Maritime Terrorism On Spot (TRAC)

Maritime Terrorism

Introduction

Photo: 2009 Unloading in Chennai Port, India, expected to take 36 hours. http://www.flickr.com/photos/39508679@N07/3683871632/

“Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”

(Albert Einstein in a letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2 August 1939)

In general terms, the phrase “maritime terrorism” means terrorism at the sea. However, the security implications of maritime terrorism are many.

• First, maritime terrorism involves terrorist attacks directed against assets in the maritime domain. This includes attacks or threat of attacks against vessels (warships, cruise liners, tankers and other carriers, tugboats and barges), harbour/ anchorage attacks, fixed land based targets near ports- oil refineries, oil storage depots, other port infrastructure, energy pipelines and undersea cables- and hijacking of commercial/passenger ships on high seas. This also includes putting obstructions such as sinking a large ship in choking points in critical sea lanes of communication – Strait of Malacca and the Hormuz Strait for example - to disrupt global trade and commerce.

• Second, maritime terrorism denotes terrorist attacks using maritime assets as platforms to deliver attacks against either land based targets or targets at sea or both. For example, groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have used fast speed boats and even combat vessels to attack targets on land or as in the case of the LTTE, to attack the Sri Lankan naval vessels at sea. The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen was delivered by a fast speed boat laden with explosives, as was the case with M.V. Limburg in October 2002. Terrorists used a maritime route and a cargo ship – Al Husaini, a fishing trawler – Kuber – and a rubberised dinghy to land on the Mumbai coast to carry out spectacular attacks in the city in November 2008. This also includes hijacking a commercial vessel (cargo liners, tugs and barges) or a cruise-liner and using it as a floating bomb to ram against a maritime target to cause widespread death and destruction. At a broader spectrum, the possibility of terrorists smuggling a crude nuclear or radiological device into a hijacked ship or loading the same into a container and setting it off in a port city, shipping lane or waterway has also emerged as one of the possible doomsday scenarios.

• Third, maritime terrorism also involves use of maritime assets by the terrorists for purely logistical purposes such as sending members from one country for training and/or asylum in another country as was the case with Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. JI recruits regularly use the sea routes to travel to the training camps in either MILF or ASG held territory. Terrorist groups like the ASG and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia have also used boats and other maritime assets to carry out piracy for financial gains.

History of Responses

Image: Screen Shot of coverage of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro on Alauro TV. http://www.portosdeportugal.pt/sartigo/index.php?x=6610

Precedents

Terrorist incidents involving maritime interests were not unprecedented. The 1985 terrorist hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt brought the spectre of maritime terrorism, reminiscent of the terrorism in the skies, to public attention. In November 1991, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demonstrated its maritime terrorist capabilities by attacking Sri Lankan naval supply ship Abheeta with an explosives laden suicide craft at the KKS harbour in northern Sri Lanka. Attack on USS Cole in October 2000 off the coast of Yemen was a bold statement of both the intention as well as capabilities of the terrorist groups to target high value maritime assets including naval vessels.

The Achille Lauro, a cruise ship based in Naples, Italy was hijacked on 7 October 1985 by terrorists belonging to the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) off the coast of Egypt as she was sailing from Alexandria to Port Said. The terrorists held more than 400 passengers and the crew hostage and directed the vessel to sail to Tartus, Syria. They also demanded that Israel free 50 Palestinian prisoners. The Syrian authorities refused permission for the cruise ship to dock at Tartus; in retaliation the hijackers killed disabled an American passenger and then threw him overboard. After two days of negotiations the hijackers agreed to abandon the liner in exchange for safe conduct and were flown towards Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner. However, the US Navy fighter planes intercepted the Egyptian plane and forced it land at Naval Air Station Sigonella, a N.A.T.O. base in Sicily, where the hijackers except the leader Abu Abbas were arrested. Abbas was allowed to go despite protests from the US. An Italian court convicted 11 of 15 others associated with the hijacking, while Abbas and another terrorist were tried in absentia and found guilty. Abbas was never arrested nor served any prison term. In 1990, he carried out another maritime attack, with an abortive speedboat attack on bathers on a beach near Tel Aviv.

Rising Maritime Terrorism

Photo: 2000 USS Cole being towed. http://www.flickr.com/photos/7515273@N07/2502381720/

Five Main Reasons for the Rise in Maritime Terrorism

(1) Increasing Security on Land and Air Based Targets

A number of factors explain this growing interest among the terrorist groups to target assets in the maritime domain. Firstly, after the September 2001 incidents, there has been an increasing focus on securing land-based targets and targets in the aviation sector. This has severely restricted the opportunity for the terrorist groups to operate on land or in the sky. Accordingly, terrorists are on the lookout for soft targets either on the land, such as hotels and resorts, as well as at sea. For the terrorists, the maritime domain offers an opaque and largely amorphous environment to exploit. The assets in the maritime sector are many thus offering terrorists a profusion of targets. Besides, more often than not, maritime assets are exposed to lax governance and poor security. As Matthew Daley, a former US deputy assistant secretary of state, put it, “as both the physical and political space in which they [the terrorists] find sanctuary shrinks, as the noose tightens,” there is increasing likelihood of them turning “to the most unregulated of spaces: the sea.” Sea offers scale, in vast areas of un-policed waters. Consequently, the maritime domain has emerged as a potential alternative venue for high profile mass casualty attacks.

(2) New Technology Allows for the Ability to Replicate Land Based Tactics to Sea

Secondly, the maritime milieu provides terrorist organizations an opportunity to develop new methods of assault and new targets. September 2001 incidents demonstrated how the terrorist groups have a high propensity to acquire increasing levels of tactical sophistication. The groups are constantly adapting known and trusted tactics, exploiting existing technology and weapon systems. This would enable the groups to replicate land capabilities in the maritime environment without much difficulty.

(3) Generates Attention

Thirdly, the maritime domain offers perceptual and psychological advantages for terrorist operations. Targeting a high profile maritime asset would generate the kind of attention that terrorists seek. Its impact would be enormous, setting precedents for other terrorist groups to emulate the action in other theatres. This “copycat effect” was demonstrated in the USS Cole attack on 12 October 2000, which generated enormous media attention, underscoring vulnerability of vessels at ports. Within a month of the USS Cole attack, LTTE suicide boats breached the defenses of Trincomalee, the most protected Sri Lankan naval port and destroyed a fast personnel carrier on 23 October 2000. Similarly, on 7 November 2000, A Hamas suicide boat attacked an Israeli naval craft, which however, exploded prematurely and could not destroy the naval vessel.

