Threat Analysis of Islamic State (IS) Terrorism for Turkey

Threat Analysis of Islamic State (IS) Terrorism for Turkey

1. Presence of Potential Threat              

Islamic Cults and Orders are widely present in Istanbul, dispersed through Gebze, Adapazari, and central Anatolia. (widely in Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, Sanliurfa, Kahramanmaras and Adiyaman). Even though most of these Orders are peaceful and busy with daily life; some, especially the ones organized as small communities in western and eastern Anatolian cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Konya, Adapazari, Samsun, Trabzon, Rize, Ankara, Hatay, Mersin, Malatya, Sanliurfa, Bingol (e.g. Aczimendis, Menzil and Kaplancilar orders) are known with their anti-secular, radical salafist doctrines and they hold a large youth population as sympathizers within their ranks.

IS’s recruitment through Turkey is a process with multiple steps. Social media is the primary source for introduction and gatherings. Also, volunteers or curious youngsters with Islamic backgrounds and religious intentions usually follow Salafi/Wahhabi media publications like;

·          Nusret Front publications (www.haksozhaber.com.tr) (Istanbul-Bursa-Kocaeli-Konya)

·          Takva News Agency (www.takvahaber.net) (Offices in Istanbul-Adapazari-Ankara-Konya-Malatya)

·          ilim-der foundation (www.ilimder.com.tr) (Offices in Istanbul-Kocaeli-Ankara-Konya-Bursa-Gaziantep)

·          Yolcu Publishing (Malatya-Sanliurfa-Adiyaman)

·          Ilke Haber Ajansi (www.ilkehaberajansi.com.tr)

·          Furkan Education and Service Foundation(www.furkanhaber.com) (Istanbul- Ankara-Konya-Kayseri-Hatay-Sanliurfa-Antep)

·          Anatolian Youth Organization’s publications (Istanbul-Kocaeli-Ankara-Bursa-Antalya-Mersin-Adana-Gaziantep-Malatya-Adiyaman-Sanliurfa), which give these followers deeper Islamic ideology and encourage them to join the Jihad, within the ranks of Mujahids.

Domestic drivers for volunteer recruitment mostly stem from Islamic teachings and doctrinal advices of senior religious figures within the Orders, as well as individuals’ social environment. Last intelligence reports indicate that the Turkish participants through IS ranks vary through different layers of public; some married with kids, with military service experience and permanent jobs; others, teenagers with Islamic mind-set, high school or university students from poor portion of the population, who’re looking for adventure and wishing to join a sacred cause. There are fighters with Chechen or Bosnian origin who fought in Russia-Chechen wars and Bosnia-Serbia low intensity conflicts. There are also a significant amount of Turks with psychological problems, drug addiction, etc. who are believed to be attracted by IS’s way of life as well as the regular monthly salary paid to the fighters.

Some security analysis mention that the drive for joining the radical groups (not just IS but also others like Nusrah Front, Ahrar Sham Brigade, etc) fighting in Syria/Iraq is not limited to Islamic doctrines. This is also about sending a message to Western oriented secular system. The reason for IS spearheading the popularity among Turks, may be explained with points like; its black banner holding the Prophet’s seal which turned into a trade mark, its propaganda mechanism through web, its ability to substantiate and accommodate the fighters, all of which are the matters serving as a supportive element for people’s desire to join the Jihad against infidels in the region.

Turkey had to combat against similar religion oriented radical terror groups in the past. Groups like IBDA-C (Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front), Turkish Hezbollah (a Sunni Kurdish terror group), Hizbut-Tahrir, and others conducted brutal terror actions against government institutions, public places, and security forces in1978-2000. If IS can keep its operational tempo and become successful to annihilate the opponents, it may enjoy an increasing popularity  throughout the region’s hard-core Islamists, and former followers of the above mentioned groups are potential candidates for establishing cells and supporting the long awaited Islamic cause (Da’wa) led by the IS, by conducting terrorist activities on soft and hard targets.

