A NEW PKK THROUGH REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
For the last two decades, PKK’s Area of
Operations in Turkish Territory was divided into 12 regions. They also held some large territories with winter bases
and multiple strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan which provided them sort term
shelter and logistic deployment before launching guerilla operations inside
Turkish territory.
Since the beginning of bilateral peace process
between Turkey and PKK; media sources and PKK experts claim that Black Sea-Amanos-and Mardin groups, as
well as some 100-200 fighters from Hakkari groups are withdrawn until the midst
July, which suggests a group of 250 to 300
strong. Also, according to Turkish security and military officials, total
number of militants who left Turkey is about 150 to 200. Since the Turkish Ministry
of Interior records indicate the approximate number of PKK in Turkey is somewhere around 2000 to 3000, it will not be wrong
to argue that PKK did not leave Turkey and has shown no indication that they’re
willing to do so.
Different PKK leaders at different interviews
spoke out that PKK will not lay arms permanently but Imrali’s call for
cease-fire and withdrawal will be honored despite
their distrust to AKP Government; stating PKK will continue to act as a
regional actor and strengthen its troops, to be able to “help Kurds in trouble
areas wherever their assistance is needed”. Recent clashes on September and
November 2013, between PKK’s Syria affiliation PYD and Anti-Assad resistance
groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusrah (JN) in Syria’s northern towns of
Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal Abyad, Al Azaz,
Hasakah and Jarabulus confirm this comment. According to FSA web sites and
Kurdish media in Iraq; PKK’s Amanos,
Mardin and Black-Sea Groups of approximately 150-250 strong, who were
withdrawn from Turkey on August 2013 and positioned in the northern Kurdish
towns of Syria, were responsible for these attacks.
MAP-1 PKK
in Turkey and Iraqi-Turkish Border before Peace Process
Recent
Changes in PKK’s Restructuring and Its Possible Effects on the Region
The news about a major change within PKK
management in July 2013 was a surprise for Turkish public. One of the
co-founders of PKK, Murat Karayilan (aka Cemal), an experienced fighter and unconventional
warfare expert, who has been heading the PKK’s General and Executive
Council (KCK-Koma Ciwaken Kurdistan- Union
of Kurdish Communities) for 3 years was assigned as the new Commander in Chief
of HPG (PKK’s Armed Wing) and left his post to another PKK co-founder Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma) and Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat). PKK
announced Cemil Bayik and Hulya Oran as co-chairs of the Executive Council and
adopted a two-chaired management for the first time in its 39 year-old history.
The illegal armed group took the decision with a 162-delegate congress on
Qandil Mountain on July 9.
Some PKK Analysts argue that, it was Ocalan
who personally planned the whole power change by writing letters, advising and consulting
the names with the organization. It is known that there has been continuous
exchange of correspondence between Ocalan and the PKK leadership. Ocalan wrote
letters and guidelines separately to PKK’s women sub-committees, to European
posts and to KCK leaders in Qandil. In his last letter to the Executive
Council, he shared his views and proposals for a necessary leadership change in
some critical levels of the organization and pressured for Bayik and Hulya
Oran’s assignment as co-chairs, as well as Karayilan’s take over the military
wing.
The General Council which will function under
imprisoned Ocalan is announced to be managed by 6 members; Cemil Bayik-Hulya Oran-Murat Karayilan-Mustafa Karasu-Nuriye Kesbir
and Elif Pazarcik, and for the first
time in PKK history, 3 women were assigned to the council.
As for other changes taken at the six-day
"general meeting" on northern Iraq's Qandil Mountain; hawkish
military figures Peyman Huseyin (aka Bahoz Erdal) and Nurettin Halef Al
Mohammed (aka Nurettin Sofi) were assigned commanding positions under Murat
Karayilan while two prominent figures and PKK co-founders Ali Haydar Kaytan
(aka Fuat) and Duran Kalkan (aka Abbas) were assigned to more passive
coordination posts due to their age and claimed health conditions.