(4) Convergence with Piracy and Transnational Crime

Fourthly, in recent years there has been an increasing nexus between the terrorism and transnational crime such as drug trafficking and piracy. The nexus or convergence between the terrorism and transnational crime is derived from the symbiotic relationship between the terrorists and the criminals, a dynamic that allows both entities to profit financially. With an overall decrease of state financial support for terrorism, combined with interdiction of terrorist finances, regulation and control of charitable and other non-governmental front organizations, terrorist groups are increasingly taking to crime to generate funds to sustain their activities. One of the manifestations of this is the terrorists taking to piracy such as GAM and ASG, which is becoming an area of increasing concerns. Photo: Somali pirates diving ransom, date and location unknown. http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/subcategory/8/Piracy_REPORT/Piracy/082011///3

(5) Maritime Sector is Vitally Important

Last but not the least, there is an increasing awareness about the maritime sector as an important conduit of global activity including global trade and commerce. There has been a very rapid growth in global commercial maritime traffic with about 90-95% of world freight moving by the sea. Disruption of the global trade and commercial activity by selective targeting of strategically significant maritime assets – sea lanes of communication, port infrastructures, cruise liners or merchant shipping - fits nicely into the calculation of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which seek to inflict least-cost most effective damage on the enemy. This includes inflicting enormous economic damage to the enemies of Islam – “a war against businesses, which will hit the enemy where he does not expect it.” Modern cruise liners are not unlike floating World Trade Centres; ports are the hubs of the global trading network; strategic sea-lanes of communication are the arteries of global commercial activity. An interruption – in a major port or in a strategic sea-lane such as the Strait of Malacca- could upset the global supply chain for indefinite periods of time. The supply chain is a highly interdependent web based on real-time information and accuracy. Lead times for deliveries have been extremely low. Disruption of cargo movements and supply chains could have devastating consequences for the global economy even bringing some countries to the edge of economic collapse. As Gail Fosler, senior vice president and chief economist of the Conference Board, the influential U.S. business and economics think tank put it, “The most serious economic consequence of the current global security threat is the vulnerability of the United States and other countries that depend on global trade to shocks from actual supply interruptions and that the threats of terrorism may achieve what the anti-globalization forces have not - a significant slowdown, even decline, in global trade and investment.”

Maritime terrorism: Technologies and tactics

Image: Anti-piracy weapons for oil tankers. http://thekevinchen.wordpress.com/2009/12/03/dambrosio250gprimstoolanti-piracyweaponsiron-man2/

Target Dependent

Maritime terrorist technology and tactics is target dependant. In the maritime domain, terrorist targets involve attacks against ships and shipping infrastructure including fixed land-based targets near the port. This involves attacks against vessels (warships, cruise liners, tankers and other carriers) on high seas/ territorial waters or while the vessels are in harbour or on anchorage, hijacking of commercial/passenger ships on high seas and attacks against oil refineries, oil storage depots near the ports, other port infrastructure, energy pipelines and undersea cables. Terrorists have also targeted shipping containers - using containers to transport personnel, illegal and dangerous merchandize and weapons. The groups have used improvised explosive devices, submersibles, mini submarines and high-speed boats laden with explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and even armour piercing weapons. The maritime terrorist inventory also includes dual-use technologies such as the Global Positioning Systems (GPS), satellite communication systems, sea sport scooters and scuba diving equipment.

Small Boats, Huge Damage

The October 2000 attack against USS Cole demonstrated how vessels (small Boats) could be used as instruments to deliver explosives. Terrorists have also used vessels themselves as weapons as evident from Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suicide craft ramming into Sri Lankan naval vessel Abheetha in May 1991. LTTE outfitted its small high-speed boats with detonation devices known as “explosive horns” that serve to explode on impact with ships and other sea borne targets. It is in this context that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) warned about the possibility of terrorists using speedboats to collide with oil tankers or liquefied natural gas carriers, which could cause significant damage. These boats can also be used to target oil platforms to disrupt energy supplies such as the attacks on Basra oil terminals in April 2004.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Potential

Boats could be used as platforms for the dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents. Vessels can also be used as tools of disruption particularly in the context that by sinking a large ship in one of the critical chokepoints in sea-lanes of communication could overstress the surrounding logistical infrastructure that is vital for just-in-time delivery in the global supply chain. And this is not discounting the possibility of environmental damage caused by attacks against carriers with petroleum products, hazardous chemicals and nuclear wastes.



Photo: 2009 After a prolonged battle with LTTE terrorists, troops of 7 Sri Lanka Sinha regiment operating under the command of 58 division, captured this factory (above) which is used to manufacture suicide bombs, claymore mines and improvised explosive devices. http://sinhalaya.com/news/eng/2009/troops-capture-ltte’s-bomb-manufacturing-factory-and-soosai’s-bunker/

State Sponsored Maritime Terrorism

In the past, terrorist groups have benefited from their access to naval inventory of patron states to acquire demonstrable maritime technology and expertise. In the initial years, LTTE’s maritime capability was built and developed with tacit support of India. Iran not only supplied the missile used by Hezbollah to attack the Israeli warship in June 2006, but it was alleged that Iranian troops helped fire the missile. These technologies include diving and underwater demolition skills using conventional -ilitary instruments as well as dual use technologies. Documents recovered from Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan indicated interest in suicide scuba operations. Diving skills using sophisticated underwater equipment was being taught at a camp in Bangladesh run by Rohingiya Solidarity Organization (RSO), a group with known association with Al-Qaeda. Similarly, in 2005, Indonesian and Philippines authorities uncovered training involving diving and underwater demolition skills being undertaken by members of groups such as Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM). Groups like LTTE and Hezbollah are known to have operatives trained in scuba diving and the use of underwater explosive devices including sea mines and underwater scooters. LTTE was known to have purchased underwater scooters from Denmark to attack military as well as civilian, commercial vessels. Few terrorist groups like the LTTE, have been successful in manufacturing sea mines themselves.

Portable Rocket Launchers

Maritime technology also involves use of portable rocket launchers similar to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These devices are especially useful as they provide a standoff distance so that the attackers could effectively target vessels transiting near land. The interest to acquire submarines for maritime terrorism is also not uncommon among groups.

(Hull of the submarine being built by LTTE)

For example, LTTE was trying to acquire a submarine being built at a shipyard in Phuket, Thailand. The main body of the submarine was outfitted with a conventional surface hatch and an underwater hatch that could deploy personnel under the surface without detection. In September 2000, a100 foot submarine capable of transporting up to approximately 200 tons of cocaine was recovered from a warehouse in the suburbs in Bogotá, Columbia. According to the police, the technology was advanced and the workmanship of high quality. In the Philippines, MILF was reportedly negotiating with North Korean arms cartel to acquire midget submarines.

Financing

Similarly, there are numerous instances where terrorist groups had used maritime instruments and services to sustain their economic and logistical requirements by smuggling drugs, weapons and personnel. Terrorists have exploited vulnerabilities in container traffic, which carries almost 90 percent of sea-borne cargo. Physical benefits of the use of containers include the transportation of group members to avoid detection or the transportation of foot soldiers to a desired operational zone. For example, in October 2001, Egyptian Al-Qaeda member - Rizik Amid Farid, was discovered by the Italian Police in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro on a container ship at Genoa, hiding in a steel container bound for Toronto. The container was furnished as a makeshift home with a bed, water, supplies for a long journey and a bucket for a toilet. He was found to be carrying two mobile phones, a satellite phone, a laptop computer, several cameras, batteries and, airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for four major American airports.
Gioia Tauro is a leading trans-shipment hub for cargo in the Mediterranean. The container fitted out as a makeshift home had been loaded in Port Said, Egypt. Had the stowaway not been trying to widen ventilation holes when workers in Gioia Tauro were nearby, the box may well have passed unhindered to its final destination at the port of Halifax in Canada, via Rotterdam in Holland.

