October 21, 2012

A Brief Intro About Syrian Resistance

Syrian Resistance Groups

Since the uprising against Essed Regime started in Syria as of 2011, world had witnessed that the main stream opposition was out sourced from Syrian Military units; which adopted the name "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) since 2012.

FSA, -not well organized and equiped, to be able to launch a massive and decisive attack against Syrian Army-, was desperate against Essed at the begining. Turkey's efforts to provide shelter and some military equipment for Syrian militia, opening her border doors for not only civilian run aways, but also some core members of the resistance was fruitless to keep the fire burning. So, Syrian resistance had paved the way for a new type of locational organization, which was necessary to show some progress. At this intersection, international observes along with media, witnessed new actors among FSA.

To date; it's not possible to obtain a definite number of resistance groups, but at the main stage of the ongoing battle, there are at least 15 to 20 local or nation wide groups, some with foreign roots; organized in battalion and larger formations, launching some serious attacks against Essed Forces, and showing a promising sound for a future victory agains the last standing Baathist Regime in the Middle East.






Some of the most significant opposition groups are stated below:

1. Idlib Tawhid Brigade

2. Aleppo Tawhid Brigade

3. Jabhat Al Nusrah (jihadist)

4. Ahrar Al Sham (Salafist)

5. Shuhada Idlib Brigade

6. Dera'a Al Thawra

7. Shuqur Al Sham Brigade (Based in Zawiya village of Sarjeh, Leader Ahmad Abu Issa)

8. Shuhada Halab'l Muham Al Khassa Battalion (Aleppo)

9. Faroq Battalion (FSA Unit, Leader Abdul Razzak Tlass)

10.Farouq Al Shamal Battalion

11.Ahfad Al Resul Brigade

12.Shuqur Jebel Al Zawitah Battalion (A Part of Shuqur Al Sham Brigade)

13. Umma Brigade (Libyan led rebel group based in northern Idlib. Its leader is Mahdi Al Harati)

14. Hamza Battalion (Rastan based. Leader Ibrahim Ayoub)

15. Shuhada Suriyah Battalion (Leader Jamal Maaruf; )

16. Uthman Dhu Nurain Battalion (FSA organization in Harem region)

17. Al Sahaba Brigade

18. Al Qaka Brigade

19. Fajrul Islam

20. Tawafiq Group

21. Turkmen's Brigade

 

1. Tawhid (Unification)Brigade :


Tawhid Brigade (Unification Brigade) is an armed group who was active in the Battle of Aleppo. Its founder, using the pseudonym of Abu Khalid is from the Aleppo's Deraa region. He was a jihadist in Iraq and in the Lebanese based group of Fatah al Islam and was jailed several times in Syria by Syrian Intelligence,for trying to organize troubles and local plots against the Essed regime.

They are engaged in the Syrian conflict fighting against the Syrian government. The group crosses the border with Jordan to resupply itself in weapons and fighters. The group had some Libyans and Palestinians waiting to join their ranks.

Staring as a battalion level organization of approximately 200 strong, Tawhid announced itself as a Brigade on March 2012. Following the summer uprisings and clashes, another Tawhid Brigade is established in Idlib.

Its ideology is jihadism, conservative Islamism but they reject Al Qaeda terrorist tactics against women and children and also killing Shia Muslims. They also said that they have had no links with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) leadership based in a refugee camp in Turkey.

As the report points out, establishing the exact ideology of a Syrian rebel group is difficult. Most do not explicitly outline their worldview and some have adopted positions simply to gain favor with donors. Although the Idlib Tawhid Brigade has not publicly defined their ideology, there is evidence indicating that they are toward the Jihadist-Salafist end of the Islamist spectrum.

The Idlib Tawhid Brigade formed in mid-May by uniting several rebel cells near Idlib city. In a statement dated July 7, the Tawhid Brigade defined themselves as an independent group, separate from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and defined their mission as supporting religion. They also posted an al-Arabiya interview with Sheikh Aid al-Qarni, a Saudi cleric who preached in support of attacks against American troops in Iraq. On October 1, the Tawhid Brigade claimed to carry out a joint operation with fighters from the jihadist group Jabhat Nusrah, attacking two regime positions near Salqin. It should be noted, however, that the connection between the Idlib Jabhat Nusrah and the Jabhat Nusrah units carrying out large-scale bombings in Damascus and Aleppo is unclear. The following day, the brigade posted a video of a joint operation with the Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham in which, what appears to be a suicide bomber detonates a motorbike at a regime checkpoint near Idlib city.


In addition to working with Salafist groups, the Tawhid Brigade regularly carries out operations with FSA units, particularly the Shuhada Idlib Brigade, which is considered the armed wing of the Idlib City Revolutionary Council. Currently, the Tawhid Brigade is laying siege to an air defense station near Salqin in conjunction with units from Jabhat Nusrah, Ahrar al-Sham, and Deraa al-Thawra. The Idlib Tawhid Brigade also has links to the Muslim Brotherhood which is a major fund/source provider of the brigade.

While defining where exactly the Tawhid Brigade sits on the Islamist spectrum is difficult, the fact that they carry out suicide attacks, have links to Salafist groups, explicitly reject affiliation with the FSA, and emphasize their religious roots more than an average FSA group, point toward the brigade being a rebel group worth monitoring.

