Win-Lose-Debates for Assad Regime, Syrian Opposition, Turkey and PKK
Syrian uprising has given Kurdish groups new opportunities to advance their nationalist agendas while serving as proxies for neighboring states. In Turkey, the Kurdish- nationalist terror organization PKK has taken advantage of the rift between the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and the Turkish government by turning to the former, offering its para-military services.
In Iraq after some delay, Kurdish elites who are connected to Barzani have entered Syrian opposition politics --with a little push, and unwillingly since Syrian Kurds are closer to PKK and have a lot of respect but less ties with Barzani--, highlighting the ironies and internal tensions of their own position. And in Syria itself, Kurds have created the Kurdish National Council in parallel to the main opposition body, the Syrian National Council (SNC) -- a reaction to the possibility-- that the SNC will morph into a successor regime led by Muslim Brothers under Turkish influence.
The Kurdish National Council; a bloc of Kurdish parties, walked out of a "Syria's Friends" meeting in Istanbul last month. They did so because the Islamist-dominated Syrian opposition group refused to include wording about the rights of Kurds, by basically refusing to promote autonomy for Kurds and stating that any issue about partitioning is unacceptable.
A delegation from the Syrian Kurdish National Council departed for the US on May 5, 2012 at the request of the US State Department. Head of foreign relations for the council Abdul Hakim Bashar, who is heading the delegation, said: "It's a four-person delegation, which also includes three members of the council, Sadi Malaye, Kamaran Haji and Walid Shawqi. The delegation met with the state department, congress and US officials. During the visit they asked the US government to put pressure on Syrian opposition parties to look at the Kurdish nation in Syria and to recognize its rights.
The Kurdish National Council; a bloc of Kurdish parties, walked out of a "Syria's Friends" meeting in Istanbul last month. They did so because the Islamist-dominated Syrian opposition group refused to include wording about the rights of Kurds, by basically refusing to promote autonomy for Kurds and stating that any issue about partitioning is unacceptable.
A delegation from the Syrian Kurdish National Council departed for the US on May 5, 2012 at the request of the US State Department. Head of foreign relations for the council Abdul Hakim Bashar, who is heading the delegation, said: "It's a four-person delegation, which also includes three members of the council, Sadi Malaye, Kamaran Haji and Walid Shawqi. The delegation met with the state department, congress and US officials. During the visit they asked the US government to put pressure on Syrian opposition parties to look at the Kurdish nation in Syria and to recognize its rights.
Whether or not the Assad regime falls, these cross-border power plays reinforce the increasing rationalization of the Kurdish problem and its destabilizing potential.
Three possible scenarios in terms of "win/lose approach" can be observed in Syria/Turkey and PKK perspective;
Scenario I
a. Regime falls and remnants of the Syrian Baathists leave the country under the heat of wide range uprisings and pressure from the international community. In this case; SNC will naturally try to establish a provisional government and the new Syrian constitution's oppose for partitioning will be discussed for a long time, even after the general elections.
b. Kurds unsurprisingly will put every effort for a maximum benefit, asking for more than an ethnic-recognition. Initially they most probably will try to impose an autonomous recognition. [This demand has been brought forward by Syria's Kurds, as the one and only condition for participating Syrian opposition and SNC. President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government Masud Barzani and PKK patrons acknowledged the demand, as Kurds' sole purpose to exist.]
c. Turkey will probably support the new Syrian regime's efforts for stabilization, primarily helping refugees sheltered in Turkey turn back safely. Should the Free Syrian Army gets busy with fighting regime supporters and remnants of Baathist groups, Turkey might feel obliged to intervene PKK activities which are expected to be intensified on the north-west mountainous region, fighting PKK elements in Idlib-Jabal Kurd and Afrin sector. If the tensions in the Kurdish dominated north-east Syria rise, Turkey again won't hesitate to support Free Syrian Army policing and counter PKK operations in Manjib, Jarabulus, Ayn Al Arab, Telabyad, Ras Al Ayn, Qamishli-Al Malikiyah sector.
d. Despite a painful process, it's not out of logic to consider that allied Syrian Arabs and Turkey will convince Syria's Kurds for negotiations without a PKK card. Given Turkey serious damage to PKK in Syria, Kurdish National Council will want to hold "autonomy demands" and try cooperating with the new regime who will be eager to comfort Kurds with some reforms and improvements. At this point, US and other international bodies should convince Massoud Barzani not mulling on Syrian Kurdish Council's negotiation efforts, since Iraq Kurdish groups are eager to involve in Syria's Kurd problem in a destructive manner.
e. PKK fighting against Syria's newly established "Sunni" government, and against Turkey who's trying to promote Sunni Arabs, will also face a great deal of opposition and antipathy from the neighbouring Arab countries. Notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council members will not like any Kurdish efforts occluding the road map for Syria's Sunni Opposition.
f. Assad and his associates gone, Syrian Army divided, PKK -with most probably 2000 fighters inside Syria- will not be successful to stop Turkey's military operations. Considering the 600 mile distance from Qandil compounds into Syrian territory, re-deployments are far less possible. Recruiting local Kurds for a low intensity conflict will be the detriment of PKK cause.