All these mentioned changes are regarded as an
important step to support the ongoing peace process by containing or pacifying
the well-known hard-liners within the organization but with Karayilan as the
Commander in Chief of the PKK military; with Peyman Huseyin, a Syrian Kurd and
classmate of Bashar Assad, who has been acting as deputy commander in chief of
HPG and running PKK’s Special Operations branch Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK)
and Nurettin Sofi, another Syrian Kurd who was Amed and Botan Regional
Commander with some 2000 militants and HPG Executive Committee member; the new
military structure of PKK does not fit in a picture for a permanent peace
process, but just the opposite. It can be evaluated that by assigning strong
military figures in critical command positions, PKK is positioning itself both
for establishing permanent gains in Syria and Iraq and for the aftermath of the
ongoing peace process with Turkey, whether it meets their expectations or not.
Should the proceedings fail, Turkey might face a stronger, fresh, more crowded
and a more dynamic PKK.
Insight
of PKK’s new Leadership assignments
1. The new chairman of the PKK’s executive
council (KCK) Cemil Bayik (aka Cuma)
is known for his close ties with Iranian
Intelligence and Iran’s border paramilitary Pasdaran command. Despite being
one of the five co-founders of PKK and commanding PKK units in some small scale
fights in 1980s, Bayik was not a dedicated fighter like Karayilan was, but he
proved himself being an accomplished planner and a diplomat that he was able to
build a bridge with Iranian intelligence agency VEVAK in 1990s. Intelligence
experts believe that his ties with VEVAK also provided some level of
communication with Iraq’s Shite
leadership, too. Analysts believe that his status as the co-chair might
help PKK and PJAK to ease tensions with Iran
and promote an alliance with Assad Forces against
Syrian opposition.
2. Co-Chair Hulya Oran (aka Bese Hozat) is a Turkish Alawite Kurd from
Tunceli’s Hozat province, who joined the PKK ranks in 1994 right after her
graduation from Kayseri High School and participated in numerous fights against
Turkish security forces. She acted as Women’s Battalion Commander and Deputy
Chief of Qandil Training Center. Her past experience in PKK’s women division
YJA Star and Women committees makes her an iconic figure to promote PKK
sympathy especially among Kurdish women and Alawites in Turkey and Syria. According
to Turkey’s Alawite Organizations and Alawite Cultural Foundations’ comments,
Hulya Oran’s new position within PKK is expected to focus on Alawite
populations’ cultural and basic human right problems through PKK’s regional
frame-works and philosophy. Also Turkey’s PKK experts explicate her function as
controlling the PKK Units in Dersim Region, which is a vital base for
organization’s recruitments and military operations.
3. General Council’s new female member Nuriye Kesbir (aka Sozdar Avesta) is an
ethnic Kurd from Mardin province who was born in to a family with Yezidi faith.
She was an activist who worked for PKK’s European offices and Kurdish Young
Women’s Movement (Komalen Ciwan) from 1990s to 2001. According to Turkish
Security officials she can speak fluent German, English, intermediate Dutch,
and she was also working for PKK’s Europe Chief Zubeyir Aydar, assisting PKK’s
Germany and Netherlands offices’ political activities/demonstrations until her
arrest by Holland Police in The Hague in 2001. Following her release, she
joined the PKK ranks in Qandil in 2006 and acted as political advisor to
executive board and also women’s committee member, which makes her an important
figure for organization’s Europe strategy and policies.
4. Other female member Elif Pazarcik/Ronahi
(pseudonym) is also a Turkish Alawite Kurd from Maras/Pazarcik province who
joined PKK in 1980 at an early age of 16 as an activist, arrested and released
by Turkish Security in 1981, 1988 and 1990 until her attendance to PKK camps in
northern Iraq in 1991. She actively served as service personnel, unit fighter, and
troop commander and managed Women’s High Committee (Koma Jinen Bilind) from 2008
to 2013. Her election to General Council with Oran and Kesbir indicates a new
era for PKK management with women in decision making process. PKK experts and
analysts evaluate this change not radical but a belated effort because this new
woman dominated showcase will likely to change the bad image of their texture.