Rebels claimed to be members of the Aleppo Tawhid Brigade arrest a man who is claimed to be "traitor" at an old military base in Sicco village near Aleppo Photograph: Stringer/EPA

 


2. Jabhat Al Nusrah (Protection of the People Front / Support Front) :


Jabhat Al Nusrah (Front for the protection of the people) is a jihadist paramilitary group of Al Qaeda formed late in 2011 during the Syrian Uprising. The group released their first public statement on 24 January 2012 in which they called for armed struggle against the Syrian government. The group claims responsibility for the 2012 Aleppo bombings, the January 2012 al-Midan bombing, the March 2012 Damascus bombings, the murder of journalist Mohammed al-Saeed and possibly the 10 May 2012 Damascus bombings.

The Al-Nusra Front aims to lead an holy war against the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, which they hold responsible for crimes against rebels in Homs. The organization encourages all Syrians to take part in the war against the government.The group has also referred to the USA and Israel as enemies of Islam and has attacked the religious beliefs of non-Sunnis in Syria, including the Alawites.

On 17 June, Walid Ahmad al-Ayesh, described by Syrian authorities as the "right hand" of the Al-Nusra Front, was killed when Syrian authorities discovered his hiding place. The Syrian authorities reported the killing of another prominent member of the group, Wael Mohammad al-Majdalawi, killed on 12 August 2012 in a qualitative operation conducted in Damascus

The al-Midan bombings of January 2012 were allegedly carried out by a fighter named Abu al-Baraa al-Shami. Footage of the destruction caused by the blast was released on a jihadist forum. The video released by Al-Nusrah asserts that the "martyrdom-seeking operation" was executed "in revenge for our mother Umm Abdullah - from the city of Homs- against whom the criminals of the regime violated her dignity and threatened to slaughter her son," SITE reported. The video shows "an excerpt of allegiances, operations, and training of the al-Nusra Front" as well as a fighter "amongst the masses in a public demonstration, advising them to do their prayers and adhere to the rituals of Islam."

On 29 May 2012, a mass execution was discovered near the eastern city of Deir El Zor. The unidentified corpses of 13 men had been discovered shot to death execution-style.This incident raised awareness that the violence in Syria was heading towards an inexorable vicious cycle of tit-for-tat attacks between the different parties involved. According to the opposition, the 13 people who were shot at point blank range and later found in a field were employees at the electricity company in Deir Ezzor, who went on strike in protest of the massacres committed by the Syrian regime. They all had their hands tied behind their backs and were shot in the head according to a UN report. The head of a UN observer mission in Syria was "deeply disturbed" by the killings in Deir Ezzor, calling it an "appalling and inexcusable act."Several days later, the dead were identified to be military and the opposition then claimed they were army defectors killed by government forces. However, on 5 June, the Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant claimed responsibility for the killings, stating that they had captured and interrogated the soldiers in Deir al-Zor and "justly" punished them with death, after they confessed to crimes.

In mid-July, Mohammed al-Saeed, a well-known government TV News Reporter, was kidnapped by the group. On 3 August, al-Nusra published a statement saying that al-Saeed was executed.

On 3 October, three suicide car bombs exploded at the eastern corner of the centralAl Jabiri Square killing 34 people, as it was announced by the Ministry of interior. More than 122 people were reported to be heavily injured.Al-Nursa group claimed responsibility for the attack.The bombs targeted the Officers' club and the nearby buildings of the Touristic Hotel and the historic "Jouha Café". The hotel received major damage while the café was entirely destroyed. A small building within the Officers' club was ruined as well.

The Al-Nusra Front also claimed responsibility for attacking: a Syrian air defense base near Aleppo on 12 October, the Hanano barracks in Aleppo city and the Suluq barracks in Raqqah. In the air defense base assault they reportedly destroyed buildings and sabotaged radar and rockets after overrunning the base. They said the al-Fajr Islamic Movement and a group of Chechen fighters were also involved. During the storming of the Hanano barracks 11 soldiers were killed and they held the complex for six hours before retreating. They also claimed killing 32 soldiers during the raid on the Raqqah base.

3. Ahrar Al Sham (Free Men of Greater Syria) :

 Members of the group are largely Salafi Islamists. Ahrar al-Sham cooperates with the Al Nusrah as well as the FSA and other secular rebel groups. Although they coordinate with other groups, they maintain their own strict and secretive leadership.The group is supported by Sheik Adnan al-Arour, and receives the majority of its funding and support from Gulf donors like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.Ahrar al-Sham receives the bulk of foreign fighters entering Syria.

Ahrar al-Sham seek to establish an Islamic government in Syria whilst preserving the standard of living experienced during Assad's era. It has been claimed that unlike certain other jihadist groups Ahrar al-Sham is a Salafi group, rather than a pan-Islamist group. The group has expressed a desire for establishing an Islamic caliphate in Syria, although it has claimed that such a system would protect minority rights.

Known leader of the group is Abdul-Rahman al-Souri.