[Assad and PKK Lose, Opposition and Turkey Win. New government's approach to Israel and Iran might open new disputes. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and US may out flank new era Syrian politics, leaving Turkey out of the box.]
b. Kurds unsurprisingly will put every effort for a maximum benefit, asking for more than an ethnic-recognition. Initially they most probably will try to impose an autonomous recognition. [This demand has been brought forward by Syria's Kurds, as the one and only condition for participating Syrian opposition and SNC. President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government Masud Barzani and PKK patrons acknowledged the demand, as Kurds' sole purpose to exist.]
c. Turkey will probably support the new Syrian regime's efforts for stabilization, primarily helping refugees sheltered in Turkey turn back safely. Should the Free Syrian Army gets busy with fighting regime supporters and remnants of Baathist groups, Turkey might feel obliged to intervene PKK activities which are expected to be intensified on the north-west mountainous region, fighting PKK elements in Idlib-Jabal Kurd and Afrin sector. If the tensions in the Kurdish dominated north-east Syria rise, Turkey again won't hesitate to support Free Syrian Army policing and counter PKK operations in Manjib, Jarabulus, Ayn Al Arab, Telabyad, Ras Al Ayn, Qamishli-Al Malikiyah sector.
d. Despite a painful process, it's not out of logic to consider that allied Syrian Arabs and Turkey will convince Syria's Kurds for negotiations without a PKK card. Given Turkey serious damage to PKK in Syria, Kurdish National Council will want to hold "autonomy demands" and try cooperating with the new regime who will be eager to comfort Kurds with some reforms and improvements. At this point, US and other international bodies should convince Massoud Barzani not mulling on Syrian Kurdish Council's negotiation efforts, since Iraq Kurdish groups are eager to involve in Syria's Kurd problem in a destructive manner.
e. PKK fighting against Syria's newly established "Sunni" government, and against Turkey who's trying to promote Sunni Arabs, will also face a great deal of opposition and antipathy from the neighbouring Arab countries. Notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council members will not like any Kurdish efforts occluding the road map for Syria's Sunni Opposition.
f. Assad and his associates gone, Syrian Army divided, PKK -with most probably 2000 fighters inside Syria- will not be successful to stop Turkey's military operations. Considering the 600 mile distance from Qandil compounds into Syrian territory, re-deployments are far less possible. Recruiting local Kurds for a low intensity conflict will be the detriment of PKK cause.
[Assad and PKK Lose, Opposition and Turkey Win. New government's approach to Israel and Iran might open new disputes. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and US may out flank new era Syrian politics, leaving Turkey out of the box.]
Scenario II
a. Assad rejects to leave, his army fights fiercely against opposition, causing thousands fleeing north, and a Kurdish initiative with Assad's direction opens path for a Kurdish Autonomy under the PKK umbrella, giving Turkey a solid reason to enter Syria and establish buffer zones in Syrian part of the border.
b. This will also ignite an asymmetric counter guerrilla warfare with PKK compounds deployed in the extending line of Kassab-Salkin-Idlib-Afrin and Jarabulus. Lacking urban warfare, Turkish Army will avoid military operations in the towns, and standing on the outskirts of northern Kurdish populated areas its soldiers will be negligible to PKK attacks. But on the other hand, Turkey's existence in Syrian territory is a deterrent factor for PKK, which will weaken Kurdish hand for pressuring Assad to honor his commitments for autonomy. Assad might ask PKK for an absolute military progress against Turkey to negotiate Kurdish autonomy, having PKK excitedly using its full capacity to accomplish the task.
b. This will also ignite an asymmetric counter guerrilla warfare with PKK compounds deployed in the extending line of Kassab-Salkin-Idlib-Afrin and Jarabulus. Lacking urban warfare, Turkish Army will avoid military operations in the towns, and standing on the outskirts of northern Kurdish populated areas its soldiers will be negligible to PKK attacks. But on the other hand, Turkey's existence in Syrian territory is a deterrent factor for PKK, which will weaken Kurdish hand for pressuring Assad to honor his commitments for autonomy. Assad might ask PKK for an absolute military progress against Turkey to negotiate Kurdish autonomy, having PKK excitedly using its full capacity to accomplish the task.
