution, which is primarily led by Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and has increasingly taken on sectarian overtones. They remain fearful that a new government dominated by Sunni Arabs could deepen their marginalization.

But largely unnoticed, the Kurds in the northeast of the country have been engaging in daily protests against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The government has concentrated most of its efforts to suppress revolt on Sunni Arab cities such as Homs and Hama, and it has, for the most part, refrained from using force against the Kurds.

Sunni Arabs make up a majority in the nation of 22 million, which for decades has been ruled by members of the Shiite Alawite sect. Kurds are estimated to make up between 8 and 15 percent. Syria’s deep ethnic and religious divides make its revolt far more complex and potentially divisive than those in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia.

Syrian Kurds appear divided over what kind of role they want to carve out for themselves if the opposition movement succeeds in toppling the Assad government. But U.S. and allied Western nations are increasingly trying to find ways to bring the Kurds into the mainstream opposition, an effort that remains elusive.

A Western diplomat involved in Syria policy said the United States and European allies have worked behind the scenes to encourage the mainstream opposition to make commitments about Kurdish rights in a post-Assad era.

“If and when the Kurds decide to get involved in a big way, it could cost the regime physical control over an entire region and could also be key to getting Aleppo and Damascus to rise up,” said the Western diplomat, who insisted on anonymity.

The predominantly Kurdish region, strategically important because it shares borders with Iraq and Turkey and has substantial oil reserves, remains essentially up for grabs.

Officials in Turkey, whose own oppressed Kurdish minority includes an insurgent wing, and in Iraq, where Kurds have attained a great degree of sovereignty, are watching the conflict closely, worried about cross-border ripple effects. The Kurds, an ethnic group spread out in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria, have long aspired to have their own state, an ambition that has often led to their persecution.

The story of the uprising of Syrian Kurds, based on interviews with experts and with Kurdish leaders in Syria and neighboring Iraq, is key to understanding why the revolt in Syria has been slow to gather decisive momentum and just how messy the post-Assad era could become.

When Syrians first took to the streets in March, buoyed by successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Kurdish political leaders were reluctant to rise up, according to those who were interviewed. As a long disenfranchised segment of society with an extensive history of revolt, Kurds had every incentive to join the protest movement. But political leaders decided that they shouldn’t play a visible role early on.

“The Baath regime has always tried to teach that the Kurds are trying to divide Syria,” said Abdul Baki Youssef, a Syrian Kurdish politician, said in an interview in Irbil, referring to Assad’s Baath political party. “If we had started, the regime would have just said we were starting to partition.”
As the revolt gathered steam in the southern Syrian city of Daraa, Kurds began holding large protests in the northeastern town of Qamishli and other predominantly Kurdish areas, at times drawing tens of thousands, Kurdish leaders say. Protesters tore down once-ubiquitous posters and portraits of Assad and toppled a statue of his late father, longtime Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Youssef said.

Kurdish antipathy toward the regime soared in October, after the assassination of Mashaal Tammo, a prominent Kurdish activist. As he was buried, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in the northeast, marking one of the relatively rare instances in which security forces were accused of firing live ammunition into crowds in the area, Kurdish activists said.

In addition to chants against Assad, demonstrations in Kurdish areas featured calls for greater sovereignty and self-determination. Protesters waved the red, white and green Kurdish flag. Security forces kept close tabs on activists and demonstrations, Kurdish activists said, and sought to disperse some with tear gas. But security forces have shown a notable degree of restraint in Kurdish cities, a stark contrast from its recent bombardment of Homs.

“The regime doesn’t want to start clashes with the Kurds,” Saleh Kado, a leader in the Kurdish Leftist Party in Qamishli said in a phone interview. “Until now, we stress that the revolution must be peaceful. Our belief is that change will come through peaceful means.”

Denise Natali, an expert on Kurdish politics at the National Defense University, said the Assad regime has sought to woo certain Kurdish factions, making concessions such as offering full citizenship to Kurds who have for years been denied official documents.

“To repress the Kurds violently would be another nail in the coffin,” she said. “It is one of the communities the regime is trying to co-opt.”

Although Kurdish leaders say most Syrian Kurds remain staunchly opposed to Assad, the Kurds have become increasingly alarmed by the leading role that Turkey has played in organizing the opposition. Turkey has become a haven for Syrian refugees and members of the opposition’s armed faction, known as the Free Syrian Army.

As Turkish leaders have devised their Syria policy, they have probably been mindful of the Kurdish angle at every turn. Members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has for years fought the Turkish government in a bid for independence, have used remote Syrian areas as staging grounds for attacks in the past and could more easily do so with the complicity of the Assad regime.

Kurdish groups boycotted a summit of Syrian opposition parties in May because it was held in Turkey. Few attended a conference in Istanbul in August during which the Syrian National Council was formed.

“The regime has sought to divide the opposition through divide-and-conquer tactics,” Shelal Gado, a Kurdish political leader, said in an interview in Sulaymaniyah, an Iraqi city where he is now based. “We regret that the majority in the opposition think the same way as the regime: They don’t want to recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”

Seeking to bridge the divisions among Syrian Kurdish groups, Massoud Barzani, the president of the semiautonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, hosted a gathering of Kurdish politicians from the neighboring country last month. He pledged the support of the prosperous region as long as Syrian Kurds found a way to band together. The Kurdish elder also emphasized that they should not join the armed resistance.

Syria's War Readiness Efforts

Syria Arms Ship Impounded, Crew Held For Questioning

April 28, 2012  11:20 AM By Daily Star BEIRUT: Military Prosecutor Judge Saqr Saqr ordered Saturday that the 11-member crew of the Syria-bound weapons ship "Lutfallah II" be held for questioning, sources close to the matter said. The sources told The Daily Star that the Sierra Leonean-flagged ship was carrying light, medium and heavy weaponry. Saqr requested that the military police question the suspects and find out at which port the arms were loaded and to whom they were to be delivered. In a statement released Saturday, the Lebanese army confirmed the confiscation of weapons on board the ship. "The army intercepted Friday off the northern coast the Sierra Leonean-flagged commercial vessel "Lutfallah II”; the army and relevant authorities inspected the vessel and confiscated three containers with a large quantity of assorted arms as well as heavy, medium and light ammunition." The statement added that the eleven detained crew members are of various Arab and foreign nationalities. President Michel Sleiman praised the army Saturday for seizing the ship, saying the measure is part of preserving civil peace and a translation into action of the Lebanese state's decision to prevent the country from becoming an arena of conflict for others or a conduit for settling accounts. According to his press office, Sleiman also stressed the importance of keeping the army and security forces alert to ward off risks that might incite strife, disturb stability, or adversely affect Lebanon's relationship with its neighbors. Lutfallah II, headed for Syria, was impounded by Lebanese authorities and transported to the Lebanese Navy base in Beirut port Saturday, after having been intercepted in Lebanese waters Friday and forced to dock at Salaata port. The ship had left Libya for the Egyptian port of Alexandria and was on its way to Syria when it entered Lebanese waters. The Lebanese Navy intercepted the vessel and directed it to Salaata in the north, whereupon an inspection of its cargo was carried out and weapons were discovered. The owner of the ship is a Syrian identified as Mohammad Khafaja and its Lebanese agent is Ahmad Bernard. Khafaja and Bernard have been arrested, as has the customs agent tasked with unloading the ship's contents -- listed as engine oil. The ship was transported Saturday to Beirut port accompanied by three Navy vessels. There is no confirmation on whether the ship intended to dock in Lebanon. Syrian authorities have repeatedly charged that weapons are being smuggled from Lebanon into Syria to assist rebels seeking the ouster of President Bashar Assad. By Coskun Unal, March 2012

New Cold War Era Through Syria

The Syrian Crisis and a Possible New Cold War Era


The Syrian crisis is no longer a purely Syrian affair. It's wider dimension was highlighted on Feb. 4, 2012 when Russia and China casted their veto at UN, thereby aborting a Western-backed resolution which had called Bashar Al-Assad to step down. At a stroke, the debate was no longer simply about Syria's internal power struggle. With their vetoes, Moscow and Beijing were highlighted the fact that they, too, had interests in Middle East which they were determined to protect. After the Iraq War and ongoing uncertainties over Tunisia, Libya, Egypt following the Arab Spring, maybe this veto meant a lot for West, reminding them that the region was no longer an exclusive Western preserve under U.S and its allies.

Russia has decades-old interests in the Middle East, in Syria in particular. As a major customer of Iranian oil, China who has been playing the game along with Russia, does not approve of Western sanctions against Tehran. Nor does it take kindly to U.S attempts to contain its influence in the Asia Pacific region.

The Syrian crisis has in fact been a two-stage affair from the very beginning, internal as well as international. On the internal level, the uprising has aimed to topple the regime on the model of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In this struggle, both sides, -government and opposition- have made serious mistakes.

The government's mistake was to use live-fire against street protesters, who were -at the beginning- demonstrating peacefully. The crisis could perhaps have been defused with the implementation of immediate results and a simple solution effort by the government would have been regarded as a fair step, not a weakness, by the people of Syria. Instead, mounting casualties have created enormous bitterness and hatred among the population reducing the chance of a future negotiation.

The opposition's mistake has been to resort to arms, to become militarized in form of Free Syrian Army (FSA)-a motley force of defectors from Syrian army as well as free lance warriors and hard-line Islamist fighters-. The opposition leadership in exile is composed of a number of disparate groups known as Syrian National Council (SNC). Inside the SNC, reports and intelligence claims that the Muslim Brotherhood -[Founded in Egypt in 1928 as a nationalist political party by an Islamic Scholar and schoolteacher Hassan Al Banna, by the end of WW2 the MB had an estimated two million members. Its ideas had gained it supporters throughout the Arab world and influenced other Islamist groups with its "model of political activism combined with Islamic charity work". Its most famous slogan, used worldwide, is "Islam is the solution." ]- is the best organized and funded element of the opposition. Outlawed since its terrorist campaign in 1977-1982 to overthrow Hafez Al-Assad,-an attempt crushed in blood at Hama- its driven by revenge.

No regime, whatever its political view and coloring, can/should tolerate an armed uprising, without responding with force. Indeed, the rise of an armed opposition has provided the Syrian regime a justification it needed to seek to crush it with ever bloodier repression. But the casualties over the last 11 months have been heavy, estimated at some point 5000-6000 civilians. As in all wars, the manipulation of information has been much in evidence but reports and media observations points out a fact that, Assad supporters [Alawites, Gypsies and Keldani Christians] along with Syrian Army are ready to act in to a Civil-War, against FSA and Sunni majority of Syria.

A Syrian Supporter of President Assad, wearing Sunni prayer beads, Shia Imam Ali Sword and Christian Rosary around his neck, at a rally in front of a Greek Orthodox church in Damascus, on January 09 2012.

 As for international stage; Russia and China, with some support from other emerging powers such as India and Brazil (besides a Venezuela in shadows), are challenging America's supremacy efforts in the Middle East. Washington's outrage at the challenge was evident when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton angrily dismissed the Russian & Chinese veto as a "travesty". Escalating the crisis, she called for an international coalition to support the Syrian opposition against what she described as the "brutal regime" in Damascus. She encouraged the creation of a "Friends of Syria" group, with the apparent aim of channelling funds and weapons to Assad's enemies.