Ahrar al-Sham (Freemen of Greater Syria) is another slightly more moderate Salafist network, operating mainly in the north-west province of Idleb. Like Jabhat al-Nusra, it wants to impose a strict Islamist state and sees the fight in Syria as a sectarian battle of Sunni Muslims versus Alawites, the esoteric Shia offshoot to which the Assads belong. The two groups’ numbers are probably relatively small. Whereas Essed's regime encouraged the flow of jihadists into Iraq to kill Americans after the invasion in 2003, it has generally stamped on extremists. But jihadists are a minority within the Salafist trend; most Salafists are of a milder bent.

 
4. Shuhada Idlib Brigade (Martry Brigade) :

In late 2011-early 2012, Idlib city was a significant center of rebel activity, but the fighters were poorly organized, allowing the regime to clear the city in three short days in March 2012. The fighters that later created the Shuhada Idlib Brigade, were fighting in Idlib city in March. After being driven out by Syrian Army, they moved north of the city and formed the Shuhada Idlib Brigade in April 2012 under the leadership of Basil Issa.

The brigade shifted its focus back to Idlib city after the regime drew down its forces there in late July in order to increase forces around Aleppo city. This created an opening across Idlib province for rebels seeking to expand their safe zones and for the rebels who used to operate in Idlib city to vie for control of their provincial capital.

 







Basil Issa with the leaders of the Shuhada Idlib Brigade's twelve component battalions. The new leader of the Jafar al-Tayar Battalion is on the far right.

Despite the unconfirmed information stating that the brigade has around 12 battalions, only Jafar Al Tayyar Battalion and Shuhada Suriyah Battalion were confirmed as being part of some attacks under the command of Shuhada Idlib Brigade.

Jafar Al Tayyar Battalion (Commander Rasul Niyaz)

Shuhada Suriyah Battalion (Leader Jamal Maaruf)





5. Deraa Al Thawrah (Deraa Revolution) :

The name "Al-Thawrah" literally means "The Revolution", in reference to the March 8th revolution. The Tabqa Dam, which compounds the Euphrates River and creates Assad Lake, was built near the city Al-Thawrah. The city located in central Syria has a population of around 70,000. But, the group which refer themselves as Deraa Al Thawrah (Deraa Revolution) has nothing to do with the city Al Thawrah.

According to intelligence sources, Deraa Al Thawra is a small group ranked with some Bedouin people of the southern Syria. Known for their commitment to Islamic Law and sympathy to Saudi Arabia, this group is acknowledged as a deterrent group, which plays a vital role especially in trafficking foreign support and logistics to FSA and other rebel groups.

 
6. Tartusi's Ansar Al Sham (Supporters of Damascus) Group :

Security sources believe that dozens of British extremists, possibly as many as 50, have travelled to
Syria to join the fighting and some may have been recruited by Abu Basir Al Tartusi. This week a junior doctor of Bangladeshi origin from, East London was charged with kidnapping two photographers in Syria, where he was said to be part of a 15-strong group of Britons.

The security services are concerned that the brutal conflict in Syria could become a "new Afghanistan" drawing in young men who return to Britain radicalised and keen to continue a fight to spread Islam.

A source said the numbers were "small but increasing" and there were concerns about "who they meet and the knowledge they could gain."

Basir, whose real name is Abdal Munem Mustafa Halima, was running classes at the al-Ansar Institute in Poplar, East London just months ago. He has his own website and his sermons are readily available on the internet. The preacher has been based in Britain since fleeing the Assad regime following an uprising in the early 1980s.

He has been compared with fellow preacher Abu Qatada and was described by one academic as one of the "most influential and most prolific radical scholars in the world right now" and by another as one of the "primary Salafi [fundamentalist] opinion-makers guiding the jihadi movement."

Usama Hasan of the Quilliam think-tank said: "Basir is a leading jihadi theologian on a level with Abu Qatada. Syria has become the number one destination for wannabe jihadis and no one knows who is recruiting them, but it could easily be Basir."

Basir's first video from Syria appeared in links from radical forums to the YouTube video-sharing site in May, labelled: "Shaykh Abu Baseer al-Tartousi In Jihad in Syria!" It featured Basir sitting in a circle, clutching a stick and lecturing a group of his students, one of them holding a Kalashnikov.

Subsequent photographs and videos showed Tartusi brandishing his own Russian-made assault rifle and a video showed the death of his nephew in the fighting. He now features in regular updates on his Arabic-language Facebook page labelled "The Islamic Opposition to the Regime in Syria," the most recent posted on Friday.

The video of him with his armed group bore the insignia Ansar al-Sham – Supporters of Syria – and appeared last Saturday, apparently filmed near Latakia, in the east of the country.

Aaron Zelinof the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, who monitors radical groups in Syria, said Basir had been described as the "emir" of one brigade but the name Ansar al-Sham appeared to be new.
Basir's willingness to travel to Syria and take up arms has gained him praise from fundamentalists in Britain.

In one posting, a long-standing member of an internet forum praised his journey to Syria and compared it with Anwar al-Awlaki, the al-Qaeda preacher who was killed in Yemen last year.

"This is why when we see Abu Basir in Syria, it increases our respect for him a hundred times over," the individual wrote.

Basir has been a key figure in the jihadi world since the late 1990s. While he has supported Islamists in Afghanistan and Iraq and advocates establishing Islamic states by force, he also believes in a "covenant of security" between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West and opposes suicide bombing.