5. Mustafa
Karasu (aka Huseyin Ali or Avaresh) is a Turkish Alawite from Sivas/Gurun
province who is also one of the co-founders of PKK. He is well respected among
PKK’s ethnic fighters with Alawite roots and also known as a grim politician
and doctrinaire rather than a fighter. Before Ocalan’s arrest and imprisonment
he served in Central Committee in Bekaa Valley and carried out envoy duties
with Iranian intelligence from 1993 to 1999. He is known with his close ties
with Turkish Marginal Leftist organizations such as DHKP-C and Dev Yol in 1990s
and believed to be capable of influencing currently active leftist armed groups
for mutual benefits. DHKP-C connections in Syria might bring some level of Assad
government’s support to PKK/PYD and Karasu is believed to be playing a major
role in such a relation.
6. Murat
Karayilan (aka Cemal) is a Turkish citizen from Sanliurfa/Birecik province.
He is one of the founders and the most prominent figure of PKK. Founding PKK in
1978 with Abdullah Ocalan in Ankara, he planned and commanded organization’s
first military operations, coordinated recruitment and training efforts,
inspiring from Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung wrote a dozen guerilla manuals and
pioneered the adoption of new military techniques and tactics through-out the
PKK ranks during 1990s. When it was vital for PKK to abandon Syria, just a few
months before Ocalan’s fleeing to Russia, it was Karayilan who organized and
established Qandil region as a permanent base by coordinating with Talabani’s
PUK and Barzani’s PDK. He performed lead
positions within PKK’s constantly changing structure. Being an experienced
fighter with big influence in PKK substructure, his last assignment as Head of
People’s Defense Committee (HPG) which is PKK’s Military Structure, may be
evaluated as a sign to coordinate, tidy up and unite PKK troops for an oncoming
war and determination to prevent any undesired military operations that can be
launched by remote groups, dispersed from Turkey, Iran, Iraq to Syria.
Political
Intentions
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Ocalan announced from Imrali, that PKK
and Syrian Kurds should support whoever claims to be ready to give Kurds’
demands. In different media interviews, both Murat Karayilan from Qandil, and
Head of PYD Saleh Muslim mentioned the importance of a political recognition,
highlighting that Kurds were ready to govern themselves and would take
necessary measures to protect their territory.
Saleh Muslim commented on PYD intentions to
declare a limited autonomy on July 2013, and on November 11, 2013 PYD management announced the establishment of a
regional government in Rojava (referring
Kurdish populated northern Syria region). Creating a lot of turbulence and
anger both from Turkey and Barzani’s Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, PYD’s
plans are still intact and in progress.
With Cemil Bayik’s assignment as co-leader,
there had been some important developments within PKK intra- ranks as well as
diplomatic connections. Bayik started with major changes in the PKK media
organizations, removing some high level officials closer to Murat Karayilan on
December 5, 2013. Those officials removed by Bayik-Hozat include Ahmad Deniz (Head of PKK External Relations
Committee), Roj Willad (PKK’s
website Firat News editor in chief), Deyari
Qamishlo (PKK Media Supervisor and Head of the Syrian Relations Committee),
Havel Damhat (Qandil Chief
Coordinator) and Haqi Hawal (Head of
Iran and PJAK Media Unit.)
Following the PKK’s 2013 convention and high
level management change, Karayılan’s wing is claimed to be in decline, and has
been excluded from some decision-making posts within the PKK. “These changes
are internal and not related to any conflicts within the PKK, they’re related
to the party structure,” said Zagros
Hiwa, the member of PKK foreign relations committee and predecessor of
Ahmad Deniz for Head of External Relations Committee.