Containers as Bombs

Terrorists could also use containers as a bomb. An attack using a bomb in a container would significantly disrupt cargo movements and supply chains with devastating consequences for the global economy even bringing some countries to the edge of “economic collapse.” Proximity of the ports to major cities would ensure deaths in large numbers especially if the terrorists manage to detonate a nuclear or at least a radiological device, the so-called dirty bomb. Ports themselves are also very vulnerable. Most of the ports are flat, being at the ocean’s edge, so would offer little shielding against weapon effects. Some have great quantities of inflammable material, such as fuel that could extend the area of destruction and release toxic gases. While ports may stretch on for miles, a nuclear device the size of the one used in Hiroshima (15k) would have enough force to destroy many key facilities of a typical port. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport, would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion.

The vulnerability of container shipping has been exposed a number of times in the past. For example, in 2002, ABC News successfully transported 15 pounds of depleted Uranium which it acquired from an environmental group, carried it by train from Austria to Istanbul and shipped it overseas to the port at Staten Island, New York. The cargo - though not dangerous in itself - went undetected passing through 7 countries, in 25 days. In 2003 again, the same news agency successfully shipped depleted uranium from Jakarta to Los Angeles. This operation involved 6.8kg of uranium in a steel pipe with a lead lining, put into a teak trunk along with other furniture in Jakarta. The shipment, which arrived at the Port of Los Angeles on 23 August 2003, was never screened.

Photo: 2011 Police in Colombia seized a submarine belonging to Farc rebels which had the capacity to carry at least seven tons of drugs. The 16m-long (52ft) vessel - equipped with a sophisticated navigation system - was captured near the Pacific port city of Buenaventura. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15051108

Container Shipping

The vulnerability of container shipping has been exposed a number of times in the past. For example, in 2002, ABC News successfully transported 15 pounds of depleted Uranium which it acquired from an environmental group, carried it by train from Austria to Istanbul and shipped it overseas to the port at Staten Island, New York. The cargo - though not dangerous in itself - went undetected passing through 7 countries, in 25 days. In 2003 again, the same news agency successfully shipped depleted uranium from Jakarta to Los Angeles. This operation involved 6.8kg of uranium in a steel pipe with a lead lining, put into a teak trunk along with other furniture in Jakarta. The shipment, which arrived at the Port of Los Angeles on 23 August 2003, was never screened.

Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist Capability

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)

Photo: 2009 LTTE sea Tiger Torpedos captured by Lanka Army during clearing ops near Putththuku.http://www.flickr.com/photos/36169878@N07/3717712525/

State of the Art

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the pioneer in maritime terrorism with a state-of-the-art maritime terrorist organization. With its maritime terrorist arm called the ‘Sea Tigers’, LTTE was successful in destroying a large number of Sri Lankan naval vessels and personnel and effectively gained sea control in waters off Jaffna before the group was destroyed by the Sri Lankan armed forces in 2009. LTTE also operated its own merchant fleet for regular supply of arms, ammunitions and other materials including contraband. The Sea Tiger unit was under the command of Col. Soosai, who was killed in a military encounter along with the leader of the group, Velupillai Prabhakaran in May 2009. Its merchant crafts were operated under the leadership of Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumram a.k.a KP, who was arrested in August 2009 in Thailand.

Arose Out of Necessity

LTTE maritime organization was product of sheer necessity. The LTTE had a strong support base in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu which was separated from its operational area in north-eastern parts of Sri Lanka by sea. During the initial years, the group depended on fast dinghies to transport personnel and on the slower fishing vessels to transport logistics. However these vessels which were armed only with small-arms and grenades were of no match against the Sri Lanka Navy which by the mid 80’s was equipped with faster and better armed patrol crafts such as the Dvora and Super Dvora. It was to counter this threat that LTTE formed the Sea Tiger Unit in 1984.
Having lost New Delhi’s support following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, LTTE was forced to move and expand its operations to other locations such as Burma and Thailand. The LTTE also began building its own ships and smaller vessels along the coast of the Wanni region by this time. In the 1993 Yal Devi military offensive, government forces were able to confiscate up to 500 boats from the LTTE’s Kilali boatyard.

Four Types of Fibre Glass Boat Attacks

By 1995 LTTE had developed four types of fibre glass boats for attack functions. These are

1. the 45kt Thrikka, with four crew, a single machine-gun and used for deploying frogmen;
2. the 10kt Sudai, manned by a crew of six, armed with a single machine-gun and used for attacks against naval craft;
3. the 45kt Muraj, with 10 crew and three machine guns, used for attacks against naval craft, logistics and for landing attack teams; and
4. the two-man Idayan, a 45kt suicide craft fitted with explosives that detonate on impact with the target.

Apart from various types of attack crafts, LTTE also acquired commercial vessels for transportation of goods and weapons. In 1984, the LTTE acquired a second hand cargo vessel called M.V. Cholan from a Mumbai based shipping magnate for the purpose of transporting arms and other military equipment as using charted ships had become too much of a risk by this time. It was also around this period that the group ordered the construction of another vessel from a shipbuilding Yard in the Kerala (India) coast By 2004 the LTTE was estimated to have around 10 freighters under “Pan – Ho – Lib” (Panama, Honduras, Libya) flags.



Photo: 2007 Navy destroyed three LTTE ships MV Manyoshi, MV Kyoshi and MV Seshin within 24 hours. http://www.nation.lk/2007/09/16/militarym.htm

Tsunami Effects

In December 2004, the Asian Tsunami devastated a significant part of the LTTE controlled areas. The actual extent of the damage incurred by the LTTE, especially damages to its maritime assets is difficult to ascertain as accounts vary drastically. According to news sources, the main Sea Tiger base in Mullaitivu including a part of its fleet was destroyed. Another report estimated that the Tsunami devastated the main Sea Tigers base at Mullaitivu, four radar stations, 200 Sea Tiger boats, as well as another 4500 boats which were operated by sympathetic fishermen. However, LTTE itself refuted these reports stating that losses were not so significant. It is to be noted that LTTE used to keep boats in trailers hidden deep in the jungles which would mean that the damage could not be as high as it was speculated.

The Sea Tigers

Photo: 2008 Col. Soosai, Liberation Tigers special commander of the Sea Tigers, addressing a gathering in Puthukkudiyiruppu. http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/01/chief-of-lttes-military-intelligence.html

Offensive Operations and Supply Support Operations

The Sea Tiger Unit’s functions were reflective of those of a conventional navy. It had two major functions: offensive operations and supply support operations. Combat or offensive operations were focused on eroding Sri Lankan navy’s capabilities thereby preventing it from interfering with LTTE combat or supply operations. A sub-unit called the “Black Sea Tigers” was entrusted with carrying out suicide attacks while other units undertook underwater operations.