He has also criticised Jabhat al-Nusra, a rival Islamist group linked to al-Qaeda, for failing to co-operate with the more secular Free Syrian Army, provoking a spat with another high-profile jihadi preacher, Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti.

A spokesman for Scotland Yard said last night: "Public safety is our priority and we will seek to prosecute individuals who travel overseas in support of terrorist activity in any country.

"We also recognise the risk that violent extremism poses for vulnerable young people in the UK and we actively engage with communities to tackle this issue, in line with the Prevent Strategy."



Security chiefs estimate that there are just over 50 Britons in Syria fighting to bring down President Assad

 

7. Suqour Al Sham (Sham Falcons) Brigade :





 

 

The Suqour al-Sham brigade was formed in September 2011 under the leadership of Ahmed Abu Issa in the town of Sarjeh in the Jabal al-Zawiya region. The group’s fighters are a mix of defectors and civilian volunteers. According to its website, the brigade has a civilian and a military wing. The civilian wing is run by a Council headed by Ahmed Abu Issa, this wing is responsible for acquiring military supplies, food, and media operations. The military wing is independent, but acts on the advice of the civilian leadership

As Suquor al-Sham has grown in prominence, rebel units in neighboring regions such as Aleppo and Idlib Governorate have declared themselves members of Suqour al-Sham. The central leadership has sometimes recognized their affiliation, but the amount of coordination with these groups is believed to be low.

Suqour al-Sham has been known to carry out effective roadside IED attacks targeting the Syrian Army since it’s inception. The organization has also carried out attacks on checkpoints using VBIEDs that had been secretly rigged with explosives and driven unwittingly by released captives, upon reaching the target they were detonated remotely. The group has not been known to undertake conventional forms of suicide attacks and bombings.

Suqour al-Sham’s ideology has been described by an analyst of the group as Islamist but not Jihadist. In a sermon delivered in a mosque in April 2012, Abu Issa said Muslims had lost their honor because they had abandoned Jihad, replacing aspirations for martyrdom with a fear of death, however, in an interview in June 2012 Issa described his vision for a post-Assad Syria as a moderate Islamic state "without imposing it on society.

The group was initially composed of a small band of troops (Sariyah) who founded the "Sham Falcons" battalion (Katibah) in September. The battalion consists of many fighters ranging from young fighters to regime army deserters who left the criminal regime’s army and joined the revolution to defend their friends and families after witnessing the injustices of the regime.

The battalion was originally formed consisting of two wings:

1 / The civilian wing, which is the primary wing. It consists of all the revolutionaries and individuals dedicated to the revolution, with the aim of defending the people, their property, and their honor. This branch is headed by "Ahmad Al Shaykh", more commonly known by Abu Issa. Abu Issa, who is from the village of Sarjeh in Jabal Al Zawiyah. He is the original founder of the battalion and the primary commander of the entire battalion. He is accompanied by an advisory council (majless el shourah).

2 / The military wing, which is composed of a group of officers and soldiers who defected from the regime army. This wing acts independently but relies on the advice of the civilian wing. This wing has since the start, ensured the safety of the battalion and fulfilled their need for supplies, ammunition, food, and shelter. The wing also serves as a media department providing material to the media outlets. The material includes but is not limited to operations conducted by the rebels and revolutionaries against the regime.

The battalion extends to cover more than one third of the province of Idlib and sections of the Hama suburbs. The largest concentration of troops covers regions of Jabal Al Zawiyah, Khan Shaykhoon, Ariha, Saraqib, Idlib, Sarmine, Al Ghab, and the suburbs of Maarat Al-Nouman. The number of units inside the battalion has reached well over 50 units.

Given the geographic expansion of this battalion and the increasing number of fighters affiliated with it, it was declared, in the evolution of the battalion, that the battalion "Brigade Shams Falcons" composed of over 10 combat units under its command, scattered across the Idlib province, as well as other units that joined the ranks of the brigade, and are linked to other provinces such as Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia and others.

The brigade can now proudly claim that its battalions and companies completed an impressive number of military operations against the army of the tyrant Al Assad, inflicting great losses on the traitorous regime army.

The Mission

The Sham Falcons Brigade considers the Syrian regime as its enemy. The regime has shown its betrayal and has plotted against its own people. They do this primarily by taking peaceful civilians as targets and by killing them brutally and indiscriminately. Thusly the primary objective is to protect peaceful demonstrations against the Assad militia and the security agents and shabiha.

For its fight, the brigade embarked on military operations in defense of the people, such as ambushes on the main roads to prevent state officials from reaching areas where protests and demonstrations are in effect. It also contributes to the protection of activists, journalists and politicians sought by the regime by providing shelter and safe haven to these people as they are the engine of popular protest in the region.

After the regime began increasing its military atrocities and availed itself to violence in an attempt to quell the protests in Idlib by forming military roadblocks throughout the region and preventing the free movement of citizens, the Brigade changed its policy and went on the offensive by using guerrilla actions. The brigade resorted to using weapons of fortunes (shotguns, small mines, Molotov cocktail, guns ...) to ambush the regime army and to create pressure on them by cutting their supply routes.

However, the brigade’s stance remained the same. Even these "offensive" actions were to liberate the region and allow free movement for citizens. Thus the general policy of the brigade remained the same: to defend and protect the rights of the oppressed people, and all operations launched by the brigade were at regions penetrated unfairly by the regime army.