Possible Turkish Concentrations for buffer-zones inside Syria will be Kurdish populated towns. This action might ease tensions between Arabs and Kurds, protect fleeing Arabs from provocative actions and help Turkey to minimize PKK influence in the northern sector.
c. According to this scenario Turkey most probably won't make a wide scale war with Syria. It's more sound that Turkey will want to fight only against PKK and only on the border region, which also is the main passage route for refugees and war devastated civilians causing them get caught between a cross-fire. If PKK or Syrian Army attempt to harass civilians, Turkey will gain a noble advantage by its protective attitude.
d. Syrian Army may launch artillery attacks on Turkish positions but they will probably choose to concentrate in urban compounds, instead of attacking Turkey in the open. Assad wouldn't want to shift his premier army units defending the southern border against Israel, since most of these troops will be occupied either with Golan disputes or homeland insurgency. So a Syria-Turkey war will most likely be a static one, more like a mutual show of force. Stabilizing Syrian war efforts on the air and sea with its superior air and naval power, Turkey will be advantageous to locate and destroy "a trapped" PKK in north Idlib, Jabal Kurd and Afrin region which are the most mountainous places, suitable for PKK deployment.
e. If Syria chooses to stall the war against Turkey; avoiding to relocate its premier units on the Israel Border to the north, and dealing with Turkey in an eccentric level; US and international community will acknowledge this as a weakness and will probably give more serious signals for a military intervention, meaning if Assad chooses not to leave, continues to possess a threat to Israel, and Syrian opposition makes itself visible to world by demonstrating eagerness to get rid of the last Baathist government at the region, a US involvement is more likely.
f. In case of a US or NATO involvement in Syria, Turkey will have its preferred battleground against PKK and will not need to concentrate on Syrian army. In the long run, PKK might be expected to leave Syrian mountains and focus on political developments for Kurds. Assad's break down will not effect democratic commitments in terms of Kurdish demands, which might create a negative attitude between Turkey and US. It's obvious that Turkey will never accept a solid autonomy for Syrian Kurds. Such a step might bring a turmoil between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, hence Turkey has been promoting a serious scale of economic cooperation with the regional government, and also might damage Turkish-US relations.
[Assad and PKK Lose, Turkey and Opposition Win. But Opposition inherits a long term Kurdish problem in its northern border.]
Scenario III
a. Assad takes serious democratic steps, comes to terms with the opposition and even accepting an exile option, paves way to elections which also brings an end to Baathist regime in Syria.
b. Assad might try to negotiate his existence in the post era. Opposition will not want him to stay. So it can be thought that if opposition becomes stronger and fight against Syrian army, Assad might step down and leave. If Assad fears a US incursion and tries to find common grounds with opposition before US involvement, it's not out of logic that he may first of all prevent a foreign invasion but also may persuade his people and may be able to stay behind the curtains in future Syrian politics.
c. It's obvious that Assad's voluntarily step a side will bring a different atmosphere for Middle East. First of all; it will be the first democratic step down, for a long-term tyrannic regime in the region which none of the others (e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Zine-el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarek of Egypt, Qaddafi of Libya and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen) had shown the courage of act.
d. Secondly, an optimistic political wind, apart from turmoils and blood will make things easier and the new regime will be able to consolidate its efforts for reorganization and construction of the new parliament.
e. Assad, either choosing to step down or not, will most probably try to take advantage of his continued power and will be more effective in future policy making efforts, than current Opposition cadres. If Assad and Opposition decide to work together for an effort of normalization, this cooperation will not be optimistic for Kurdish expectations. This is why, PKK chief Ocalan commented from his cell in an isolated island Imrali, that PKK should be close both Assad and Opposition and should be willing to support any party who's eager to commit what Kurds deserve.
www.strategyonblog.blogger.com
By Coskun Unal
Scenario III
a. Assad takes serious democratic steps, comes to terms with the opposition and even accepting an exile option, paves way to elections which also brings an end to Baathist regime in Syria.
b. Assad might try to negotiate his existence in the post era. Opposition will not want him to stay. So it can be thought that if opposition becomes stronger and fight against Syrian army, Assad might step down and leave. If Assad fears a US incursion and tries to find common grounds with opposition before US involvement, it's not out of logic that he may first of all prevent a foreign invasion but also may persuade his people and may be able to stay behind the curtains in future Syrian politics.
c. It's obvious that Assad's voluntarily step a side will bring a different atmosphere for Middle East. First of all; it will be the first democratic step down, for a long-term tyrannic regime in the region which none of the others (e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Zine-el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarek of Egypt, Qaddafi of Libya and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen) had shown the courage of act.
d. Secondly, an optimistic political wind, apart from turmoils and blood will make things easier and the new regime will be able to consolidate its efforts for reorganization and construction of the new parliament.
e. Assad, either choosing to step down or not, will most probably try to take advantage of his continued power and will be more effective in future policy making efforts, than current Opposition cadres. If Assad and Opposition decide to work together for an effort of normalization, this cooperation will not be optimistic for Kurdish expectations. This is why, PKK chief Ocalan commented from his cell in an isolated island Imrali, that PKK should be close both Assad and Opposition and should be willing to support any party who's eager to commit what Kurds deserve.
PKK Check Point on Syria's Turkish border town of Afrin.
Kurds demonstrates in Afrin promoting Barzani and Ocalan as National Figures, together.
www.strategyonblog.blogger.com
By Coskun Unal
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