If we compare Turkey’s past Islamic terror groups and today’s IS; we will notice that there are a lot of similarities in their techniques, mindsets and ideologies. Another common issue is their stance against Kurdish groups and parties in the region. IS is determined to fight with PYD/PKK in Syria’s Rojava region, and in the past both IBDA-C and Hezbollah were PKK’s arch enemies. So it will not be wrong to argue/analyze that;

·          IS will be able to find enough numbers of supporters inside Turkey, some of those will be the former members of the past radical Islamic terror groups,

·          With the leadership of the experienced command cadres who have been fighting in Iraq and Syria; recruiting, training and arming the new IS cells inside Turkey is possible,

·          Among the potential targets of IS in Turkey; the primary and easiest ones might be Kurdish cities and Kurdish political figures/organizations, as well as religious minorities.

·          Considering Turkey-KRG strategic rapprochement and the last oil deal between two parties; Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, especially its stations in Iraqi Kurdistan and TPO’s (Turkish Petroleum Agency) 6 pumping stations (BOTAS) in Silopi, Idil, Sirtkoy, Maden,  Gaziantep, Adana , with 890 km. of pipeline passing parallel to the Syria border may be a potential target for IS cells.

2. Intent and Possible Target Sets

Turkish government officials announced that there are approximately 500-600 Turkish citizens (some sources claim the number reaching up to 1,200s) fighting alongside IS in Syria and Iraq. A few of these Turks are believed to be acting as leading figures (either as inner circle leaders, deputies under Baghdadi or as troop commanders) within the organization.

Considering the past Islamic terror groups’ capabilities; IBDA-C was successful at using remote detonation attacks, assassinations and suicide attacks on soft targets; Hezbollah was also good at attacking soft targets in Turkey’s Kurdish dominated regions. So newly established, potential IS groups/cells will be able to use the same methodology, but also they will be able to use more sophisticated attacking techniques on hard-targets.

Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay and Iskenderun are the most possible and ‘easy to reach targets’ for IS terror attacks, due to these mentioned provinces’ diverse populated nature, complexity and their economic potential, as well as the mountainous south-western border region which might provide infiltration/exfiltration routes for IS action cells. Other potential targets may be Diyarbakir, Mardin and Sanliurfa, since these Kurdish towns are lightly guarded due to the ongoing peace process with Turkey and PKK, and they are also significantly/politically important for PKK, who has been fighting against IS in Syria’s Rojava region.

In addition; IS may not need to infiltrate its militia into Turkey to hit the critical provinces or awaken its cells of returnee jihadists, but they may choose to use intermediaries or supporter groups within Turkish Islamic hard-liners who swore allegiance (ba’yah) for Baghdadi’s Caliphate. In this case; IS returnees united with the recruited elements of former Islamic hard-liners, might be able to conduct terror attacks and create havoc especially by attacking western brand institutions in big metropols like Istanbul, Kocaeli or Ankara. (McDonald’s restaurants, Starbucks, shopping malls, foreign Bank offices like HSBC, embassies/diplomats, as well as Turkish Army/Police guest houses and personnel service buses in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir were targeted by IBDA-C and Hizbut-Tahrir in the past.)

3. Capability Demonstrated by Previous Attacks in Turkey

On March 21, 2014, three foreigners traveling from Syria to Istanbul (Benjamin Xu-Germany, Chendrim Ramadani-Sweden, and Mohammed Zahiri- Kosovo) attacked Turkish police who were conducting routine security controls on a checkpoint, in Nigde. Attackers were claimed to be ISIS fighters going to Istanbul probably for terror attacks right before the Local Elections. They were carrying pistols, silencers, hand grenades and falsified ID cards. Turkish security officials announced that the three were believed to be assisted for their trip, and the weapons, IDs were provided by their Turkish associates, somewhere between Kilis-Gaziantep and Adana.

Other than the March 21 incident mentioned above, there are no significant and deliberate IS attacks in Turkey, yet. Turkish Chief of Staff’s “daily incident reports” provide information about countless numbers of border crossing and smuggling attempts around Hatay’s Yayladagi, Altinozu, Narlica, Reyhanli border posts; Kilis’s Oncupinar, Yuksektepe Border posts; Gaziantep’s Calkaya and Otluca border posts.

From February to September 2014, IS demonstrated deliberate car bomb attacks, mortar / artillery barrage fires and motorized raids on the Kurdish towns of the Syrian border. Some of its mortar/artillery attacks targeted Turkish positions in Reyhanli, Kilis and most recently Nusaybin on September 13.These attacks are also indicators for IS’s capability to disturbing entrenched military troops with the light artillery and mortars in their arsenal.