So far we have not seen a rise in military commitment to the brigade by the defected soldiers. This is because they have not dared to take the responsibility of fighting against the regime, and instead sought asylum in neighboring countries with the exception of a select few, who remained on the ground and fight to defend their people, even giving their lives for the cause.

Major operations

Due to the intense pressure forced upon the people by the regime army in the province of Idlib, and in particular, Jabal Alzawiyah, The Sham Falcons brigade has made a significant number of military operations.

One of the most important operations that were carried out by the brigade was an ambush of armored vehicles headed from Hamidiya and Maarat Al-Nouman that were headed there to suppress peaceful demonstrations and to arrest the anti-regime activists. The city of Maarat Al-Nouman was then one of the most important centers of protest in this period. The targeted attack lead to the destruction of a BMP tank, a Zell military transport truck, a jeep and killed over 15 agents of the regime.

Another important operation was the attack on the regime army after they formed an offensive on the city of Ariha. The Sham Falcons brigade answered the cry for help by the unarmed civilians of the city despite the lack of equipment and weaponry. The brigade fought the Assad army for three days and prevented them from entering the city. The attack led to heavy losses from the regime army. A high ranking officer was killed and more than four T72 tanks were destroyed as well as four transport vehicles and a BMP tank. The attack however had to be stopped due to a lack of ammunition, and the brigade withdrew from the town of Ariha.

Many other important activities were conducted such as the participation of the brigade in the battle of Bab Al Hawaa and the liberation of several cities of Jabal Al Zawiyah by invading and destroying military bases and cutting off their supply routes.


8. Shuhada Halab'l Muhammad Al Ghassan Battalion aka Al Abbas Battalion :

There's not much information about this group but it is known as one of the Deir Al Zour City based groups and is considered to have 60-100 fighters. The group had been announced itself as Al Abbas Battalion of FSA, a sister unit of Farouq Battalion of FSA, at the beginning of the war against Syrian Army. It's leader Muhammed Ghassan Al Atwan was killed on August 2012, in fierce clash and in the following months group announced it's new name as Muhammed Al Ghassam Battalion via social network and Twitter.

The group carries the banner of Farouq Battalion and claims to be a branch of FSA in Deir Al Zaur region.

9. Ahfad Al Rasul Brigade (Decendents of the Prophet) :

Operates under FSA. Main area of operation is Damascus and its suburbs and surroundings.

Group has known to organize the killings of Syrian army generals, including Air Force Command in Chief General Hassan. Group have a facebook and twitter account which it claims responsibility for the military operations, through social media.

October 16, 2012

Syrian Resistance Groups-4 (Idlib Tawhid Brigade)




 

Idlib Tawhid Brigade

The International Crisis Group released a great report last week detailing the evolving role of Salafists in the Syrian civil war. The report identified rebel groups with Salafist leanings whose future activity require monitoring. One group not mentioned in the report but worth watching is the Tawhid Brigade in Idlib Province (a different group than the Aleppo-based Tawhid Brigade).

As the report points out, establishing the exact ideology of a Syrian rebel group is difficult. Most do not explicitly outline their worldview and some have adopted positions simply to gain favor with donors. Although the Idlib Tawhid Brigade has not publicly defined their ideology, there is evidence indicating that they are toward the Jihadist-Salafist end of the Islamist spectrum.

The Idlib Tawhid Brigade formed in mid-May by uniting several rebel cells near Idlib city. In a statement dated July 7, the Tawhid Brigade defined themselves as an independent group, separate from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and defined their mission as supporting religion. They also posted an al-Arabiya interview with Sheikh Aid al-Qarni, a Saudi cleric who preached in support of attacks against American troops in Iraq. On October 1, the Tawhid Brigade claimed to carry out a joint operation with fighters from the jihadist group Jabhat Nusrah, attacking two regime positions near Salqin. It should be noted, however, that the connection between the Idlib Jabhat Nusrah and the Jabhat Nusrah units carrying out large-scale bombings in Damascus and Aleppo is unclear. The following day, the brigade posted a video of a joint operation with the Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham in which, what appears to be a suicide bomber detonates a motorbike at a regime checkpoint near Idlib city.

In addition to working with Salafist groups, the Tawhid Brigade regularly carries out operations with FSA units, particularly the Shuhada Idlib Brigade, which is considered the armed wing of the Idlib City Revolutionary Council. Currently, the Tawhid Brigade is laying siege to an air defense station near Salqin in conjunction with units from Jabhat Nusrah, Ahrar al-Sham, and Deraa al-Thawra. The Idlib Tawhid Brigade also has links to the Muslim Brotherhood which is a major funder of the brigade.

While defining where exactly the Tawhid Brigade sits on the Islamist spectrum is difficult, the fact that they carry out suicide attacks, have links to Salafist groups, explicitly reject affiliation with the FSA, and emphasize their religious roots more than your average FSA group, all point toward the brigade being a rebel group worth monitoring.