45 year-long Cold War has officially ended in 1991, and after 21 years  it's not beyond logic to observe a new partitioning in another two maybe three axis. Europe and Israel tend to form a block under U.S umbrella, while Russia & China put every effort to contain U.S in major hinterlands. Middle East has not pick its side clear yet, hence the out-come of Arab Spring and after-math of regime changes may point-out an Islamic domination. Islam, a natural opposition to Israel, might well be tie-knotter to U.S oriented block and this is why U.S should want to be patient about Syria. 

Turkey; a country ruled by an Islamic government of Justice and Development Party (AKP)-which came to power with majority votes 11 years ago- seems to be critical for both U.S and Russia. Loosening its ties with Israel,Turkey's stance alongside U.S and Europe might have a positive effect for other Muslim countries' adopting Western point of view and expectations for the region. Considering Russia's support to Syria and Iran in the region, Turkey's neutrality -for the sake of its stability- may damage its "stable-strong-democrat Muslim" image.

By Coskun Unal [April 28, 2012]

A Snap-Shot of Turkey-Saudi Arabia Relations; Complex Interdependence Theory

Theory


"Complex Interdependence" theory suggests a refinement and synthesis of traditionalist (realist) and modernist(idealist) theories of international relations' with an argument that neither of these two theories present a full picture of global political environment.

In the enlightenment of this description, we can observe Turkey-Saudi Arabia relations have been characterized by an increasing tone of rapprochement, covert and overt  cooperation and solidarity beginning in the 1970s, relying on some commonly shared historical/cultural values, in addition to the awareness of shared economic and diplomatic interests related to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and US embargo to Turkey for Cyprus war of 1974. A common theme in these areas is the Islamic identity of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.


Tying Policy-Knot With Oil


The Oil Producing countries of the Middle East have had a great impact on regional and global politics, especially as a result of their ability, to secure greater control over their domestic oil industries and unite in some international organizations to regulate the Oil Market.

The period between discovery of oil fields in the Middle East and the nationalization of the oil industry can be classified as the first oil regime during which more than %50 of extraction, refinery, transportation and marketing of oil was controlled by major States and companies. The oil producing states were substantially dependent on these western states and companies that, Israel's establishment (1948) and Ashkenaz Jews' immigration to the new Israel state (1955)- a territory in the heartland of oil- without a major veto from oil producing countries, places on the same period.

After 1940, growing oil consumption and the (predicted) decline of US oil production capacity led to the revision of concession agreements according to which owning states would participate in oil industry with a 50% share of the total profits. Before this amendment more than 85% of the oil industry was under the control of Western States (primarily British, Dutch, French). However, though the oil producing countries secured greater revenues from oil production after 1950s, oil itself was still not an effective source of diplomatic influence on behalf of the East.

The emergence of the second oil regime was closely associated with the prime of OPEC(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and OAPEC(Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) in the 1970s, uniting the producing countries for the control of the oil industry, at a time of increasing global oil consumption and depletion of major oil fields in the West. The producing countries were highly motivated to nationalize the industry and use it as a foreign policy tool. This motivation was blessed and supported with non-producing Arab countries, which provided an upper-hand to the major oil rich countries of Arabian Peninsula. Gradually; through multilateral negotiations and sometimes unilateral actions by the producing countries, these states took control of more than 80% of the oil industry. The outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the support of major Western Powers for Israel, provided an opportunity to use that leverage.  

During this second oil regime, 1973 War triggered an oil embargo that severely hit all oil-importing states, including Turkey. Turkey was one of those vulnerable states, an industrializing country with an "acute" dependence on imported oil. As a consequence, Turkey was compelled to re-orient its relations with Saudi Arabia and other OAPEC members, which have been downplayed for a long time, due to Turkey's secular structure. This re-orientation was reflected in Turkey's membership in the -Saudi Supported- Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Downgrading its relations with Israel, Turkey gave legal permission to World Muslim League (WML) and similar Islamic organizations along with banking and financing tools of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia's Influence on Islamic Turkey


King Faisal (ruled 1964-1975) dreamed of recovering Jerusalem and praying in Al-Aqsa Mosque before his death, and called for Arab and Muslim states to unite against Israel and communism, describing both entities as heretic products of Western imperialism and/or Atheism. On this perspective, Saudi Arabia's diplomatic relations with Turkey were aimed at promoting Turkish support of the Arab struggle, as well as uniting Muslim countries around common religious goals. 

The energy crisis and its continued impact after the 1979 Revolution in Iran, affected Turkey much more severely than any other western country. The rise of the oil price in international markets, brought the oil-dependent Turkish domestic industry, to a grinding halt and paralyzed the transportation system, hospitals, institutions. Turkey was in need of a stable supply of oil and needed to increase its export revenues. Thus, Turkey's foreign policy agenda in the 1970s and its need for credits to mitigate the domestic economy, helped to channel relations with the Kingdom in specific directions.

A simple chronology of a decade (between 1974 of Cyprus War Aftermath to 1984 of Turgut Ozal Era) might help to observe the Saudi Arabia influence in Turkey.

• Turkey entered Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (1969 and 1974)
• Saudi Arabia granted 5,000,000 USD through Faisal Foundation (1973)
• Saudi Arabia Petroleum Company supported Iraq-Turkey pipe line construction and enabled 6000 barrels for Turkey's emergency needs. (1975)
• Promoting Islamic Education,Kingdom granted 7,000,000 USD for Rabita Foundation of Turkey (1982)
• Faisal-Finance entered Turkish Money Market (1982)
• Al Baraka-Turk emerged in Turkish Banking System (1984)
• Turkey entered World Muslim League (WML) (1981-1985)

The World Muslim League (WML) was established in 1965 by King Faisal to serve as an international Islamic cooperation, missionary and charity foundation. It put particular emphasis on supporting knowledge and practice of Islamic principles for all Muslims around the world. Their activities generally included donations and funding for activities, conferences, youth-camps, publications and construction of mosques, Islamic centers.

Turkey's relations with Arab states had previously been shaped by the dynamics of Cold-War, which required Turkey join Western Bloc due to its security concerns. This was reflected in its relations with Arab neighbours of pro-Soviet regimes.  

As Turkey's policies shifted towards increased relations with Saudi Arabia, so too did its
foreign policy priorities. Turkish foreign policy cardinals of Ozal Era can be summarized as in the following steps;

• Provide diplomatic support to the Arabs,
• Prevent relations with the West from deteriorating,
• Keep relations with Israel at a minimum,
• Support the Palestinian Case but keep a distance to avoid upsetting America,
• Improve relations with Arab countries in a multi dimensional way, especially in commercial areas.

 Euler diagram showing the relationships between various multinational organisations within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

For similar economic and politic considerations, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of Palestine and established diplomatic relations with it, by permitting PLO open offices in Ankara in 1976.

Turkey agreed to support anti-Israeli decisions made by OIC by downsizing but not ending the relations with Israel. In return; Turkey was allowed to invite a representative from Turkish Cypriot community to all OIC meetings and the Conference recognized the existance of two equal communities on the Island.


Conclusion


Turkish-Saudi Arabia relations have shown a trend towards  greater cooperation and proximity with Ozal Government and this cooperation is accelerated during the period of Justice and Development Party (AKP). Influential in this process is thought to be increasing Saudi foreign policy of mitigating its dependency on the US and the West, and its concerns about intense US involvement in the Middle East triggered by the Iraq War and Arab Spring movements.

Both countries have united in actions to combat Al-Qaida. In February 2005 two countries signed a security cooperation agreement. Again in early 2005 a Turkish national, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu became President of OIC, which can be interpreted as a deeper and more active Turkish involvement with the goals of the organization.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed more than 10 agreements, conventions, protocols in various political, military, economic, social areas, almost as much as the number of agreements signed between two countries until 2002.
In 2006, they agreed to establish a "Medical City" in Istanbul, to be built by Saudi-German Hospital Company with an investment value of 13 Billion USD. Again in 2006 and 2007, Saudi King visited Istanbul and Turkey, promising the solidarity of two countries with new incoming projects. These high level visits have been reciprocated with the visits of Erdogan and Davutoglu between 2007-2011.

The emergence of  this particular kind of relationship between two countries is explained with the aid theory of Complex Interdependence, which advocates that international relations is not limited to security matters only. Rather, economic, diplomatic and social issues can be primary goals of bilateral and multidimensional relations, with the participation of state and non-state actors.

Georgetown University Acceptance Study-(Examplary Study on Complex Interdependence Theory)-By Coskun Unal, March 2012.

Afghan Security Forces Develop Confidence

NATO "very confident" in Afghan security forces

Good forecast: In one of the most positive predictions yet, a senior NATO security official said Monday that the coalition is "very confident" that the Afghan National Security Forces will be ready to handle all security operations in the country by December 2014 (NYT). The assessment comes just over a week after the Taliban launched a complex series of attacks across the country, and amidst growing concern within the Afghan populace that the country's security forces will founder once international troops leave.

The long-term strategic partnership agreement approved by the U.S. and Afghan negotiating teams on Sunday is reportedly more symbolic than it is substantive, designed to send a message to al-Qaeda that the United States will maintain a presence in the region to prevent a resurgence by the group (AP). Important details such as how much funding the U.S. government will give Afghanistan after 2014, or how many U.S. troops will stay in the country, are expected to be worked out over the coming year.

Indicative of the end of the U.S. war in Iraq and drawdown in Afghanistan, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will reportedly reorganize its spy operations to put more emphasis on new national security priorities like China and Iran. A study of the DIA's work completed last year found that the agency's attention to war zones was adequate, but intelligence on other global threats was lacking.

How find you?

Pakistan's Supreme Court is expected to deliver a verdict on Thursday in the contempt of court case against Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who could be forced to step down and spend six months in prison if convicted of refusing a court order to reopen a corruption case against President Asif Ali Zardari . However, even in the case of Gilani's resignation, the ruling Pakistan People's Party has a majority in parliament that would allow them to elect a new prime minister.

Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) named 11 more companies in its investigation of an ephedrine quota scandal involving the illegal import and processing of the drug for sale on the black market, in which Prime Minister Gilani's son Ali Musa Gilani has also be implicated . The prime minister has rejected the allegations against his son (Dawn, ET, DT).

 

Realpolitik

U.S. President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh engaged in a violent fight in the northern Punjab city of Gunjrunwala on Monday (ET). The actual world leaders were not present of course, but two bulls with the names of the U.S. president and the Indian prime minister painted on their backs fought out the diplomatic battle on a grassy field, with Obama reigning victorious at the end.

-- Jennifer Rowland

Turkish Intervention in Syria

<><><><><><><><> Changed Prospects for Turkish Military Intervention in Syria

Coskun Unal

April 12, 2012


Several recent developments have put the possibility of military action in Syria on Turkey's agenda. On April 9, Syrian forces opened fire at a refugee camp on the Turkish side of the border, killing two Syrian refugees and wounding two Turks. The number of such refugees crossing into Turkey has increased sharply, reaching some 25,000. In response, Ankara is hinting at creating a buffer zone inside Syria to defend the civilian population and contain the crisis on its border. On April 10, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that although Turkey does not want to enter Syria, "if anybody were to force [Ankara] to do that, it would be the Syrian regime itself."
What are the most likely signs that Turkey is planning military action aimed at creating such a safe haven? Both domestic and regional political dynamics would no doubt shape Ankara's decisions in this regard, as would the military's level of preparedness. The following early indicators could help predict imminent Turkish military action:

• Parliamentary approval. First and foremost, if the Turkish military is to be deployed beyond the border, the government must receive authorization from parliament. So far, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has not approached the legislature with such a request. Should it decide to do so, its prospects for success are good: the AKP holds 327 of the parliament's 550 seats, and a motion to approve military deployment requires only 276 votes.