Photo: LTTE Sea Tigers cadre transport. Google Images.

Supply Routes

Supply support units are tasked with keeping LTTE supply routes safe for cargo transportation as well as acting as escorts to boats carrying cargo to shore. Most of these operations took place in the waters that link north-eastern Sri Lanka with Southeast Asia. Since the group did not have ports to accommodate cargo ships, the cargo was being unloaded to fast moving logistics crafts which were protected by several fast attack crafts (FACs).

Do Not Engage in Battle Unless Absolutely Necessary

Even though the Sea Tiger vessels had the capacity to outrun SLN patrol boats, they used to cluster together in order to appear as a single blip on the radar screen. When approaching the coast the FACs would move away from the logistics craft. The FACs would engage and attempt to drive away SLN crafts trying to intercept them. Unlike in combat operations, the Sea Tigers usually preferred not to engage in battles when performing escort duties. However if an LTTE vessel was intercepted it would not hesitate to engage in a long gun battle aimed at harassing and exhausting the SLN boat’s ammunition. Photo: SLN patrol boat Super Dvora-II. http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-photos-multimedia/42900-sri-lanka-navy-pictures-new-2.html

Size and Tactics

Usually, the Sea Tigers operated in squadrons of three boats each. When engaging with the SLN its aim was to isolate one of the SLN crafts and destroy it, usually by firing at the outboard motors. These tactics which were used by the Sea Tigers mirror exactly those of the SLN. Photo: 2009 Captured LTTE boat used by Tamil Tiger rebels, at a hide out in the No Fire Zone in Puttumattalan, in Putukudiyiruppu area about 240 kilometers (150 miles) northeast of Colombo, Sri Lanka. http://www.flickr.com/photos/36169878@N07/3481320700/

Assistance and Combat Functions

The Sea Tigers also play a vital role in the LTTE’s land operations where they help transporting troops to combat locations when land routes are unavailable. They also help in rescuing cadres who are trapped in military controlled areas. The role of the Sea Tigers was noteworthy during LTTE operations to recapture Mullaitivu in 1996 and to capture the Elephant Pass complex in 2000. In the latter instance, the Sea Tigers were instrumental in transporting 1500 troops on to the Jaffna peninsula which was the turning point of the battle which caused the Sri Lankan army to retreat and subsequently surrender.
 

The attack on the Trincomalee naval base in October 2000 was one of the most important Sea Tiger operations in which the group was able to sink a naval boat and damage others after a three hour long firefight which took place in a high security zone. A Jane’s Intelligence Review analysis of a video of the same attack identified eight distinctly different speedboat types where it is believed that the LTTE had attempted at using stealth technology. The analysis however could not estimate the efficiency of the stealth design. While it was initially speculated that the designs may have originated in North Korea, subsequently it was determined that these were indigenous creations.

Hijacking

The Sea Tigers periodically hijacked ships and fishing vessels that were passing through their waters. Hijackings were carried out irrespective of the nationality of the victim. Most of the hijackings were for financial gains or to recoup supplies including food grains. Some examples of such hijackings were: Irish Mona (August 1995), Princess Wave (August 1996), Athena (May 1997), Misen (July 1997), Morong Bong (1997). In September 1997 MV Cordiality was attacked from several angles while it was anchored near Trincomalee and was unloading 29000 tons of ilmenite. The Princes Kash which was heading towards Mullaitivu was attacked in August 1998. The Sri Lanka Air Force bombed the vessel to prevent the LTTE from confiscating the cargo. In September 1999 several Indian fishermen were taken hostage by the LTTE. The group demanded a ransom of gasoline, diesel, and battery oil from the Indian government in exchange of the hostages.

Photo: 2006 MV Farah III in the hands of Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka. http://www.marinebuzz.com/2009/05/18/sea-piracy-mv-farah-iii-in-the-hands-of-sea-tigers-of-sri-lanka/

Notable Hijacking By the LTTE

• MV Irish Mona – August 1995
• MV Princess Wave – August 1996
• MV Athena – May 1997
• MV Misen – July 1997
• MV Morang Bong – July 1997
• MV Cordiality – September 1997
• MV Princess Kash – August 1988
• MV Sik Yang – reported missing May 25, 1999
• MV Farah III – December 2006 – crew members were released

Suicide Operations: the Black Sea Tigers

Photo: 2008 captured LTTE suicide boat seen floating in the Northern seas. http://www.spur.asn.au/chronology_of_suicide_bomb_attacks_by_Tamil_Tigers_in_sri_Lanka.htm


The Black Sea Tiger unit which was responsible for suicide missions was established in
1990 to compensate for the technological superiority of the Sri Lanka Navy. On 10 July 1990 it carried out its first suicide attack against the Sri Lankan navy’s command ship Edithara off the coast of Valvettiturai. The unit’s importance for the group could be judged from the fact that of the 273 Black Tigers that have died in various operations, 194 were from the Black Sea Tigers. Of this 56 were female Black Sea Tigers. Using deception and elements of surprise, the Black Sea Tigers became a highly lethal weapon against the Sri Lanka Navy.

Type of Crafts

The unit used a variety of crafts such as SBS – Type Arrows, torpedo riders similar in design to those used during WW II and speed racing style boats. It also used logistics crafts, modified FGB – type vessels as well as fishing trawlers for attacks that were carried out in seas further away from the shore. Photo: 2009 Sri Lanka Navy Arrow SBS, 7 special Boat squad craft armed w/14.5mm,.50cal & 40mm grenade launchers. 

Swarm Tactics

The Black Sea Tiger attacks were usually conducted in groups of three boats with one acting as the command craft. The unit also used “swarm” tactics where several attack crafts, (combination of 5-10 suicide and non- suicide vessels), move at high speed towards a single Sri Lankan Navy craft. Identifying and engaging the LTTE boats would require close-range gunnery situations and even then it is almost impossible to engage and destroy all the attacking vessels. The unit outfitted its small high-speed boats with detonation devices known as “explosive horns” that served to explode on impact with ships and other sea borne targets.

Underwater Operations

Mines, Reconnaissance, and Operations

The LTTE also had an underwater unit which was responsible for infiltrating harbours to lay mines, conducting reconnaissance operations and recovering material from vessels that were sunk in combat. The Sea Tigers developed improvised mines from everyday household objects such as rice cookers. Free floating mines were also used (e.g. inside the Trincomalee harbour) which were generally equipped with about 6 horns to prevent accidental detonation while floating. In its early years (1990s) the mines used by the Sea Tigers were detonated remotely from shore, especially around Kilali which is the southern end of the Jaffna peninsula. Prior to that in the mid 1980’s the Sea Tigers used diving equipment for these purposes. However release of air bubbles to the surface revealed the divers’ positions which resulted in several Sea Tigers being killed. Following this the LTTE purchased “re-breather” kits which allowed them to investigate the hull of berthed SLN vessels without leaving any signature. The group was exploring to purchase Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) - small submersible “tugs”- which increase the swimmer’s range and carrying capacity.