Syrian Resistance Groups-3 (Shuhada Suriyah)

In late July, Jamal Maaruf, leader of the Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah Battalion formed the Shuhada Suriyah Battalions, presaging a growth in capabilities and aggressiveness. Before mid-July, Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah’s area of operations was restricted to Jebel al-Zawiyah and the M5 highway seven kilometers to the east, it has since expanded 29 kilometers further east to the border of Aleppo province and north to Saraqeb.

The expansion began late July when the group moved south of Jebel al-Zawiyah to capture regime positions in Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabl in quick succession. Shuhada Suriyah then participated in the battle for Ariha in late August. A few days later, they traveled 45 kilometers from their base in Deir Sunbil to carry out a raid on the Abu Dhuhur air base. There were many impressive aspects of this operation, including the seizure of a section of the air base as well as the downing two MiGs, but their ability to sustain the fight for two weeks far from their base of operations was unprecedented.

After pulling back from Abu Dhuhur, Shuhada Suriyah did not simply rest and regroup. Instead, it attacked regime positions in the town of Saraqeb, strategically located where the M4 and M5 highways meet, and maintained the fight for three days.

Over the past two months, Shuhada Suriyah’s pace of operations, extended area of operations, and strategic choice of targets has been impressive, making it a key player in northern Syria. The funding that Shuhada Suriyah is reportedly receiving from Gulf states probably accounts for part of this rapid expansion in capabilities.



Syrian Resistance Groups-2 (Networks and Relations)

Syrian Rebel Groups Expand into National Networks



A new phenomenon is emerging in Syria in which powerful rebel groups that were formally associated with a single city are developing national networks. Rebel networks including the Ahrar al-Sham Battalions and the Free Syrian Army have existed on a national level since the early stages of the Syrian civil war, but the expansion of networks that once revolved around a distinct region into nationwide organizations reflects the increasing complexity of Syrian rebel groups, the growing influence of several charismatic leaders, and the power of money.

The Ariha based Suqour al-Sham Brigade was one of the first to expand out of their province when they incorporated the Shuhada Halab L’Muham al-Khasa Battalion in Aleppo city during the spring. Abdul Razzaq Tlass’ Farouq Battalion, a dominant player in Homs, now claims the Farouq al-Shamal Battalion based around the Bab Hawa border crossing, as well as a group in Damascus that played a role in the bombing of a Syrian army general staff building on September 2. The Damascus-based Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade, which also took part in the September 2 bombing, recently announced the formation of a battalion in Idlib province named Suqour Jebel al-Zawiyah, giving the brigade a presence in the north.

Given their distinct areas of operation, it is unlikely that there is an operational relationship between the leaders of the brigades and their new far-flung battalions, but the satellite groups probably receive financial benefits from their well-endowed patrons. A recent video by the videographer Mani depicted Farouq Battalion commanders receiving a shipment of $100,000 in cash, while Ahmed Abu Issa, the leader of Suqour al-Sham, candidly told reporters in August that “people want to join us because we have enough weapons.”

Suqour al-Sham and the Farouq Battalions are both high-profile groups with charismatic leaders, allowing them to pull fighters, funders, and journalists into their orbits. It is also likely that Abu Issa and Tlass have political ambitions for the post-Assad era. The expansion of their networks beyond their immediate region gives them control of geographically widespread networks of supporters, allowing them to be national political leaders after the war.

 By Berman Asher Syria Survey

Syria-Turkey-Kurds: Scenarios and Debates.


Win-Lose-Debates for Assad Regime, Syrian Opposition, Turkey and PKK

Syrian uprising has given Kurdish groups new opportunities to advance their nationalist agendas while serving as proxies for neighboring states. In Turkey, the Kurdish- nationalist terror organization PKK has taken advantage of the rift between the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and the Turkish government by turning to the former, offering its para-military services.

In Iraq after some delay, Kurdish elites who are connected to Barzani  have entered Syrian opposition politics --with a little push, and unwillingly since Syrian Kurds are closer to PKK and have a  lot of respect but less ties with Barzani--, highlighting the ironies and internal tensions of their own position.  And in Syria itself, Kurds have created the Kurdish National Council in parallel to the main opposition body, the Syrian National Council (SNC) -- a reaction to the possibility-- that the SNC will morph into a successor regime led by Muslim Brothers under Turkish influence.

The Kurdish National Council; a bloc of Kurdish parties, walked out of a "Syria's Friends" meeting in Istanbul last month. They did so because the Islamist-dominated Syrian opposition group refused to include wording about the rights of Kurds, by basically refusing to promote autonomy for Kurds and stating that any issue about partitioning is unacceptable.

A delegation from the Syrian Kurdish National Council departed for the US on May 5, 2012 at the request of the US State Department. Head of foreign relations for the council Abdul Hakim Bashar, who is heading the delegation, said: "It's a four-person delegation, which also includes three members of the council, Sadi Malaye, Kamaran Haji and Walid Shawqi. The delegation met with the state department, congress and US officials. During the visit they asked the US government to put pressure on Syrian opposition parties to look at the Kurdish nation in Syria and to recognize its rights.

Whether or not the Assad regime falls, these cross-border power plays reinforce the increasing rationalization of the Kurdish problem and its destabilizing potential.