• Russian neutrality. Turkey is more likely to consider intervention if Russia, which has blocked international action against Damascus, were to drop its objections. Russia is the only neighbor with an economy and military larger than Turkey's. Ankara appears uninterested in confronting its most powerful neighbor, with which it has deep trade and energy ties -- for example, Turkey imports over 50 percent of its natural gas from Russia. At the same time, Moscow depends on Ankara as both a key trading partner and a strategic partner on energy security issues, including those related to proposed pipelines from the Caspian Basin to international energy markets. Given this interdependence, the two governments might be able to bridge their differences on Syria. Even if Ankara cannot convince Russia to formally approve Turkish action against the Assad regime, Russian neutrality could help clear a hurdle in Ankara's forward thinking on possible intervention.


• Arab support. Ankara has cultivated good ties with the Arab Middle East over the past decade, building its own regional soft power in the process. For instance, Turkey receives regular invitations to Arab League summits. Ankara cherishes this newfound status and therefore takes Arab opinion into account when formulating foreign policy, including on Syria. Should the Arab League or Gulf Cooperation Council sanction military intervention -- Ankara has especially good ties with GCC members, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- this might help Turkey move forward against Damascus, potentially to the point of military action.


• Closing of Aleppo consulate. Turkey closed its embassy in Damascus on March 22, but it has kept its consulate in Aleppo open for now. One reason a government chooses to evacuate its diplomatic personnel from another country is to safeguard them from becoming hostages in case of conflict between the two nations. In this regard, Turkey would likely close the Aleppo consulate and evacuate the rest of its diplomats before any military action in Syria.


• Army drills along the border. The Turkish military has not conducted regular exercises along the border with Syria for over a decade. Accordingly, the army would need to carry out preparatory drills in this area if Ankara were planning an intervention. Such exercises could be seen as a likely final step ahead of potential Turkish action, though they could also be interpreted as deterrence. In 1998, when Ankara wanted to end Syria's support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), it carried out a massive military exercise along the border, successfully convincing Damascus to change its policy without actually invading.


• Mobilization of the 1st Army. The Turkish Land Forces, the backbone of the country's military, are divided into four armies. Southern Turkey, adjacent to the Syrian border, falls under the responsibility of the 2nd Army, headquartered in Malatya in east-central Turkey. Yet the country's premier fighting force, the 1st Army, is headquartered in Istanbul, with most of its units located over 1,000 miles from the Syrian border.
  
  Currently, four 2nd Army brigades are positioned along that frontier: the 39th Mechanized Infantry Brigade based in Iskenderun, the 5th Armored Brigade based in Gaziantep, the 20th Armored Brigade based in Sanliurfa, and the 70th Mechanized Infantry Brigade based in Mardin. In addition, several support units are stationed up to two days' distance from the border: the 5th Armored Brigade and Artillery Regiment based in Kahramanmaras, the Combat Engineer Regiments based in Malatya, the 16th Mechanized Infantry Brigade based in Diyarbakir, and the 172nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Silopi.
  
  The 2nd Army has spent much of its energy fighting the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq over the past few decades. Indeed, Turkey's military planning has played down the possibility of a serious threat from Syria since Ankara convinced Damascus to change its PKK policy in 1998. Thus, until the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara had taken a rather benign view of its neighbor, as shown by actions such as removing mines from the border area and deploying premier fighting units elsewhere.
  
  In short, the Turkish military along the Syrian border is arguably less than war ready. Units in this area appear to be weaker than those in the rest of the country; for instance, they typically fail the war-preparedness drills run by the Turkish chief of staff every other year.
  
  For its part, Syria has traditionally stationed a comparable number of troops near the border, namely, four brigades and three regiments. Of course, most of the Syrian military is tied down with fighting the uprising, so it is not clear how many of these units would be available to counter a Turkish incursion. Still, if Ankara is planning to intervene, it would be better served by boosting its military presence in the area both qualitatively and quantitatively to improve the chances of success. This would require strengthening the 2nd Army primarily with units from the premier 1st Army in northwestern Turkey, and perhaps also from the Aegean Army (often called the 4th Army) in western Turkey. Although the 3rd Army in the northeast is a relatively small force, some of its units could be mobilized toward Syria as well. Whatever is decided, the Turkish military would require approximately six weeks to mobilize such units, relocate them to the Syrian border, and make them war ready.

Coskun Unal is a retired Turkish Army Lieutenant Colonel, and owner of the Strategy On Blog.

TRAC point of view on Recruiting Terrorists

Psychology for Recruiting Terrorists

Introduction

Global terrorism is extreme both in its lack of realistic goals and in its cynical exploitation of the vulnerability of complex systems. Jurgen Habermas, German Philosopher

Operating within Decentralized Management

As terrorism has evolved over the past several hundred years, terrorist organizations have taken great strides to expand their influence in the West, resulting in Islamic organizations initiating an offensive jihad against the far enemy. One of the key components to the successful expansion of terrorism is the terrorists ability to act within a decentralized management framework. This decentralization affords multiple advantages in the areas of recruiting, planning, and executing guerilla-style operations to varying degrees of success. Recruiting tactics have expanded greatly as Islamic terrorist organizations have found fertile recruiting grounds in the Western hemisphere.
According to Jenkins, “Recruiting is not merely meant to fill operational needs. It is an end in itself: It aims at creating a new mindset.”[i] Having the ability to recruit in the United States, France, Germany, and all corners of the globe provides tremendous benefits as terrorist organizations continue to operate and expand in foreign lands recruiting what Mili labeled “Caucasian foot soldiers”[ii].
Photo: Social media has become an increasingly effective recruitment tool for terror organizations. Google Images

For purposes of this chapter and its discussion, we will generically define recruiting as:

… to engage persons for military service; to strengthen or raise an army through enlistment; to supply with new members or employees; to enroll; to replenish; to renew or restore the health, vitality or intensity of; to obtain replacements for something lost, wasted or needed; to regain health or recover; NOUN: a new member of an organization or body[iii].

First Stage of Socialization

The process of recruiting represents the first stage of socialization into any organization, even those whose mission are not related to terrorist activity. The stage is called anticipatory socialization and involves recruitment, selection and placement[iv]. An in-depth analysis of terrorist community network recruiting requires integration of several theoretical frameworks from an interdisciplinary and multi-level perspective: the individual, the social environment and the organizational network. In his book Deviant Behavior, Humphrey briefly applied the major criminological theories to terrorism individually rather than in a more integrated framework[v], as discussed in this chapter.

Criminological Context

The rich history of criminological theory informs us as to why an individual would choose one behavior over another (in this case the decision to join or not join a terrorist organization), based upon their moral development, the values and beliefs that comprise their social and learning environment, the culture and the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, Humphry’s theory has enhanced practicality and application as many Muslims in U.S. prisons are increasingly becoming susceptible to these groups and their ideology[vi]. This interdisciplinary approach integrates individual choice, community theory and sociological influence, merging the potential recruit with the terrorist organizations that need these recruits to continue their perpetuation and mission within an environmental context.
The first part of this chapter builds the theoretical framework of terrorist organization recruiting from the standpoint of the recruit within his environment, followed by the manners and methods in which these organizations recruit new members and what is being done to counter these efforts.

Social Structure: The Environment is Local

Close-Knit and Traditional Cultural Environments

The social environment is a key factor in theorizing about terrorist organization recruiting in Islamic populations. Many areas of the Middle East more closely resemble the social structural environments described by Tonnies[i] as “gemeinschaft” and “mechanical” by Durkheim[ii]. These environments are close-knit and traditional, with very little deviance among the members. In such social and cultural environments, people become highly bonded to one another and to the community, but lack the bridging capabilities necessary to form positive social capital. Though recruiters often use modern technology as a means to reach and attract recruits, they despise the “gesellschaft” or “organic” world where traditions are lost and faith is loosened. Conformity is the goal, thus deviance from norms is a major focus in gemeinschaft social arrangements. If one uses raw numbers as a measure of deviant activity, then dividing the number of actual operational “terrorists” that belong to terrorist organizations by the total number of Islamic believers’ results in a very low percentage, perhaps qualifying membership in these communities as a deviant behavior, even in places where they are more accepted socially. There are tighter social controls and more profound cultural pushes and pulls toward organizational sympathy. Thus, in these communities, young males are more prone to join but most still do not.

Values and Beliefs

Very important to both the individual and the terrorist organization are values and beliefs. Travis Hirschi codified a theoretical framework of social control in which social bonds were central to behavior through four key areas: attachment, commitment, belief and idea[iii], all of which are more developed in gemeinschaft or mechanical communities. Thus, in more tribal areas of the Middle East, a youth who is attached to local values and norms favorable to terrorism, who is not committed or invested in the broader society or world, who does not engage or become involved in conventional social activities, and who holds less of a belief in the broader social bond is more susceptible to terrorist organization recruiting methods. Humphrey[iv] discussed terrorism as a “form of social control”, supporting the application of this perspective.

Drifting

As social controls weaken or stronger subcultural bonds develop, a young man would theoretically “drift”[v] toward the decision of joining or rejecting a terrorist group as an active participant. Those that have some elements – attachment and belief, as examples – but are more involved or committed to broader social goals, may be sympathizers of terrorist organizations and have contact with terrorists but they would likely not join as active participants outside some external intervention. This is the theoretical equivalent of those who propose the United States ‘created’ terrorists in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Photo: Young men from Togo play a game of football on a black sand field adjacent a coal works in Lome, Togo 2006. With a poulation of 5.5 million Togo is one of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa. http://www.flickr.com/photos/34639725@N00/167102279/

However, there are three separate groups that must be realized to understand this relationship:

1. the first is those individuals already susceptible who would have joined absent any foreign intervention;
2. the second is those who would never have joined.
3. It is the third group of susceptible – or potential joiners – that are key in intervention efforts: those who joined after a change to their commitment and involvement as a result of changes in the social structures of their communities and as resistance to the new social controls placed upon their culture. These are the people that Americans have been trying to “win the hearts and minds” of to varying degrees of success.

These complexities reflect both modernity and social milieu, two reasons for terrorist activity and clearly important as youth and young adults in the Middle East experience the transition of mechanical to organic living, from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft social structures, amid outside interventions that impact their cultural and social bonds.

Social Structure

Social structure provides the environmental rationale for why some youths and young adults would be susceptible to terrorist organization recruiting. Schwartz has noted that

… identity helps one to make sense of, and to find one’s place in, an almost limitless world with a vast set of possibilities. Because it provides an anchor in a sea of possibilities and allows one to define oneself as something in particular, identity would seem to have a great deal of practical value.[vi]
Photo: Young recruits who are being trained as terrorists, many times with the blessings of their parents. Extremist groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen use religion as the main mechanism for recruiting juveniles. They prefer juveniles who are poor or involved in illegal activities since they make easy targets for recruitment. Photo: Global Security.

Youth and Young Adults

Certain environments impact the social bonds that youth and young adults experience in their developmental stages. They are more heavily bonded to their culture than they have a capacity for responding to others, which reduces their social capacity and makes them vulnerable to organizations offering attachment, commitment, involvement and belief in a way that upholds their traditions, values and norms; thus, reaffirming their social identity. But social processes cannot be ignored either, as recruiting is a social process, not just an organizational structure.