Mines

In June 2006, 5 Sea Tigers were arrested by Sri Lankan police while laying mines off the shore of Wennappuwa (60km north of Colombo). The mines were a new type of improvised devices which the authorities believe was developed by the LTTE. The mines were similar to limpet mines and were designed to stick magnetically to the ship’s hull. Each mine weighed between 10-15kg and could be triggered to explode by a time – delay fuse or be made to explode remotely. The expertise to design and manufacture the mines could have been developed by LTTE on its own, though there were allegations that in the past India provided some form of training to boost group’s overall capabilities.

Semi-Submersibles

The Sea Tigers also developed a semi-submersible “human torpedo” to carry out suicide operations underwater. The explosives charge carried by these suicide scooters varied from 25kg to 50kg. The vehicle was powered by a 2 - horsepower outboard motor which was quiet and gave a maximum speed of five knots. Equipped with diving gear the single operator would either stay with the craft or drop away. Slowly approaching the target, the Sea Tiger could either accelerate the craft when it was about 100 – 200 meters away from the target or stop the engine and push the craft into the target. The sinking of the Sri Lankan naval Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Nayaru on the Mullaitivu coast in March 2008 was attributed to an attack by a human torpedo. Although the propensity of such a craft making a successful attack during day time was low, the devises were difficult to be detected visually or on radar as they remained semi submersed. Even if it was spotted, as with all other Sea Tiger suicide missions, there was very little response time available to the target to intercept.

Submarines

LTTE was also attempting to gain a full submersible capability. According to some reports, the outfit was trying to purchase mini-submarines from North Korea and South Africa but there was no evidence of these purchases. However in April 2000 it was discovered that the LTTE was making attempts at building a submarine in Phuket, Thailand. The arrest of Christy Reginold Lawrence (former member of the Norwegian Special Forces) revealed that the LTTE was in the process of building its own mini submarine. Its hull was 3.6 metres with the tail designed to hold a 1.6 metre long propeller. The total length of the craft was 5.2 metres and could hold two persons. This could have been used to launch divers to swim underwater and attach mines or explosives or possibly to lunch torpedoes like conventional submarines.

Attacks

May 2006 saw the first of several significant attacks where a vessel carrying 700 soldiers including several monitors from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was attacked by the Sea Tigers. The Navy was able to defend against the attack but lost 17 sailors and 2 Dvora crafts in the battle. Since fighting resumed in August 2006, the Sri Lanka Navy had successive triumphs over the LTTE where Navy crafts effectively engaged and destroyed rebel boats. In September 2006 alone there were two significant attacks against the Sea Tigers: on 2 September the Navy destroyed 12 LTTE boats (believed to be heading towards the Kakasanthurai Naval Base) off the coast of Point Pedro while on 25 September 2006, 11 Sea Tiger boats were destroyed off the coast of Trincomalee. A retaliatory suicide attack was carried out in October 2006 against the Dakshina Naval base in the southern city of Galle just two days after a suicide attack (on land) which killed over 100 unarmed sailors in Habarana. Between March to October 2007, the Sri Lankan navy also destroyed 9 merchant vessels of the LTTE, effectively cutting off its supply line. Throughout 2008 and early 2009, the military successfully captured all of the major Sea Tiger bases in Chundikulam, Kaddaikadu, Thalaidi, Champianpattu, Mullaittivu (Vadduval), Chemmalai And Alampil, areas which were located along the eastern and north-eastern coast. The Sea Tigers also lost several of their boat launching pads in both the eastern and western coasts including its main base in Chalai, along the north-eastern coast. The Sri Lankan armed forces recovered a significant number craft and other maritime equipment of the Sea Tigers which highlights the level of sophistication of the group. One of the most important recoveries involved three underwater vehicles from the Udayarkattukulam area in Mullaitivu. There were also three other smaller underwater vehicles which were under construction. In addition, troops also recovered three suicide boats and a large haul of LTTE maritime equipment from the area. The largest underwater vehicle found was about 35 feet long and armour plated.

Victory

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan forces declared complete victory on LTTE with the killing of Prabhakaran and other top leadership of the group. The government forces overran all the LTTE held areas and destroyed the entire infrastructure of the group.Though there is a concern that some LTTE members may still be hiding, there is no chance that the group can revive its maritime infrastructure.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Terrorist and Pirate

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has strong roots to the banditry/pirate culture of the region. Primarily based in the Basilan Island in the Philippines, the group is composed of several semi-autonomous factions each based on a different island or archipelago. Most of its units are led by veterans of the Afghan jihad. It is known to have conducted attacks around the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the Southern Philippines, East Malaysia, and Indonesian Kalimantan. The group also conducts maritime weapon smuggling operations as far away as in Sulawesi and Maluku in Indonesia. The group is considered a major threat to Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the East Timor Sea. ASG leader Nadzmi Sabdullah,“Commander Global,” planned many maritime operations including the kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001. Similarly, Galib Andang, “Commander Robot,” led the 2000 Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid. ASG also claimed responsibility for the bombing of Davao City port on 2 April 2003, which killed at least 16 people and injured 55. The explosion was apparently timed to maximize casualties at a time when the wharf was most busy with two passenger ships - Filipina Princess and Superferry 15 – were boarding/discharging passengers. The bombing of the Superferry 14 in February 2004 was ASG’s maritime spectacular.
Photo: 2001 Nadzmi Sabdullah alias Commander "Global", one of the top leaders of the Abu Sayyaf and the brain of all the bandit's kidnapping activities was captured Friday in General Santos City.

SuperFerry 14 was a large passenger ferry which was bombed with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on 27 February 2004. The ship was en route to Bacolod City in the southern Philippines and was cruising between Corregidor and El Fraile Island, outside of the Manila harbor when the bomb went off on or about 12:30 AM. The blast and a subsequent fire killed at least 116 people. The leader of the ASG claimed responsibility for the attack, specifically referring to “Passenger 51” of the Blue Room or Blue Cabin who carried out the mission. Janjalani cited the failure of the ship’s owners to pay “taxes” as the reason behind the bombing. However, another ASG leader Abu Solaiman claimed that it was a revenge for violence inflicted upon Muslims by the Philippine military.

Coastal Operations Proficient

ASG is highly proficient in conducting brown (riverine) and green (coastal and archipelagic) water operations during both night and day. However its blue water capability is limited. It lacks the maritime logistics necessary to sustain extended operations in high seas. According to an estimate of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) about 26 city ports and anchorages including Manila are vulnerable to attacks by the ASG.

Primary Vehicle of Choice: Speedboats

The ASG operates speedboats, mostly wooden crafts with minimal freeboard, multiple outboard engines, and shallow draft. The boats are stealthy, fast, and able to easily navigate reefs and swamps; many are armed with machine guns and capable of outrunning the naval vessels. Some reports suggest that the group contracted or acquired ships that can navigate long distances. ASG maritime forces have used assault rifles, hand guns, grenade launchers, and RPGs, which would indicate that the group does not have a weapons inventory specifically meant for maritime use. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has reported that the ASG uses night-vision devices, thermal imagers, sniper scopes, various types of commercial radio, satellites and cellular phones for its maritime operations. At sea, ASG forces strike with speed and violence similar to ambushes and hit and run tactics on land. They evade capture by using their fast, shallow draft boats to outrun government forces and disappear into the littoral reefs and swamps. For smuggling operations the group typically uses small fast boats or conceals contraband in local barter trade craft. ASG avoids using larger craft because it is easier to detect and harder to avade capture.