Analysis of demonstrated IS attacks indicate that the group has the potential to disturb fixed Turkish troops, with artillery/mortar barrages, can conduct small unit operations on the Turkish Border posts, can conduct suicide attacks in towns and metropols, and small scale ambushes, hit-run attacks on mobile Turkish border units.

4. Assessment of IS Threat for Turkey and Its Possible Results

Turkish Army border troops and brigades are well trained and equipped for conventional operations, have better command &control structure comparing to ISF and Peshmerga forces. IS’s capability to attack and take down Turkish army installments or units larger than a platoon, is unlikely. On the other hand, border platoons (35-40 strong) can be considered vulnerable to IS cells’ ambush type attacks but the Army has been taking precautions to minimize the results of such confrontations, by improving its thermal monitoring systems, positioning tanks as supportive elements, and assigning experienced officers for the command posts. Considering the Turkish Army deployments, its combatant adequacy, Southern-Turkey’s road structure and the geographical terrain; it is almost impossible for IS, to move and advance with mounted militia and motorized troops, capture villages/towns/cities, raise their infamous black flag, etc. as they used to do in Syria and Iraq. This is why, IS threats should be assessed within the perspective of unconventional warfare techniques and tactics.

Forefront IS threat for Turkey is the existing entities within the reach of the group inside Syria and Iraq. In my opinion, the best potential target for an imminent IS attack will be the 35 soldiers guarding the Suleiman Shah Shrines in Syria’s Karakozak village of Kobani province. Shrine and its soldiers have been hanging like the sword of Damocles over AKP government’s head for some time.

Secondary threat factor against Turkey can be assessed as the organized terror attacks of returnees and recruits. Despite the recent exaggerated and controversial Turkish Intelligence success over the release of 46 Turkish diplomats and families who were kept captive by IS for 102 days,-which also might be interpreted for some level of Turkish influence over IS ranks-; Turkey is not immune from IS terror cells’ recruitment and operations, especially inside big metropols due to their problematic structure for security forces’ control and monitoring terror activities. Discussing the possibility of some level cooperation, -perhaps the possibility of a block against PKK/PYD existence on the Syrian border- between Turkey and IS is not out of logic, but none of the above guarantees security or immunity from IS terror, due to the complicated variables of the region. IS’s last declaration of newly founded “Firat Province”, extending from Abu-Kemal of northeast Syria, to Al-Kaim of western Iraq indicates its intention to control and dominate the Turkish border and Aleppo sea-port, and this alone should be evaluated as a potential future threat for Turkey.

When using terror as a tool, most likely targets for IS are high value state institutions and infrastructure as well as foreign institutions and brands which have symbolic values for the public. Places like Starbucks, McDonalds etc are widely preferred by Turkey’s secular public, yet they’re often criticized and disliked by the others. Depending on the results of Western supported anti-IS military campaign which is expected to start any time sooner; defeated or survived IS will most probably be capable of;

·          Attacking Turkey’s high value infrastructure close to Syrian border (e.g. oil pipe-lines, eastern sector railroad tracks, dams)

·          Conducting bombings, arson on western-originated facilities with symbolic values

·         Attacking any visible artistic elements and structures, representing Turkey’s secular values (e.g. Ataturk statues, museums, art centers)

·          Assassination attempts to Turkish and Kurdish politic figures

·          Attacking crowds in populated areas

·      Kidnapping and killing prominent figures of Turkey’s secular life (businessmen, stars, singers, etc) or opposition figures from Islamic orders, groups and organizations.

5. Assessment of violent unrest/protests associated with the threat (either pro or anti-Muslim), likely triggers and places

As the existence of radical Islamist groups supporting IS in Turkey cannot be denied, there are also significant number of anti-IS groups led by; secular groups (mostly Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Leftist ideology supporters), nationalist political groups functioning under Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Kurdish groups leaded by Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Other than the Kurds, none of these groups can be assessed as a serious potential for organizing destructive unrest activities.