Critical Recruitment Platforms

Internet

There are numerous recruiting opportunities presented in today’s society, and these fertile environments have increased terrorist recruitment over the past decade. One such example is the use of the Internet. The “Internet can bring individuals together based on their personal interests and values.”[vii] Additionally,

“the result is a relationship that begins development at a less superficial level. This is especially beneficial for individuals whose ideas, experiences, and beliefs are not main stream and that often incite negative judgments from the majority.”[viii]

Geography

Geography is another key variable for terrorist recruitment. Locations such as Kenya and Tanzania, where there are “substantial Muslim populations, widespread poverty, poor policing, inadequate border control, and systemic political and economic corruption,”[ix] provide ideal circumstances for attracting disenfranchised youth.

Correctional Facilities

Another critical recruitment platform exists in U.S. correctional facilities. Prisoner radicalization serves as a key venue for inmates who are “primarily searching for meaning and identity” and are “linked to prison gangs.”[x] Gunaratna has opined that “individuals are ideologically driven, not operationally driven.[xi] Social process theories enhance the understanding of when and how this decision occurs once the environment is conducive.
Photo: Indonesian terrorists are using their time in jail to recruit and plan new attacks. Google Images

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[i] Jenkins, B.M. (2007). Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment. Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment United States House of Representatives RAND Corporation.

[ii] Mili, H. (2006, November 2,). Al-Qaeda's Caucasian Foot Soldiers, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 21,

[iii] The American Heritage College Dictionary, 2002, 4^th ed., 1164.

[iv] Gibson, J.L., J.M. Ivancevich, J.H. Donnelly & R. Konopaske, (2006). Organizations: Behavior, Structure, Processes. 12^th Ed. Boston: McGraw Hill.

[v] Humphrey, J.A. (2006). Deviant Behavior. Pearson Prentice-Hall.

[vi] Loza, W. (2010). The Prevalence of Middle Eastern Extremist Ideologies Among Some Canadian Offenders. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. 25(5): 919-928.

Maritime Terrorism On Spot (TRAC)

Maritime Terrorism

Introduction

Photo: 2009 Unloading in Chennai Port, India, expected to take 36 hours. http://www.flickr.com/photos/39508679@N07/3683871632/

“Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”

(Albert Einstein in a letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2 August 1939)

In general terms, the phrase “maritime terrorism” means terrorism at the sea. However, the security implications of maritime terrorism are many.

• First, maritime terrorism involves terrorist attacks directed against assets in the maritime domain. This includes attacks or threat of attacks against vessels (warships, cruise liners, tankers and other carriers, tugboats and barges), harbour/ anchorage attacks, fixed land based targets near ports- oil refineries, oil storage depots, other port infrastructure, energy pipelines and undersea cables- and hijacking of commercial/passenger ships on high seas. This also includes putting obstructions such as sinking a large ship in choking points in critical sea lanes of communication – Strait of Malacca and the Hormuz Strait for example - to disrupt global trade and commerce.

• Second, maritime terrorism denotes terrorist attacks using maritime assets as platforms to deliver attacks against either land based targets or targets at sea or both. For example, groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have used fast speed boats and even combat vessels to attack targets on land or as in the case of the LTTE, to attack the Sri Lankan naval vessels at sea. The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen was delivered by a fast speed boat laden with explosives, as was the case with M.V. Limburg in October 2002. Terrorists used a maritime route and a cargo ship – Al Husaini, a fishing trawler – Kuber – and a rubberised dinghy to land on the Mumbai coast to carry out spectacular attacks in the city in November 2008. This also includes hijacking a commercial vessel (cargo liners, tugs and barges) or a cruise-liner and using it as a floating bomb to ram against a maritime target to cause widespread death and destruction. At a broader spectrum, the possibility of terrorists smuggling a crude nuclear or radiological device into a hijacked ship or loading the same into a container and setting it off in a port city, shipping lane or waterway has also emerged as one of the possible doomsday scenarios.

• Third, maritime terrorism also involves use of maritime assets by the terrorists for purely logistical purposes such as sending members from one country for training and/or asylum in another country as was the case with Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. JI recruits regularly use the sea routes to travel to the training camps in either MILF or ASG held territory. Terrorist groups like the ASG and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia have also used boats and other maritime assets to carry out piracy for financial gains.

History of Responses

Image: Screen Shot of coverage of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro on Alauro TV. http://www.portosdeportugal.pt/sartigo/index.php?x=6610

Precedents

Terrorist incidents involving maritime interests were not unprecedented. The 1985 terrorist hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt brought the spectre of maritime terrorism, reminiscent of the terrorism in the skies, to public attention. In November 1991, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demonstrated its maritime terrorist capabilities by attacking Sri Lankan naval supply ship Abheeta with an explosives laden suicide craft at the KKS harbour in northern Sri Lanka. Attack on USS Cole in October 2000 off the coast of Yemen was a bold statement of both the intention as well as capabilities of the terrorist groups to target high value maritime assets including naval vessels.

The Achille Lauro, a cruise ship based in Naples, Italy was hijacked on 7 October 1985 by terrorists belonging to the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) off the coast of Egypt as she was sailing from Alexandria to Port Said. The terrorists held more than 400 passengers and the crew hostage and directed the vessel to sail to Tartus, Syria. They also demanded that Israel free 50 Palestinian prisoners. The Syrian authorities refused permission for the cruise ship to dock at Tartus; in retaliation the hijackers killed disabled an American passenger and then threw him overboard. After two days of negotiations the hijackers agreed to abandon the liner in exchange for safe conduct and were flown towards Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner. However, the US Navy fighter planes intercepted the Egyptian plane and forced it land at Naval Air Station Sigonella, a N.A.T.O. base in Sicily, where the hijackers except the leader Abu Abbas were arrested. Abbas was allowed to go despite protests from the US. An Italian court convicted 11 of 15 others associated with the hijacking, while Abbas and another terrorist were tried in absentia and found guilty. Abbas was never arrested nor served any prison term. In 1990, he carried out another maritime attack, with an abortive speedboat attack on bathers on a beach near Tel Aviv.

Rising Maritime Terrorism

Photo: 2000 USS Cole being towed. http://www.flickr.com/photos/7515273@N07/2502381720/

Five Main Reasons for the Rise in Maritime Terrorism

(1) Increasing Security on Land and Air Based Targets

A number of factors explain this growing interest among the terrorist groups to target assets in the maritime domain. Firstly, after the September 2001 incidents, there has been an increasing focus on securing land-based targets and targets in the aviation sector. This has severely restricted the opportunity for the terrorist groups to operate on land or in the sky. Accordingly, terrorists are on the lookout for soft targets either on the land, such as hotels and resorts, as well as at sea. For the terrorists, the maritime domain offers an opaque and largely amorphous environment to exploit. The assets in the maritime sector are many thus offering terrorists a profusion of targets. Besides, more often than not, maritime assets are exposed to lax governance and poor security. As Matthew Daley, a former US deputy assistant secretary of state, put it, “as both the physical and political space in which they [the terrorists] find sanctuary shrinks, as the noose tightens,” there is increasing likelihood of them turning “to the most unregulated of spaces: the sea.” Sea offers scale, in vast areas of un-policed waters. Consequently, the maritime domain has emerged as a potential alternative venue for high profile mass casualty attacks.

(2) New Technology Allows for the Ability to Replicate Land Based Tactics to Sea

Secondly, the maritime milieu provides terrorist organizations an opportunity to develop new methods of assault and new targets. September 2001 incidents demonstrated how the terrorist groups have a high propensity to acquire increasing levels of tactical sophistication. The groups are constantly adapting known and trusted tactics, exploiting existing technology and weapon systems. This would enable the groups to replicate land capabilities in the maritime environment without much difficulty.

(3) Generates Attention

Thirdly, the maritime domain offers perceptual and psychological advantages for terrorist operations. Targeting a high profile maritime asset would generate the kind of attention that terrorists seek. Its impact would be enormous, setting precedents for other terrorist groups to emulate the action in other theatres. This “copycat effect” was demonstrated in the USS Cole attack on 12 October 2000, which generated enormous media attention, underscoring vulnerability of vessels at ports. Within a month of the USS Cole attack, LTTE suicide boats breached the defenses of Trincomalee, the most protected Sri Lankan naval port and destroyed a fast personnel carrier on 23 October 2000. Similarly, on 7 November 2000, A Hamas suicide boat attacked an Israeli naval craft, which however, exploded prematurely and could not destroy the naval vessel.

(4) Convergence with Piracy and Transnational Crime

Fourthly, in recent years there has been an increasing nexus between the terrorism and transnational crime such as drug trafficking and piracy. The nexus or convergence between the terrorism and transnational crime is derived from the symbiotic relationship between the terrorists and the criminals, a dynamic that allows both entities to profit financially. With an overall decrease of state financial support for terrorism, combined with interdiction of terrorist finances, regulation and control of charitable and other non-governmental front organizations, terrorist groups are increasingly taking to crime to generate funds to sustain their activities. One of the manifestations of this is the terrorists taking to piracy such as GAM and ASG, which is becoming an area of increasing concerns. Photo: Somali pirates diving ransom, date and location unknown. http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/subcategory/8/Piracy_REPORT/Piracy/082011///3

(5) Maritime Sector is Vitally Important

Last but not the least, there is an increasing awareness about the maritime sector as an important conduit of global activity including global trade and commerce. There has been a very rapid growth in global commercial maritime traffic with about 90-95% of world freight moving by the sea. Disruption of the global trade and commercial activity by selective targeting of strategically significant maritime assets – sea lanes of communication, port infrastructures, cruise liners or merchant shipping - fits nicely into the calculation of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which seek to inflict least-cost most effective damage on the enemy. This includes inflicting enormous economic damage to the enemies of Islam – “a war against businesses, which will hit the enemy where he does not expect it.” Modern cruise liners are not unlike floating World Trade Centres; ports are the hubs of the global trading network; strategic sea-lanes of communication are the arteries of global commercial activity. An interruption – in a major port or in a strategic sea-lane such as the Strait of Malacca- could upset the global supply chain for indefinite periods of time. The supply chain is a highly interdependent web based on real-time information and accuracy. Lead times for deliveries have been extremely low. Disruption of cargo movements and supply chains could have devastating consequences for the global economy even bringing some countries to the edge of economic collapse. As Gail Fosler, senior vice president and chief economist of the Conference Board, the influential U.S. business and economics think tank put it, “The most serious economic consequence of the current global security threat is the vulnerability of the United States and other countries that depend on global trade to shocks from actual supply interruptions and that the threats of terrorism may achieve what the anti-globalization forces have not - a significant slowdown, even decline, in global trade and investment.”

Maritime terrorism: Technologies and tactics

Image: Anti-piracy weapons for oil tankers. http://thekevinchen.wordpress.com/2009/12/03/dambrosio250gprimstoolanti-piracyweaponsiron-man2/

Target Dependent

Maritime terrorist technology and tactics is target dependant. In the maritime domain, terrorist targets involve attacks against ships and shipping infrastructure including fixed land-based targets near the port. This involves attacks against vessels (warships, cruise liners, tankers and other carriers) on high seas/ territorial waters or while the vessels are in harbour or on anchorage, hijacking of commercial/passenger ships on high seas and attacks against oil refineries, oil storage depots near the ports, other port infrastructure, energy pipelines and undersea cables. Terrorists have also targeted shipping containers - using containers to transport personnel, illegal and dangerous merchandize and weapons. The groups have used improvised explosive devices, submersibles, mini submarines and high-speed boats laden with explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and even armour piercing weapons. The maritime terrorist inventory also includes dual-use technologies such as the Global Positioning Systems (GPS), satellite communication systems, sea sport scooters and scuba diving equipment.