Piracy as Camouflage


The ASG is regarded the best as among the terrorist groups in Southeast Asia at its capability to use piracy both as a camouflage to wage maritime terrorist attacks and as a means to fund terrorist ventures. However, most of the maritime attacks conducted by the group are kidnapping for ransom operations, except the February 2004 bombing of the Superferry 14. The maritime attacks of the ASG are seen as a way to finace the group’s objective of establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao. Maritime kidnapping operations were carried out as a means to raise funds from ransom payments which the organization used to buy firearms and explosives for its terrorist activities. The ASG has also said that the maritime attacks it carried out were the group’s reaction to the continuing military offensives against Muslims in southern Philippines.

Photo: M/V Doulos before attack, location and date unknown. http://www.ssmaritime.net/Doulos-concluding-days-2008-2010.htm

Historical Attacks

Despite limited capability, the ASG has repeatedly demonstrated its propensity for maritime attacks. In fact, one of its first attacks was maritime related. On 24 August 1991, the ASG bombed the M/V Doulos, a Christian missionary ship and floating library which was docked at the Zamboanga Port. Two foreign missionaries were killed and eight others were wounded in the bombing. Many analysts believed that the attack was made purely for political reasons as the ASG claimed that the bombing was a reaction of the group to the military offensives in Mindanao.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Photo: c.1998 Moro Islamic Liberation Front training grounds.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippines. Inhabiting what is locally called the Bangsamoro homeland of which the island of Mindanao is the largest, the Moros are fighting for a separate homeland for the Muslims in the southern Philippines. According to the Philippines military, thr MILF and the ASG have conducted a number of operations together, including MILF providing safe haven and training to ASG members. However, the MILF has consistently refuted these allegations.

Abilities

In pursuit of its objectives, MILF has conducted numerous attacks against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the police infrastructure in the country. The group has also used its land capabilities to conduct operations in the maritime domain. It is highly skilled at using IEDs with electronic detonators, and has proven its ability to use these devices against maritime targets such as ports and ferries. MILF is capable of brown (riverine) and green (coastal and archipelagic) water operations. Its maritime activities are routine logistics operations; to smuggle people, carry supplies, and weapons. MILF’s blue water capability is extremely limited. Although its forces are able to venture onto the high seas beyond the Philippine/Indonesian archipelago under certain weather conditions, they lack the maritime logistics necessary to sustain extended operations.


MILF’s maritime operations include:

1. Use of maritime craft for smuggling and general transportation,
2. Small battles between government forces and MILF in which one or both units were waterborne.
3. Attacks on inter-island ferries and in seaports using sophisticated IED’s have likely been the work of MILF. These attacks have been timed to both cripple infrastructure and maximize causalities.

Shallow-Draft Boats

When operating in the maritime environment, MILF cadres either attempt to avoid detection by appearing innocuous or evade government forces by using their fast, shallow-draft boats to outrun government forces and disappear into the littoral reefs and swamps. Although MILF has been known to kidnap individuals for ransom in the past, it has renounced such tactics as forbidden by the Quran. In March 2002, MILF leader Salamat Hashim (now deceased) announced that MILF would take drastic action against those who conduct kidnapping in its territories. The MILF has also publicly distanced itself from activities such as sabotage, assassination, and piracy. 

Connections with Other Groups

Reports suggest that the MILF,Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al Qaeda have all planned or executed maritime operations and are likely to have shared maritime strategies, tactics and/or equipment with each other. The 2003 bombings in Davao City, including the bombing of a sea port, were said to be the product of the MILF-JI alliance. The MILF has denied it has ties with the JI but police and military intelligence believe that it provided JI with training facilities in areas they control.

Piracy Connections

The MILF allegedly has affiliations with regional pirate gangs and smuggling syndicates operating in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. It also avails of protective services from corrupt elements of the Philippine Navy for the valuable shipments of arms and goods.

High Profile Attacks

The MILF was implicated in one of the high profile maritime attacks on 20 February 2000, when two IEDs hidden in coaches being carried by Our Lady Mediatrix, a Philippine ferry, exploded when the ship was docked in Ozamiz City. The blast and ensuing fire killed 52 people and wounded 42. The group was also implicated in the April 2003 bombing of the Davao City Sasa Wharf, the main dock for Davao City where cargo ships and passenger ferries land. The bomb detonated at a barbecue stand near the wharf killed 17 people and wounded almost 60 others. Several members of the MILF and the ASG were arrested for their involvement in the bombing. However, the MILF denied any involvement in the bombing.

Photo: Port of Ozamiz City. 

Peace Talks

Since the late 1990s, the MILF has been in peace negotiations with the Philippine government. Although the talks have been punctuated with hiccups on both sides, the MILF is concentrating on establishing its credibility as the rightful representative of the Bangsamoro homeland by refraining from violence and criminality. Hence, its activities, including its maritime adventures have been scaled down to the minimum.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

 Photo: The rebels of Free Aceh Movement are fighting for an independent
Islamic state from Indonesia.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia’s Aceh province was notorious for its maritime activities. The group strove for an independent nationhood for itself. However, weakened by sustained operations by the Indonesian military and the Tsunami of December 2004, the group settled down for autonomy within the framework of the Indonesian constitution. In August 2005 it signed a peace agreement to that effect and subsequently formed government in the province after being successful in the elections. 

Image: Map of Strait of Malacca.

Strait of Malacca

The Indonesian province of Aceh is located at the northern tip of Sumatra island. It covers an area of 57,366 km including more than one hundred small islands stretching out along its western coast. The littoral zone is dominated by islets, mangrove swamps, reefs, and small coves which provide a favourable environment for irregular maritime warfare and smuggling. Aceh is also at the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca, an important sea traffic lane with about 50,000 vessels transiting the strait in a year.[1] About 25 percent of the world's crude oil is carried through the Strait of Malacca. This volume is expected to triple by 2010. The waters are under-policed and prone to maritime violence. In fact Indonesian waters account for largest number of the world’s total piracy incidents.[2] The Acehnese have relied on smuggling, piracy, and maritime crime as a source livelihood for more than one thousand years. In the 19^th century Acehnese pirates regularly attacked passing merchants which brought them into conflict with Western navies. Since then the Acehnese have fiercely resisted the control of the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian forces. Smuggling and maritime combat have been at the forefront of these conflicts. Aceh also has rich natural gas fields. GAM regarded Aceh’s maritime environment and natural gas fields as interlocking resources and key to their prosperity.

Not Capable of Deep Water Combat

GAM used to operate in the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore straits, West Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma) and ventured into the Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka. GAM was capable of brown water (riverine) and green water (coastal) operations. Although GAM maritime craft could cross the high seas, they were not capable of blue water combat operations.

