Alleged Turkey-ISIS Relations
Erdogan government and Turkey’s
involvement with Syria surfaced in the first quarter of 2012, but records
indicate that the relations between Turkish Intelligence (MIT) and Sunni Groups
had a longer history. Of course back then Syrian Sunni groups were amorphous,
FSA was not on the theatre and Salafis were the only ones who
were able to counter Assad Forces. By 2012, we observed dispersion of these
groups (due to religious-ethnic-organizational reasons) and the group names
like Nusra Front, Ahrar Al Sham, Ansar Al Sham, Tawhid Brigade, Idlib Martyrs
Brigade, Suqour Al Sham Brigade, Abbas Battalion and Ahfad Al Rasul Brigade became
visible and prominent for the Western Media and Analysts.
By 2012, we observed Turkish Intelligence
efforts; to unite the Syrian resistance groups via influential Sunni States
(Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and to some extend Saudis) and promoting Free Syrian
Army (FSA) as a secular Sunni Group which should be supported both by West and
Sunni States to topple Assad Regime. According to AKP government; a unified
political body SNC; – made up of Sunni
intellectuals, clerics and other Syrian Ethnic Minority bodies-, should have had
a fighting army and FSA was the best option for such an establishment.
On October 31; The US indicated that it
was undertaking its most aggressive attempt yet to reshape the Syrian
opposition, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissing the “Turkey
supported Sunni leadership” as a bunch of affectless exiles who should be
replaced with a group more representative of the fighting groups on the ground.
According to the media sources and policy analysts; over the last several
months the State Department has worked to broaden its contacts in Syria,
meeting with military commanders and local governance representatives, in a bid
to bypass the fractious SNC (Syrian National Council).
A serious number of Syrian Opposition
figures took part in a unity conference started on November 5, in the Qatari
capital Doha. For the US, this represented an opportunity to overhaul Syria’s
fragmented opposition leadership. At the Doha conference, the SNC was expected
to decide whether to accept a plan proposed by a prominent dissident, Riad
Seif, to set up a new leadership group of about 60 members. The SNC would get
about 22 seats, meaning its influence would be diluted, while military
commanders and local leaders in rebel-held areas would win wider
representation. [U.S. officials and opposition leaders called the initiative
the "Seif-Ford Initiative”
named after the US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford and the former Syrian
parliamentarian and dissident who were imprisoned after he signed the Damascus
Declaration on respect for Syrians' human rights in 2005. He was released in
2011, and allowed to leave Syria in June 2012.]
After this brief history of developing
events; I come to the conclusion that, Turkey’s concerns regarding losing the
headway over re-structuring Syria, pushed AKP government to deepen its relations
with Salafist Sunni blocks like Ahrar al Sham-Nusra Front etc. and they had to
keep some level of relations with these groups, by using FSA and non-significant Turkmen groups (e.g. Bayirbucak Turkmen Tribe) as an umbrella.
It’s been published lots of times that by 2014, FSA started losing ground and
lots of its fighters [especially the ones from prominent Sunni tribes] joined to
the ranks of Salafist groups. ISIS was indeed one of those groups, which at the
beginning, had been acknowledged by Turkey as an Iraqi Sunni effort to expand
Sunni Jihad into Syria. AKP was not at good terms with Baghdad’s Shia dominated
Maliki government, yet was not so influential on Iraqi Sunni groups due to
Al-Qaida involvement in the region. Also, there was a peace process with
Kurdish PKK and Erdogan was maintaining good relations as well as construction
and energy related contracts with Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government and Barzani.
Turkish Interests vs. Kurdish Interests
Most of the military analysts in Turkey
agree that; until the capture of Mosul and taking hostage of Turkish Consulate
personnel in June 2014; Turkey considered ISIS as a part of Sunni resistance- Al Qaida in Iraq’s Syria expansion- and overlooked its activities, since
they were prone to fight Assad forces as well as PKK establishments on the
Turkish-Syrian border.
It won’t be wrong to argue that Turkish
interests on the region can be summarized under two head-lines.
1- Preventing any PKK involved
military/political headway which will cause a future autonomy for Syrian
Kurds. (PYD’s canton establishments can be regarded as a confrontation for
Turkish concerns)
2- Leading political efforts to topple Assad, for
paving the way for a Sunni-era in Syria.
To some extent, these two interests
collide with each other. Because a strong Sunni dominance of the region will
definitely rely on border relations with Turkey, of which is occupied mostly by
Kurds. Turkey’s ultimatum to PYD for “not to extend its operations to the West”
(Latakia), drawing the West of Euphrates as a Red Line for Kurds, basically
stems from this concern. Ankara wants an ISIS free and Kurdish Free territory
in Syria, which can be flourished with Ankara’s hands-on assistance. Latakia is
prone to be an economic territory for even a de-facto Sunni State, of which, if
can be protected against Assad and other threats, might give Sunnis an upper
hand to keep going against Assad.
Turkey is aware that PYD (which used to
be a branch of PKK for decades, -Salih Muslim acting as deputy under Ocalan
since 1980s-) success leaning towards an autonomous (or semi-autonomous)
governance in northern Syria, will be a strong influence for its Kurds.
Ankara’s efforts to strengthen Barzani and Iraq KRG’s influence over Syrian Kurds
were not fruitful, indicating that a de-facto Syrian Kurdish political entity
right under its nose will not be a friendly one.
Does Putin's allegations regarding an oil deal reflect the truth?