Small Boats, Huge Damage

The October 2000 attack against USS Cole demonstrated how vessels (small Boats) could be used as instruments to deliver explosives. Terrorists have also used vessels themselves as weapons as evident from Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suicide craft ramming into Sri Lankan naval vessel Abheetha in May 1991. LTTE outfitted its small high-speed boats with detonation devices known as “explosive horns” that serve to explode on impact with ships and other sea borne targets. It is in this context that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) warned about the possibility of terrorists using speedboats to collide with oil tankers or liquefied natural gas carriers, which could cause significant damage. These boats can also be used to target oil platforms to disrupt energy supplies such as the attacks on Basra oil terminals in April 2004.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Potential

Boats could be used as platforms for the dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents. Vessels can also be used as tools of disruption particularly in the context that by sinking a large ship in one of the critical chokepoints in sea-lanes of communication could overstress the surrounding logistical infrastructure that is vital for just-in-time delivery in the global supply chain. And this is not discounting the possibility of environmental damage caused by attacks against carriers with petroleum products, hazardous chemicals and nuclear wastes.



Photo: 2009 After a prolonged battle with LTTE terrorists, troops of 7 Sri Lanka Sinha regiment operating under the command of 58 division, captured this factory (above) which is used to manufacture suicide bombs, claymore mines and improvised explosive devices. http://sinhalaya.com/news/eng/2009/troops-capture-ltte’s-bomb-manufacturing-factory-and-soosai’s-bunker/

State Sponsored Maritime Terrorism

In the past, terrorist groups have benefited from their access to naval inventory of patron states to acquire demonstrable maritime technology and expertise. In the initial years, LTTE’s maritime capability was built and developed with tacit support of India. Iran not only supplied the missile used by Hezbollah to attack the Israeli warship in June 2006, but it was alleged that Iranian troops helped fire the missile. These technologies include diving and underwater demolition skills using conventional -ilitary instruments as well as dual use technologies. Documents recovered from Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan indicated interest in suicide scuba operations. Diving skills using sophisticated underwater equipment was being taught at a camp in Bangladesh run by Rohingiya Solidarity Organization (RSO), a group with known association with Al-Qaeda. Similarly, in 2005, Indonesian and Philippines authorities uncovered training involving diving and underwater demolition skills being undertaken by members of groups such as Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM). Groups like LTTE and Hezbollah are known to have operatives trained in scuba diving and the use of underwater explosive devices including sea mines and underwater scooters. LTTE was known to have purchased underwater scooters from Denmark to attack military as well as civilian, commercial vessels. Few terrorist groups like the LTTE, have been successful in manufacturing sea mines themselves.

Portable Rocket Launchers

Maritime technology also involves use of portable rocket launchers similar to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These devices are especially useful as they provide a standoff distance so that the attackers could effectively target vessels transiting near land. The interest to acquire submarines for maritime terrorism is also not uncommon among groups.

(Hull of the submarine being built by LTTE)

For example, LTTE was trying to acquire a submarine being built at a shipyard in Phuket, Thailand. The main body of the submarine was outfitted with a conventional surface hatch and an underwater hatch that could deploy personnel under the surface without detection. In September 2000, a100 foot submarine capable of transporting up to approximately 200 tons of cocaine was recovered from a warehouse in the suburbs in Bogotá, Columbia. According to the police, the technology was advanced and the workmanship of high quality. In the Philippines, MILF was reportedly negotiating with North Korean arms cartel to acquire midget submarines.

Financing

Similarly, there are numerous instances where terrorist groups had used maritime instruments and services to sustain their economic and logistical requirements by smuggling drugs, weapons and personnel. Terrorists have exploited vulnerabilities in container traffic, which carries almost 90 percent of sea-borne cargo. Physical benefits of the use of containers include the transportation of group members to avoid detection or the transportation of foot soldiers to a desired operational zone. For example, in October 2001, Egyptian Al-Qaeda member - Rizik Amid Farid, was discovered by the Italian Police in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro on a container ship at Genoa, hiding in a steel container bound for Toronto. The container was furnished as a makeshift home with a bed, water, supplies for a long journey and a bucket for a toilet. He was found to be carrying two mobile phones, a satellite phone, a laptop computer, several cameras, batteries and, airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for four major American airports.
Gioia Tauro is a leading trans-shipment hub for cargo in the Mediterranean. The container fitted out as a makeshift home had been loaded in Port Said, Egypt. Had the stowaway not been trying to widen ventilation holes when workers in Gioia Tauro were nearby, the box may well have passed unhindered to its final destination at the port of Halifax in Canada, via Rotterdam in Holland.

Containers as Bombs

Terrorists could also use containers as a bomb. An attack using a bomb in a container would significantly disrupt cargo movements and supply chains with devastating consequences for the global economy even bringing some countries to the edge of “economic collapse.” Proximity of the ports to major cities would ensure deaths in large numbers especially if the terrorists manage to detonate a nuclear or at least a radiological device, the so-called dirty bomb. Ports themselves are also very vulnerable. Most of the ports are flat, being at the ocean’s edge, so would offer little shielding against weapon effects. Some have great quantities of inflammable material, such as fuel that could extend the area of destruction and release toxic gases. While ports may stretch on for miles, a nuclear device the size of the one used in Hiroshima (15k) would have enough force to destroy many key facilities of a typical port. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport, would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion.

The vulnerability of container shipping has been exposed a number of times in the past. For example, in 2002, ABC News successfully transported 15 pounds of depleted Uranium which it acquired from an environmental group, carried it by train from Austria to Istanbul and shipped it overseas to the port at Staten Island, New York. The cargo - though not dangerous in itself - went undetected passing through 7 countries, in 25 days. In 2003 again, the same news agency successfully shipped depleted uranium from Jakarta to Los Angeles. This operation involved 6.8kg of uranium in a steel pipe with a lead lining, put into a teak trunk along with other furniture in Jakarta. The shipment, which arrived at the Port of Los Angeles on 23 August 2003, was never screened.

Photo: 2011 Police in Colombia seized a submarine belonging to Farc rebels which had the capacity to carry at least seven tons of drugs. The 16m-long (52ft) vessel - equipped with a sophisticated navigation system - was captured near the Pacific port city of Buenaventura. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15051108

Container Shipping

The vulnerability of container shipping has been exposed a number of times in the past. For example, in 2002, ABC News successfully transported 15 pounds of depleted Uranium which it acquired from an environmental group, carried it by train from Austria to Istanbul and shipped it overseas to the port at Staten Island, New York. The cargo - though not dangerous in itself - went undetected passing through 7 countries, in 25 days. In 2003 again, the same news agency successfully shipped depleted uranium from Jakarta to Los Angeles. This operation involved 6.8kg of uranium in a steel pipe with a lead lining, put into a teak trunk along with other furniture in Jakarta. The shipment, which arrived at the Port of Los Angeles on 23 August 2003, was never screened.

Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist Capability

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)

Photo: 2009 LTTE sea Tiger Torpedos captured by Lanka Army during clearing ops near Putththuku.http://www.flickr.com/photos/36169878@N07/3717712525/

State of the Art

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the pioneer in maritime terrorism with a state-of-the-art maritime terrorist organization. With its maritime terrorist arm called the ‘Sea Tigers’, LTTE was successful in destroying a large number of Sri Lankan naval vessels and personnel and effectively gained sea control in waters off Jaffna before the group was destroyed by the Sri Lankan armed forces in 2009. LTTE also operated its own merchant fleet for regular supply of arms, ammunitions and other materials including contraband. The Sea Tiger unit was under the command of Col. Soosai, who was killed in a military encounter along with the leader of the group, Velupillai Prabhakaran in May 2009. Its merchant crafts were operated under the leadership of Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumram a.k.a KP, who was arrested in August 2009 in Thailand.

Arose Out of Necessity

LTTE maritime organization was product of sheer necessity. The LTTE had a strong support base in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu which was separated from its operational area in north-eastern parts of Sri Lanka by sea. During the initial years, the group depended on fast dinghies to transport personnel and on the slower fishing vessels to transport logistics. However these vessels which were armed only with small-arms and grenades were of no match against the Sri Lanka Navy which by the mid 80’s was equipped with faster and better armed patrol crafts such as the Dvora and Super Dvora. It was to counter this threat that LTTE formed the Sea Tiger Unit in 1984.
Having lost New Delhi’s support following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, LTTE was forced to move and expand its operations to other locations such as Burma and Thailand. The LTTE also began building its own ships and smaller vessels along the coast of the Wanni region by this time. In the 1993 Yal Devi military offensive, government forces were able to confiscate up to 500 boats from the LTTE’s Kilali boatyard.

Four Types of Fibre Glass Boat Attacks

By 1995 LTTE had developed four types of fibre glass boats for attack functions. These are

1. the 45kt Thrikka, with four crew, a single machine-gun and used for deploying frogmen;
2. the 10kt Sudai, manned by a crew of six, armed with a single machine-gun and used for attacks against naval craft;
3. the 45kt Muraj, with 10 crew and three machine guns, used for attacks against naval craft, logistics and for landing attack teams; and
4. the two-man Idayan, a 45kt suicide craft fitted with explosives that detonate on impact with the target.

Apart from various types of attack crafts, LTTE also acquired commercial vessels for transportation of goods and weapons. In 1984, the LTTE acquired a second hand cargo vessel called M.V. Cholan from a Mumbai based shipping magnate for the purpose of transporting arms and other military equipment as using charted ships had become too much of a risk by this time. It was also around this period that the group ordered the construction of another vessel from a shipbuilding Yard in the Kerala (India) coast By 2004 the LTTE was estimated to have around 10 freighters under “Pan – Ho – Lib” (Panama, Honduras, Libya) flags.



Photo: 2007 Navy destroyed three LTTE ships MV Manyoshi, MV Kyoshi and MV Seshin within 24 hours. http://www.nation.lk/2007/09/16/militarym.htm

Tsunami Effects

In December 2004, the Asian Tsunami devastated a significant part of the LTTE controlled areas. The actual extent of the damage incurred by the LTTE, especially damages to its maritime assets is difficult to ascertain as accounts vary drastically. According to news sources, the main Sea Tiger base in Mullaitivu including a part of its fleet was destroyed. Another report estimated that the Tsunami devastated the main Sea Tigers base at Mullaitivu, four radar stations, 200 Sea Tiger boats, as well as another 4500 boats which were operated by sympathetic fishermen. However, LTTE itself refuted these reports stating that losses were not so significant. It is to be noted that LTTE used to keep boats in trailers hidden deep in the jungles which would mean that the damage could not be as high as it was speculated.

The Sea Tigers

Photo: 2008 Col. Soosai, Liberation Tigers special commander of the Sea Tigers, addressing a gathering in Puthukkudiyiruppu. http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/01/chief-of-lttes-military-intelligence.html

Offensive Operations and Supply Support Operations

The Sea Tiger Unit’s functions were reflective of those of a conventional navy. It had two major functions: offensive operations and supply support operations. Combat or offensive operations were focused on eroding Sri Lankan navy’s capabilities thereby preventing it from interfering with LTTE combat or supply operations. A sub-unit called the “Black Sea Tigers” was entrusted with carrying out suicide attacks while other units undertook underwater operations.

Photo: LTTE Sea Tigers cadre transport. Google Images.

Supply Routes

Supply support units are tasked with keeping LTTE supply routes safe for cargo transportation as well as acting as escorts to boats carrying cargo to shore. Most of these operations took place in the waters that link north-eastern Sri Lanka with Southeast Asia. Since the group did not have ports to accommodate cargo ships, the cargo was being unloaded to fast moving logistics crafts which were protected by several fast attack crafts (FACs).