 
Three possible scenarios in terms of "win/lose approach" can be observed in Syria/Turkey and PKK perspective;

Scenario I

a. Regime falls and remnants of the Syrian Baathists leave the country under the heat of wide range uprisings and pressure from the international community. In this case; SNC will naturally try to establish a provisional government and the new Syrian constitution's oppose for partitioning will be discussed for a long time, even after the general elections.

b. Kurds unsurprisingly  will put every effort for a maximum benefit, asking for more than an ethnic-recognition. Initially they most probably will try to impose an autonomous recognition. [This demand has been brought forward by Syria's Kurds, as the one and only condition for participating Syrian opposition and SNC. President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government Masud Barzani and PKK patrons acknowledged the demand, as Kurds' sole purpose to exist.]

c. Turkey will probably support the new Syrian regime's efforts for stabilization, primarily helping refugees sheltered in Turkey turn back safely. Should the Free Syrian Army gets busy with fighting regime supporters and remnants of Baathist groups, Turkey might feel obliged to intervene PKK activities which are expected to be intensified on the north-west mountainous region, fighting PKK elements in Idlib-Jabal Kurd and Afrin sector. If the tensions in the Kurdish dominated north-east Syria rise, Turkey again won't hesitate to support Free Syrian Army policing and counter PKK operations in Manjib, Jarabulus, Ayn Al Arab, Telabyad, Ras Al Ayn, Qamishli-Al Malikiyah sector.

d. Despite a painful process, it's not out of logic to consider that allied Syrian Arabs and Turkey will  convince Syria's Kurds for negotiations without a PKK card. Given Turkey serious damage to PKK in Syria, Kurdish National Council will want to hold "autonomy demands" and try cooperating with the new regime who will be eager to comfort Kurds with some reforms and improvements. At this point, US and other international bodies should convince Massoud Barzani not mulling on Syrian Kurdish Council's negotiation efforts, since Iraq Kurdish groups are eager to involve in Syria's Kurd problem in a destructive manner.

e. PKK fighting against Syria's newly established "Sunni" government, and against Turkey who's trying to promote Sunni Arabs, will also face a great deal of opposition and antipathy from the neighbouring Arab countries. Notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council members will not like any Kurdish efforts occluding the road map for Syria's Sunni Opposition.

f. Assad and his associates gone, Syrian Army divided, PKK -with most probably 2000 fighters inside Syria- will not be successful to stop Turkey's military operations. Considering the 600 mile distance from Qandil compounds into Syrian territory, re-deployments are far less possible. Recruiting local Kurds for a low intensity conflict will be the detriment of PKK cause.

[Assad and PKK Lose, Opposition and Turkey Win. New government's approach to Israel and Iran might open new disputes. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and US may out flank new era Syrian politics, leaving Turkey out of the box.]

Scenario II

a. Assad rejects to leave, his army fights fiercely against opposition, causing thousands fleeing north, and a Kurdish initiative with Assad's direction opens path for a Kurdish Autonomy under the PKK umbrella, giving Turkey a solid reason to enter Syria and establish buffer zones in Syrian part of the border.

b. This will also ignite an asymmetric counter guerrilla warfare with PKK compounds deployed in the extending line of Kassab-Salkin-Idlib-Afrin and Jarabulus. Lacking urban warfare, Turkish Army will avoid military operations in the towns, and standing on the outskirts of northern Kurdish populated areas its soldiers will be negligible to PKK attacks. But on the other hand, Turkey's existence in Syrian territory is a deterrent factor for PKK, which will weaken Kurdish hand for pressuring Assad to honor his commitments for  autonomy. Assad might ask PKK for an absolute military progress against Turkey to negotiate Kurdish autonomy, having PKK excitedly using its full capacity to accomplish the task. 


 
Possible Turkish Concentrations for buffer-zones inside Syria will be Kurdish populated towns. This action might ease tensions between Arabs and Kurds, protect fleeing Arabs from provocative actions and help Turkey to minimize PKK influence in the northern sector.


c. According to this scenario Turkey most probably won't make a wide scale war with Syria. It's more sound that Turkey will want to fight only against PKK and only on the border region, which also is the main passage route for refugees and war devastated civilians causing them get caught between a cross-fire. If PKK or Syrian Army attempt to harass civilians, Turkey will gain a noble advantage by its protective attitude.

d. Syrian Army may launch artillery attacks on Turkish positions but they will probably choose to concentrate in urban compounds, instead of attacking Turkey in the open. Assad wouldn't want to shift his premier army units defending the southern border against Israel, since most of these troops will be occupied either with Golan disputes or homeland insurgency. So a Syria-Turkey war will most likely be a static one, more like a mutual show of force. Stabilizing Syrian war efforts on the air and sea with its superior air and naval power, Turkey will be advantageous to locate and destroy "a trapped" PKK in north Idlib, Jabal Kurd and Afrin region which are the most mountainous places, suitable for PKK deployment.


e. If Syria chooses to stall the war against Turkey; avoiding to relocate its premier units on the Israel Border to the north, and dealing with Turkey in an  eccentric level; US and international community will acknowledge this as a weakness and will probably give more serious signals for a military intervention, meaning if Assad chooses not to leave, continues to possess a threat to Israel, and Syrian opposition makes itself visible to world by demonstrating eagerness to get rid of the last Baathist government at the region, a US involvement is more likely. 


f. In case of a US or NATO involvement in Syria, Turkey will have its preferred battleground against PKK and will not need to concentrate on Syrian army. In the long run, PKK might be expected to leave Syrian mountains and focus on political developments for Kurds. Assad's break down will not effect democratic commitments in terms of Kurdish demands, which might create a negative attitude between Turkey and US. It's obvious that Turkey will never accept a solid autonomy for Syrian Kurds. Such a step might bring a turmoil between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, hence Turkey has been promoting a serious scale of economic cooperation with the regional government, and also might damage Turkish-US relations.