Not just ISIS but also other Syrian
Resistance elements have been parts of oil smuggling efforts through Turkey. Some
Turkish experts believe that ISIS is the dominating force behind all these
smuggling efforts, because they are the ones who "sell oil" to any smuggling
groups, thanks to the Mosul Oil which has been controlled by ISIS since June
2014.
Besides, crude oil is just a significant
part of overall smuggling efforts, because some groups have been caught with
containers of diesel and gasoline, probably processed and distributed through
Mosul Refinery, which again, puts ISIS
in the center of the spotlight as the “main supplier” if not a smuggler.
From 2012s to the mid-2015, (especially
in the aftermath of ISIS Kobane attacks, Turkey’s neutral stance against its
attacks on Kurds, but then opening of Incirlik Air Base, which caused ISIS
attacking on Kurdish demonstrations in Diyarbakir-Suruc and Ankara) Turkey was
an accomplice if not an abettor, by loosening the border control (especially
through Hatay-Kilis region) and turning its back against smugglers. For some
politicians, this blind eye was necessary for Sunni Fighting groups as well as Turkmen
resistance groups to revive the suffering economy. In return for cheap oil sold
into Turkish markets, they were claimed to be getting medical equipment-medicine-clothing-
etc. (!) In this case the FINAL BUYER/DISTRIBUTOR in Turkey can only be a government
controlled buyer/distributor, otherwise it will not be easy to create a market for this
illegal product and off the market oil sale cannot be a long term job for
Turkish oil wholesalers, because the market is known as one of the most
expensive in the world. So; even though the government denies its
connection/approval/covert support for oil smuggling; we have to accept at
least some level of Ankara involvement, in terms of smuggled-oil’s controlled
distribution into Turkish Markets.
There is also another fact, that since
the oil smuggling have been an easy way to profit, a lot of different groups
and individuals started to pursue this trade, with our without the approval of
ISIS or other groups who are controlling the territory. [In May 2015, ISIS
executed 4 people who were trying to start their own oil network between Syrian
Qara Baba and Turkish Reyhanli region]There are multiple records, mentioning
about families (who have relatives on Turkish side of the border) got caught
digging 500 to 1000m long holes and inserting plastic pipe-lines, to be able to
“pump” oil from Syria into Turkey..
Turkey, in most cases, used such events
and arrests to save the face, as if they were doing their part, to contain ISIS
profiting from oil; but on the other hand, there are countless numbers of
allegations, claiming Ahrar Al Sham, Nusra Front oil smuggling activities, of
which are known and approved by Turkish Intelligence. [Since 2013, Turkish MIT
has the overall authority for Syrian Border security units and military
troops.]
Gasoline Smuggling Route, Hatay Syria Border (April 2014)
Hatay Altinozu, a smuggling pipe
line close to Ozeker village (March 2014)
Does Turkish Intelligence have some level of control/dialogue with ISIS?
This can never be fully exposed due to
the nature of the “job”. I believe Turkish MIT is able to keep “some” level of
communication with ISIS, by using proxies or other Sunni elements’ liaison
abilities. Again, I believe that during 2014 MIT and ISIS was able to maintain
a dialogue channel through a small level of communication chain handled by
Islamic Leaders and members of Islamic sects who has followers in southeast
Turkey and Syria, which is corrupted and disturbed by 2015.
Is Border Security being neglected by Turkey?
I have to accept the fact that, it is not easy to cover and
control, especially Hatay region and its western parts alongside the border,
due to the geographical constraints and inadequacy of the border troops. But, the
War is approaching (we might expect to witness more airstrikes, combined with
ground army troops' movements from Turkey, as well as more Kurdish operations
on ISIS with the support of US/Western Special Operation Forces) all for a big
push to conduct the Safe Zones inside Syria.
Turkey thinks (and trying to convince US/West) that safe zones
established inside, might play a crucial role to stopping routine border
crossings. But this is something to be discussed for the future steps. Should
Turkey and Allies plan to contain ISIS, weaken its free travel in the northern
sector and then get to the further steps of the operation for safe zones, this
will be a slow moving process. Being able to control the majority of
Turkey-Syria border is important for two main reasons:
(1) Such a control, will lessen foreign fighters' influx in and out
of the ISIS territories,
(2) This will also make things easier for a future "Safe
Zone" creating strategy.
In a military point of view; current US/Western strategy relies on
following steps:
- Weaken ISIS with constant air strikes, for which the target intelligence is gathered through Kurdish elements working with US Special Forces and Intelligence Units.
- Force ISIS to shift troops from Iraq into Syria, (which presents a better open terrain to monitor insurgency movements) and scatter ISIS military ranks forcing them to disperse, and push them for Urban Defense preparations especially in and around Deir Az Zour, Dabiq and Raqqa.[the towns where ISIS officially rules, governs and trains the recruits]
- Isolate passage points from Syria to Iraq (e.g. Al Yarubiyah-Sinjar-Al Baadi-Khwayibyra- Qaim)
- Clear ISIS from MOSUL and gain control of the oil fields and refineries in the region.
We have to keep in mind that; weakened, dispersed ISIS may
want to get an exit strategy by trying new partnerships with other Sunni groups
(like Nusra Front-Ahrar Sham-etc.) and they also will try to announce an
Islamic Mobilization, inviting its followers to join the Final Jihad and secure
the passage for Heavens by becoming Martyrs. So, before reaching this level,
both US and also Turkey will want to get a better control of the border.
Especially Turkey, as a forerunner for Safe Zone operations (not to combat with
ISIS but to weaken Assad) will have to take care of its (intentional or not)
weakness at the border line, to be able to establish relatively safer army
movements and transportation to establish and maintain the proposed Safe Zones.
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