Do Not Engage in Battle Unless Absolutely Necessary

Even though the Sea Tiger vessels had the capacity to outrun SLN patrol boats, they used to cluster together in order to appear as a single blip on the radar screen. When approaching the coast the FACs would move away from the logistics craft. The FACs would engage and attempt to drive away SLN crafts trying to intercept them. Unlike in combat operations, the Sea Tigers usually preferred not to engage in battles when performing escort duties. However if an LTTE vessel was intercepted it would not hesitate to engage in a long gun battle aimed at harassing and exhausting the SLN boat’s ammunition. Photo: SLN patrol boat Super Dvora-II. http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-photos-multimedia/42900-sri-lanka-navy-pictures-new-2.html

Size and Tactics

Usually, the Sea Tigers operated in squadrons of three boats each. When engaging with the SLN its aim was to isolate one of the SLN crafts and destroy it, usually by firing at the outboard motors. These tactics which were used by the Sea Tigers mirror exactly those of the SLN. Photo: 2009 Captured LTTE boat used by Tamil Tiger rebels, at a hide out in the No Fire Zone in Puttumattalan, in Putukudiyiruppu area about 240 kilometers (150 miles) northeast of Colombo, Sri Lanka. http://www.flickr.com/photos/36169878@N07/3481320700/

Assistance and Combat Functions

The Sea Tigers also play a vital role in the LTTE’s land operations where they help transporting troops to combat locations when land routes are unavailable. They also help in rescuing cadres who are trapped in military controlled areas. The role of the Sea Tigers was noteworthy during LTTE operations to recapture Mullaitivu in 1996 and to capture the Elephant Pass complex in 2000. In the latter instance, the Sea Tigers were instrumental in transporting 1500 troops on to the Jaffna peninsula which was the turning point of the battle which caused the Sri Lankan army to retreat and subsequently surrender.
 

The attack on the Trincomalee naval base in October 2000 was one of the most important Sea Tiger operations in which the group was able to sink a naval boat and damage others after a three hour long firefight which took place in a high security zone. A Jane’s Intelligence Review analysis of a video of the same attack identified eight distinctly different speedboat types where it is believed that the LTTE had attempted at using stealth technology. The analysis however could not estimate the efficiency of the stealth design. While it was initially speculated that the designs may have originated in North Korea, subsequently it was determined that these were indigenous creations.

Hijacking

The Sea Tigers periodically hijacked ships and fishing vessels that were passing through their waters. Hijackings were carried out irrespective of the nationality of the victim. Most of the hijackings were for financial gains or to recoup supplies including food grains. Some examples of such hijackings were: Irish Mona (August 1995), Princess Wave (August 1996), Athena (May 1997), Misen (July 1997), Morong Bong (1997). In September 1997 MV Cordiality was attacked from several angles while it was anchored near Trincomalee and was unloading 29000 tons of ilmenite. The Princes Kash which was heading towards Mullaitivu was attacked in August 1998. The Sri Lanka Air Force bombed the vessel to prevent the LTTE from confiscating the cargo. In September 1999 several Indian fishermen were taken hostage by the LTTE. The group demanded a ransom of gasoline, diesel, and battery oil from the Indian government in exchange of the hostages.

Photo: 2006 MV Farah III in the hands of Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka. http://www.marinebuzz.com/2009/05/18/sea-piracy-mv-farah-iii-in-the-hands-of-sea-tigers-of-sri-lanka/

Notable Hijacking By the LTTE

• MV Irish Mona – August 1995
• MV Princess Wave – August 1996
• MV Athena – May 1997
• MV Misen – July 1997
• MV Morang Bong – July 1997
• MV Cordiality – September 1997
• MV Princess Kash – August 1988
• MV Sik Yang – reported missing May 25, 1999
• MV Farah III – December 2006 – crew members were released

Suicide Operations: the Black Sea Tigers

Photo: 2008 captured LTTE suicide boat seen floating in the Northern seas. http://www.spur.asn.au/chronology_of_suicide_bomb_attacks_by_Tamil_Tigers_in_sri_Lanka.htm


The Black Sea Tiger unit which was responsible for suicide missions was established in
1990 to compensate for the technological superiority of the Sri Lanka Navy. On 10 July 1990 it carried out its first suicide attack against the Sri Lankan navy’s command ship Edithara off the coast of Valvettiturai. The unit’s importance for the group could be judged from the fact that of the 273 Black Tigers that have died in various operations, 194 were from the Black Sea Tigers. Of this 56 were female Black Sea Tigers. Using deception and elements of surprise, the Black Sea Tigers became a highly lethal weapon against the Sri Lanka Navy.

Type of Crafts

The unit used a variety of crafts such as SBS – Type Arrows, torpedo riders similar in design to those used during WW II and speed racing style boats. It also used logistics crafts, modified FGB – type vessels as well as fishing trawlers for attacks that were carried out in seas further away from the shore. Photo: 2009 Sri Lanka Navy Arrow SBS, 7 special Boat squad craft armed w/14.5mm,.50cal & 40mm grenade launchers. 

Swarm Tactics

The Black Sea Tiger attacks were usually conducted in groups of three boats with one acting as the command craft. The unit also used “swarm” tactics where several attack crafts, (combination of 5-10 suicide and non- suicide vessels), move at high speed towards a single Sri Lankan Navy craft. Identifying and engaging the LTTE boats would require close-range gunnery situations and even then it is almost impossible to engage and destroy all the attacking vessels. The unit outfitted its small high-speed boats with detonation devices known as “explosive horns” that served to explode on impact with ships and other sea borne targets.

Underwater Operations

Mines, Reconnaissance, and Operations

The LTTE also had an underwater unit which was responsible for infiltrating harbours to lay mines, conducting reconnaissance operations and recovering material from vessels that were sunk in combat. The Sea Tigers developed improvised mines from everyday household objects such as rice cookers. Free floating mines were also used (e.g. inside the Trincomalee harbour) which were generally equipped with about 6 horns to prevent accidental detonation while floating. In its early years (1990s) the mines used by the Sea Tigers were detonated remotely from shore, especially around Kilali which is the southern end of the Jaffna peninsula. Prior to that in the mid 1980’s the Sea Tigers used diving equipment for these purposes. However release of air bubbles to the surface revealed the divers’ positions which resulted in several Sea Tigers being killed. Following this the LTTE purchased “re-breather” kits which allowed them to investigate the hull of berthed SLN vessels without leaving any signature. The group was exploring to purchase Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) - small submersible “tugs”- which increase the swimmer’s range and carrying capacity.

Mines

In June 2006, 5 Sea Tigers were arrested by Sri Lankan police while laying mines off the shore of Wennappuwa (60km north of Colombo). The mines were a new type of improvised devices which the authorities believe was developed by the LTTE. The mines were similar to limpet mines and were designed to stick magnetically to the ship’s hull. Each mine weighed between 10-15kg and could be triggered to explode by a time – delay fuse or be made to explode remotely. The expertise to design and manufacture the mines could have been developed by LTTE on its own, though there were allegations that in the past India provided some form of training to boost group’s overall capabilities.

Semi-Submersibles

The Sea Tigers also developed a semi-submersible “human torpedo” to carry out suicide operations underwater. The explosives charge carried by these suicide scooters varied from 25kg to 50kg. The vehicle was powered by a 2 - horsepower outboard motor which was quiet and gave a maximum speed of five knots. Equipped with diving gear the single operator would either stay with the craft or drop away. Slowly approaching the target, the Sea Tiger could either accelerate the craft when it was about 100 – 200 meters away from the target or stop the engine and push the craft into the target. The sinking of the Sri Lankan naval Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Nayaru on the Mullaitivu coast in March 2008 was attributed to an attack by a human torpedo. Although the propensity of such a craft making a successful attack during day time was low, the devises were difficult to be detected visually or on radar as they remained semi submersed. Even if it was spotted, as with all other Sea Tiger suicide missions, there was very little response time available to the target to intercept.

Submarines

LTTE was also attempting to gain a full submersible capability. According to some reports, the outfit was trying to purchase mini-submarines from North Korea and South Africa but there was no evidence of these purchases. However in April 2000 it was discovered that the LTTE was making attempts at building a submarine in Phuket, Thailand. The arrest of Christy Reginold Lawrence (former member of the Norwegian Special Forces) revealed that the LTTE was in the process of building its own mini submarine. Its hull was 3.6 metres with the tail designed to hold a 1.6 metre long propeller. The total length of the craft was 5.2 metres and could hold two persons. This could have been used to launch divers to swim underwater and attach mines or explosives or possibly to lunch torpedoes like conventional submarines.

Attacks

May 2006 saw the first of several significant attacks where a vessel carrying 700 soldiers including several monitors from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was attacked by the Sea Tigers. The Navy was able to defend against the attack but lost 17 sailors and 2 Dvora crafts in the battle. Since fighting resumed in August 2006, the Sri Lanka Navy had successive triumphs over the LTTE where Navy crafts effectively engaged and destroyed rebel boats. In September 2006 alone there were two significant attacks against the Sea Tigers: on 2 September the Navy destroyed 12 LTTE boats (believed to be heading towards the Kakasanthurai Naval Base) off the coast of Point Pedro while on 25 September 2006, 11 Sea Tiger boats were destroyed off the coast of Trincomalee. A retaliatory suicide attack was carried out in October 2006 against the Dakshina Naval base in the southern city of Galle just two days after a suicide attack (on land) which killed over 100 unarmed sailors in Habarana. Between March to October 2007, the Sri Lankan navy also destroyed 9 merchant vessels of the LTTE, effectively cutting off its supply line. Throughout 2008 and early 2009, the military successfully captured all of the major Sea Tiger bases in Chundikulam, Kaddaikadu, Thalaidi, Champianpattu, Mullaittivu (Vadduval), Chemmalai And Alampil, areas which were located along the eastern and north-eastern coast. The Sea Tigers also lost several of their boat launching pads in both the eastern and western coasts including its main base in Chalai, along the north-eastern coast. The Sri Lankan armed forces recovered a significant number craft and other maritime equipment of the Sea Tigers which highlights the level of sophistication of the group. One of the most important recoveries involved three underwater vehicles from the Udayarkattukulam area in Mullaitivu. There were also three other smaller underwater vehicles which were under construction. In addition, troops also recovered three suicide boats and a large haul of LTTE maritime equipment from the area. The largest underwater vehicle found was about 35 feet long and armour plated.

Victory

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan forces declared complete victory on LTTE with the killing of Prabhakaran and other top leadership of the group. The government forces overran all the LTTE held areas and destroyed the entire infrastructure of the group.Though there is a concern that some LTTE members may still be hiding, there is no chance that the group can revive its maritime infrastructure.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Terrorist and Pirate

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has strong roots to the banditry/pirate culture of the region. Primarily based in the Basilan Island in the Philippines, the group is composed of several semi-autonomous factions each based on a different island or archipelago. Most of its units are led by veterans of the Afghan jihad. It is known to have conducted attacks around the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the Southern Philippines, East Malaysia, and Indonesian Kalimantan. The group also conducts maritime weapon smuggling operations as far away as in Sulawesi and Maluku in Indonesia. The group is considered a major threat to Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the East Timor Sea. ASG leader Nadzmi Sabdullah,“Commander Global,” planned many maritime operations including the kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001. Similarly, Galib Andang, “Commander Robot,” led the 2000 Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid. ASG also claimed responsibility for the bombing of Davao City port on 2 April 2003, which killed at least 16 people and injured 55. The explosion was apparently timed to maximize casualties at a time when the wharf was most busy with two passenger ships - Filipina Princess and Superferry 15 – were boarding/discharging passengers. The bombing of the Superferry 14 in February 2004 was ASG’s maritime spectacular.
Photo: 2001 Nadzmi Sabdullah alias Commander "Global", one of the top leaders of the Abu Sayyaf and the brain of all the bandit's kidnapping activities was captured Friday in General Santos City.