These changes shouldn’t only be acknowledged
as “pacification” of Karayilan supporters, but also as significant indicators for
PKK intensions to promote strong diplomatic and organizational cadres in Syria,
Iraq and Iran; which Kurdish media sources claim that, Ahmad Deniz and Deyari
Qamishlo (pseudonyms) have
been assigned as liaisons and coordinators to Syria’s PYD and they are claimed
to be assisting/directing PYD’s Saleh Muslim to take necessary measures to format
the future Syrian Kurdistan’s manifesto and management principles according to
the design and decisions given by the Qandil management.
According to media news of Iraqi Kurdistan, Havel
Damhat and Haqi Hawal (pseudonyms) are also acting as negotiators to establish
some level of diplomatic connections between PKK, Bagdad and Iran, to further
possible assistance to PYD, in their local scale fights against Syria’s radical
resistance groups like Al Nusrah and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, as well
as supporting Assad’s military operations as a force multiplier.
Peyman
Hussein and Nurettin Sofi are
two other actors, who should be regarded highly important for PYD/PKK’s cooperation
with the Assad Regime; because of the fact that they’re both Syrian Kurds with
close ties to Syrian’s Baathist officials as well as intelligence agency “Al Muhaberat” since the early 1990s.
According to Kurdish media reports, both
figures left Qandil sometime on November and stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan’s
western border close to Simalka-Al
Qahtaniya region to be able to contact and consult with PYD and Assad
liaisons, at least for a few months. Considering PKK leadership has left Syria
in 1999 closing its permanent facilities and training camps in Bekaa Valley on
Syria-Israel border, this alleged “come-back” indicates serious intentions for
building new bridges with Syrian regime.
Given the facts that Peyman Hussein and Bashar
Al Assad were classmates for one year at Damascus Medical School in 1987 and
used to have some level of dialogue, also both Peyman and Nurettin Sofi are
known to be PKK’s effective tools for communicating with Syrian Baath Party officials
to develop strategies against their mutual enemy “Turkey” back in 1990s; this
new PKK positioning may be evaluated as a serious effort to establish beneficial
relations with Syrian government and a long-term efficient organization within
Syria’s Kurdish Rojava region.
Challenges
and Controversies
1. Turkey
Since the first month of the bilateral peace
process, Turkish authorities have been complaining about PKK’s unwillingness
for a major withdrawal and their activities for strengthening military bases in
Qandil region, referring a significant increase in joining PKK ranks as of May
2013. PKK confirms the increase in new recruitments, by publishing new Guerilla
Graduation Ceremonies through their web sites.
Visa versa, PKK has been opposing Turkish
efforts for building new water dams, along with transforming old military and
gendarme posts and stations to much sophisticated strongholds, by building new
military installations (KALEKOL) on
the Iranian and Iraqi border, as well as on the areas that control PKK routes
in southeast of Turkey.
Turkish Ministry of Defense announced that
KALEKOL project, which was initiated in September 2010, is designed to host 50
to 100 military personnel, with high level protection as well as superior fire
power. Main Contractor Company TOKI delivered 114 KALEKOLS to Army and Gendarme
units throughout Turkey’s eastern and southern border since 2012, and is
expected to deliver another 166 KALEKOLs at Iraq and Syrian border region no
later than May 2014.
Following the declaration of the bilateral
peace process, between September and December 2013; PKK units attacked three
KALEKOL construction sites in Hakkari and Sirnak provinces, destroying the
machinery and kidnapping contractors. In addition to these incidents, PKK’s
militant youth organization Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDGH)
demonstrated road blocks and check-point police operations in Sirnak, Cizre and
Hakkari provinces of Turkey which created a lot of public anger and criticism
among the government ranks as well as Turkish intellectuals who have been
supporting the peace dialogues since the beginning.
Turkish government confirms that PKK, using
the peace process for its benefit, has reached out a serious threat level in
terms of military readiness, recruitment and re organization of the fighter
troops and political establishments not only in Turkey, but also in Syria and
Iraq.