[Assad and PKK Lose, Turkey and Opposition Win. But Opposition inherits a long term Kurdish problem in its northern border.]


Scenario III


a. Assad takes serious democratic steps, comes to terms with the opposition and even accepting an exile option, paves way to elections which also brings an end to Baathist regime in Syria.


b. Assad might try to negotiate his existence in the post era. Opposition will not want him to stay. So it can be thought that if opposition becomes stronger and fight against Syrian army, Assad might step down and leave. If Assad fears a US incursion and tries to find common grounds with opposition before US involvement, it's not out of logic that he may first of all prevent a foreign invasion but also may persuade his people and may be able to stay behind the curtains in future Syrian politics. 


c. It's obvious that Assad's voluntarily step a side will bring a different atmosphere  for Middle East. First of all; it will be the first democratic step down, for a long-term tyrannic regime in the region which none of the others (e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Zine-el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarek of Egypt, Qaddafi of Libya and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen) had shown the courage of act. 


d. Secondly, an optimistic political wind, apart from turmoils and blood will make things easier and the new regime will be able to consolidate its efforts for reorganization and construction of the new parliament. 


e. Assad, either choosing to step down or not, will most probably try to take advantage of his continued power and will be more effective in future policy making efforts, than current Opposition cadres. If Assad and Opposition decide to work together for an effort of normalization, this cooperation will not be optimistic for Kurdish expectations. This is why, PKK chief Ocalan commented from his cell in an isolated island Imrali, that PKK should be close both Assad and Opposition and should be willing to support any party who's eager to commit what Kurds deserve.




PKK Check Point on Syria's Turkish border town of Afrin.




Kurds demonstrates in Afrin promoting Barzani and Ocalan as National Figures, together. 


www.strategyonblog.blogger.com
By Coskun Unal

Syrian Resistance Groups-1 (Ahrar Al Sham)


When members of the Farouq Battalions first began to wear distinctive green T-shirts with their fighting unit’s logo in the spring, you could see them only around Homs, more than 100 miles south of the crossing point of Bab al Howa along the border with Turkey.
Now, however, they can be seen not only in Bab al Howa, one of two crossing points the Syrian rebels control, but all over northern Syria, a sign that as the war goes on, some of the rebel groups that began as local rebellions now stretch throughout the country, with a chain of command that’s national in scope; in Farouq’s case, stretching all the way to Damascus.
Farouq’s T-shirts identify their wearers as part of the Free Syrian Army, but Farouq itself has no operational links to the former army officers who defected, now reside in Turkey and nominally claim leadership of the Free Syrian Army. Neither do a number of other battalions and brigades, big and small, that have emerged across the country. By one count, there are more than 600 battalions, though fewer than 10 stand out as having significant organizational capability across large swaths of territory.
Indeed, the news media convention of referring to all these groups as the Free Syrian Army is accurate only in that they all oppose the government of President Bashar Assad. In reality, they’re independent actors, sharing little in ideologies or resources.
In northern Syria, the largest of these groups is Ahrar al Sham, a unit whose fighters generally belong to the conservative Salafi strain of Islam and have proudly hoisted their banner from Aleppo to the outskirts of Hama. There are even reports of them fighting as far south as Syria’s border with Jordan.

“If you want to join Ahrar al Sham, you have to pray,” said one Ahrar fighter near the city of Hama, who asked not to be identified out of security concerns.
In Aleppo, the country’s largest city, the Tawhid Brigade controls the largest number of fighters, many of whom also espouse a fundamentalist Islamist creed.
In Damascus, much of the fight is led by the Islam Brigade, which one Syrian analyst, who also asked not to be named for security reasons, described as a grouping of battalions that also are primarily Salafists.

The idea that army defectors make up much of the rebel forces has long been a myth, one that in past months rebel media spokesmen have done less to promote. Farouq’s fighters are largely volunteers, as are those of Ahrar al Sham.
“We are making a lot of progress. In the past, we were unorganized; now we are much more systematic and organized,” said Khalid Amin, a member of Ahrar al Sham in Qalat al Mudiq, a city of about 30,000 in the western part of Syria where rebels move with relative ease and use the space they’ve carved out to train and to construct weapons.
Though the rebels largely solved problems with acquiring light weapons and ammunition earlier this year, Amin said both remained expensive. That’s a major impediment, the rebels say.
“As long as bullets are 100 lira (about $1.50 each) or more, it will take more than a year to topple the regime,” Amin said.
Rebels in Turkey and Syria confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing financial support for different rebel groups. They said the Qatari government was directly involved in supporting groups associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a longtime opponent of the Assad dynasty, and that Saudi Arabia was channeling money to Salafi groups such as Ahrar al Sham.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/24/3014440/syrias-rebel-groups-united-only.html#storylink=cpy