SuperFerry 14 was a large passenger ferry which was bombed with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on 27 February 2004. The ship was en route to Bacolod City in the southern Philippines and was cruising between Corregidor and El Fraile Island, outside of the Manila harbor when the bomb went off on or about 12:30 AM. The blast and a subsequent fire killed at least 116 people. The leader of the ASG claimed responsibility for the attack, specifically referring to “Passenger 51” of the Blue Room or Blue Cabin who carried out the mission. Janjalani cited the failure of the ship’s owners to pay “taxes” as the reason behind the bombing. However, another ASG leader Abu Solaiman claimed that it was a revenge for violence inflicted upon Muslims by the Philippine military.

Coastal Operations Proficient

ASG is highly proficient in conducting brown (riverine) and green (coastal and archipelagic) water operations during both night and day. However its blue water capability is limited. It lacks the maritime logistics necessary to sustain extended operations in high seas. According to an estimate of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) about 26 city ports and anchorages including Manila are vulnerable to attacks by the ASG.

Primary Vehicle of Choice: Speedboats

The ASG operates speedboats, mostly wooden crafts with minimal freeboard, multiple outboard engines, and shallow draft. The boats are stealthy, fast, and able to easily navigate reefs and swamps; many are armed with machine guns and capable of outrunning the naval vessels. Some reports suggest that the group contracted or acquired ships that can navigate long distances. ASG maritime forces have used assault rifles, hand guns, grenade launchers, and RPGs, which would indicate that the group does not have a weapons inventory specifically meant for maritime use. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has reported that the ASG uses night-vision devices, thermal imagers, sniper scopes, various types of commercial radio, satellites and cellular phones for its maritime operations. At sea, ASG forces strike with speed and violence similar to ambushes and hit and run tactics on land. They evade capture by using their fast, shallow draft boats to outrun government forces and disappear into the littoral reefs and swamps. For smuggling operations the group typically uses small fast boats or conceals contraband in local barter trade craft. ASG avoids using larger craft because it is easier to detect and harder to avade capture.


Piracy as Camouflage


The ASG is regarded the best as among the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia at its capability to use piracy both as a camouflage to wage maritime terrorist attacks and as a means to fund terrorist ventures. However, most of the maritime attacks conducted by the group are kidnapping for ransom operations, except the February 2004 bombing of the Superferry 14. The maritime attacks of the ASG are seen as a way to finace the group’s objective of establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao. Maritime kidnapping operations were carried out as a means to raise funds from ransom payments which the organization used to buy firearms and explosives for its terrorist activities. The ASG has also said that the maritime attacks it carried out were the group’s reaction to the continuing military offensives against Muslims in southern Philippines.

Photo: M/V Doulos before attack, location and date unknown. http://www.ssmaritime.net/Doulos-concluding-days-2008-2010.htm

Historical Attacks

Despite limited capability, the ASG has repeatedly demonstrated its propensity for maritime attacks. In fact, one of its first attacks was maritime related. On 24 August 1991, the ASG bombed the M/V Doulos, a Christian missionary ship and floating library which was docked at the Zamboanga Port. Two foreign missionaries were killed and eight others were wounded in the bombing. Many analysts believed that the attack was made purely for political reasons as the ASG claimed that the bombing was a reaction of the group to the military offensives in Mindanao.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Photo: c.1998 Moro Islamic Liberation Front training grounds.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippines. Inhabiting what is locally called the Bangsamoro homeland of which the island of Mindanao is the largest, the Moros are fighting for a separate homeland for the Muslims in the southern Philippines. According to the Philippines military, thr MILF and the ASG have conducted a number of operations together, including MILF providing safe haven and training to ASG members. However, the MILF has consistently refuted these allegations.

Abilities

In pursuit of its objectives, MILF has conducted numerous attacks against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the police infrastructure in the country. The group has also used its land capabilities to conduct operations in the maritime domain. It is highly skilled at using IEDs with electronic detonators, and has proven its ability to use these devices against maritime targets such as ports and ferries. MILF is capable of brown (riverine) and green (coastal and archipelagic) water operations. Its maritime activities are routine logistics operations; to smuggle people, carry supplies, and weapons. MILF’s blue water capability is extremely limited. Although its forces are able to venture onto the high seas beyond the Philippine/Indonesian archipelago under certain weather conditions, they lack the maritime logistics necessary to sustain extended operations.


MILF’s maritime operations include:

1. Use of maritime craft for smuggling and general transportation,
2. Small battles between government forces and MILF in which one or both units were waterborne.
3. Attacks on inter-island ferries and in seaports using sophisticated IED’s have likely been the work of MILF. These attacks have been timed to both cripple infrastructure and maximize causalities.

Shallow-Draft Boats

When operating in the maritime environment, MILF cadres either attempt to avoid detection by appearing innocuous or evade government forces by using their fast, shallow-draft boats to outrun government forces and disappear into the littoral reefs and swamps. Although MILF has been known to kidnap individuals for ransom in the past, it has renounced such tactics as forbidden by the Quran. In March 2002, MILF leader Salamat Hashim (now deceased) announced that MILF would take drastic action against those who conduct kidnapping in its territories. The MILF has also publicly distanced itself from activities such as sabotage, assassination, and piracy. 

Connections with Other Groups

Reports suggest that the MILF,Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al Qaeda have all planned or executed maritime operations and are likely to have shared maritime strategies, tactics and/or equipment with each other. The 2003 bombings in Davao City, including the bombing of a sea port, were said to be the product of the MILF-JI alliance. The MILF has denied it has ties with the JI but police and military intelligence believe that it provided JI with training facilities in areas they control.

Piracy Connections

The MILF allegedly has affiliations with regional pirate gangs and smuggling syndicates operating in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. It also avails of protective services from corrupt elements of the Philippine Navy for the valuable shipments of arms and goods.

High Profile Attacks

The MILF was implicated in one of the high profile maritime attacks on 20 February 2000, when two IEDs hidden in coaches being carried by Our Lady Mediatrix, a Philippine ferry, exploded when the ship was docked in Ozamiz City. The blast and ensuing fire killed 52 people and wounded 42. The group was also implicated in the April 2003 bombing of the Davao City Sasa Wharf, the main dock for Davao City where cargo ships and passenger ferries land. The bomb detonated at a barbecue stand near the wharf killed 17 people and wounded almost 60 others. Several members of the MILF and the ASG were arrested for their involvement in the bombing. However, the MILF denied any involvement in the bombing.

Photo: Port of Ozamiz City. 

Peace Talks

Since the late 1990s, the MILF has been in peace negotiations with the Philippine government. Although the talks have been punctuated with hiccups on both sides, the MILF is concentrating on establishing its credibility as the rightful representative of the Bangsamoro homeland by refraining from violence and criminality. Hence, its activities, including its maritime adventures have been scaled down to the minimum.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

 Photo: The rebels of Free Aceh Movement are fighting for an independent
Islamic state from Indonesia.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia’s Aceh province was notorious for its maritime activities. The group strove for an independent nationhood for itself. However, weakened by sustained operations by the Indonesian military and the Tsunami of December 2004, the group settled down for autonomy within the framework of the Indonesian constitution. In August 2005 it signed a peace agreement to that effect and subsequently formed government in the province after being successful in the elections. 

Image: Map of Strait of Malacca.

Strait of Malacca

The Indonesian province of Aceh is located at the northern tip of Sumatra island. It covers an area of 57,366 km including more than one hundred small islands stretching out along its western coast. The littoral zone is dominated by islets, mangrove swamps, reefs, and small coves which provide a favourable environment for irregular maritime warfare and smuggling. Aceh is also at the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca, an important sea traffic lane with about 50,000 vessels transiting the strait in a year.[1] About 25 percent of the world's crude oil is carried through the Strait of Malacca. This volume is expected to triple by 2010. The waters are under-policed and prone to maritime violence. In fact Indonesian waters account for largest number of the world’s total piracy incidents.[2] The Acehnese have relied on smuggling, piracy, and maritime crime as a source livelihood for more than one thousand years. In the 19^th century Acehnese pirates regularly attacked passing merchants which brought them into conflict with Western navies. Since then the Acehnese have fiercely resisted the control of the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian forces. Smuggling and maritime combat have been at the forefront of these conflicts. Aceh also has rich natural gas fields. GAM regarded Aceh’s maritime environment and natural gas fields as interlocking resources and key to their prosperity.

Not Capable of Deep Water Combat

GAM used to operate in the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore straits, West Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma) and ventured into the Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka. GAM was capable of brown water (riverine) and green water (coastal) operations. Although GAM maritime craft could cross the high seas, they were not capable of blue water combat operations.

Types of Watercraft Used

GAM mariners used tug boats, speed boats, fishing boats, and traditional wooden craft. Its maritime activities included operations to smuggle people, weapons, supplies, and information for use in the broader struggle. It also used its maritime infrastructure to target Indonesian officials and international petroleum company facilities/personnel working in Aceh and its vicinity. GAM was also accused of conducting piracy and maritime kidnapping in order to raise funds. Teams attacking ships used to operate in groups of two or three boats. They typically approached transiting vessels and demanded for the ship to stop. In some cases, they have fired on the ship’s pilothouse in order to persuade the crew to surrender.

Piracy and Smuggling

GAM had extensive contacts with smuggling syndicates (narcotics, people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and pirate gangs operating across the Strait of Malacca. It had sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang, Malaysia and Islamic mariners in Southern Thailand especially the ones belonging to the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), an insurgent group fighting for an independent state in Southern Thailand. In September 2001, in a statement to the Associated Press, GAM spokesman Tengku Ishak Daud, asked all ships transiting the Strait of Malacca to request protection from GAM. It has also claimed credit for attacks on crafts used to service offshore petroleum facilities. In addition, GAM has been accused of pirating international shipping in the Strait of Malacca. The accusation seemed to be supported by the drastic reduction in piracy in Indonesian waters after the Tsunami. The tsunami severely damaged the coastal fishing villages, or kampongs, from which the attacks are launched. It is also possible that many members engaged in piracy have died in the tsunami.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Photo: 2009 Oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island. 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Southeast Asian regional terrorist group that came to limelight with October 2002 attacks in Bali does not have a dedicated maritime organization. But it has used the maritime domain extensively, especially for sending its recruits from Indonesia for training in camps in the Philippines. JI also conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi Naval Base. Since 2005, increasing evidence of coordination among the terrorist groups in the region – between JI, Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)- have emerged. It was alleged that the attack on SuperFerry 14 in February 2004, was a joint operation involving JI, ASG and Raja Sulaiman Movement – a group gaining increasing visibility in the region.
Photo: 2007 Changi Naval Base.