2. Syria
According to the Turkish and Kurdish media
news, approximately 300 PKK fighters are transferred to Syria’s northern towns,
, mainly Kobani (Ayn Al Arab), Derik (Al Malikiyah) and Afrin regions, both
from Turkey and Iraq. In addition, it’s also claimed that another 200 to 250
fighters are moved from Qandil to temporary bases in Northern Iraq’s
mountainous region, to be able to reinforce and support PKK units positioned in
Syria.
Military analysts and media reports mention
that Syria’s Kurdish dominated northern towns of Ayn Al Arab (Kobani), Afrin,
Al Malikiyah (Derik), Tal Abyad, Azaz and Jarabulus are substantially controlled
by Kurdish groups, especially PKK/PYD.
Intelligence reports and some media news mention
that PKK established some level of reconnaissance units equipped with off-road
dirt bikes, 50 cal. long range sniper rifles and machine gun mounted Toyota
Pickups. The same sources mention about PKK efforts to maintain
telecommunication systems through-out Syria, which is expected to provide
two-way and more secure communication with Damascus, Qandil leadership and
fighter units in the region, since US and Turkish counter intelligence efforts
are highly capable of intercepting PKK’s current telecommunication. These
developments indicate the existence of serious efforts for strengthening PKK
armed groups in Syria and establishing more capable combat-ready troops derived
through local population, supported with experienced PKK units, through-out the
Syria’s northern sector, for a wide scale urban warfare.
Major clashes on September and November 2013,
between Kurds and Anti-Assad resistance groups like Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al
Nusrah (JN) and ISIS in Syria’s northern towns of Ras Al Ayn, Sereqani, Tal
Abyad, Al Azaz, Hasakah and Jarabulus can be accepted as serious indicators for
the upcoming term, yet ISIS and PYD are still trying to control Qamishli and
Ras Al Ayn, two border towns with high volume of trade and business
opportunities.
So far, Qandil’s threats have not been actualized yet no clashes are reported between PKK/PJAK and Iranian Security forces since September 2013. PJAK’s Head of Foreign Relations, Shamal Beshir talked to European media sources on December 2013, stating that Syria is prone to be the next battle ground for Al Qaida; PJAK is willing and ready to support Syria’s Kurds with every tool within their capabilities. His explanations are interpreted by military and policy analysts, as cooperation offer to Iranian government to support Assad regime by isolating and pacifying extremist Sunni groups within Syria.
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3. Iran
Iran and PKK relations have been dire for
almost a decade and the main reason behind this conflict was PJAK (Party for a
Free Life in Kurdistan), an offshoot of PKK, based in Iran’s eastern
territories. PJAK announced its establishment in 2004 and since then it’s been fighting
against Iranian military units, mostly deployed on the Iran-Iraq border’s rural
areas.
Intensified Iran pressures on PJAK’s
military activities are at its lowest levels since June 2013. But, although
both sides have agreed upon a cease-fire on August 2011, Iran and PJAK had
attacked each other on small scales, until both sides found a common ground in
Syria, for supporting Assad regime.
On May 2013, following his arrest and
release by German Police, Abdurrahman
Haji Ahmedi (PJAK Political Leader, a German citizen living in Hamburg) commented
about two high level PJAK members’ arrest by Iranian security forces; stating
that the rise of transnational jihadists in Syria is a threat for the region and
warned Iran stop attacking Kurds, highlighting that Jihadists were mutual enemy
for both Kurds and Iranian Government.
Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani, who took office on August 2013 initiated a new and
promising era in terms of human rights, freedom and tolerance. But despite his
positive start, he did not hesitate to approve the hangings of two PJAK
members; Habibollah Golparipour and Reza Mamadi, who were captured and sentenced
to death in 2009. Both men were hanged on October 2013 and PJAK officials in
Qandil immediately declared that the executions will not go unanswered, threatening
Iran with major retaliation.
4. Iraq
For the past few years, Turkey has been
trying to grant Iraqi Kurdistan and Barzani
a pivotal role as a Kurdish symbol of political progress in the region. The
Erbil Agreement and the Kurdish National Congress were both red lines for
Turkey, but Ankara welcomed them because they happened under Barzani’s patronage.