Types of Watercraft Used

GAM mariners used tug boats, speed boats, fishing boats, and traditional wooden craft. Its maritime activities included operations to smuggle people, weapons, supplies, and information for use in the broader struggle. It also used its maritime infrastructure to target Indonesian officials and international petroleum company facilities/personnel working in Aceh and its vicinity. GAM was also accused of conducting piracy and maritime kidnapping in order to raise funds. Teams attacking ships used to operate in groups of two or three boats. They typically approached transiting vessels and demanded for the ship to stop. In some cases, they have fired on the ship’s pilothouse in order to persuade the crew to surrender.

Piracy and Smuggling

GAM had extensive contacts with smuggling syndicates (narcotics, people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and pirate gangs operating across the Strait of Malacca. It had sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang, Malaysia and Islamic mariners in Southern Thailand especially the ones belonging to the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), an insurgent group fighting for an independent state in Southern Thailand. In September 2001, in a statement to the Associated Press, GAM spokesman Tengku Ishak Daud, asked all ships transiting the Strait of Malacca to request protection from GAM. It has also claimed credit for attacks on crafts used to service offshore petroleum facilities. In addition, GAM has been accused of pirating international shipping in the Strait of Malacca. The accusation seemed to be supported by the drastic reduction in piracy in Indonesian waters after the Tsunami. The tsunami severely damaged the coastal fishing villages, or kampongs, from which the attacks are launched. It is also possible that many members engaged in piracy have died in the tsunami.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Photo: 2009 Oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island. 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Southeast Asian regional terrorist group that came to limelight with October 2002 attacks in Bali does not have a dedicated maritime organization. But it has used the maritime domain extensively, especially for sending its recruits from Indonesia for training in camps in the Philippines. JI also conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi Naval Base. Since 2005, increasing evidence of coordination among the terrorist groups in the region – between JI, Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)- have emerged. It was alleged that the attack on SuperFerry 14 in February 2004, was a joint operation involving JI, ASG and Raja Sulaiman Movement – a group gaining increasing visibility in the region.
Photo: 2007 Changi Naval Base.

Al-Qaeda

Photo: 2008 Al Shabaab Pitates are using two Mother Ships to off load speed boats to capture ships in the Gulf of Aden and around the Somalia coast line. Al Shabaab has links to al Qaeda. Later in 2008 al Shabaab seized a the Russian cargo ship Faina carrying 33 Russinan tanks.http://www.billwarnerpi.com/2008_09_21_archive.html

The Sea Star

Although there is no consensus about the estimate or even the existence of Al-Qaeda’s maritime fleet, the group’s intention as well as the capability to target maritime assets is well documented. Osama bin Laden himself reportedly owned a ship named Seastar purchased by Wadih El- Hage, his personal assistant, in 1994. According to Barwill Agencies in Sudan, which was hired to load and unload the cargoes, the ship worked the waters of the Red Sea carrying sesame and watermelon seeds and carried cement between Port Sudan and Aqaba, in Jordan. The proceeds of the operation supported Al-Qaeda while Osama was in Sudan. Seastar sank of the coast of Oman in 2000 when owned by a Norwegian company.

Targets of Opportunity

When Al Qaeda’s chief of naval operations- Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda Al-Nashiri, nicknamed “Prince of the Sea” was arrested in the United Arab Emirates, a 180-page file listing “targets of opportunity,” was in his possession. The list which contained plans to attack naval vessels and large cruise liners etc., reinforced concerns about plans of terrorists’ to attack against maritime assets. Al-Nashiri worked with Tawfiq bin Attash, known as Khallad, a principal planner of USS Cole attack. Khallad attended the January 2000 Al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in which plans for the September 2001 attacks and attacks against USS Cole and other maritime targets including those in Southeast Asia were discussed.
Similarly, as per documents recovered in Afghanistan from the house of Mohammad Atef, Al-Qaeda’s commander of military operations, Al-Qaeda had developed detailed instructions on diving including the use of diving equipments for military functions. The manual invoked verses from Quran to stimulate interest in maritime operations especially attacks involving deep sea diving. As a postscript, the manual noted;

“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam. And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war (tanks, planes missiles, artillery).”

Ignorance of Water Transportation

However, an analysis of the document makes it quite evident that, the training procedure and the equipments discussed in the manual were of a very basic nature. It betrayed ignorance about underwater transportation capabilities, techniques of diving, medical effects and the amount of training necessary to reach the level of professional civilian divers, not to speak of cutting edge operational combat divers.

Marine Terrorism, A Strategic Requirement from Jihad Press (Excerpts)

The Jewish-Crusade campaign hasn’t been left except at the sea, where they roam about and move fearlessly. The armed battalions near the Yemeni coasts have started targeting, since more than an year, fishing for the trade, tourist and petroleum ships one after the other, and now it has become important at this phase, for the Mujahideen and they are running a worldwide battle to revive the Caliphate and rule the world by it, the next step should be to control the sea and the sea loopholes starting from around the Arabian peninsula.

The Mujahideen in Yemen succeeded in targeting Jewish-Crusade targets twice on the sea, the first was preparation for the blessed raids of New York and Washington by targeting the USS Cole in October 2000, and then the petroleum transferring vessel of France, Lamburg- in 2002.

And with the approach of the hour of decisiveness .. it becomes necessary to complicate the battle towards the waters, and just like the Mujahideen have succeeded in setting up martyrdom units on land, the waters remain an important strategic step over dominating the world and returning the Islamic Caliphate.

According to US and European intelligence sources, between fifteen and fifty cargo freighters could be owned or operated by Al-Qaeda. A report in September 2003 described the creation of Al-Qaeda’s naval fleet with ships capable of carrying cargoes of lethal chemicals, a “dirty bomb” or even a nuclear weapon. The ships, the sales of which were traced by the British MI6 and CIA with the help of Lloyds of London and which carry the flags of Yemen and Somalia were believed to be somewhere in the Indian or Pacific oceans after they left their home ports in the Horn of Africa. However, there is no independent confirmation.


Hadits of the prophet on jihad at sea in Ibn Majah book of hadits known as Sunan Ibn Majah

• “One battle at sea equals ten battles on the land. Those who become seasick [during sea expedition] get similar reward of a wounded fighter in the path of Allah.”
• “… one who obtains martyrdom at sea is equal to two martyrs on the land. …”
• “…Allah delegates the tasks of taking life to the angels of death except the life of martyrs at sea. He took it Himself. Allah forgive the sins of the martyrs on land except his debt but for martyrs at sea, forgiveness of all sins including his debt.”

Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable interest among the jihadi community about the attacks involving the maritime sector. This strategy has repeatedly been discussed in postings in a number of jihadi websites. For example, in September 2008, an article entitled “Marine Terrorism – A Strategic Requirement” was posted to the English language section of the al-Ekhlass website, an Arabic language jihadist website. The author acknowledged that it has now become necessary to expand the battle to the sea (water) and “just like the Mujahideen have succeeded in setting up martyrdom units on land, the waters remain an important strategic step for dominating the world and returning the Islamic Caliphate.” In another posting Al-Qaeda strategist al-Qureishi published a document entitled “the return of al-Qaeda’s navy” suggesting that al-Qaeda utilize more maritime attacks for strategic reasons.