Given the increasing confrontations between IS and PYD/PKK in Syria’s Kurdish northern Rojava region; Kurds are on the blink of organizing nation-wide, continuous protests, which may not only damage the ongoing peace process with the AKP government, but also may turn into violent unrests among the Kurdish dominated provinces like Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Mardin, as well as western metropols holding significant Kurdish population like Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya. It is also another fact that any Kurdish protests demonstrated in the western provinces (e.g. Istanbul, Izmir) have the potential of triggering anti-Kurdish protests, which may cause extensive confrontations/clashes among the rival groups of both sides. Recent defeat of PYD/PKK against IS invasion in Kobani and Sinjar forced BDP, call for Kurdish mobilization and Turkey’s Kurds summed on the Syrian border towns of Ceylanpinar, Suruc and Cizre. The army forcefully scattered the groups but the potential of wider unrests still exists.

IS related civil unrests will also be depending on the forthcoming US led military operations against the group. Military defeat or weakening of IS may force the leadership to focus on more suicide type revenge attacks, and Turkey will be a suitable/target-rich battle zone for the group’s political activities. IS also has the potential to influence some religious groups, taking advantage of important Islamic gatherings like Friday prayers, Eid Al Adha, etc, turning them into nationwide demonstrations.

6. Turkish Intelligence and Security Force Capabilities

a. Police & Army

Turkey has two main anti-terror forces within its counter terrorism system. While division-level Special Forces command (made of 2 SF Brigades with 6 Regiments, a training center and a Special Aviation Regiment) is tasked with internal and international operations in the rural and highlands of Turkey and surroundings, Police Special Operation Groups are responsible from internal threats and urban operations on the problematic regions and locations. Among the two, the former is more operational and capable of working with multinational task forces in international environments. Turkey’s new Prime Minister Davutoglu announced on September 22, 2014 that according to the latest security restructuring, the embassies and diplomats in problematic regions (Iraq-Somali-Lebanon-Libya-Sudan-Algeria-Egypt) will be protected by Special Forces ODAs. Both groups can be considered effective tools for combatting IS like threats. It is true that they may not be functioning as agile and organized as their western counterparts but they proved their mission worthiness on most occasions, yet their methods of execution have always been controversial. Turkish Police for example, conducted 5 major operations-with around 15,000 police- against illegal radical groups and mafia organizations, in Istanbul and Kocaeli, in the past three months, and arrested more than 600 with terror and supporting terror charges. Also the modernized border security action plan, prepared by Turkish Gendarme General Command, Office of Police Director General, and announced by the Turkish government on September 15 consists of;

·       Stationery Border Control Points will be established on critical hard terrains,

·       Integrated Consulate Stations will be formed on mobile checkpoints, for mobile passport controls and confirmation,

·       Army border troops will be supported with additional 50,000 police officers designated as Special Border Police Force,

·     Borders will be supported with extra heavy weapon systems and thermal infra-red monitoring cameras,

·     Border and customs IT Software will be improved and supported by new biometric analysis systems,

·          A new data base for immigration and refugee process will be formed and this data base will be connected to intelligence and police networks,

·   Remote controlled TALOS (Transportable Autonomous Patrol System for Land Border Surveillance) vehicles –an EU project headed by Poland and participated by 14 countries, supported by Turkey’s TUBITAK and ASELSAN, currently under production phase- will be widely used on Syrian border.

b. Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT)

Turkish Intelligence’s involvement with Syrian resistance groups is not a secret. President Erdogan assigned MIT Chief Mr. Fidan to organize and assist Syrian resistance groups, almost 2 years ago, when there were no IS, on the ground. Yet MIT was not successful enough to foresee the radicalization of Islamic groups and establishing ISIS with the help of Al Qaeda and Iraqi Sunni elements.

It will not be wrong to argue that Turkish Intelligence Agency showed significant progress, especially in 2014. They successfully assisted France, Spain and Morocco for their operations in Syria. More recently MIT managed the release of 46 Consulate personnel and families from a distant IS safe-house in Mosul, carrying negotiations to move them from Iraq into Syria’s IS dominated border town Tal Abyad and taking over the hostages from IS guides, bringing them to safety require a lot of channels and MIT in general, proved itself credible to carrying out a negotiation based operation such as this particular one conducted on September 20.

Despite a lot of criticism on the Agency; concerning particularly its inexperienced Chief’s strong political and personal relations with the President, MIT is able to conduct effective IMINT, SIGINT but especially HUMINT (with the assistance of few informants inside FSA, Nusrah and to some level IS) inside Syria and this may be a force multiplier for US and Western Agencies for their Syria strategy.

Published by IHS for Carpenter Report 2014