On the other hand PKK; by engaging in the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s complicated politics and supporting the Iraqi
Kurdistan’s opposition party GORRAN(Change
Movement) is attempting to suppress Barzani, while stirring local criticism
of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG). These PKK interventions are unlikely to alter the status quo in the Iraqi
Kurdistan region however they are fueling political fragmentation and creating
additional challenges to regional stability.
GORRAN became popular as a Kurdish
nationalist party that seeks to remove Barzani from office while pressing for a
parliamentary and not presidential system for the region. Following the
regional elections held on September 2013, which resulted with 2 year-old party’s
unexpected victory in Suleymania region; GORRAN
leader Nawshirwan Mustapha announced
his support for the PKK and affirmed the PYD as the representative of the Kurds
in Syria, posing another direct challenge to Barzani and the KDP. The PKK-GORRAN
alliance also is based on shared concerns about Turkey’s regional power and the
need to isolate Erdogan’s influence efforts over Iraqi Kurds and in Syria.
In response to the PYD’s unilateral steps to
leading Syrian Kurds, Massoud Barzani,
the KDP leader and president of Iraqi Kurdistan, called on all other Syrian
Kurdish political parties to gather in Erbil. The result of the gathering was
unifying all the pro-Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) parties under one umbrella called the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is a member of the Syrian
National Coalition, which opposes President Bashar al-Assad. It has accused the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) for supporting and siding with Assad regime. To
avert any possible armed conflict between the KNC and the PYD, a meeting was
held in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil under the auspices of Barzani. The
two sides agreed to cooperate on the ground, establishing the High Cooperation
Council.
According to the agreement, the two parties
share all responsibilities in the Syrian Kurdish territories, but the agreement
has so far failed to achieve its goals. In meetings with US and European
officials, KNC leaders have labeled the PYD as a “gang that belongs to the PKK,” which they listed as a terrorist
organization.
On December 2013, KRG agreed to supply
Turkey with oil through a pipeline in a landmark deal that Baghdad considers
illegal and refused to approve. Maliki Government stressed that the quantities
of Iraqi oil exported to Turkey must be known to the central government, oil
must be sold at international market prices, and revenues from oil sales must
be channeled to the account of the Iraq Development Fund in New York, in line
with previous U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Furthermore, oil is not the sole apple of
discord between KRG and the Central Government. Kurdish territorial claims on
Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninawa regions, which are also prominent oil-rich grounds-,
seem to cause further tensions between two groups.
Assessments for 2014
Syria is a new and promising front for PKK
to initiate its military and political goals. While Assad is turning the face of the war to
Al Qaeda elements and radical groups, Syrian resistance and its weak political
structure SNC (Syrian National Coalition) is losing both credibility and
popularity, which give PKK a chance to implement its political agenda for
Rojava Region. If they can isolate and
secure the northern Kurdish regions, they are capable of cultivating and
administering necessary measures to promote a new Kurdish government, with or
without Assad’s approval.
Syrian resistance groups are dispersed and a
unified command structure is almost impossible. Free Syrian Army (FSA),
sponsored by Turkey, is losing influence giving away a serious number of its
troops to Islamist and radical groups. Turkey is also very concerned about the
emerging power of both the jihadists and Kurdish militia forces in Syria. By
maintaining a direct connection to compliant Syrian rebel groups, Ankara can
try to play different rebel factions against each other in an attempt to minimize
the jihadist and Kurdish separatist threat. As operations intensify across the Turkish-Syrian
border, the risks of clashes between Turkey and the Syrian regime,
transnational jihadists or the advancing YPG Kurdish militia remain very real.
Sharing a vast border with a destabilized Syria, Ankara cannot hope to
completely isolate itself from Syria and can only take measures to diminish the
risk. A Turkish operation against PKK /PYD units is said to be on the table,
but Erdogan Government will probably want to see the results of the ongoing
peace process before deciding for action.