Al-Qaeda

Photo: 2008 Al Shabaab Pitates are using two Mother Ships to off load speed boats to capture ships in the Gulf of Aden and around the Somalia coast line. Al Shabaab has links to al Qaeda. Later in 2008 al Shabaab seized a the Russian cargo ship Faina carrying 33 Russinan tanks.http://www.billwarnerpi.com/2008_09_21_archive.html

The Sea Star

Although there is no consensus about the estimate or even the existence of Al-Qaeda’s maritime fleet, the group’s intention as well as the capability to target maritime assets is well documented. Osama bin Laden himself reportedly owned a ship named Seastar purchased by Wadih El- Hage, his personal assistant, in 1994. According to Barwill Agencies in Sudan, which was hired to load and unload the cargoes, the ship worked the waters of the Red Sea carrying sesame and watermelon seeds and carried cement between Port Sudan and Aqaba, in Jordan. The proceeds of the operation supported Al-Qaeda while Osama was in Sudan. Seastar sank of the coast of Oman in 2000 when owned by a Norwegian company.

Targets of Opportunity

When Al Qaeda’s chief of naval operations- Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda Al-Nashiri, nicknamed “Prince of the Sea” was arrested in the United Arab Emirates, a 180-page file listing “targets of opportunity,” was in his possession. The list which contained plans to attack naval vessels and large cruise liners etc., reinforced concerns about plans of terrorists’ to attack against maritime assets. Al-Nashiri worked with Tawfiq bin Attash, known as Khallad, a principal planner of USS Cole attack. Khallad attended the January 2000 Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in which plans for the September 2001 attacks and attacks against USS Cole and other maritime targets including those in Southeast Asia were discussed.
Similarly, as per documents recovered in Afghanistan from the house of Mohammad Atef, Al-Qaeda’s commander of military operations, Al-Qaeda had developed detailed instructions on diving including the use of diving equipments for military functions. The manual invoked verses from Quran to stimulate interest in maritime operations especially attacks involving deep sea diving. As a postscript, the manual noted;

“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam. And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war (tanks, planes missiles, artillery).”

Ignorance of Water Transportation

However, an analysis of the document makes it quite evident that, the training procedure and the equipments discussed in the manual were of a very basic nature. It betrayed ignorance about underwater transportation capabilities, techniques of diving, medical effects and the amount of training necessary to reach the level of professional civilian divers, not to speak of cutting edge operational combat divers.

Marine Terrorism, A Strategic Requirement from Jihad Press (Excerpts)

The Jewish-Crusade campaign hasn’t been left except at the sea, where they roam about and move fearlessly. The armed battalions near the Yemeni coasts have started targeting, since more than an year, fishing for the trade, tourist and petroleum ships one after the other, and now it has become important at this phase, for the Mujahideen and they are running a worldwide battle to revive the Caliphate and rule the world by it, the next step should be to control the sea and the sea loopholes starting from around the Arabian peninsula.

The Mujahideen in Yemen succeeded in targeting Jewish-Crusade targets twice on the sea, the first was preparation for the blessed raids of New York and Washington by targeting the USS Cole in October 2000, and then the petroleum transferring vessel of France, Lamburg- in 2002.

And with the approach of the hour of decisiveness .. it becomes necessary to complicate the battle towards the waters, and just like the Mujahideen have succeeded in setting up martyrdom units on land, the waters remain an important strategic step over dominating the world and returning the Islamic Caliphate.

According to US and European intelligence sources, between fifteen and fifty cargo freighters could be owned or operated by Al-Qaeda. A report in September 2003 described the creation of Al-Qaeda’s naval fleet with ships capable of carrying cargoes of lethal chemicals, a “dirty bomb” or even a nuclear weapon. The ships, the sales of which were traced by the British MI6 and CIA with the help of Lloyds of London and which carry the flags of Yemen and Somalia were believed to be somewhere in the Indian or Pacific oceans after they left their home ports in the Horn of Africa. However, there is no independent confirmation.


Hadits of the prophet on jihad at sea in Ibn Majah book of hadits known as Sunan Ibn Majah

• “One battle at sea equals ten battles on the land. Those who become seasick [during sea expedition] get similar reward of a wounded fighter in the path of Allah.”
• “… one who obtains martyrdom at sea is equal to two martyrs on the land. …”
• “…Allah delegates the tasks of taking life to the angels of death except the life of martyrs at sea. He took it Himself. Allah forgive the sins of the martyrs on land except his debt but for martyrs at sea, forgiveness of all sins including his debt.”

Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable interest among the jihadi community about the attacks involving the maritime sector. This strategy has repeatedly been discussed in postings in a number of jihadi websites. For example, in September 2008, an article entitled “Marine Terrorism – A Strategic Requirement” was posted to the English language section of the al-Ekhlass website, an Arabic language jihadist website. The author acknowledged that it has now become necessary to expand the battle to the sea (water) and “just like the Mujahideen have succeeded in setting up martyrdom units on land, the waters remain an important strategic step for dominating the world and returning the Islamic Caliphate.” In another posting Al-Qaeda strategist al-Qureishi published a document entitled “the return of al-Qaeda’s navy” suggesting that al-Qaeda utilize more maritime attacks for strategic reasons.

Piracy and Terrorism

Image: 2011 Path of two ships, MS Dover and SV ING, before hijacking by Somali pirates. 


There is considerable ambivalence about the so-called nexus between piracy and terrorism. There is much apprehension that terrorists could team up with pirates to carryout maritime attacks. This is due to an increase in number of piracy incidents in the same part of the world as well as the changing nature of the attacks. According to conventional wisdom a piracy-terrorism nexus could bridge the gap between the intentions of the terrorist groups and their maritime capabilities.

Southeast Asia

Until Somali pirates stole the limelight, the Southeast Asian waters have always ranked high in terms of reported piracy incidents. Out of a total of 2375 piracy incidents worldwide between 1991 and 2001 reported to the ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1567 (66%) incidents occurred in the waters of Southeast Asia. In 2002-2005, similarly, the number of reported incidents was the highest in Southeast Asia in comparison to the rest of the world. During that period, the Strait of Malacca, one of the most critical sea lanes of communication reported very high incidence of piracy which prompted the Lloyds of London to make a stiff hike in Insurance premium for the cargo and vessels transiting this route. Piracy was also very high on the Indonesian waters during that period. Similarly, some of the most violent pirate attacks took place in the territorial waters off Bangladesh with almost seventy-five percent of these attacks taking place in harbour or port areas.

Strait of Malacca

It was not only the number but also the nature of piracy attacks became a matter of concern for the littoral (on or near the shore) as well as user states. Attacks on vessels especially in the Strait of Malacca and in waters off Bangladesh for example, were carried out with almost military precision using sophisticated weapons and techniques. Attacks on ships by pirates increasingly resembled military operations - getting more violent, more frequent and more organized. In many cases such as with the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in March 2003 off Indonesian waters, pirates boarded, robbed and piloted the vessels for a period of time in the Strait of Malacca. According to some observers, it was “possible that these could be rehearsals [by terrorists for maritime attacks].” A number of tug boats and barges, which were hijacked, remained unaccounted for. Many of the crews taken hostage went missing. These developments led to the concern that terrorists may be having some hands-on “driver training” by piloting the vessels themselves or getting the kidnapped crew to teach how to master the navigation of large commercial vessels. The hijacked tugboats and barges could be used as floating bombs targeting other vessels, key installations, naval bases or port facilities. Tugboats and barges manoeuvring among the bigger ships to load or unload cargo are a common sight in the straits and in port areas. That would make them ideal cover for acts of terrorism.

Africa

Since 2006, the action seems to have moved towards the African coasts as can be seen from the following:

Piracy 2006-2008

(Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2006, 2007 and 2008)

Gulf of Aden

It is evident that the epi-centre of piracy has moved to the waters off Africa especially the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates have earned particular notoriety in piracy even though pirates from Nigeria and Yemen have joined the act. But, in all most all cases, these are pure criminal acts designed to make money from kidnapping or hijacking. According to an estimate, pirates collected a sum of $40 million in ransom payments in 2008. The attacks nearly doubled in the first quarter of 2009, even as the response from the international community against piracy intensified. Though there is a concern that some of the money collected by the pirates could be getting into the hands of the extremist groups operating in Nigeria or Somalia, a direct connection between the piracy and terrorism has not been evident yet.




Piracy & Terrorism Nexus?

Photo: Somali pirates in small boats hijack the mv Faina, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, on September 25, 2008. 

Possible Convergence

Given the number and the nature of pirate attacks and the volatile political climate in particular regions, which are hospitable to terrorism, a convergence between piracy and terrorism could be a possibility. Nevertheless, no clear consensus about a direct nexus between the pirates and the terrorists has emerged so far. Many analysts argue that the growing terrorist problem in some regions provides “the background conditions that are necessary for this convergence to take place.” Under these conditions, pirates could “contract out” their services to hijack ships which could then be used to smuggle weapons and personnel or cause a collision to block critical shipping lanes – a plot consistent with jihadists’ economic warfare strategy against the Western capitalist system. Just as al Qaeda is subcontracting or outsourcing many of its drug efforts to the Taliban – it seems a natural progression to use work-for-hire pirates as contract labor as well.

Motives Different

Others are however, skeptical about whether pirates would partner terrorists or vice versa for business and fundamentalist reasons respectively. Acts of piracy and terrorism are not interchangeable as their motives are different. As Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-general of IMO put it, “although criminals and terrorists may operate in similar ways, terrorists aim to use their violence in pursuit of strategic objectives, and all too frequently, mass destruction.” It would thus be difficult to accept that the criminal entrepreneurs engaged in acts of piracy would be willing to team up with terrorists for acts of political violence. For the pirates this could be counterproductive for their profession. It may however be possible that terrorist could learn the tricks of the trade from the pirates to build up their capability in the maritime sector. Thus piracy could more of vulnerability, one that can be exploited by the terrorists.

Photo: 2010 Fv Golden Wave, a South Korean fishing vessel, was seized by Somali pirates. In 2011 the vessel was released.

Terrorists

Maritime terrorism is thus a low probability threat with medium consequences. As discussed above, maritime capabilities of the terrorists vary significantly. After the demise of the LTTE, there is probably no group that possesses a dedicated maritime terrorist organization. Even though many groups have maritime capabilities, not all necessarily have maritime terrorist capabilities. This is largely because; traditionally terrorists groups as well as terrorists themselves are “land lubbers” and tend to be tactically conservative. They resort to tried and trusted methods and opt for the course that offers least difficulties. Land-based targets or targets involving the aviation sector offer leverage both in terms of greater ease of access and higher visibility. Due to resource constraints many groups may also use their maritime capabilities for support functions only – for movement of men and materials and to make money – and may not be disposed to conduct maritime terrorist operations. Similarly, the consequence of a maritime terrorist attack is of limited nature and duration unless terrorists manage to use nuclear or radiological weapons, the possibility of which remains remote. However, the threat of maritime terrorism exposes the many weakened spots of the maritime system (such as container inspection) that can be exploited by the terrorists even though the target of those attacks need not be an maritime asset.

Networking, Training and Technology

Nevertheless, the threat to maritime assets from these groups, remain because of continuing networking, training and transfer of technology among the groups and the inherent nature of terrorism itself to change and adapt quickly. For example, in 2005, the Philippines and the Indonesian authorities discovered how ASG was enhancing its underwater capabilities with two JI members as trainers, teaching them on scuba diving and underwater demolition skills. Upon completion of the training, the graduates would have been deployed in groups to conduct underwater bombings against seaports and vessels in Mindanao. These capabilities could be replicated elsewhere. Besides, the terrorist groups have kept pace with changing technologies and have adapted themselves to counter- measures in maritime defence. Consequently, terrorists now have the capability to disrupt maritime enterprise and threaten the peaceful use of the seas.

By: Coskun UNAL and TRAC