Piracy and Terrorism

Image: 2011 Path of two ships, MS Dover and SV ING, before hijacking by Somali pirates. 


There is considerable ambivalence about the so-called nexus between piracy and terrorism. There is much apprehension that terrorists could team up with pirates to carryout maritime attacks. This is due to an increase in number of piracy incidents in the same part of the world as well as the changing nature of the attacks. According to conventional wisdom a piracy-terrorism nexus could bridge the gap between the intentions of the terrorist groups and their maritime capabilities.

Southeast Asia

Until Somali pirates stole the limelight, the Southeast Asian waters have always ranked high in terms of reported piracy incidents. Out of a total of 2375 piracy incidents worldwide between 1991 and 2001 reported to the ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1567 (66%) incidents occurred in the waters of Southeast Asia. In 2002-2005, similarly, the number of reported incidents was the highest in Southeast Asia in comparison to the rest of the world. During that period, the Strait of Malacca, one of the most critical sea lanes of communication reported very high incidence of piracy which prompted the Lloyds of London to make a stiff hike in Insurance premium for the cargo and vessels transiting this route. Piracy was also very high on the Indonesian waters during that period. Similarly, some of the most violent pirate attacks took place in the territorial waters off Bangladesh with almost seventy-five percent of these attacks taking place in harbour or port areas.

Strait of Malacca

It was not only the number but also the nature of piracy attacks became a matter of concern for the littoral (on or near the shore) as well as user states. Attacks on vessels especially in the Strait of Malacca and in waters off Bangladesh for example, were carried out with almost military precision using sophisticated weapons and techniques. Attacks on ships by pirates increasingly resembled military operations - getting more violent, more frequent and more organized. In many cases such as with the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in March 2003 off Indonesian waters, pirates boarded, robbed and piloted the vessels for a period of time in the Strait of Malacca. According to some observers, it was “possible that these could be rehearsals [by terrorists for maritime attacks].” A number of tug boats and barges, which were hijacked, remained unaccounted for. Many of the crews taken hostage went missing. These developments led to the concern that terrorists may be having some hands-on “driver training” by piloting the vessels themselves or getting the kidnapped crew to teach how to master the navigation of large commercial vessels. The hijacked tugboats and barges could be used as floating bombs targeting other vessels, key installations, naval bases or port facilities. Tugboats and barges manoeuvring among the bigger ships to load or unload cargo are a common sight in the straits and in port areas. That would make them ideal cover for acts of terrorism.

Africa

Since 2006, the action seems to have moved towards the African coasts as can be seen from the following:

Piracy 2006-2008

(Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2006, 2007 and 2008)

Gulf of Aden

It is evident that the epi-centre of piracy has moved to the waters off Africa especially the Gulf of Aden. Somali pirates have earned particular notoriety in piracy even though pirates from Nigeria and Yemen have joined the act. But, in all most all cases, these are pure criminal acts designed to make money from kidnapping or hijacking. According to an estimate, pirates collected a sum of $40 million in ransom payments in 2008. The attacks nearly doubled in the first quarter of 2009, even as the response from the international community against piracy intensified. Though there is a concern that some of the money collected by the pirates could be getting into the hands of the extremist groups operating in Nigeria or Somalia, a direct connection between the piracy and terrorism has not been evident yet.




Piracy & Terrorism Nexus?

Photo: Somali pirates in small boats hijack the mv Faina, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine, on September 25, 2008. 

Possible Convergence

Given the number and the nature of pirate attacks and the volatile political climate in particular regions, which are hospitable to terrorism, a convergence between piracy and terrorism could be a possibility. Nevertheless, no clear consensus about a direct nexus between the pirates and the terrorists has emerged so far. Many analysts argue that the growing terrorist problem in some regions provides “the background conditions that are necessary for this convergence to take place.” Under these conditions, pirates could “contract out” their services to hijack ships which could then be used to smuggle weapons and personnel or cause a collision to block critical shipping lanes – a plot consistent with jihadists’ economic warfare strategy against the Western capitalist system. Just as al Qaeda is subcontracting or outsourcing many of its drug efforts to the Taliban – it seems a natural progression to use work-for-hire pirates as contract labor as well.

Motives Different

Others are however, skeptical about whether pirates would partner terrorists or vice versa for business and fundamentalist reasons respectively. Acts of piracy and terrorism are not interchangeable as their motives are different. As Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-general of IMO put it, “although criminals and terrorists may operate in similar ways, terrorists aim to use their violence in pursuit of strategic objectives, and all too frequently, mass destruction.” It would thus be difficult to accept that the criminal entrepreneurs engaged in acts of piracy would be willing to team up with terrorists for acts of political violence. For the pirates this could be counterproductive for their profession. It may however be possible that terrorist could learn the tricks of the trade from the pirates to build up their capability in the maritime sector. Thus piracy could more of vulnerability, one that can be exploited by the terrorists.

Photo: 2010 Fv Golden Wave, a South Korean fishing vessel, was seized by Somali pirates. In 2011 the vessel was released.

Terrorists

Maritime terrorism is thus a low probability threat with medium consequences. As discussed above, maritime capabilities of the terrorists vary significantly. After the demise of the LTTE, there is probably no group that possesses a dedicated maritime terrorist organization. Even though many groups have maritime capabilities, not all necessarily have maritime terrorist capabilities. This is largely because; traditionally terrorists groups as well as terrorists themselves are “land lubbers” and tend to be tactically conservative. They resort to tried and trusted methods and opt for the course that offers least difficulties. Land-based targets or targets involving the aviation sector offer leverage both in terms of greater ease of access and higher visibility. Due to resource constraints many groups may also use their maritime capabilities for support functions only – for movement of men and materials and to make money – and may not be disposed to conduct maritime terrorist operations. Similarly, the consequence of a maritime terrorist attack is of limited nature and duration unless terrorists manage to use nuclear or radiological weapons, the possibility of which remains remote. However, the threat of maritime terrorism exposes the many weakened spots of the maritime system (such as container inspection) that can be exploited by the terrorists even though the target of those attacks need not be an maritime asset.

Networking, Training and Technology

Nevertheless, the threat to maritime assets from these groups, remain because of continuing networking, training and transfer of technology among the groups and the inherent nature of terrorism itself to change and adapt quickly. For example, in 2005, the Philippines and the Indonesian authorities discovered how ASG was enhancing its underwater capabilities with two JI members as trainers, teaching them on scuba diving and underwater demolition skills. Upon completion of the training, the graduates would have been deployed in groups to conduct underwater bombings against seaports and vessels in Mindanao. These capabilities could be replicated elsewhere. Besides, the terrorist groups have kept pace with changing technologies and have adapted themselves to counter- measures in maritime defence. Consequently, terrorists now have the capability to disrupt maritime enterprise and threaten the peaceful use of the seas.

By: Coskun UNAL and TRAC