2014 Geneva meeting’s success to unite Syrian opposition is
important but doesn’t seem to be promising. Kurds agreed to send delegation to
Geneva as KNC representatives and PYD is expected to join the talks. PYD’s
active support for Syrian resistance may turn Assad against Kurds in the north
which will result in losing the gains for PKK and PYD.
Iran will support PJAK and PKK for fighting
against Al Qaida affiliated Sunni groups.
Also Tehran government might give a green light for establishment of a
semi-autonomous Kurdish region within Syria in the future, if Assad fails to
advance in his fight against insurgency. But this will not mean a major policy
change against PJAK activities in Iran.
This Article has been published by IHS Jane's on May 2014.
Hey, you are just the BEST military analyst blog if have seen, EVER. Bro, you are totally AMAZING. Such detail in this analysis, such clarity in showing what's happening here! Amazing!
ReplyDeleteYou were 100% correct in your assumption of the PKK taking advantage of the peace process to build up its subsidiary in north Syria. In fact, the peace process opened political space for US govt to support pkk-ypg with extensive airstrikes in Syria. Saying the PKK is effective against ISIS is not quite true... US could have picked any group to support, the US decision to fully support YPG is precisely what lead to YPG gains against ISIS. In fact, there are very close contacts between 'former' US special forces & soldiers and the PKK: http://goo.gl/RV4oNZ. US has been making a deal also with Iran, the most important sponsor the PKK (all current leaders have close links to Iran as you say here).
Negotiation with the PKK was a massive error. PKK is clearly a terror group that seeks to monopolize the kurdish voice and making the PKK the prime negotiator in the peace process was exactly what it needed. It gave the PKK the chance to say 'Turkey acknowledges kurds because of us' while the reality is that the PKK has always tried to stop economic development in the region, runs an extensive drug network (which hurts many local youth), regularly attacked kurds who opposed it.. The govt should have maintained the crackdown on terrorist PKK governance structures while simultaneously promoting alternative kurdish political voices.
AMAZING WORK. WELL DONE. Please, please, please can we have an analysis of the current round of fighting?? Turkey has been dormant for a long time but when they did hit, it seems they hit furiously and swiftly. What is the effectiveness of the current air campaign against the PKK? Govt casualty claims reliable? Are the Kalekols helping clamp down on PKK movements? Turkish govt should have acted much earlier, the cost/risks for action in Syria in 2012/13 was much lower than it is now. ISIS could have been destroyed before it ever emerged if we acted back then.
Is the Turkish military ready for the war with the PKK and ISIS? What is the status of ongoing professionalization efforts within the TSK? Will the new equipment ANKA, T129, satellite improve intel+strike capabilities enough to degrade the PKK? And MOST IMPORTANT, what is the effect on kurdish public opinion in Turkey? Do kurds hold the PKK accountable for its crimes (for instance the killing of a rail worker)? What precisely is the anatomy of kurdish support for the PKK?
ReplyDeletePKK-YPG was effective against ISIS only because of US support. All of the people who wish to split Turkey are clamoring for an end to strikes against the PKK.
ReplyDeleteTurkey should:
- compensate all civilian victims & rebuild their villages
- move quickly to launch the main attack against ISIS. A force of Syrian Turkmen & Arabs must be placed under direct command of TSK (through maroon berets) and will coordinate closely with Turkish Air forces in move against ISIS.
- A portion of this force will attack Jarbulus directly from Turkish soil (to deny a PKK advance on a collapsing ISIS). Taking and holding Jarbulus is 1st step of offensive, then they can attack from Azaz towards Manjib.. to link up all the way to Jarbulus
- How to deal with JAN AQ-linked terrorists with presence in Azaz: the force should include some elements from Ahrar Al-Sham & Jaish Al Islam (diplomatic detterence to JN attack). The force should be large, well-trained, well-equipped and must move into place very quickly (military deterrence & fait accompli).
- A civil administration council must be stood up in the liberated area to govern & handle local politics. The greatest weakness of the syrian revolution is a lack of unity (which also leads to a lack of governance).